*Necessity of counting on statute in pleading, and manner of doing so; 69 C. 210; 72 C. 159; 77 C. 569; 80 C. 434; 81 C. 626; it is better to refer to it in prayer for relief. 75 C. 696; 84 C. 47. It must appear that all terms have been complied with. 86 C. 568; 90 C. 527.
Cited. 35 CS 177.
Sec. 52-555. Actions for injuries resulting in death.
Sec. 52-556. Actions for injuries caused by motor vehicles owned by the state.
Sec. 52-557. Injury to children being transported to school.
Sec. 52-557a. Standard of care owed social invitee.
Sec. 52-557c. Standard of care applicable to owners and operators of school buses.
Sec. 52-557d. Defense of charitable immunity abolished.
Sec. 52-557f. Landowner liability for recreational use of land. Definitions.
Sec. 52-557g. Liability of owner of land available to public for recreation; exceptions.
Sec. 52-557h. Owner liable, when.
Sec. 52-557i. Obligation of user of land.
Sec. 52-557l. Immunity from liability of certain persons who donate food or distribute donated food.
Sec. 52-557o. Liability of land surveyors.
Sec. 52-557s. Liability of owner or keeper of horse, pony, donkey or mule.
Sec. 52-558. Liability for placing obstructions in highway.
Sec. 52-559. Damage for spreading fire.
Sec. 52-560. Damages for cutting trees, timber or shrubbery. Exclusion.
Sec. 52-561. Trespass to lands without color of right.
Sec. 52-561a. Damage by domestic fowls.
Sec. 52-562. Liability for fraud in contracting debt; concealing property.
Sec. 52-563. Liability for waste by tenant for life or years.
Sec. 52-563a. Transferred
Sec. 52-564. Treble damages for theft.
Sec. 52-564a. Liability for shoplifting.
Sec. 52-565. Double damages for forgery.
Sec. 52-566. Treble damages for wilful removal or destruction of bridge.
Sec. 52-567. Treble damages for injury to milestone, guidepost or railing.
Sec. 52-568. Damages for groundless or vexatious suit or defense.
Sec. 52-569. Damages for leaving open bars, gate or fence.
Sec. 52-570. Action for malicious erection of structure.
Sec. 52-570a. (Formerly Sec. 52-202). Action against fiduciary.
Sec. 52-570b. Action for computer-related offenses.
Sec. 52-570d. Action for illegal recording of private telephonic communications.
Sec. 52-571. Transferred
Sec. 52-571a. Action for deprivation of equal rights and privileges.
Sec. 52-571c. Action for damages resulting from intimidation based on bigotry or bias.
Sec. 52-571e. Action for damages resulting from actions of agent of surety on a bond.
Sec. 52-571f. Strict liability of person who illegally transfers a firearm.
Sec. 52-571g. Strict liability of person who fails to securely store a firearm.
Sec. 52-571h. Action for damages resulting from identity theft.
Sec. 52-571i. Action for damages resulting from trafficking in persons.
Secs. 52-571o to 52-571z. Reserved
Sec. 52-572. Parental liability for torts of minors.
Sec. 52-572a. Release by injured person voidable if obtained within fifteen days.
Sec. 52-572b. Alienation of affections and breach of promise actions abolished.
Sec. 52-572c. Parent-child immunity abrogated in certain negligence actions.
Sec. 52-572e. Release of joint tortfeasor.
Sec. 52-572f. Criminal conversation action abolished.
Sec. 52-572i. Application of the family car doctrine.
Sec. 52-572j. Derivative actions by shareholders or members.
Sec. 52-572k. Hold harmless clause against public policy in certain construction contracts.
Sec. 52-572m. Product liability actions. Definitions.
Sec. 52-572n. Product liability claims.
Sec. 52-572o. Comparative responsibility. Award of damages. Action for contribution.
Sec. 52-572p. Limitation of liability of product seller.
Sec. 52-572q. Liability of product seller due to lack of adequate warnings or instructions.
Sec. 52-572r. Product liability claims against third parties.
Secs. 52-572s to 52-572v. Reserved
Sec. 52-555. Actions for injuries resulting in death. (a) In any action surviving to or brought by an executor or administrator for injuries resulting in death, whether instantaneous or otherwise, such executor or administrator may recover from the party legally at fault for such injuries just damages together with the cost of reasonably necessary medical, hospital and nursing services, and including funeral expenses, provided no action shall be brought to recover such damages and disbursements but within two years from the date of death, and except that no such action may be brought more than five years from the date of the act or omission complained of.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, an action may be brought under this section at any time after the date of the act or omission complained of if the party legally at fault for such injuries resulting in death has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a violation of section 53a-54a, 53a-54b, 53a-54c, 53a-54d, 53a-55 or 53a-55a with respect to such death.
(1949 Rev., 8296; 1949, 1951, S. 3230d; 1957, P.A. 532; 1969, P.A. 401, S. 1; P.A. 91-238, S. 1, 2; P.A. 99-42; P.A. 00-200, S. 8.)
History: 1969 act changed deadline for bringing action from one year from date injury is sustained or discovered or should have been discovered to two years from that date, effective October 1, 1969, and applicable only to injuries first sustained on or after that date; P.A. 91-238 required that action be brought within two years of death or within five years of act or omission complained of rather than within two years of date of injury or discovery of injury or within three years of act or omission complained of, effective October 1, 1991, and applicable only to injuries first sustained on or after that date; P.A. 99-42 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and added Subsec. (b) eliminating time limitation in certain homicide cases; P.A. 00-200 amended Subsec. (b) by adding references to Secs. 53a-55 and 53a-55a.
See Sec. 45a-448 re distribution of damages recovered for injuries resulting in death.
See Sec. 52-584 re limitation of action for injury to person or property.
See Sec. 52-594 re time limit for executor or administrator to bring personal action which survives to deceased person's representatives.
No action lay at common law for causing death. 25 C. 272. Right of recovery in general. 24 C. 577; 69 C. 284; 72 C. 617; 73 C. 616; 77 C. 111; 87 C. 337. Action begun by injured person in lifetime survives, not restricted to death from negligence. 87 C. 301. Action lies for death in another state. 83 C. 278. Statute is not penal. 33 C. 246. It prevents any suit for the benefit of deceased's estate generally. 34 C. 58. Action lies for instantaneous death; 30 C. 187; 69 C. 620; 72 C. 616; and substantial damages may be given. 73 C. 616; 99 C. 6. Administration proper to enforce right, though there is no estate. 36 C. 214. The law presumes that there are heirs; effect. 64 C. 482; 69 C. 272; 71 C. 286. Under former statute, sum named was limitation, not measure, of damages. 85 C. 117. Purpose of statute is not to penalize, but to give just damages. 87 C. 472. Elements and rule of damage. 29 C. 496; 33 C. 56; 61 C. 159; 72 C. 617; 73 C. 620; 75 C. 548; Id., 571; 79 C. 367; 83 C. 278; 90 C. 35; 92 C. 678; 95 C. 117; 103 C. 530; 106 C. 330; 123 C. 302; 132 C. 466. Omission to charge as to limitation not error. 87 C. 149. Necessary averments in action. 33 C. 247. Effect of default by defendant. 33 C. 252; 36 C. 155. Delay in taking out administration does not extend time limit; 90 C. 527; but the provisions of Sec. 52-592 apply. 91 C. 395; 102 C. 69. Negligence of statutory distributees is no defense. 78 C. 284. Not necessary to count on statute in complaint; applies whether death is instantaneous or not. 99 C. 6. Limit of damage covers all expenses prior to death as well as loss to estate. 103 C. 529; 106 C. 338. New York statute enforceable in our courts. 108 C. 445. No bar to action that heirs at law are defendants. Id., 649. Does not permit recovery of damages for death resulting from breach of implied warranty. 115 C. 253. History of statute. Id., 255; 122 C. 95. Whether action for death due to highway defect falls within section, quaere. Id. Employer obligated to pay compensation to deceased employee's dependents is entitled to apportionment under Sec. 31-293 of damages recovered by administratrix from third person. 116 C. 92. Statute applies in action to recover damages for death against physician for malpractice. 127 C. 380. Does not create new cause of action; administratrix of father may not sue unemancipated minor son. 129 C. 518. Cited. 111 C. 336; 127 C. 692; 131 C. 130; 142 C. 84. Section is not limited or modified by Sec. 45-210 so as to postpone the beginning of the 1-year period. 134 C. 382. Cited. 143 C. 653. Basic principles underlying act; assessment of damages; distinguished from Sec. 52-599. 144 C. 659. Computation of actuarial expectancy of child. 145 C. 622. Extensive discussion of rule for measuring damages. 146 C. 114. In such an action, the administrator does not act in his true capacity as administrator for the benefit of the estate but as agent or trustee for those beneficially interested; proceeds do not become general assets of the estate. 147 C. 233. Right of action for wrongful death and that for nonfatal personal injuries rest on substantially the same basis; administrator of unemancipated minor may sue her unemancipated minor sister for wrongful death. Id., 649. Damages for death and its direct consequences are recoverable only if, and to the extent that, they are made so by statute. 153 C. 360. Cited. Id., 633. Plaintiff stands in shoes of decedent and can recover only if he, had his injuries not proved fatal, could himself have recovered. 154 C. 432. As executor, plaintiff is empowered to sue for injuries resulting in decedent's death whether his appointment issued from a court in this state or in a foreign jurisdiction. 156 C. 115. Admission in evidence of hearsay statements by defendant's driver, although made in presence of plaintiff's decedent on date of accident, was reversible error. 159 C. 307. Injuries resulting in death held not to constitute medical malpractice. 170 C. 443. Cited. Id., 637; 183 C. 448; 187 C. 53; 192 C. 280; Id., 327; 196 C. 134; Id., 509. Suit under section not barred by Workers' Compensation Act where minor killed while illegally employed. 203 C. 34. Permits a recovery of death damages only by decedent's estate; claim for loss of ante mortem consortium distinguished from claim for loss of post mortem consortium. Id., 187. 3-year limitation is a jurisdictional prerequisite which must be met to maintain action under statute and cannot be waived; statute does not violate Art. I, Sec. 10 of Connecticut Constitution. 205 C. 219. Intent is not an essential element of the cause of action. 206 C. 229. Cited. 208 C. 392; 209 C. 59; 210 C. 175; Id., 721; 212 C. 415; 213 C. 282; 221 C. 346; 226 C. 282. Elements of wrongful death cause of action under section discussed. 267 C. 539. The limitations period set forth in section must be read in conjunction with the savings statute, Sec. 52-592, such that the time limitation contained in the savings statute modifies the time limitation contained in this section. 323 C. 741. The continuing course of conduct and continuing course of treatment doctrines apply to the cause of action created by section. 330 C. 251. Section does not create a new cause of action, but rather merely allows the administrator of an estate to append to an already valid claim an additional element of damages consisting of costs associated with the decedent's death; a cause of action for wrongful death predicated on CUTPA will lie only insofar as the decedent, had he or she survived, could have satisfied all essential elements of the CUTPA claim, including the statute of limitations. 331 C. 53.
Cited. 3 CA 598; 43 CA 294; 44 CA 172. Executor who brings an action under section does so in his representative, fiduciary capacity, not as an individual plaintiff, and because it is not his own cause of action, he has no right to self-representation under Sec. 51-88(d)(2). 118 CA 211. Plaintiff's claim for bystander emotional distress is a derivative claim and cannot be brought as a freestanding claim without a predicate wrongful death action brought by the decedent's estate. 189 CA 736.
Limitation held applicable to recovery under section allowing action for death or injury against highway commissioner. 1 CS 136. History of section reviewed. Id; 11 CS 117. Action to be brought 1 year after “the neglect complained of” and not from date of death. 4 CS 32. Applicable to action where death results from malpractice of a physician. 6 CS 450. Cited. 7 CS 328; 9 CS 184. Statute does not limit the number of parties that can be sued. 10 CS 396. Proviso is not a true statute of limitations but a condition precedent to the actual ripening of a complete right of action. 11 CS 239. Parent has no cause of action to recover for loss of services of child wrongfully killed. Id., 447. Fact that person injured died more than a year after injury immaterial where original complaint was brought within statutory period. Id., 413; Id., 468. Cited. 16 CS 430; 17 CS 3. Covers both antemortem elements of damage such as pain and suffering and also for injuries resulting in death. 19 CS 487. Connecticut's wrongful death statute compared with that of North Carolina, which is based on Lord Campbell's Act. 21 CS 233. Where prenatal injuries result in death, the personal representative of the child may prosecute an action; it makes no difference whether death took place just after birth or just prior to birth. 23 CS 256. Stillborn infant, dead from injuries sustained as a viable fetus, has a cause of action; Connecticut follows the “survival” rather than the “new cause of action” theory. 26 CS 358. Damages for antemortem injuries, though required to be claimed in same action as damages for death, do not depend on this section but on Sec. 52-599, which provides that decedent's cause of action survives to his personal representative; where 1-year period of limitation with respect to those injuries had not expired when decedent died, his personal representative, under Sec. 52-594, had year from date of death to initiate action. 28 CS 461. Wrongful death action must be brought by executor or administrator to have standing; standing acquired subsequent to statute of limitations does not cure original action. 29 CS 139. Amendment to complaint not deemed instituting new cause of action so as to be barred by section but was amplification and expansion not change of facts originally claimed. 35 CS 38. Wrongful death action is not a new and independent action created by the demise of the injured party, but rather a claim of the deceased party which survives his death; therefore decedent's spouse can attach to the wrongful death claim an independent claim for loss of consortium; loss of consortium is now legally recoverable under “just damages”; consortium is an element of a marital relationship and cannot be extended to the children of the marriage. Id., 292. Cited. 37 CS 1; 38 CS 318. Damages for loss of consortium are not recoverable under statute, which compensates losses suffered only by decedent or his estate. 39 CS 8. Cited. 40 CS 95. Read together with Secs. 45-249c and 45-249d(a), “executor or administrator” is interpreted to include a temporary administrator to be allowed to commence wrongful death action when necessary to preserve estate. Id., 451. Cited. Id., 457; 44 CS 477. Administratrix may maintain action for wrongful death on behalf of a viable unborn fetus for injuries and death. 48 CS 440. Section is sole basis upon which an action that includes as an element of damages a person's death or its consequences can be brought, and where damages for wrongful death are sought, the statute of limitations in section, rather than for torts or negligence generally, applies. 52 CS 435; judgment affirmed, see 139 CA 88.
Subsec. (a):
Plaintiff who brought a wrongful death action against the state after having previously obtained permission to sue for medical negligence from the Claims Commissioner, must comply with both the two year time limitation for a wrongful death action articulated in Subsec. and the one year time limitation on the Claims Commissioner's authorization to sue articulated in Sec. 4-160 (d). 337 C. 291.
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Sec. 52-555a. Actions for loss of consortium re death of spouse independent for determination of damages. Any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium by one spouse with respect to the death of the other spouse shall be separate from and independent of all claims or causes of action for the determination of damages with respect to such death.
(P.A. 89-148, S. 1, 5.)
History: P.A. 89-148 effective October 1, 1989, and applicable to all causes of action arising on or after that date.
Cited. 226 C. 282.
Cited. 44 CA 172.
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Sec. 52-555b. Actions for loss of consortium re death of spouse to be joined with all actions re death of spouse. Any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium by one spouse with respect to the death of the other spouse, which claim or cause of action may include, without limitation, claims for damages with respect to loss of the society of, affection of, moral support provided by, services provided by, sexual relations with or companionship of the other spouse, suffered because of the death of the other spouse, shall be brought with or joined with the claims and causes of action with respect to the death of the other spouse.
(P.A. 89-148, S. 2, 5.)
History: P.A. 89-148 effective October 1, 1989, and applicable to all causes of action arising on or after that date.
Cited. 44 CA 172.
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Sec. 52-555c. Statute of limitations. Actions for loss of consortium re death of spouse contingent upon proof of facts for wrongful death. (a) No action with respect to any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium shall be commenced except within the time within which an action may be commenced with respect to the death of the other spouse in relation to which the action for loss of consortium arises.
(b) Any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium by one spouse arising out of the claim or cause of action for the wrongful death of the other spouse shall be contingent upon proof of facts sufficient to establish recovery for the claim or cause of action for wrongful death. Nothing in sections 52-555a to 52-555d, inclusive, shall limit the assertion of any defenses against the claim or cause of action for loss of consortium that would be available against the claim or cause of action for wrongful death.
(P.A. 89-148, S. 3, 5.)
History: P.A. 89-148 effective October 1, 1989, and applicable to all causes of action arising on or after that date.
Cited. 44 CA 172.
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Sec. 52-555d. Eligibility for workers' compensation benefits bar to action for loss of consortium against employer. No action with respect to any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium shall be brought by one spouse against an employer of the other spouse if such other spouse is entitled to receive, is receiving or has received benefits pursuant to chapter 568.
(P.A. 89-148, S. 4, 5.)
History: P.A. 89-148 effective October 1, 1989, and applicable to all causes of action arising on or after that date.
Cited. 226 C. 282.
Cited. 44 CA 172.
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Sec. 52-556. Actions for injuries caused by motor vehicles owned by the state. Any person injured in person or property through the negligence of any state official or employee when operating a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state against personal injuries or property damage shall have a right of action against the state to recover damages for such injury.
(1949 Rev., S. 8297.)
Cited. 143 C. 653; 144 C. 282; 185 C. 616. Legislature did not intend statute to authorize an additional cause of action for state employees or their representatives who are eligible for workers' compensation. 189 C. 550. Cited. 239 C. 265. State's waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to section does not exempt the state from a reallocation of damages under Sec. 52-572h(g). 247 C. 256. Reiterated previous holdings that operation of motor vehicle encompasses both parking incidental to travel and movement where essential element is location of motor vehicle in travel lane. 287 C. 421. Section inapplicable where state not made a party to negligence action; court does not have authority to treat an action against a state employee as one against state. 297 C. 317. “Damages” does not include postjudgment interest, and state did not waive sovereign immunity with regard to postjudgment interest under Sec. 37-3b. Id., 798. When the state, by statute, waives its immunity to suit, the right to a jury trial cannot be implied, but instead must be affirmatively expressed; section does not expressly provide for a right to a jury trial, therefore there is no right to a jury trial brought under section. 330 C. 138. The phrase “any person” signifies that waiver applies without restriction to persons who are injured under circumstances specified in section and therefore extends to state employees, but does not preclude state from asserting against such state employees a defense to liability based on workers' compensation exclusivity provision in Sec. 31-284(a). 336 C. 669.
Cited. 7 CA 196; 10 CA 22; 20 CA 619. To constitute cause of action under statute, injury must result from negligent operation of motor vehicle by state employee or official. 82 CA 459. As a matter of law, state employee was “operating a motor vehicle” within the meaning of section based on facts where he left a state-owned truck running alongside of the road so he could perform required maintenance. 84 CA 535. Allegation defendant was operating a state vehicle in course of employment is insufficient ground to invoke statute as defense to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction when state was not a named party and never formally notified by plaintiff of pending action. 92 CA 158. Section authorizes suit against the state on the basis of the negligence of its employee, but not against the employee in his or her individual capacity. 154 CA 448. Trial court failed to properly instruct jury that the state may be held liable only if the state vehicle alleged to have caused the accident was being operated at the time of the accident, that a motor vehicle ordinarily is still being operated if it is parked incident to travel in a convenient or ordinarily appropriate place to park, and that the state may not be sued or held liable if the state vehicle is positioned or parked in a particular location so as to warn drivers as to the danger ahead or to serve as a protective barrier. 155 CA 462.
Cited. 15 CS 251. Statute abolishes defense of governmental immunity. 18 CS 36. Defendant's motion to expunge portion of complaint alleging truck owned by state was insured denied as statute gives right of recovery only where there is such insurance. 22 CS 212.
Negligence of a state official or employee must be established by a fair preponderance of all the evidence to recover damages. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 116.
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Sec. 52-557. Injury to children being transported to school. In any action brought by any person for personal injuries received while being transported to or from school in a vehicle owned, leased or hired by, or operated under contract with, any town, school district or other municipality, it shall be no defense that such transportation is in the line of governmental duty or is mandated by the state. In any such action brought against any town, school district or other municipality, the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be available and it shall be no defense that the transportation was being provided by an independent contractor.
(1949 Rev., S. 8298; P.A. 00-133.)
History: P.A. 00-133 barred the defense that the transportation is mandated by the state and the defense of sovereign immunity.
See Sec. 52-557c re standard of care applicable to school bus owners and operators.
Cited. 203 C. 317.
Cited. 42 CA 624.
Cited. 41 CS 402; 44 CS 527. Section eliminates defense of governmental immunity for personal injuries student received due to harassment on school bus. 52 CS 42; judgment affirmed, see 129 CA 682.
Subsec (a):
Subdiv. (2): City police officer's decision to drive her cruiser into the oncoming traffic lane that the plaintiff was traveling was a discretionary act that violated both city and state policies that imposed ministerial duties regarding roadblocks, the operation of police vehicles and pursuits. 337 C. 326.
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Sec. 52-557a. Standard of care owed social invitee. The standard of care owed to a social invitee shall be the same as the standard of care owed to a business invitee.
(1963, P.A. 575.)
Postman a licensee comparable to a social invitee. 154 C. 185. Standard of care owed to social invitee is same as standard of care as owed to business invitee. 160 C. 61. Cited. 194 C. 129. Does not abrogate common law regarding status of firefighters and police officers; status of such licensees is unaffected by manner in which they came upon the premises. 218 C. 610.
Cited. 54 CA 335.
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Sec. 52-557b. “Good samaritan law”. Immunity from liability for emergency medical assistance, first aid or medication by injection. Immunity from liability re automatic external defibrillators. School personnel not required to render emergency first aid or administer medication by injection. (a)(1) A person licensed to practice medicine and surgery under the provisions of chapter 370 or dentistry under the provisions of section 20-106 or members of the same professions licensed to practice in any other state of the United States, a person licensed as a registered nurse under section 20-93 or 20-94 or certified as a licensed practical nurse under section 20-96 or 20-97, a medical technician or any person operating a cardiopulmonary resuscitator or a person trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the American Red Cross or American Heart Association, or a person operating an automatic external defibrillator, who, voluntarily and gratuitously and other than in the ordinary course of such person's employment or practice, renders emergency medical or professional assistance to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care, which may constitute ordinary negligence. A person or entity that provides or maintains an automatic external defibrillator shall not be liable for the acts or omissions of such person or entity in providing or maintaining the automatic external defibrillator, which may constitute ordinary negligence. A person or entity that provides or maintains an automatic external defibrillator in a cabinet, which also contains an opioid antagonist used to treat or prevent a drug overdose, shall not be liable for the acts or omissions of such person or entity in making available the opioid antagonist, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence. With respect to the use of an automatic external defibrillator, the immunity provided in this subsection shall only apply to acts or omissions involving the use of an automatic external defibrillator in the rendering of emergency care, except a health club licensed pursuant to section 21a-223, shall not be held liable on and after October 1, 2022, for acts or omissions involving the nonuse of the automatic external defibrillator. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to exempt paid or volunteer firefighters, police officers or emergency medical services personnel from completing training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation or in the use of an automatic external defibrillator in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the American Red Cross or American Heart Association. For the purposes of this subsection, “automatic external defibrillator” means a device that: (A) Is used to administer an electric shock through the chest wall to the heart; (B) contains internal decision-making electronics, microcomputers or special software that allows it to interpret physiologic signals, make medical diagnosis and, if necessary, apply therapy; (C) guides the user through the process of using the device by audible or visual prompts; and (D) does not require the user to employ any discretion or judgment in its use.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection, a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery under the provisions of chapter 370 or dentistry under the provisions of section 20-106 or members of the same professions licensed to practice in any other state of the United States, or a person licensed as a registered nurse under section 20-93 or 20-94 or certified as a licensed practical nurse under section 20-96 or 20-97, who operates an automatic external defibrillator to render emergency medical or professional assistance to a person in need thereof shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from the malfunctioning of the automatic external defibrillator, which malfunctioning was not a result of such health care provider's negligence.
(b) A paid or volunteer firefighter or police officer, a teacher or other school personnel on the school grounds or in the school building or at a school function, a member of a ski patrol, a lifeguard, a conservation officer, patrol officer or special police officer of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, or emergency medical service personnel, who (1) has completed a course in first aid offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health, any director of health or an organization using guidelines for first aid published by the American Heart Association and the American Red Cross, that is certified by the organization or director of health offering the course, and, (2) renders emergency first aid to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency first aid, which may constitute ordinary negligence. No paid or volunteer firefighter, police officer or emergency medical service personnel who forcibly enters the residence of any person in order to render emergency first aid to a person whom such firefighter, police officer or emergency medical service personnel reasonably believes to be in need thereof shall be liable to such person for civil damages incurred as a result of such entry. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.
(c) An employee of a railroad company, including any company operating a commuter rail line, who has successfully completed a course in first aid, offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health, any director of health or an organization using guidelines for first aid published by the American Heart Association and the American Red Cross, that is certified by the organization or director of health offering the course, and who renders emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injury or death which results from acts or omissions by such employee in rendering the emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.
(d) A railroad company, including any commuter rail line, which provides emergency medical training or equipment to any employee granted immunity pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall not be liable for civil damages for any injury sustained by a person or for the death of a person which results from the company's acts or omissions in providing such training or equipment or which results from acts or omissions by such employee in rendering emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.
(e) (1) For purposes of this subsection, “cartridge injector” means an automatic prefilled cartridge injector or similar automatic injectable equipment used to deliver epinephrine in a standard dose for emergency first aid response to allergic reactions.
(2) Any volunteer worker associated with, or any person employed to work for, a program offered to children sixteen years of age or younger by a corporation, other than a licensed health care provider, that is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, who (A) has been trained in the use of a cartridge injector by a licensed physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse or registered nurse, (B) has obtained the consent of a parent or legal guardian to use a cartridge injector on his or her child, and (C) uses a cartridge injector on such child in apparent need thereof participating in such program, shall not be liable to such child assisted or to such child's parent or guardian for civil damages for any personal injury or death which results from acts or omissions by such worker in using a cartridge injector which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.
(3) A corporation, other than a licensed health care provider, that is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, which provides training in the use of cartridge injectors to any volunteer worker granted immunity pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection shall not be liable for civil damages for any injury sustained by, or for the death of, a child sixteen years of age or younger who is participating in a program offered by such corporation, which injury or death results from acts or omissions by such worker in using a cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.
(f) A teacher or other school personnel, on the school grounds or in the school building or at a school function, who has completed both a course in first aid in accordance with subsection (b) of this section and a course given by the medical advisor of the school or by a licensed physician in the administration of medication by injection, who renders emergency care by administration of medication by injection to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to the person assisted for civil damages for any injuries which result from acts or omissions by the person in rendering the emergency care of administration of medication by injection, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.
(g) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to require any teacher or other school personnel to render emergency first aid or administer medication by injection.
(h) Any person who has completed a course in first aid offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health, any director of health or by an organization using guidelines for first aid published by the American Heart Association and the American Red Cross, that is certified by the organization or director of health offering the course, or has been trained in the use of a cartridge injector by a licensed physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse or registered nurse, and who, voluntarily and gratuitously and other than in the ordinary course of such person's employment or practice, renders emergency assistance by using a cartridge injector on another person in need thereof, or any person who is an identified staff member of a before or after school program, day camp or child care facility, as defined in section 19a-900, and who renders emergency assistance by using a cartridge injector on another person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in using a cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence. For the purposes of this subsection, “cartridge injector” has the same meaning as provided in subdivision (1) of subsection (e) of this section.
(i) A school bus driver, on or in the immediate vicinity of a school bus during the provision of school transportation services, who renders emergency care by administration of medication with a cartridge injector to a student in need thereof who has a medically diagnosed allergic condition that may require prompt treatment in order to protect the student against serious harm or death, shall not be liable to the student assisted for civil damages for any injuries which result from acts or omissions by the school bus driver in rendering the emergency care of administration of medication with a cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence. For the purposes of this subsection, “cartridge injector” has the same meaning as provided in subdivision (1) of subsection (e) of this section.
(1963, P.A. 205; 1967, P.A. 282; 878; 1969, P.A. 785; 1971, P.A. 729; P.A. 75-132; 75-456, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-225; 77-349, S. 3; 77-614, S. 323, 610; P.A. 78-122, S. 1, 2; P.A. 82-160, S. 224; 82-286; P.A. 83-375, S. 2; P.A. 84-546, S. 119, 173; P.A. 86-237, S. 1, 2; P.A. 87-589, S. 34, 87; P.A. 89-149; P.A. 93-381, S. 9, 39; P.A. 95-257, S. 12, 21, 58; P.A. 98-62, S. 1; P.A. 99-181, S. 13; P.A. 00-196, S. 36; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-4, S. 37, 58; P.A. 03-211, S. 10; P.A. 04-221, S. 27; P.A. 05-144, S. 1; 05-259, S. 6; P.A. 06-196, S. 181, 182; P.A. 09-59, S. 1; P.A. 11-80, S. 1; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-2, S. 124; P.A. 16-163, S. 37; P.A. 18-185, S. 7; P.A. 19-105, S. 2, 3; 19-113, S. 1; 19-169, S. 1; P.A. 21-26, S. 3.)
History: 1967 acts added registered nurses, firemen, policemen and ambulance personnel; 1969 act applied provisions to persons certified as licensed practical nurses under Sec. 20-96 or 20-97; 1971 act added reference to completion of first aid course offered by American Heart Association; P.A. 75-132 applied provisions to members of ski patrols; P.A. 75-456 applied provisions to lifeguards, conservation officers and patrolmen or special policemen of environmental protection department; P.A. 77-225 clarified licensees under chapter 370 as persons licensed “to practice medicine and surgery”, and applied provisions to dentists and to teachers and other school personnel while on school grounds, in school building or at school function; P.A. 77-349 applied provisions to medical technicians, persons operating cardiopulmonary resuscitator and persons trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation pursuant to standards of American Red Cross or American Heart Association; P.A. 77-614 substituted department of health services for department of health where appearing, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 78-122 referred to first aid courses offered by directors of health rather than those offered by municipal health departments and added Subsec. (b) re teachers and school personnel who have completed recognized first aid course; P.A. 82-160 redesignated part of former Subsec. (a) as a new Subsec. (b) and relettered the remaining Subsecs. accordingly and rephrased the section; P.A. 82-286 amended Subsec. (a) to provide immunity from civil damages for any fireman or policeman who forcibly enters residence to render emergency first aid; P.A. 83-375 amended Subsec. (a), providing that ambulance personnel who enter residences to render emergency aid shall be immune from liability for civil damages resulting from entry; P.A. 84-546 made technical change, moving provisions re firemen's and policemen's immunity from Subsec. (a) to Subsec. (b); P.A. 86-237 granted immunity to railroad companies and employees for ordinary negligence committed while rendering aid and granted immunity to railroad companies for ordinary negligence committed while training employees to render aid; P.A. 87-589 made technical change in Subsec. (b); P.A. 89-149 amended Subsec. (b) to include a course in first aid offered by the National Ski Patrol; P.A. 93-381 replaced department of health services with department of public health and addiction services, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-257 replaced Commissioner and Department of Public Health and Addiction Services with Commissioner and Department of Public Health, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 98-62 amended Subsec. (a) to include persons trained in the use of an automatic external defibrillator and added a definition thereof; P.A. 99-181 amended Subsec. (c) by allowing an employee to take a course in first aid offered by the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health or any certified director of public health, in addition to a course offered by the American Red Cross, and by making technical changes; P.A. 00-196 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (e); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-4 amended Subsec. (b) by changing “fireman” to “firefighter”, “policeman” to “police officer”, “patrolman” to “patrol officer” and “ambulance personnel” to “emergency medical service personnel”; P.A. 03-211 added new Subdiv. (e) re immunity for use of a cartridge injector by volunteer workers and for corporations that provide training in the use of cartridge injectors and redesignated existing Subsecs. (e) and (f) as new Subsecs. (f) and (g), effective July 1, 2003; P.A. 04-221 amended Subsec. (e)(2) by adding “or any person employed to work for”; P.A. 05-144 added Subsec. (h) re immunity from civil liability for rendering emergency assistance by using a cartridge injector; P.A. 05-259 amended Subsec. (a) to extend immunity to any person who operates an automatic external defibrillator during an emergency and to specify that such immunity does not exempt paid or volunteer firefighters, police officers or emergency medical services personnel from completing training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation or in the use of an automatic external defibrillator, effective July 13, 2005; P.A. 06-196 made technical changes in Subsecs. (e)(2) and (h), effective June 7, 2006; P.A. 09-59 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provisions re operation, provision and maintenance of automatic external defibrillators and making conforming changes; pursuant to P.A. 11-80, “Department of Environmental Protection” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Department of Energy and Environmental Protection” in Subsec. (b), effective July 1, 2011; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-2 amended Subsec. (a) to substitute “guidelines” for “standards” set forth by the American Red Cross or American Heart Association; P.A. 16-163 amended Subsec. (h) by replacing “day care facility” with “child care facility” and replacing “provided” with “defined”, effective June 9, 2016; P.A. 18-185 added Subsec. (i) re immunity from civil liability for school bus driver who renders emergency care to a student by administering medication using a cartridge injector, effective July 1, 2018; P.A. 19-105 amended Subsecs. (b), (c) and (h) by adding references to organization using guidelines for first aid published by the American Heart Association and American Red Cross, and making technical and conforming changes, effective July 1, 2019; P.A. 19-113 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing provisions re persons not liable for personal injuries resulting from acts or omissions in rendering emergency care, which may constitute ordinary negligence as Subdiv. (1), redesignating existing Subdivs. (1) to (4) as Subparas. (A) to (D) and adding new Subdiv. (2) re persons who operate automatic external defibrillator not liable for civil damages for personal injuries resulting from malfunctioning; P.A. 19-169 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provision re person or entity that provides or maintains automatic external defibrillator in cabinet which contains opioid antagonist not liable for acts or omissions in making available opioid antagonist which may constitute ordinary negligence and making a technical change; P.A. 21-26 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by adding exception re health club not liable on and after October 1, 2022, for acts or omissions involving nonuse of automatic external defibrillator.
Cited. 10 CA 86.
Liability for gross negligence was not abolished by Good Samaritan Law. 48 CS 10.
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Sec. 52-557c. Standard of care applicable to owners and operators of school buses. The standard of care applicable to the owners and operators of any school bus, as defined in section 14-275, or of any motor vehicle registered as a service bus transporting children to and from school or school activities, private or public camps or any other activities concerning the transportation of groups of children shall be the same as the standard of care applicable to common carriers of passengers for hire.
(February, 1965, P.A. 303, S. 1.)
Duty of carrier is to provide its passengers with a reasonably safe place to alight. 180 C. 302.
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Sec. 52-557d. Defense of charitable immunity abolished. The common law defense of charitable immunity is abolished and shall not constitute a valid defense to any cause of action.
(1967, P.A. 52; P.A. 82-160, S. 225.)
History: P.A. 82-160 deleted “arising subsequent to October 1, 1967” after “cause of action”.
Extended statute of limitations in section was intended to address causes of action for personal injuries arising from intentional sexual misconduct rather than negligent sexual misconduct. 337 C. 627.
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Sec. 52-557e. Immunity of physicians from liability for uncompensated service on hospital utilization review committee. No action may be brought to recover damages against any licensed physician for any decision or action taken by him as a member of a hospital utilization review committee on which he serves without compensation and to which he shall have been appointed by the staff of the hospital, the function of which committee, as directed by the federal Medicare Act, as amended, shall have been to review the utilization of the facilities of the hospital in the interests of efficiency and the quality of service to the public.
(1971, P.A. 157; P.A. 82-160, S. 226.)
History: P.A. 82-160 made minor changes in wording.
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Sec. 52-557f. Landowner liability for recreational use of land. Definitions. As used in sections 52-557f to 52-557i, inclusive:
(1) “Charge” means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land;
(2) “Land” means land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty, except that if the owner is a municipality, political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, special district or water or sewer district: (A) “Land” does not include a swimming pool, playing field or court, playground, building with electrical service, or machinery when attached to the realty, that is also within the possession and control of the municipality, political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, special district or water or sewer district; and (B) “road” does not include a paved public through road that is open to the public for the operation of four-wheeled private passenger motor vehicles;
(3) “Owner” means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises. “Owner” includes, but is not limited to, a municipality, political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, special district or water or sewer district;
(4) “Recreational purpose” includes, but is not limited to, any of the following, or any combination thereof: Hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, snow skiing, ice skating, sledding, hang gliding, sport parachuting, hot air ballooning, bicycling and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites.
(1971, P.A. 249, S. 1; 440, S. 2; P.A. 77-393; Oct. Sp. Sess. P.A. 79-12, S. 2, 3; P.A. 82-160, S. 227; P.A. 88-204; P.A. 90-310, S. 3; P.A. 11-61, S. 139; 11-141, S. 19; 11-211, S. 1.)
History: Later 1971 act (P.A. 440) removed snowmobiling from definition of “recreational purpose”; P.A. 77-393 included cutting and removing wood in definition of “recreational purpose”; October, 1979, P.A. 79-12 removed cutting and removing wood from definition of “recreational purpose”; P.A. 82-160 alphabetized the defined terms; P.A. 88-204 included hang gliding and hot air ballooning in definition of “recreational purpose”; P.A. 90-310 in Subdiv. (4) added sport parachuting to the definition of “recreational purpose”; P.A. 11-61 redefined “charge” in Subdiv. (1) and “owner” in Subdiv. (3); P.A. 11-141 redefined “charge” in Subdiv. (1) and “owner” in Subdiv. (3); P.A. 11-211 redefined “land” in Subdiv. (2), “owner” in Subdiv. (3) and “recreational purpose” in Subdiv. (4).
See Sec. 52-557k re liability of landowner who allows persons to harvest firewood, fruits or vegetables or engage in maple-sugaring activities.
Cited. 194 C. 129; 219 C. 914; 221 C. 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653; 226 C. 446; 238 C. 633; Id., 687. Specially chartered municipal corporation water supply company not immune from liability when bicyclist rode her bike into gate on company property; gate was maintained in an unsafe and dangerous condition and maintenance of gate was inextricably linked to proprietary function of operating the company. 309 C. 282.
Cited. 7 CA 164. Sec. 52-557f et seq. apply to all landowners including governmental entities. 24 CA 592. Cited. 39 CA 280; 45 CA 17.
Subdiv. (3):
Held municipalities are not owners within meaning of section, reconsidering and overruling decision in 221 C. 256. 238 C. 653.
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Sec. 52-557g. Liability of owner of land available to public for recreation; exceptions. (a) Except as provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who makes all or any part of the land available to the public without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service for recreational purposes owes no duty of care to keep the land, or the part thereof so made available, safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity on the land to persons entering for recreational purposes.
(b) Except as provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who, either directly or indirectly, invites or permits without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service any person to use the land, or part thereof, for recreational purposes does not thereby: (1) Make any representation that the premises are safe for any purpose; (2) confer upon the person who enters or uses the land for recreational purposes the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or (3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act or omission of the owner.
(c) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any subdivision thereof for recreational purposes.
(1971, P.A. 249, S. 2–4; P.A. 73-70, S. 1, 2; P.A. 82-160, S. 228.)
History: P.A. 73-70 deleted language limiting applicability to owners of “five or more acres” of land and specified that landowner may make “all or any part” of land available for public use without liability; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.
Cited. 204 C. 435. Applies to all municipal and private landowners. 221 C. 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653. Cited. 226 C. 446; 238 C. 653; Id., 687.
Cited. 7 CA 164. Void for vagueness doctrine does not require prior warning of civil immunity to potential claimants. 10 CA 86. Sec. 52-557f et seq. apply to all landowners including governmental entities; municipality's immunity under section extends to its employees. 24 CA 592. Cited. Id., 832; 39 CA 280; 45 CA 17.
State enjoys same immunity from suit as private persons as long as it makes its land available for recreational purposes free of charge. 52 CS 562.
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Sec. 52-557h. Owner liable, when. Nothing in sections 52-557f to 52-557i, inclusive, limits in any way the liability of any owner of land which otherwise exists: (1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity; (2) for injury suffered in any case where the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof, except that, in the case of land leased to the state or a subdivision thereof, any consideration received by the owner for the lease shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this section.
(1971, P.A. 249, S. 5; P.A. 82-160, S. 229.)
History: P.A. 82-160 made minor technical change and replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators with numeric indicators.
Cited. 221 C. 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653; 226 C. 446; 238 C. 653; Id., 687.
Subdiv. (1): Does not authorize recovery for nuisance. 7 CA 164. Cited. 10 CA 86. Sec. 52-557f et seq. apply to all landowners including governmental entities. 24 CA 592. Cited. 39 CA 280; 45 CA 17.
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Sec. 52-557i. Obligation of user of land. Nothing in sections 52-557f to 52-557i, inclusive, shall be construed to relieve any person using the land of another for recreational purposes from any obligation which he may have in the absence of said sections to exercise care in his use of such land and in his activities thereon, or from the legal consequences of failure to employ such care.
(1971, P.A. 249, S. 6.)
Cited. 221 C. 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653; 226 C. 446; 238 C. 653; Id., 687.
Sec. 52-557f et seq. apply to all landowners including governmental entities. 24 CA 592. Cited. 39 CA 280; 45 CA 17.
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Sec. 52-557j. Liability of landowner upon whose land snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, motorcycles, minibikes or minicycles are operated. No landowner may be held liable for any injury sustained by any person operating a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, as defined in section 14-379, motorcycle or minibike or minicycle, as defined in section 14-1, upon the landowner's property or by any passenger in the snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle or motorcycle, minibike or minicycle, whether or not the landowner had given permission, written or oral, for the operation upon his land unless the landowner charged a fee for the operation, or unless the injury is caused by the wilful or malicious conduct of the landowner.
(1971, P.A. 440, S. 1; P.A. 73-67, S. 1, 2; 73-676, S. 2; P.A. 82-160, S. 230.)
History: P.A. 73-67 exempted landowners from liability for injuries sustained in operation of all-terrain vehicles or motorcycles; P.A. 73-676 extended exemption to cover injuries sustained in operating minibikes and minicycles; P.A. 82-160 made minor changes in wording.
Statute held constitutional. 194 C. 129. Cited. 238 C. 653; Id., 687.
City held to be a “landowner” within the ambit of statute. 7 CA 164. Cited. 10 CA 86; 24 CA 592; 39 CA 280.
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Sec. 52-557k. Liability of landowner who allows persons to harvest firewood, fruits or vegetables or engage in maple-sugaring activities. (a) As used in this section: (1) “Owner” means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, occupant or person in control of the premises; (2) “harvesting” means the cutting and removal of designated standing trees, down trees, tree tops and other logging slash or debris suitable for use as firewood or the picking and removal of designated fruits or vegetables; (3) “charge” means the fee asked in return for a specified volume of firewood or a specified volume of fruits or vegetables and the right to harvest such firewood or such fruits or vegetables; and (4) “maple-sugaring” means the collection of sap from any species of tree in the genus Acer for the purpose of boiling to produce food.
(b) Any owner of land who invites or permits any person (1) to enter the land or a part thereof to harvest firewood, with or without charge, or (2) to enter the land or a part thereof to harvest fruits or vegetables or engage in maple-sugaring activities, without charge, on behalf of a nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation for use by such nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation or for distribution to other nonprofit organizations or nonprofit corporations, shall not be liable for damages as a result of injury to such person when such injury arises out of the use of the land or out of the act of harvesting firewood, harvesting fruits or vegetables, or engaging in maple-sugaring activities, unless such injury is caused by such owner's failure to warn of a dangerous hidden hazard actually known to such owner.
(c) This section shall not apply to (1) an owner who sells more than one hundred cords of firewood each calendar year, (2) an owner who operates a “pick or cut your own agricultural operation” as defined in section 52-568a, (3) an owner who operates an agricultural operation to which the public is invited and charged for produce harvested and removed from the land, or (4) an owner who operates a maple-sugaring operation to which the public is invited and charged for products derived from the maple-sugaring operation or collects more than a nominal fee from other persons for maple-sugaring on the owner's property.
(Oct. Sp. Sess. P.A. 79-12, S. 1, 3; P.A. 01-82; P.A. 14-18, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 01-82 made section applicable to owners who permit persons to harvest fruits or vegetables under certain circumstances, amending Subsec. (a) to redefine “harvesting” to include the picking and removal of designated fruits or vegetables and redefine “charge” to include the fee asked in return for a specified volume of fruits or vegetables and the right to harvest such fruits or vegetables, amending Subsec. (b) to designate existing provisions re person entering the land to harvest firewood as Subdiv. (1) and add new Subdiv. (2) re person entering the land to harvest fruits or vegetables on behalf of a nonprofit corporation or nonprofit organization for use or distribution by such nonprofit corporation or nonprofit organization and amending Subsec. (c) to designate existing provision re inapplicability of section to owner who sells more than 100 cords of firewood as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re owner who operates a “pick or cut your own agricultural operation” and add Subdiv. (3) re owner who operates an agricultural operation to which the public is invited and charged for produce harvested and removed from the land; P.A. 14-18 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (4) defining “maple-sugaring”, amended Subsec. (b) to add provisions re engaging in maple-sugaring activities and amended Subsec. (c) to add Subdiv. (4) re section not to apply to owner who operates a maple-sugaring operation to which the public is charged for products derived from the operation or who collects more than a nominal fee from persons for maple-sugaring on owner's property.
Cited. 194 C. 129; 238 C. 653; Id., 687.
Cited. 10 CA 86.
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Sec. 52-557l. Immunity from liability of certain persons who donate food or distribute donated food. (a) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, any person, including but not limited to a seller, farmer, processor, distributor, wholesaler or retailer of food, who donates an item of food for use or distribution by a nonprofit organization, nonprofit corporation, political subdivision of the state or senior center, and any nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation that collects donated food and distributes such food to other nonprofit organizations or nonprofit corporations or a political subdivision of the state or senior center free of charge or for a nominal fee, shall not be liable for civil damages or criminal penalties resulting from the nature, age, condition or packaging of the food, unless it is established that the donor, at the time of making the donation, or the nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation, at the time of distributing the food, knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the food was (1) adulterated, as described in section 21a-101, or (2) not fit for human consumption.
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, any food establishment classified as a class 3 or class 4 food establishment pursuant to regulations adopted under section 19a-36h, that donates perishable food for use or distribution by a temporary emergency shelter in accordance with the provisions set forth in section 38a-313b shall not be liable for civil damages or criminal penalties resulting from the nature, age, condition or packaging of the food, unless it is established that the donor, at the time of making the donation, knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the food was (1) embargoed or ordered destroyed by the Department of Public Health or a local director of health, or an authorized agent thereof, (2) adulterated, as described in section 21a-101, or (3) not fit for human consumption.
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, any food relief organization or supermarket that donates any canned food or perishable food shall not be liable for civil damages or criminal penalties resulting from the nature, age, condition or packaging of such canned food or perishable food, unless it is established that such food relief organization or supermarket, at the time such food relief organization or supermarket donated such canned food or perishable food, knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that such canned food or perishable food was (1) embargoed or ordered destroyed by the Department of Public Health or a local director of health, or an authorized agent thereof, (2) adulterated, as described in section 21a-101, or (3) not fit for human consumption. For the purposes of this subsection, “canned food”, “food relief organization”, “perishable food” and “supermarket” have the same meanings as provided in section 38a-313c.
(P.A. 83-223, S. 1, 2; P.A. 94-17; P.A. 12-123, S. 2; P.A. 17-93, S. 15; P.A. 22-28, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 94-17 applied provisions to any nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation that collects donated food and distributes such food to other nonprofit organizations or nonprofit corporations free of charge or for a nominal fee and deleted Subsec. (b) that had provided “Nothing in this section limits the liability of the donee organization or corporation accepting the food.”; P.A. 12-123 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and made technical changes therein, and added Subsec. (b) re immunity from liability for food establishments donating perishable food; P.A. 17-93 amended Subsec. (a) by adding “political subdivision of the state or senior center”, amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “class III or class IV” with “class 3 or class 4 food establishment” and replacing “19a-36” with “19a-36h”, and made technical changes; P.A. 22-28 added Subsec. (c) re food relief organizations and supermarkets and made technical changes.
Cited. 238 C. 653; Id., 687.
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Sec. 52-557m. Immunity from liability of directors, officers and trustees of nonprofit tax-exempt organizations. Any person who serves as a director, officer or trustee of a nonprofit organization qualified as a tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, and who is not compensated for such services on a salary or prorated equivalent basis, shall be immune from civil liability for damage or injury occurring on or after October 1, 1987, resulting from any act, error or omission made in the exercise of such person's policy or decision-making responsibilities if such person was acting in good faith and within the scope of such person's official functions and duties, unless such damage or injury was caused by the reckless, wilful or wanton misconduct of such person.
(P.A. 86-338, S. 10; P.A. 87-227, S. 7; P.A. 88-364, S. 68, 123; P.A. 89-211, S. 50.)
History: P.A. 87-227 replaced provision granting immunity for “any act or omission resulting in damage or injury occurring on or after October 1, 1986” with immunity for “damage or injury occurring on or after October 1, 1987, resulting from any act, error or omission made in the exercise of such person's policy or decision-making responsibilities” and excluded damage or injury caused by “reckless” misconduct; P.A. 88-364 made technical change; P.A. 89-211 clarified reference to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
Cited. 214 C. 1; 228 C. 375; 238 C. 653; Id., 687.
Section provides greater protections to director, officer or trustee of nonprofit organization than does federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 and so is not preempted by said act. 140 CA 40.
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Sec. 52-557n. Liability of political subdivision and its employees, officers and agents. Liability of members of local boards and commissions. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties; (B) negligence in the performance of functions from which the political subdivision derives a special corporate profit or pecuniary benefit; and (C) acts of the political subdivision which constitute the creation or participation in the creation of a nuisance; provided, no cause of action shall be maintained for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road or bridge except pursuant to section 13a-149. (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct; or (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a political subdivision of the state or any employee, officer or agent acting within the scope of his employment or official duties shall not be liable for damages to person or property resulting from: (1) The condition of natural land or unimproved property; (2) the condition of a reservoir, dam, canal, conduit, drain or similar structure when used by a person in a manner which is not reasonably foreseeable; (3) the temporary condition of a road or bridge which results from weather, if the political subdivision has not received notice and has not had a reasonable opportunity to make the condition safe; (4) the condition of an unpaved road, trail or footpath, the purpose of which is to provide access to a recreational or scenic area, if the political subdivision has not received notice and has not had a reasonable opportunity to make the condition safe; (5) the initiation of a judicial or administrative proceeding, provided that such action is not determined to have been commenced or prosecuted without probable cause or with a malicious intent to vex or trouble, as provided in section 52-568; (6) the act or omission of someone other than an employee, officer or agent of the political subdivision; (7) the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization, when such authority is a discretionary function by law, unless such issuance, denial, suspension or revocation or such failure or refusal constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety; (8) failure to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, other than property owned or leased by or leased to such political subdivision, to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety, unless the political subdivision had notice of such a violation of law or such a hazard or unless such failure to inspect or such inadequate or negligent inspection constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances; (9) failure to detect or prevent pollution of the environment, including groundwater, watercourses and wells, by individuals or entities other than the political subdivision; or (10) conditions on land sold or transferred to the political subdivision by the state when such conditions existed at the time the land was sold or transferred to the political subdivision.
(c) Any person who serves as a member of any board, commission, committee or agency of a municipality and who is not compensated for such membership on a salary or prorated equivalent basis, shall not be personally liable for damage or injury occurring on or after October 1, 1992, resulting from any act, error or omission made in the exercise of such person's policy or decision-making responsibilities on such board, commission, committee or agency if such person was acting in good faith, and within the scope of such person's official functions and duties, and was not acting in violation of any state, municipal or professional code of ethics regulating the conduct of such person, or in violation of subsection (a) of section 9-369b or subsection (b) or (c) of section 1-206. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply if such damage or injury was caused by the reckless, wilful or wanton misconduct of such person.
(P.A. 86-338, S. 13; P.A. 92-198; P.A. 93-290.)
History: P.A. 92-198 added Subsec. (c) concerning immunity of members of local boards and commissions who are not compensated for their membership; P.A. 93-290 added Subsec. (b)(10) re preexisting conditions on land sold or transferred by the state.
Cited. 208 C. 161; 214 C. 1. Court construed statute to provide action under Sec. 13a-149 is plaintiff's exclusive remedy against political subdivision for damages resulting from a defective road or bridge. 219 C. 179. Common law action for nuisance is barred by section. Id., 641. Cited. 229 C. 829; 231 C. 370; 233 C. 524; 235 C. 408; 238 C. 653; Id., 687. Section allows plaintiffs to bring direct cause of action for negligence against municipality; in absence of reference to Sec. 7-308 or 7-465, statutes can coexist and a party may choose to rely on either statute. 263 C. 22. Whether driveway upon which plaintiff was driving was a private thoroughfare, thereby falling within the purview of section, or whether it was public, thereby falling within the purview of Sec. 13a-149, is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court. 315 C. 606. Action was untimely and savings provision in Sec. 52-593 does not apply in municipal liability action under this section because plaintiff could have recovered from defendants in original action, based on the factual allegations and causes of action in the original complaint. Id., 821. Because the operation of a motor vehicle is a highly regulated activity that constitutes a ministerial function, such operation in a non-emergency situation is a ministerial act and negligence in such operation is not shielded by governmental immunity. 344 C. 464.
Cited. 32 CA 373; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 829; 36 CA 601; 42 CA 624. Absent specific language in this section modifying common law rule of governmental immunity for claims of strict liability pursuant to Sec. 22-357, that section should not be so construed. 58 CA 702. Section does not bar recovery from a political subdivision where circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm. 60 CA 178. Court provided jury with clear guidance on the issue of agency with respect to town's potential liability. 68 CA 284. Complaint alleging that city negligently failed to maintain a stairway in a reasonably safe condition constituted an allegation of negligent performance of a discretionary, rather than ministerial, act and therefore city was immune from liability pursuant to statute that exempts political subdivisions from liability for negligent acts of its employees that require the exercise of judgment or discretion. 71 CA 844. Plaintiff's statutory negligence claims were barred by governmental immunity. 87 CA 353.
Cited. 41 CS 420; 42 CS 22; 44 CS 45; Id., 527. Summary judgment granted for municipal defendants in matter where plaintiff alleged that defendant's failure to timely respond to 911 call and provide effective medical care resulted in her son's death; plaintiff unable to invoke identifiable person, imminent harm exception to defendant's claimed governmental immunity because decedent was not identifiable nor was the harm imminent. 49 CS 200.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(C): Liability in nuisance can be imposed on a municipality only if condition constituting the nuisance was created by positive act of the municipality. 245 C. 385. Subdiv. (2)(A): Plaintiff's claim against city for intentional infliction of emotional distress by city employee is barred by governmental immunity. 267 C. 669. Subdiv. (1)(B) codifies common law rule that municipalities are liable for their negligent acts committed in their proprietary capacity. 279 C. 830. Appellate Court improperly concluded that plaintiff, the mother of a 6-year-old child attending after school program located within a public school, fell within identifiable person, imminent harm exception to governmental immunity; only persons recognized for purposes of exception are school children attending public schools during school hours. 284 C. 91. Subdiv. (2)(B): Governmental immunity applicable to defendants, board of education and certain public school officials, because plaintiff, a summer program supervisor who slipped on urine in the school bathroom where program was located, was not an identifiable person subject to imminent harm because the potential for harm was neither sufficiently immediate nor sufficiently certain. 294 C. 265. Subdiv. (1)(A): The identifiable person, imminent harm common-law exception to municipal employee's qualified immunity is also applicable in an action brought directly against a municipality under Subdiv., regardless of whether an employee or officer of municipality is also a named defendant; plaintiff resident who was injured at transfer station was not a member of a class of foreseeable victims because he was not legally required to dispose of his refuse by taking it to transfer station and could have hired an independent contractor to do so. Id., 324. Subdiv. (1)(C): Trial court properly struck plaintiffs' claims asserted pursuant to Subpara. (C) on grounds that defendants may not be held liable for damages caused by their failure to act to abate an alleged public nuisance because Subpara. (C) contains a positive act requirement. 295 C. 141. Common law identifiable person, imminent harm exception to governmental immunity for discretionary acts applicable in action solely against municipality under Subdiv. (1)(A). 296 C. 518. Subdiv. (1)(A) is grounded in common law negligence cause of action and does not create a new kind of cause of action, but provides that political subdivisions may be held liable for certain common law negligence claims against them and their employees; negligence claims against chaperones at a school dance are barred by doctrine of qualified immunity because such chaperones were performing governmental acts, were acting in the exercise of discretion and no exception applied. 301 C. 112. Subdiv. (1): Town is protected by governmental immunity and duty to warn of hazardous conditions is discretionary; failure to allege town owned or controlled land the use of which unreasonably interfered with plaintiffs' use or enjoyment of their property does not render nuisance claim insufficient, but motion to strike nuisance claim properly granted because plaintiffs could not have alleged facts sufficient to establish town created or participated in creating alleged nuisance or had duty to warn of risks. 307 C. 364. Subdiv. (1): Pertains only to municipal roads and bridges and not to state roads and bridges; town may be liable for nuisance on state highway if nuisance was created by the town; legislature sought to ensure that a person who sustains injuries or property damage as a result of a nuisance created by a municipality may recover against the municipality either by way of an action sounding in nuisance or, if the nuisance was created on a road or bridge that the municipality was legally responsible for maintaining, under Sec. 13a-149. Id., 620. Specially chartered municipal corporation water supply company liable for negligent conduct when bicyclist rode her bike into gate on company property; gate was maintained in an unsafe and dangerous condition and maintenance of gate was inextricably linked to proprietary function of operating the company. 309 C. 282. Subdiv. (2): Town not liable under identifiable person/imminent harm exception for injuries sustained by passenger in vehicle pursued by volunteer firefighter while firefighter was on telephone call with town's 911 dispatcher where it was not apparent to dispatcher that firefighter was pursuing vehicle at excessive rate of speed and improperly using blue courtesy lights that were similar to police lights, and that dispatcher's response or lack thereof likely would have subjected the passenger to imminent harm. 311 C. 217. Police officers' duty to remain at the scene of a domestic violence incident was discretionary and not ministerial, therefore defendant municipality is entitled to governmental immunity. 312 C. 150. Under identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity, the standard to determine whether harm was imminent is whether it was apparent to municipal defendant that the dangerous condition was so likely to cause harm that defendant had a clear and unequivocal duty to act immediately to prevent harm. 314 C. 303. Municipal immunity was not abrogated under Subdiv. (1)(B) by proprietary function exception because defendant's operation of pool was for general public purpose, did not result in excess revenues and was used by private company only for short periods of time without any formal lease or contract, and was not abrogated under Subdiv. (1)(A) by application of the identifiable person, imminent harm exception because plaintiff was not compelled to attend aqua therapy sessions offered by private company at defendant's pool, and therefore was not an identifiable person. 326 C. 420. Whether a statute, regulation or other provision of law creates a ministerial duty ordinarily presents a question of law to be decided by the court. 330 C. 613. The fact that a police officer, either by training or experience, ordinarily responds to a situation in a particular manner does not transform his or her response into a ministerial duty. Id. Subdiv. (2)(B): Mandatory reporting of abuse pursuant to Sec. 17a-101a et seq. is a ministerial duty rather than a discretionary duty. 340 C. 1. Subdiv. (1): By its express terms, section waives a municipal corporation's governmental immunity “for damages to persons or property”, but not for purely economic or commercial losses. Id., 200.
Cited. 39 CA 289. Language of section is clear and unambiguous in abrogating governmental immunity that common law gives to municipalities with respect to vicarious liability; parties need not comply with filing requirements of Sec. 7-465 in order to utilize this section, rather parties can bring a direct cause of action for negligence against a municipality under its provisions. 66 CA 669. Although trial court improperly analyzed plaintiff's claims under Subsec., which concerns claims brought directly against a municipality, rather than under applicable municipal indemnification statute, Sec. 7-465, which provides that qualified municipal immunity does not apply to claims for indemnification for acts by municipal employees unless the acts are willful or wanton, she could not prevail on claim that trial court improperly granted motion for a directed verdict because there is no recognized right to a claim for emotional distress resulting to a person from loss of a pet. 84 CA 395. Trial court properly struck plaintiffs' negligence claim where plaintiffs claimed that city's negligence in failing to ensure security of the building after city had taken the property by eminent domain resulted in plaintiffs property being stolen and destroyed; pursuant to Subdiv. (2)(B) city cannot be held liable for the actions of its employees pertaining to security of the property. 88 CA 1. Because municipal status of city of New Haven was undisputed, the protection afforded under Subdiv. (2)(A) granted municipal immunity from liability for intentional tort committed by plaintiff's coemployee who was a city employee. 92 CA 558. Subdiv. (2)(A): A municipality may not be held liable for the intentional acts of its employees including the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 108 CA 710. When a law enforcement officer has been ordered by the court to vacate an arrest warrant, this is a mandatory duty; failure to do so may not be excused by governmental immunity. 110 CA 389. Section codifies the common law doctrine of qualified immunity; defendants, a municipality and police officers employed by the municipality, were entitled to qualified immunity in the performance of discretionary duties relating to the monitoring of an individual who committed suicide while being held in police department lock-up area. 120 CA 282. Decedent's estate could not prevail against police officers because of doctrine of governmental immunity since complaint did not demonstrate that decedent was an identifiable and foreseeable victim subject to imminent harm. Id., 806. Subdiv. (2)(B): Trial court's conclusion that statutes, regulations and policies are most often held to create discretionary duties was overreaching; because standards exist for town firefighters to secure traffic accident scene in prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion, plaintiff's negligence action against town arose out of violations of ministerial rather than discretionary duties, and trial court improperly granted town's motion to strike on grounds of governmental immunity. 127 CA 254; judgment affirmed, see 307 C. 620. Subdiv. (2)(A): Neither the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts nor the exceptions to discretionary act immunity factor into an analysis of governmental immunity when an intentional cause of action is alleged; the term “wilful” is synonymous with “intentional”; provision makes no distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts. 133 CA 215. City was immune from indemnity claim re fatal shooting at carnival because language in Sec. 7-284 concerning police protection at places of amusement describes a discretionary function, not a ministerial duty, and billing of operator for such police protection did not convert governmental function of providing security into a proprietary function. 138 CA 40. Subdiv. (1)(A): Police action was discretionary re homicide victim killed by domestic violence perpetrator while in the household of a person who was protected by an order of protection because the victim was not the person protected by the order of protection and law enforcement directives adopted under Sec. 46b-38b re domestic violence victims did not impose a duty re victim. 140 CA 315; judgment affirmed, see 312 C. 150. Police officer's decisions whether or not to enforce certain statutes and to take other actions in securing traffic accident scene requires exercise of judgment and discretion and, therefore, entitles officer to governmental immunity. 142 CA 113. Subdiv. (1)(C): A public nuisance claim may not be brought independently of Sec. 13a-149 when plaintiff's claim for damages against a municipality resulted from an injury sustained by means of a defective municipal road. 150 CA 805. Subdiv. (2)(B): School superintendent's manner of communicating plaintiff's termination was a discretionary act to which municipal immunity attached. 158 CA 872. Subdiv. (2)(B): Police dispatcher's statement to caller that police officer would respond shortly did not create a ministerial duty for which governmental immunity is abrogated under Subdiv. (1), and plaintiff did not present any other evidence that police response to a call is a ministerial rather than discretionary act or that plaintiff was an identifiable victim subjecting defendants to identifiable person-imminent harm exception. 163 CA 847. To the extent that the phrase “wear shin guards for additional protection” is ambiguous, and thus susceptible to different meanings, that fact alone supports a determination that the language in the school's physical education guideline was not intended to create a ministerial duty that would be a clear and unequivocal waiver of governmental immunity under Subdiv. (2). 175 CA 613.
Cited. 41 CS 402. Governmental immunity inapplicable in case in which plaintiff was involved in assisting police when she was bitten by police dog. 46 CS 197.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 226 C. 314. Subdiv. (6): Provision does not establish a sole proximate causation standard or some other heightened causation standard; codifies common law that municipal defendants are not liable for acts of nonemployees or nonagents of the municipality. 245 C. 385. Subdiv. (8): Subdiv. abrogates traditional common-law doctrine of municipal immunity, now codified by statute, in the two enumerated circumstances following the word “unless”. 307 C. 364. Subdiv. (8): “Possible impact” standard for reckless disregard adopted by Appellate Court, requiring defendant merely disregard a possible impact on public or individual health or safety, would effectively eliminate distinction between negligence and recklessness - no indication legislature intended to adopt lower standard for recklessness in context of municipal inspections; municipal actor may demonstrate reckless disregard for health or safety when it is clear that the failure to inspect may result in a catastrophic harm, albeit not a likely one. 327 C. 338. A claim brought under exception in Subdiv. is a “cause of action created by statute based on negligence” such that apportionment underSec. 52-572h(o) is allowed because Subdiv. expressly abrogates the common-law doctrine of municipal immunity. 344 C. 86.
Subdiv. (8): A failure to inspect that constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under Subdiv. is one in which an individual is aware of the duty to inspect, recognizes the possible impact on public or individual health or safety, and makes the conscious decision not to perform that duty. 159 CA 679; judgment affirmed on alternate grounds, see 327 C. 338.
Subdiv. (7): Section does not offer municipal immunity for allegedly unconstitutional taking through inverse condemnation. 51 CS 636.
Subsec. (c):
Subsec. does not authorize a private cause of action against zoning board of appeals as a whole but refers to the personal liability of an individual board member; since plaintiff directs his allegations against the board as an entity and not to any of its members individually, he fails to state a claim under Subsec. that would subvert governmental immunity. 160 CA 1. Section affords qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, because it expressly excepts from its purview any conduct that is not undertaken in good faith, that is in violation of any state, municipal or professional code of ethics, or that is reckless, wilful or wanton. 166 CA 685.
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Sec. 52-557o. Liability of land surveyors. No action for trespass shall lie against any surveyor licensed under chapter 391 or person acting at the direction of any such licensed surveyor who enters upon land other than the land being surveyed without causing any damage to such other land in order to perform a survey, provided no such surveyor or person acting at the direction of such surveyor shall enter upon any land owned by a railroad company, as defined in section 13b-199, which is within fifty feet of a railroad track without first obtaining written permission from the railroad company, which written permission shall not be unreasonably withheld. Nothing herein shall relieve such licensed surveyor or person from liability for actual damages caused by such entry upon such other property.
(P.A. 89-310, S. 1; P.A. 92-74, S. 2, 7; P.A. 14-134, S. 6.)
History: P.A. 92-74 amended section to require surveyor or person acting at the direction of surveyor to obtain railroad company's written permission before entering upon any land owned by it which is within 50 feet of a railroad track; P.A. 14-134 replaced reference to Sec. 16-1 with reference to Sec. 13b-199, effective June 6, 2014.
Cited. 238 C. 653; Id., 687.
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Sec. 52-557p. (Formerly Sec. 52-577p). Assumption of risk by person engaged in recreational equestrian activities, when. Each person engaged in recreational equestrian activities shall assume the risk and legal responsibility for any injury to his person or property arising out of the hazards inherent in equestrian sports, unless the injury was proximately caused by the negligence of the person providing the horse or horses to the individual engaged in recreational equestrian activities or the failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity by the person providing the horse or horses or his agents or employees.
(P.A. 93-286, S. 1.)
History: Sec. 52-577p transferred to Sec. 52-557p in 1997.
Protection granted by statute does not permit operator of horseback riding facility to avoid liability entirely for its negligence or its employees' negligence; the release plaintiff signed broadly indemnifying facility's operators from liability for damages resulting from operators' own negligence was a contract of adhesion and invalid as it violates public policy and is not in the public interest. 280 C. 153.
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Sec. 52-557q. Immunity from liability of broadcaster that broadcasts emergency alert and information concerning child abduction. Immunity from liability of outdoor advertising establishment. No claim for damages shall be made against a broadcaster, as defined in subsection (k) of section 12-218, or an outdoor advertising establishment, as described in the United States Department of Labor Standard Industrial Classification System Code 7312, that, pursuant to a voluntary program between broadcasters and law enforcement agencies, or between law enforcement agencies and outdoor advertising establishments, broadcasts or disseminates an emergency alert and information provided by a law enforcement agency concerning the abduction of a child, including, but not limited to, a description of the abducted child, a description of the suspected abductor and the circumstances of the abduction. Nothing in this section shall be construed to (1) limit or restrict in any way any legal protection a broadcaster or outdoor advertising establishment may have under any other law for broadcasting, outdoor advertising or otherwise disseminating any information, or (2) relieve a law enforcement agency from acting reasonably in providing information to the broadcaster or outdoor advertising establishment.
(P.A. 03-111, S. 1; P.A. 05-210, S. 33; P.A. 06-196, S. 183; Dec. Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-1, S. 46.)
History: P.A. 05-210 provided immunity for outdoor advertising establishment; P.A. 06-196 made technical changes, effective June 7, 2006; Dec. Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-1 replaced reference to Sec. 12-218(l) with reference to Sec. 12-218(k), effective January 1, 2016.
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Sec. 52-557r. Immunity from liability of fire department for installation or delivery of smoke and carbon monoxide detectors. (a) For the purposes of this section “fire department” includes any municipal fire department, independent fire department, fire district, independent fire company, volunteer fire department and any member thereof; “device” includes any battery-operated or plug-in smoke detector, carbon monoxide detector, or combination smoke and carbon monoxide detector; and “installation” does not include the alteration or installation of electrical wiring.
(b) A fire department that delivers to, or installs at, residential premises a device or batteries for such a device shall not be liable for civil damages for personal injury, wrongful death, property damage or other loss, provided (1) such installation was done in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions, and (2) such installation or delivery was in such department's official capacity.
(c) Any device delivered or installed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall be new and shall meet all applicable current safety and manufacturing standards.
(d) Any fire department that delivers or installs a device in accordance with this section shall keep records documenting every such delivery or installation for not less than five years after such delivery or installation.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect the obligations and duties of the owner or occupier of the residential premises receiving such delivery or installation services.
(P.A. 09-78, S. 1.)
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Sec. 52-557s. Liability of owner or keeper of horse, pony, donkey or mule. (a) In any civil action brought against the owner or keeper of any horse, pony, donkey or mule to recover damages for any personal injury allegedly caused by such horse, pony, donkey or mule, such horse, pony, donkey or mule shall not be found to belong to a species that possesses a naturally mischievous or vicious propensity.
(b) In any civil action brought against the owner or keeper of any horse, pony, donkey or mule to recover damages for any personal injury allegedly caused by such horse, pony, donkey or mule, there shall be a presumption that such horse, pony, donkey or mule did not have a propensity to engage in behavior that would foreseeably cause injury to humans. Such presumption may be rebutted by evidence that such horse, pony, donkey or mule previously exhibited behavior that put the owner or keeper of such horse, pony, donkey or mule on notice that such horse, pony, donkey or mule had a propensity to engage in the behavior that allegedly caused such personal injury.
(c) There shall be no cause of action for strict liability brought against the owner of any horse, pony, donkey or mule to recover damages for any personal injury alleged to be caused by such horse, pony, donkey or mule.
(P.A. 14-54, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 14-54 effective May 28, 2014.
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Sec. 52-557t. Absolute defense to civil action resulting from good faith report of an act of threatening. Any individual who reports an act of threatening described in subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of section 53a-61aa shall have an absolute defense to any civil action brought as a result of having made such report, provided such individual exercised due care when making such report and at all times acted in good faith while making such report.
(P.A. 16-67, S. 9.)
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Sec. 52-557u. Entering the passenger motor vehicle of another to remove child or animal from vehicle. Affirmative defense against civil damages and criminal penalties, when. (a) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, a person who enters the passenger motor vehicle of another, including entry by force, to remove a child or animal from the passenger motor vehicle shall have an affirmative defense against any civil damages or criminal penalties resulting from the acts or omissions by such person in removing the child or animal from the passenger motor vehicle, if such person:
(1) Has a reasonable belief, at the time such person enters the passenger motor vehicle, that such entry is necessary to remove the child or animal from imminent danger of serious bodily injury;
(2) Uses no more force than reasonably necessary under the circumstances to enter the passenger motor vehicle to remove the child or animal from imminent danger of serious bodily injury based upon the circumstances known by such person at the time;
(3) Reports the entry and the circumstances surrounding such entry to a law enforcement agency or other public safety agency within a reasonable period of time after entering the passenger motor vehicle; and
(4) Takes reasonable steps to ensure the safety, health and well-being of the child or animal after removing the child or animal from the passenger motor vehicle.
(b) The affirmative defense provided in subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.
(c) Nothing in this section shall affect a person's civil liability if the person attempts to render aid to the child or animal in addition to the aid that is authorized under this section.
(d) The provisions of this section are not exclusive, and the affirmative defense shall be in addition to any other defenses or immunities provided by state or federal law or which are available under common law.
(e) As used in this section, “passenger motor vehicle” has the same meaning as provided in section 14-1 and “public safety agency” has the same meaning as provided in section 28-25.
(P.A. 17-134, S. 1; P.A. 18-164, S. 16.)
History: P.A. 18-164 amended Subsecs. (a) and (c) to add “or animal”.
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Sec. 52-557v. Immunity from liability of the state, political subdivisions and employees for emergency administration of epinephrine cartridge injector. (a) A person (1) employed to work for the state or any political subdivision thereof that has acquired and maintains a supply of epinephrine cartridge injectors, (2) who is trained in the use of an epinephrine cartridge injector in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 19a-909, and (3) provides or administers an epinephrine cartridge injector to an individual whom the person believes in good faith is experiencing anaphylaxis during the course of such person's employment, shall not be liable to such individual for civil damages or subject to criminal prosecution for any personal injuries that result from acts or omissions by such person in using an epinephrine cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection shall not apply to wilful or wanton misconduct or acts or omissions constituting gross negligence.
(b) The state or any political subdivision thereof that (1) has acquired and maintains a supply of epinephrine cartridge injectors, and (2) employs a person who (A) is trained in the use of an epinephrine cartridge injector in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 19a-909, and (B) provides or administers an epinephrine cartridge injector to an individual whom the person believes in good faith is experiencing anaphylaxis during the course of such person's employment, shall not be liable to such individual for civil damages for any personal injuries that result from acts or omissions by such person in using an epinephrine cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection shall not apply to wilful or wanton misconduct or acts or omissions constituting gross negligence.
(P.A. 19-19, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 19-19 effective June 13, 2019.
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Sec. 52-558. Liability for placing obstructions in highway. When any person places or keeps building materials, or any obstacle, in any highway, either with or without a license therefor from the town, city or borough in which such highway is situated, he shall pay to such town, city or borough all costs and damages which it sustains or is compelled to pay by reason thereof.
(1949 Rev., S. 8299.)
Open sewer box on sidewalk not an obstacle. 91 C. 255. Allowing water to flow from building and freeze on sidewalk. 104 C. 508. Gasoline from abutter's filling station making sidewalk unsafe. 108 C. 198. Imposes liability upon an abutting owner who, while not placing an obstruction in a highway, allows it to remain there. 134 C. 322.
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Sec. 52-559. Damage for spreading fire. Any person who sets fire on any land, that runs upon the land of any other person, shall pay to the owner all damages done by such fire.
(1949 Rev., S. 8300.)
See Sec. 23-48 re penalty for kindling fire in the open without proper authorization.
See Sec. 23-49a re burning ban, special burning permits and penalties for violation of ban.
If fire was originally set on plaintiff's land, by one occupying it under a license, he is not within statute. 25 C. 170. Fire need not be proved to have run continuously on the ground from one lot to the other. 30 C. 306. Proof of negligence is not required; 54 C. 461; but if defendant did not cause to be set or himself set fire, he is not liable under statute; nor at common law for negligence unless negligence is shown. 100 C. 701. Fire marshal, not having authority to start fire, may not claim governmental immunity. 119 C. 599. Not enough to warrant recovery that fire causing plaintiff's loss originated on defendant's land but must have been set by, or caused to be set by, defendant. 149 C. 170. Fire must have not only originated on defendant's land, but it must have been set by defendant or caused by him to be set; the affirmative act of causing the fire is required. 150 C. 432.
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Sec. 52-560. Damages for cutting trees, timber or shrubbery. Exclusion. Any person who cuts, destroys or carries away any trees, timber or shrubbery, standing or lying on the land of another or on public land, except on land subject to the provisions of section 52-560a, without license of the owner, and any person who aids therein, shall pay to the party injured five times the reasonable value of any tree intended for sale or use as a Christmas tree and three times the reasonable value of any other tree, timber or shrubbery; but, when the court is satisfied that the defendant was guilty through mistake and believed that the tree, timber or shrubbery was growing on his land, or on the land of the person for whom he cut the tree, timber or shrubbery, it shall render judgment for no more than its reasonable value.
(1949 Rev., S. 8301; 1961, P.A. 548; 1963, P.A. 123; P.A. 06-89, S. 2.)
History: 1961 act substituted terms “shrubbery” for “underwood” and “public land” for “town commons,” eliminated separate provision for trees less than one foot in diameter, specified all provisions apply to trees, timber or shrubbery damaged, stipulated value, for determining damages, be reasonable value, deleting term “true” value in last clause and added provision for one cutting timber, etc., for another; 1963 act added provision re Christmas tree; P.A. 06-89 added exclusion re land subject to provisions of Sec. 52-560a.
See Secs. 53a-115 to 53a-117a, inclusive, re criminal mischief.
Increased damages are allowed not as a penalty but as compensation for the injury to landowner. 74 C. 134; 87 C. 468. Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Nature of right given; possession of land by plaintiff necessary element. 90 C. 576. Burden of proving honest mistake under statute rests on defendant. 105 C. 368. Cited. 125 C. 331. Not a penal statute; damages may be, and generally are, compensatory in nature; it is jury's duty, if defendant is found liable, to treble the value of trees. 134 C. 592. Proof of title and absence of actual, exclusive possession by another are sufficient to show constructive possession. 136 C. 597. Cited. 185 C. 195. Trial court properly determined that replacement cost of trees was not a proper measure of damages. 275 C. 105.
In order to recover treble damages under statute, the complaint must clearly state that the claim for relief is based upon the statutory remedy. 1 CA 303. Cited. 43 CA 1; 45 CA 56. Replacement cost of destroyed trees is not a proper measure of damages under section. 75 CA 781. Does not preempt the field of remedies, but rather provides for an enhancement of common-law damages by providing for treble damages in certain circumstances. 131 CA 306; judgment affirmed, see 309 C. 62. Award of damages for cost of cleaning up and screening property with new trees was improper where plaintiff only introduced evidence of replacement cost of trees, rather than proper measure of damages such as market value of severed trees or diminution in real property value. 133 CA 572. Section does not provide for attorney's fees or punitive damages. 134 CA 538. An action under section is an action in trespass with a prescribed measure of recovery of damages; plaintiff cannot recover if defendant had license or permission of the owner; failure to prove elements of the underlying trespass dooms an action under section. 170 CA 459.
For mitigation of treble damages provision, requirement is that defendant be “guilty through mistake” and believe that “timber was growing on his own land”; requirements are not in the alternative; legislative history of section. 22 CS 195. The true measure of damages is the reasonable market value of a severed tree or the diminution of the value of the land because of its loss; evidence of replacement cost of a tree and a charge to the jury this could be “reasonable value” was error. 31 CS 536.
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Sec. 52-560a. Damages for encroachment on state, municipal or nonprofit land conservation organization open space land. Attorney General enforcement. Civil action. (a) As used in this section, “open space land” includes, but is not limited to, any park, forest, wildlife management area, refuge, preserve, sanctuary, green or wildlife area owned by the state, a political subdivision of the state or a nonprofit land conservation organization and “encroach” means to conduct an activity that causes damage or alteration to the land or vegetation or other features thereon, including, but not limited to, erecting buildings or other structures, constructing roads, driveways or trails, destroying or moving stone walls, cutting trees or other vegetation, removing boundary markers, installing lawns or utilities, or using, storing, or depositing vehicles, materials or debris.
(b) No person may encroach or cause another person to encroach on open space land or on any land for which the state, a political subdivision of the state or a nonprofit land conservation organization holds a conservation easement interest, without the permission of the owner of such open space land or holder of such conservation easement or without other legal authorization.
(c) Any owner of open space land or holder of a conservation easement subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section or the Attorney General may bring an action in the superior court for the judicial district where the land is located against any person who violates the provisions of said subsection with respect to such owner's land or land subject to such conservation easement. The court shall order any person who violates the provisions of subsection (b) of this section to restore the land to its condition as it existed prior to such violation or shall award the landowner the costs of such restoration, including reasonable management costs necessary to achieve such restoration. In addition, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs and such injunctive or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
(d) In addition to any damages and relief ordered pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the court may award damages of up to five times the cost of restoration or statutory damages of up to five thousand dollars. In determining the amount of the award, the court shall consider the willfulness of the violation, the extent of damage done to natural resources, if any, the appraised value of any trees or shrubs cut, damaged, or carried away as determined in accordance with the latest revision of The Guide for Plant Appraisal, as published by the International Society of Arboriculture, Urbana, Illinois, or a succeeding publisher, any economic gain realized by the violator and any other relevant factors.
(P.A. 06-89, S. 1.)
Provision permitting injunctive and equitable relief authorized trial court to order a restoration plan that went beyond restoration of the property to its condition prior to defendant's violation of conservation restriction; attorney's fees were improperly awarded for plaintiff's proceedings before the wetlands commission, but properly awarded for the declaratory judgment portion of the court action due to provision allowing for attorney's fees in any action in which relief is granted. 325 C. 737. The trial court's punitive damages award was not compliant with Subsec. (d) after the court revised the initial restoration plan because, with no evidence of the cost of the plan, the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages became unknown. Id.
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Sec. 52-561. Trespass to lands without color of right. Section 52-561 is repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 8302; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 57; P.A. 81-410, S. 14.)
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Sec. 52-561a. Damage by domestic fowls. Any owner or keeper of domestic fowls who allows them to trespass upon the premises of another person shall be liable to the owner or occupant of such premises for all damage done by such fowls.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 49.)
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Sec. 52-562. Liability for fraud in contracting debt; concealing property. When any person is guilty of fraud in contracting a debt, or conceals, removes or conveys away any part of his property, with intent to prevent it from being taken by legal process, or refuses to pay any debt admitted by him or established by a valid judgment, while having property, not exempt from execution, sufficient to discharge the debt, concealed or withheld by him so that the property cannot be taken by legal process, or refuses to disclose his rights of action, with intent to prevent the rights of action from being taken by foreign attachment or garnishment, any creditor aggrieved thereby may institute an action against him, setting forth his debt and the fraudulent act or acts particularly in the complaint.
(1949 Rev., S. 8303; P.A. 81-410, S. 11; P.A. 82-160, S. 231.)
History: P.A. 81-410 eliminated provision re body attachment and execution; P.A. 82-160 replaced “estate” with “property”, added “or garnishment” after “foreign attachment” and rephrased the section.
See Sec. 52-279 re conditions under which attachment may be granted.
Statute creates a new remedy. 19 C. 545. What constitutes a fraudulent concealment or withdrawal of property. 25 C. 368. Amount of the debt is ordinarily the rule of damages. 30 C. 413. Subsequent proceedings in insolvency, or insolvency in fact, no defense. Id., 412; 38 C. 76. Declaration. Id. Defense of offer of payment by note. Id., 77. Complaint held insufficient to show statutory fraud. 41 C. 241. Cited. Id., 301. Defendant held liable for refusing to disclose to officer the names of his debtors. 46 C. 270. A preconceived design not to pay for goods bought on credit is not essential to constitute fraud. 55 C. 277. Complaint charging a violation of statute, and on which defendant's body has been attached, cannot be amended by adding count in contract; 63 C. 370; 105 C. 679; nor is another action pending seeking recovery for same debt under common counts a ground for abatement. Id., 683. Refusal to find fraud held warranted on writ of error. 108 C. 94. History of statutes concerning body attachments and executions. 111 C. 229. Cited. 114 C. 53; 134 C. 207. Requires that fraudulent acts be specifically set up in complaint; evidence held to sustain ruling of not guilty of fraud. 136 C. 222.
Cited. 12 CS 106. Not enough to prove a debt under section; fraud must also be proved. 16 CS 158. Cited. 35 CS 130.
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Sec. 52-563. Liability for waste by tenant for life or years. Any person who, having no greater interest in real property than an estate for years, or for life, created by the act of the parties and not by the act of the law, commits waste upon the premises, beyond what tenants for years or life created by operation of law may do, shall be liable to the party injured in an action on this section, unless he was expressly authorized, by the contract under which the interest is created, to do the acts complained of.
(1949 Rev., S. 8304; P.A. 82-160, S. 232.)
History: P.A. 82-160 replaced “estate” with “property” and made a minor technical change.
If tenant for life cuts fruit trees, it is waste. 24 C. 357. An estate created by devise is within statute. Id., 356. Whether tenant of life estate created by will is liable for waste depends upon terms of will. 45 C. 527. Mortgagee not liable for waste. 46 C. 213. Waste by one having dower interest. 84 C. 202. Life tenant may be liable under section to pay damages to owner for either voluntary or permissive waste before termination of the tenancy. 220 C. 170.
Term “waste” relates to real estate and does not relate to personalty. 5 CS 502.
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Sec. 52-563a. Transferred to Chapter 827, Sec. 47-121.
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Sec. 52-564. Treble damages for theft. Any person who steals any property of another, or knowingly receives and conceals stolen property, shall pay the owner treble his damages.
(1949 Rev., S. 8305; 1963, P.A. 99.)
History: 1963 act provided recovery be treble damages rather than treble the value of the property stolen.
See chapter 952, part IX, re larceny, robbery and related offenses.
In a public prosecution for theft, the court will not on conviction award treble damages to the owner. 6 C. 105. Plaintiff not bound to prove his case “beyond a reasonable doubt”. 30 C. 103. Rules of evidence are the same as in any civil suit. Id., 556. Not a penal statute. 74 C. 135; 87 C. 468. Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Statutory treble damages discussed. 188 C. 36. Cited. 206 C. 125; 216 C. 200; 236 C. 582; 241 C. 678. Statutory theft under section is synonymous with larceny as provided in Sec. 53a-119; statutory theft requires that defendant wrongfully take, obtain or hold property of another. 255 C. 20. Preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applies to statutory theft claims brought under section. 297 C. 26. The litigation privilege applies to bar plaintiff's statutory theft claim. 341 C. 1.
Cited. 1 CA 303; 8 CA 96; 11 CA 161; 18 CA 20; 33 CA 303; 37 CA 7; 42 CA 599; 43 CA 1; 45 CA 46; Id., 324. Statute synonymous with larceny under Sec. 53a-119. 47 CA 517. Liability for conversion is a precondition to finding of liability for treble damages under section. 86 CA 527. Because count of plaintiff's complaint alleging civil theft is devoid of any factual assertion that defendants acted with the requisite intent to permanently deprive plaintiff of her property, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for civil theft, and count is legally insufficient. 99 CA 719. Plaintiff is required to prove the actions alleged by clear and convincing evidence in order to be entitled to an award of treble damages. 112 CA 160; judgment reversed in part, see 297 C. 26. In order to prove liability under section, plaintiff only had to show that defendant engaged in conduct that was synonymous with larceny, and was not required to show that the funds had been stolen by defendant or anyone else; given defendant's knowledge concerning source and disposition of funds in question, his continued failure to return funds constituted an intentional decision on his part to deprive plaintiff of its use of funds. 136 CA 99. The essential elements plaintiffs must prove to obtain treble damages for civil theft are the same as the elements to prove larceny: (1) An intent to do the act complained of, (2) the act was done wrongfully, and (3) the act was committed against an owner. 138 CA 695. Benefit on behalf of defendant is not an element of statutory theft; an intent to deprive plaintiff of funds could be inferred from fact that defendant withdrew funds that were not used for the benefit of the beneficiary and the trust had been exhausted. 139 CA 794. Injunctive relief is not a remedy available under section and since plaintiffs have made no tuition payments there is no loss of property; no theft can occur absent the loss of property. 191 CA 360. A claim for civil theft of funds must be for specific identifiable money and cannot arise from an implied contract of unjust enrichment. 196 CA 583. There is no basis for precluding the application of absolute immunity to a statutory theft claim that does not challenge the underlying purpose of the litigation but, instead, challenges the alleged misconduct of the defendant in his role as an attorney on behalf of his client; Public policy does not support permitting claims of statutory theft against attorneys, as it would inhibit participation and candor in judicial proceedings, and have a chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship and on an attorney's zealous representation of his or her client. 198 CA 197; judgment affirmed, see 341 C. 1.
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Sec. 52-564a. Liability for shoplifting. (a) Any person eighteen years of age or older or an emancipated minor who takes possession of goods or merchandise displayed or offered for sale by any mercantile establishment, or who takes from any real property any agricultural produce kept, grown or raised on the property for purposes of sale, without the consent of the owner and with the intention of converting such goods, merchandise or produce to his own use without having paid the purchase price thereof, or who alters the price indicia of such goods or merchandise, shall be liable in a civil action to the owner of the goods, merchandise or produce for (1) the actual and reasonable costs of maintaining the action, including court costs and a reasonable attorney's fee, (2) the retail value of the goods, merchandise or produce taken, if not recovered by the time of the commencement of the action or if recovered in an unmerchantable condition, and (3) punitive damages in an amount not to exceed three hundred dollars.
(b) A conviction of larceny by shoplifting, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-119, shall not be a condition precedent to the maintenance of a civil action under this section.
(c) In any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, if the plaintiff does not prevail, the court may award to the defendant his costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and damages not to exceed three hundred dollars.
(d) No action shall be brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section but within two years from the date of the act complained of.
(P.A. 90-197; 90-282, S. 5.)
History: P.A. 90-282 added Subsec. (d) to impose two-year deadline for bringing action.
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Sec. 52-565. Double damages for forgery. Any person who falsely makes, alters, forges or counterfeits any document, or knowingly utters, as true, any document falsely made, altered, forged or counterfeited, shall pay double damages to any party injured thereby.
(1949 Rev., S. 8306.)
See Secs. 53a-137 to 53a-140, inclusive, re forgery.
Not a penal statute. 1 D. 100; 74 C. 136; 87 C. 468. Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Cited. 205 C. 93; 236 C. 582.
Cited. 11 CA 161; 41 CA 659; 43 CA 1.
An agent may commit forgery by making or signing an instrument in disobedience of his instructions or by exceeding his authority. 24 CS 498.
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Sec. 52-565a. Liability of drawer for dishonored check. Service charge on drawer for dishonored check. (a) A drawer negotiating a check who knows or should know that payment of such check will be refused by the drawee bank either because the drawer has no account with such bank or because the drawer has insufficient funds on deposit with such bank shall be liable to the payee for damages, in addition to the face amount of the check, provided the payee has presented such check for payment, the check is dishonored and the drawer fails to pay the face amount of such check within thirty days following the date of mailing by the payee of the written demand for payment as provided in subsection (f) of this section.
(b) In the case of a drawer negotiating a check who knows or should know that payment of such check will be refused by the drawee bank because the drawer has no account with such bank, such damages shall be in an amount to be determined by the court in light of the circumstances, but in no event shall such amount be greater than the face amount of the check or seven hundred fifty dollars, whichever is less.
(c) In the case of a drawer negotiating a check who knows or should know that payment of such check will be refused by the drawee bank because the drawer has insufficient funds on deposit with such bank, such damages shall be in an amount to be determined by the court in light of the circumstances, but in no event shall such amount be greater than the face amount of the check or four hundred dollars, whichever is less.
(d) The drawer shall not be liable to the payee for the damages provided for by this section if: (1) The drawer gave such check as payment for residential service supplied by a gas, electric, steam, telephone or water utility; (2) the drawer gave such check as payment for the rental of residential premises; or (3) the drawer gave such check as repayment of all, or a portion of, a debt secured by collateral which the payee has repossessed.
(e) The damages provided for in this section shall be available only to those persons or entities which post or otherwise give conspicuous notice to the public of the damages which may be imposed pursuant to this section. Such notice shall set forth: (1) The damages that may be imposed if a check is dishonored; (2) the section of the general statutes authorizing imposition of such damages; and (3) that criminal penalties also may apply.
(f) The written demand for payment on the dishonored check shall be in the form prescribed by subsection (g) of this section and shall be sent to the drawer's last-known residence address or last-known place of business (1) by first class mail and certified mail return receipt requested with delivery restricted to the drawer, or (2) by first class mail or regular mail supported by an affidavit of service by mail. Such written demand for payment shall be sent on or after the date the payee received notice that such check had been dishonored. Such affidavit of service by mail shall provide substantially as follows:
| } |
...., being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states that he/she is of legal age and that on (date) ...., 20.., he/she served the attached Written Demand for Payment, by placing a true and correct copy thereof securely enclosed in an envelope addressed as follows:
....
....
....
....
and deposited the same, with postage prepaid, in the United States mails at ...., .... .
....
(Signature)
Subscribed and sworn to before me this .... day of ...., 20.. .
....
Notary Public
.... County, ....
(SEAL)
(g) The written demand for payment required by subsection (f) of this section shall be printed in at least ten-point type in both English and Spanish and shall include the following: (1) The name and last-known address of the drawer; (2) the amount and date of the dishonored check; (3) the bank upon which the check was drawn; (4) the name of the payee; (5) the reason the check was dishonored; (6) the address to which payment should be delivered; and (7) an explanation of the damages which may be imposed pursuant to this section in the event the drawer fails to pay the face amount of the dishonored check.
(h) The penalties provided for in this section shall not apply to any check for which payment has been stopped by the drawer or to any check where the drawer has raised a reasonable defense with respect to the validity of the underlying debt.
(i) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, in the case of a drawer who negotiates a check which is dishonored, the payee or its assignee may impose on the drawer a service charge of up to twenty dollars, provided, no such service charge may be imposed if (1) the drawer has stopped payment on the check, (2) the check was stolen, or (3) the drawer has raised a reasonable defense with respect to the validity of the underlying debt. The drawer shall not be liable under this subsection for more than one such service charge for each dishonored check.
(P.A. 86-248; P.A. 97-207, S. 2; P.A. 98-77; P.A. 03-196, S. 19.)
History: P.A. 97-207 added new Subsec. (i) re service charge for dishonored check; P.A. 98-77 deleted provisions requiring the payee to send a second written demand for payment to the drawer and specifying the form, content and manner of delivery of such second demand; P.A. 03-196 amended Subsec. (f) by inserting subdivision designators, making a technical change in Subdiv. (1) and adding provisions and form in Subdiv. (2) to allow written demand for payment on dishonored check to be sent by first class mail or regular mail supported by an affidavit of service by mail.
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Sec. 52-566. Treble damages for wilful removal or destruction of bridge. Any person who wilfully removes or destroys any part of any bridge, or of its approaches, shall pay treble damages to the owner thereof or to the party bound to maintain it.
(1949 Rev., S. 8307; P.A. 82-160, S. 233.)
History: P.A. 82-160 made minor change in wording.
See Secs. 53a-115 to 53a-117a, inclusive, re criminal mischief.
Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Not a penal statute. 87 C. 468. Owned construed to include truck loaned to state by federal government. 163 C. 576. Requirement and definition of “wilfulness” discussed. 189 C. 671.
Cited. 43 CA 1.
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Sec. 52-567. Treble damages for injury to milestone, guidepost or railing. Any person who pulls down or injures any milestone, guidepost or other monument for the direction of travelers, or any railing lawfully erected on any causeway or public road for safety of travelers, shall pay to the owner thereof treble damages.
(1949 Rev., S. 8308.)
See Secs. 53a-115 to 53a-117a, inclusive, re criminal mischief.
Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Not a penal statute. 87 C. 468.
Cited. 43 CA 1.
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Sec. 52-568. Damages for groundless or vexatious suit or defense. Any person who commences and prosecutes any civil action or complaint against another, in his own name or the name of others, or asserts a defense to any civil action or complaint commenced and prosecuted by another (1) without probable cause, shall pay such other person double damages, or (2) without probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble such other person, shall pay him treble damages.
(1949 Rev., S. 8309; P.A. 82-160, S. 234; P.A. 86-338, S. 9; P.A. 87-526, S. 1, 5; P.A. 93-191, S. 3, 4.)
History: P.A. 82-160 substituted “civil action” for “suit”; P.A. 86-338 made section applicable to any person who asserts a defense to an action or complaint and added provision requiring payment of double damages if an action is commenced or defense is asserted without probable cause; P.A. 87-526 added Subsec. (b), authorizing public agency to bring court action against person prosecuting freedom of information commission appeals found by commission to be frivolous, unreasonable and harassing; P.A. 93-191 deleted provisions authorizing court action against persons who brought frivolous, unreasonable or harassing appeals to the freedom of information commission, effective July 1, 1993.
See Sec. 1-241 re court action against persons who bring frivolous, unreasonable or harassing appeals to the Freedom of Information Commission.
See Sec. 52-226a re request for special finding.
Action lies at common law; 11 C. 586; but cannot be joined with count on statute. Id., 587. Joinder of plaintiffs. K. 146. Both malice and want of probable cause must be proved. 21 C. 515; 102 C. 444; 107 C. 294; 108 C. 40. “Malice” defined; may be inferred. 9 C. 313. Evidence of want of probable cause. 3 D. 432. Special damages. 2 D. 211. Excessive damages. 9 C. 313. Action for vexatious suit will lie against a private corporation. 22 C. 535. Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Not a penal statute. 87 C. 468. Judgment in original action against plaintiff conclusive that it was not vexatious. 75 C. 637. Malice as a necessary element; evidence to prove; 69 C. 512; 86 C. 6; Id., 250; 91 C. 448; 102 C. 439; 105 C. 177; 107 C. 294; advice of counsel as rebutting. 70 C. 235; 107 C. 295. Damages. 69 C. 512; 84 C. 111; 86 C. 249; 91 C. 448; 102 C. 439. Various matters of evidence considered. 90 C. 545; 105 C. 177. Probable cause a defense; what constitutes. 93 C. 475; 105 C. 177; 107 C. 295. May not base action on statute for malicious prosecution of suit in New York. 110 C. 534. Whether particular facts constitute probable cause is always a question of law; conclusion of trier is reviewable on appeal. 132 C. 571. Cited. 176 C. 353; 205 C. 255; 214 C. 1; 220 C. 225; 224 C. 29. Statute applies equally to claims against private litigants and attorneys and does not suggest any basis for treating probable cause differently depending on the type of defendant against whom the action is brought, and therefore in a vexatious litigation action against a law firm, the presence or absence of probable cause should be judged by the general objective standard. 281 C. 84. Congress has occupied the field of penalties and sanctions for abuse of the bankruptcy process, implicitly preempting state law CUTPA and vexatious litigation claims; in field of bankruptcy law, the federal interest is so dominant that federal law is assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the subject, and even though state law actions are not in conflict with federal law, the former are still preempted under conflict preemption analysis because they are an obstacle to accomplishing Congress' purposes within the Bankruptcy Code. 333 C. 1.
Cited. 43 CA 1. Discussed re District Court ruling on evidence of reasonableness in pursuing a claim and “advice of counsel” defense. 49 CA 582. Plaintiff's vexatious litigation claim based on defendant's filing of an adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court is preempted by federal bankruptcy law that provides sanctions for filing frivolous and malicious pleadings. 86 CA 596. Court adopted Indiana Court of Appeals' articulation of objective standard of probable cause: Standard which should govern the reasonableness of attorney's action in instituting litigation for a client is whether claim merits litigation against defendant in question on the basis of facts known to the attorney when suit is commenced; on the basis of the facts known to the law firm, a reasonable attorney familiar with the law of this state would believe that applicable statutes of limitation could be tolled by fraudulent concealment on the part of Retirement Centers. 89 CA 459. Prejudgment remedy is not a civil action for purposes of vexatious litigation. 100 CA 63. Statutory action for vexatious litigation differs from a common-law action only in that a finding of malice is not an essential element, but will serve as a basis for higher damages; trial court properly concluded that law firm did not have a proper purpose in filing a shareholder litigation suit pursuant to Sec. 33-948 to permit inspection of corporate records, where stock repurchase offer had expired prior to filing of suit. 103 CA 20. Vexatious litigation counterclaim by defendant was premature where the original lawsuit had not yet been terminated in defendant's favor at the time of pleading. 110 CA 511. Trial court's determination that certificate of good faith that was attempted to be filed in malpractice action was insufficient did not equate to determination that there was lack of probable cause to bring such action; court's finding of blatant and egregious conduct did not collaterally estop party from litigating in vexatious litigation action the question of whether there was probable cause to bring malpractice action against hospital. 144 CA 100. All counts of the underlying action must be favorably terminated for a vexatious litigation claim to be ripe. 148 CA 176. Subdivs. (1) and (2) do not constitute two separate and distinct causes of action; to prevail under either Subdiv., plaintiff must prove four elements by preponderance of evidence. 156 CA 854.
Elements of a vexatious suit. 14 CS 293. In an action for vexatious suit, plaintiff must show that the suit complained of terminated in his favor and that there was want of probable cause; where defendants showed they had knowledge of facts sufficient to justify reasonable men in the belief that there were reasonable grounds for commencing and prosecuting the original action, there was no want of probable cause. 22 CS 272. Section relates only to vexatious suit and has no application to malicious prosecution. 24 CS 256. Complaint in action for vexatious suit must contain allegation prior suit terminated in plaintiff's favor. 31 CS 305.
Vexatious suit may be brought as cause of action created by statute in which treble damages may be awarded or may be instituted under common law in which case damages must be compensatory only. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 666.
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Sec. 52-568a. Damages for groundless or vexatious suit against the owner or operator of a “pick or cut your own agricultural operation”. Any person or any attorney who represents such person, who commences any civil action or complaint, in his own name or the name of others, against the owner or operator of a “pick or cut your own agricultural operation” (1) without probable cause, shall pay such owner or operator double damages, including, in the discretion of the court, costs and attorney's fees, or (2) without probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble such owner or operator, shall pay such owner or operator treble damages including, in the discretion of the court, costs and attorney's fees. As used in this section, “pick or cut your own agricultural operation” means a farm to whom the Department of Revenue Services has issued a farmer tax exemption permit under subdivision (63) of section 12-412 that allows any person to enter such farm for the purpose of agricultural harvesting, including the cutting of Christmas trees. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or abrogate the provisions of section 52-568.
(P.A. 97-179, S. 11.)
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Sec. 52-569. Damages for leaving open bars, gate or fence. Any person who wilfully and unlawfully throws down or leaves open any bars, gate or fence, belonging to any particular enclosure or common field, shall pay to the party injured double damages, and a sum not exceeding five dollars, according to the nature and aggravation of the trespass.
(1949 Rev., S. 8310; P.A. 82-160, S. 235.)
History: P.A. 82-160 substituted “wilfully” for “wittingly”.
See Sec. 53a-109 re criminal trespass in the third degree.
See Sec. 53a-115 to 53a-117a, inclusive, re criminal mischief.
Penalty is recoverable though act be done under claim of right. 44 C. 359.
Cited. 43 CA 1.
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Sec. 52-570. Action for malicious erection of structure. An action may be maintained by the proprietor of any land against the owner or lessee of land adjacent, who maliciously erects any structure thereon, with intent to annoy or injure the plaintiff in his use or disposition of his land.
(1949 Rev., S. 8311.)
See Sec. 52-480 re injunction against malicious erection of structure.
What constitutes “malice” and evidence of it; 75 C. 424; a question of fact ordinarily not reviewable. 82 C. 290. Court rejected defendant's argument that the effect of this section and Sec. 52-480 is to create for plaintiff an unlawful visual easement across defendant's land. 174 C. 29.
Cited. 43 CA 1; 46 CA 164.
Elements necessary to state a cause of action under section enumerated. 21 CS 110. Testimony credible that fence was erected, in part, for legitimate purpose of safeguarding children and dogs; essential elements of cause of action under section are (1) structure erected on defendant's land, (2) malicious erection of structure, (3) intent to injure enjoyment of adjacent landowner's land by erection of structure, (4) impairment of value of adjacent land because of structure, (5) structure is useless to defendant, and (6) enjoyment of adjacent landowner's land is in fact impaired. 51 CS 399.
Provides legal remedy for structures erected with intention to annoy and injure plaintiff's use of premises. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 427, 428.
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Sec. 52-570a. (Formerly Sec. 52-202). Action against fiduciary. (a) If any person has a legal claim against any executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, on account of moneys paid or services rendered for the estate administered by the executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, and which should justly be paid out of the estate, the claimant may bring a civil action against the executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, while in office, or against the successor of any of them, if such fiduciary has ceased to hold office.
(b) If the claim is found to be a just one and one which ought to be equitably paid out of the estate, judgment may be rendered in favor of the claimant, to be paid wholly out of the estate held by the executor, administrator, guardian or trustee.
(c) If there is not sufficient estate to satisfy the claim or claims in the possession of the executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, this section shall not be construed to prevent any claimant from pursuing his legal remedy against the executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, at his election, for the balance that may be due him, nor from electing to hold any such official liable to his personal responsibility for any debt contracted in the execution of the trust.
(1949 Rev., S. 7954; P.A. 82-160, S. 221.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; Sec. 52-202 transferred to Sec. 52-570a in 1983.
Annotations to former section 52-202:
Statute does not apply to expenses incurred by claimant in an unsuccessful will contest. 53 C. 116. If statute applies to conservators, it certainly cannot be invoked in a proceeding to which he is in no way a party. 72 C. 172; 93 C. 37. Does not include action for fraud of administrator in selling land of estate. 77 C. 63. Expenses incurred by executors carrying on business. 106 C. 616; 114 C. 692. Cited. 129 C. 582; 130 C. 601. Proceeds from wrongful death action do not become general assets of the estate subject to claim against administrator. 147 C. 233. Word “guardian” does not include conservator. 155 C. 121. Permits trustee to be sued but does not apply to equitable actions and applies only to those who have incurred expenses and are executors, administrators, guardians or trustees. 160 C. 415.
Trustees held personally liable for taxes assessed on real estate held in trust. 3 CS 66. Expenses incurred by executor are his personal obligations so far as the person who furnishes them is concerned. 13 CS 400. Where plaintiff performed legal services for estate at request of executrix, since deceased, he has recourse to her estate without seeking judgment against her executor or administrator; history of statute reviewed. 17 CS 5. A suit upon a contract with administrator does not lie against him in his representative capacity, except claims growing out of moneys paid or services rendered the estate. 20 CS 179. Estate administrator may be sued individually and as administrator for negligence in administering estate properties. 31 CS 407. Plaintiff seeking recovery for services rendered executor or administrator has no standing to appeal Probate Court decree disallowing his claim but must instead bring a civil action against the executor or administrator for such relief. 36 CS 34.
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Sec. 52-570b. Action for computer-related offenses. (a) Any aggrieved person who has reason to believe that any other person has been engaged, is engaged or is about to engage in an alleged violation of any provision of section 53a-251 may bring an action against such person and may apply to the Superior Court for: (1) An order temporarily or permanently restraining and enjoining the commencement or continuance of such act or acts; (2) an order directing restitution; or (3) an order directing the appointment of a receiver. Subject to making due provisions for the rights of innocent persons, a receiver shall have the power to sue for, collect, receive and take into his possession any property which belongs to the person who is alleged to have violated any provision of section 53a-251 and which may have been derived by, been used in or aided in any manner such alleged violation. Such property shall include goods and chattels, rights and credits, moneys and effects, books, records, documents, papers, choses in action, bills, notes and property of every description including all computer system equipment and data, and including property with which such property has been commingled if it cannot be identified in kind because of such commingling. The receiver shall also have the power to sell, convey and assign all of the foregoing and hold and dispose of the proceeds thereof under the direction of the court. Any person who has suffered damages as a result of an alleged violation of any provision of section 53a-251, and submits proof to the satisfaction of the court that he has in fact been damaged, may participate with general creditors in the distribution of the assets to the extent he has sustained out-of-pocket losses. The court shall have jurisdiction of all questions arising in such proceedings and may make such orders and judgments therein as may be required.
(b) The court may award the relief applied for or such other relief as it may deem appropriate in equity.
(c) Independent of or in conjunction with an action under subsection (a) of this section, any person who suffers any injury to person, business or property may bring an action for damages against a person who is alleged to have violated any provision of section 53a-251. The aggrieved person shall recover actual damages and damages for unjust enrichment not taken into account in computing damages for actual loss, and treble damages where there has been a showing of wilful and malicious conduct.
(d) Proof of pecuniary loss is not required to establish actual damages in connection with an alleged violation of subsection (e) of section 53a-251 arising from misuse of private personal data.
(e) In any civil action brought under this section, the court shall award to any aggrieved person who prevails, reasonable costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
(f) The filing of a criminal action against a person is not a prerequisite to the bringing of a civil action under this section against such person.
(g) A civil action may be brought under this section against the state or any political subdivision thereof and the defense of governmental immunity shall not be available in any such action. The rights and liability of the state or any political subdivision thereof in each such action shall be coextensive with and shall equal the rights and liability of private persons in like circumstances.
(h) No civil action under this section may be brought but within three years from the date the alleged violation of section 53a-251 is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 13.)
See Sec. 53-452 re civil action for computer crimes.
Cited. 49 CA 582. Meaning of “who prevails” in Subsec. (e) discussed. 86 CA 527.
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Sec. 52-570c. Action for transmission of unsolicited facsimile or telephone messages. Unsolicited electronic mail advertising material. (a) No person shall use a machine that electronically transmits facsimiles through connection with a telephone network or a device that automatically transmits a recorded telephone message to transmit unsolicited advertising material or an unsolicited telephone message which offers to sell goods or services.
(b) (1) No person shall send unsolicited advertising material by electronic mail, or cause such material to be sent by electronic mail, to an electronic mail address held by a resident of this state unless: (A) Such person identifies in the electronic mail a toll-free telephone number or a valid return electronic mail address that the recipient may use to unsubscribe or otherwise notify the sender to not send any further unsolicited electronic mail, and (B) the subject line begins with the letters “ADV”.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection, no person or entity shall send by electronic mail, or cause to be sent by electronic mail, unsolicited advertising material upon notification by a recipient of such recipient's request to not receive any further such material.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, (A) “person” does not include an electronic mail service provider, as defined in section 53-451, or an Internet access provider, (B) “Internet access provider” means a person who provides underlying network facilities utilized in the transmission of Internet services, and (C) electronic mail has “unsolicited advertising material” if it includes an advertisement for products or services and is sent without the consent of the recipient by a person with whom the recipient does not have an established business relationship, and electronic mail does not have “unsolicited advertising material” if the sender has the consent of the recipient to send such mail to the receiver, or if the sender has a prior or existing business relationship formed by voluntary communication between the sender and the recipient with or without an exchange of consideration, in response to the recipient's inquiry about, application for, purchase of or use of products or services offered by the sender.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to tax-exempt nonprofit organizations or to political or candidate committees or candidates or solicitors, as defined in chapter 155.
(d) Any person aggrieved by a violation of the provisions of this section may bring a civil action in the Superior Court to enjoin further violations and for five hundred dollars for each violation, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. No such action shall be brought but within two years from the date of the act complained of. For purposes of this subsection, each electronic mail sent in violation of subsection (b) of this section constitutes a separate and distinct violation.
(P.A. 89-103, S. 1; P.A. 90-282, S. 3, 4; P.A. 03-128, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 90-282 amended Subsec. (a) by prohibiting use of device that automatically transmits unsolicited telephone message and amended Subsec. (b) by imposing two-year deadline from date of act complained of for bringing action; P.A. 03-128 added new Subsecs. (b) and (c) re the sending of unsolicited electronic mail advertising material and re application of section, redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as new Subsec. (d) and amended same to authorize a $500 civil damages award, costs and reasonable attorney's fee, specify that each electronic mail sent in violation of section constitutes a separate and distinct violation and making conforming changes.
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Sec. 52-570d. Action for illegal recording of private telephonic communications. (a) No person shall use any instrument, device or equipment to record an oral private telephonic communication unless the use of such instrument, device or equipment (1) is preceded by consent of all parties to the communication and such prior consent either is obtained in writing or is part of, and obtained at the start of, the recording, or (2) is preceded by verbal notification which is recorded at the beginning and is part of the communication by the recording party, or (3) is accompanied by an automatic tone warning device which automatically produces a distinct signal that is repeated at intervals of approximately fifteen seconds during the communication while such instrument, device or equipment is in use.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to:
(1) Any federal, state or local criminal law enforcement official or agent of any such official who in the lawful performance of such official's or agent's duties, or at the request or direction of such official or agent in the performance of such official's or agent's duties, records telephonic communications;
(2) Any officer, employee or agent of a public or private safety agency, as defined in section 28-25, who in the lawful performance of his duties records telephonic communications of an emergency nature;
(3) Any person who, as the recipient of a telephonic communication which conveys threats of extortion, bodily harm or other unlawful requests or demands, records such telephonic communication;
(4) Any person who, as the recipient of a telephonic communication which occurs repeatedly or at an extremely inconvenient hour, records such telephonic communication;
(5) Any officer, employee or agent of any communication common carrier who in the lawful performance of his duties records telephonic communications or provides facilities to an investigative officer or criminal law enforcement official authorized pursuant to chapter 959a to intercept a wire communication;
(6) Any officer, employee or agent of a Federal Communications Commission licensed broadcast station who records a telephonic communication solely for broadcast over the air;
(7) Any officer, employee or agent of the United States Secret Service who records telephonic communications which concern the safety and security of the President of the United States, members of his immediate family or the White House and its grounds; and
(8) Any officer, employee or agent of a Federal Communications Commission broadcast licensee who records a telephonic communication as part of a broadcast network or cooperative programming effort solely for broadcast over the air by a licensed broadcast station.
(c) Any person aggrieved by a violation of subsection (a) of this section may bring a civil action in the Superior Court to recover damages, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(P.A. 90-305; P.A. 19-132, S. 3; P.A. 21-40, S. 51.)
History: P.A. 19-132 amended Subsec. (b)(1) by replacing “criminal law enforcement official who in the lawful performance of his duties records telephonic communications” with “law enforcement official or agent of any such official who in the lawful performance of such official or agent's duties, or at the request or direction of such official or agent in the performance of such official or agent's duties, records telephonic communications”; P.A. 21-40 made technical changes in Subsec. (b)(1).
Cited. 238 C. 692.
Does not apply to rerecording of illegally taped telephone conversation. 47 CA 764. Section does not waive sovereign immunity by force of necessary implication, and Subsecs. (a) and (b) can be read as an implicit waiver of the state's sovereign immunity from liability but not as an implicit waiver of the state's sovereign immunity from suit. 193 CA 576.
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Sec. 52-570e. Action for damages resulting from violations of unemployment or workers' compensation laws. Any person, firm, association or corporation which suffers damages as a result of a competitive bid for a project involving the construction, repair, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, rehabilitation, replacement or renovation of a building or structure not being accepted due to another person, firm, association or corporation knowingly violating the provisions of chapter 567 or 568, may bring an action for damages in the Superior Court. For the purposes of an action brought pursuant to this section, employee status shall be determined by the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended.
(P.A. 90-273.)
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Sec. 52-570f. Action for theft of electric, gas, water, steam or community antenna television service. Any person aggrieved by acts constituting a violation of section 53a-127c may bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district where the violation occurred for relief, including a temporary or permanent injunction, and damages. In addition to any other relief, the court may, in its discretion, award costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(P.A. 94-215, S. 2.)
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Sec. 52-571. Transferred to Sec. 52-571aa.
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Sec. 52-571a. Action for deprivation of equal rights and privileges. Any person aggrieved by a violation of section 53-37b may apply to the Superior Court for injunctive relief, recovery of damages and such other relief as the court deems just and equitable.
(P.A. 93-412, S. 2.)
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Sec. 52-571b. Action or defense authorized when state or political subdivision burdens a person's exercise of religion. (a) The state or any political subdivision of the state shall not burden a person's exercise of religion under section 3 of article first of the Constitution of the state even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The state or any political subdivision of the state may burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(c) A person whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of the provisions of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the state or any political subdivision of the state.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the state or any political subdivision of the state to burden any religious belief.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect, interpret or in any way address that portion of article seventh of the Constitution of the state that prohibits any law giving a preference to any religious society or denomination in the state. The granting of government funding, benefits or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the Constitution of the state, shall not constitute a violation of this section. As used in this subsection, the term “granting” does not include the denial of government funding, benefits or exemptions.
(f) For the purposes of this section, “state or any political subdivision of the state” includes any agency, board, commission, department, officer or employee of the state or any political subdivision of the state, and “demonstrates” means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.
(P.A. 93-252.)
Religious society was owner of property that was subject to zoning appeal and therefore individual member of society lacked standing under section because member's claim was derivative of society's claim; religious society has standing to bring action under section in order to preserve its rights under Art. I, Sec. 3 of Connecticut Constitution; the terms “burden” and “exercise of religion” are not plain and unambiguous in this land use case, and do not provide broader protection than under the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and the court did not believe that legislature intended that land use decision regarding proposed construction of a place of worship would raise religious exercise issues and thus be subject to strict scrutiny under statute. 285 C. 381. Subsec. (d) does not purport to confer on religious institutions immunity from employment discrimination actions but, rather, operates as rule of construction for whole section, as further evidenced by dissimilarity between its language and language of statutes that do confer immunity. 329 C. 684.
Plaintiff could not prevail on claim that, pursuant to Subsec. (b), antidiscrimination statutes should be enforced against religious institution upon showing of compelling state interest; although Subsecs. (a) and (b) authorize state to burden “exercise” of a person's religion upon showing of compelling state interest, Subsec. (d) expressly precludes state from burdening “any religious belief”, and because internal governance of religious institution, including employment of ministers and clergy, is a protected religious belief of the institution, commission correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction. 98 CA 646.
Plaintiff's claim re injuries she suffered while voluntarily participating in church healing ritual service are based on religious exercise and not religious belief, and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny under Subsecs. (a) and (b); plaintiff cannot prevail under “public safety exception” of Art. I, Sec. 3 of Connecticut Constitution. 52 CS 218; judgment affirmed, see 134 CA 459.
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Sec. 52-571c. Action for damages resulting from intimidation based on bigotry or bias. (a) Any person injured in person or property as a result of an act that constitutes a violation of section 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l may bring a civil action against the person who committed such act to recover damages for such injury.
(b) In any civil action brought under this section in which the plaintiff prevails, the court shall award treble damages and may, in its discretion, award equitable relief and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(c) No action shall be brought under this section but within three years from the date of the act complained of.
(P.A. 95-112; P.A. 00-72, S. 9.)
History: P.A. 00-72 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference to “section 53a-181b” with reference to “section 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l”.
Subsec. (b):
Trial court properly determined that extent of plaintiff's monetary recovery is not the determinative factor in exercise of its discretion to award reasonable attorney's fee; in determining reasonable attorney's fee, court may also consider whether plaintiff has prevailed on a significant legal issue and whether the legal action accomplished a public policy goal. 277 C. 319.
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Sec. 52-571d. Action for discrimination by golf country club in membership or access to facilities or services. (a) For the purposes of this section, “golf country club” means an association of persons consisting of not less than twenty members who pay membership fees or dues and which maintains a golf course of not less than nine holes and (1) receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages, directly or indirectly, from or on behalf of nonmembers or (2) holds a permit to sell alcoholic liquor under chapter 545.
(b) No golf country club may deny membership in such club to any person on account of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status or sexual orientation.
(c) All classes of membership in a golf country club shall be available without regard to race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status or sexual orientation.
(d) A golf country club that allows the use of its facilities or services by two or more adults per membership, including the use of such facilities or services during restricted times, shall make such use equally available to all adults entitled to use such facilities or services under that membership. The requirements of this subsection concerning equal access to facilities or services of such club shall not apply to adult children included in the membership. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect the assessment by a golf country club of any fees, dues or charges it deems appropriate, including the ability to charge additional fees, dues or charges for access by both adult members during restricted times.
(e) A golf country club that has food or beverage facilities or services shall allow equal access to such facilities and services for all adults in all membership categories at all times. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require access to such facilities or services by any person if such access by such person would violate any provision of the general statutes or a municipal ordinance concerning the sale, consumption or regulation of alcoholic beverages.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a golf country club from sponsoring or permitting events that are limited to members of one sex if such club sponsors or permits events that are comparable for members of each sex.
(g) Any person aggrieved by a violation of the provisions of this section may bring a civil action in the Superior Court to enjoin further violations and to recover the actual damages sustained by reason of such violation or two hundred fifty dollars, whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(h) If, in an action brought under subsection (g) of this section, the court finds that a golf country club holding a permit to sell alcoholic liquor under chapter 545 has violated any of the provisions of this section, it may, in addition to any relief ordered under said subsection (g), order the suspension of such permit until such time as it determines that such club is no longer in violation of this section. The plaintiff shall send a certified copy of such order to the Department of Consumer Protection. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 4-182 and 30-55, the department shall, upon receipt of such order, suspend such permit in accordance with such order. Upon determination by the court that such club is no longer in violation of this section, such club shall send a certified copy of such determination to the department and the department shall reinstate such permit.
(P.A. 97-85, S. 1, 2; P.A. 99-215, S. 20, 29; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, S. 146(d); P.A. 04-169, S. 17; 04-189, S. 1; P.A. 11-55, S. 35.)
History: P.A. 97-85 effective January 1, 1998; P.A. 99-215 amended Subsec. (h) by deleting “clerk of the court” and substituting “plaintiff”, adding “certified” before “copy”, deleting “clerk of the court” and substituting “such club” and deleting “notice to that effect” and substituting “certified copy of such determination”, effective June 29, 1999, and applicable to actions pending or filed on or after that date; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6 and P.A. 04-169 replaced Department of Consumer Protection with Department of Agriculture and Consumer Protection, effective July 1, 2004; P.A. 04-189 repealed Sec. 146 of June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, thereby reversing the merger of the Departments of Agriculture and Consumer Protection, effective June 1, 2004; P.A. 11-55 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) to prohibit discrimination on account of gender identity or expression.
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Sec. 52-571e. Action for damages resulting from actions of agent of surety on a bond. Any person other than the principal on the bond injured in person or property by the actions of an agent of a surety on a bond in a criminal proceeding in taking or attempting to take into custody the principal on the bond, may bring a civil action for damages in the Superior Court against such agent and the court may award such injured person treble damages, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(P.A. 97-287, S. 13.)
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Sec. 52-571f. Strict liability of person who illegally transfers a firearm. Any person who sells, delivers or otherwise transfers a firearm, as defined in section 53a-3, to a person knowing that such other person is prohibited from possessing such firearm shall be strictly liable for damages for the injury or death of another person resulting from the use of such firearm by any person.
(P.A. 99-212, S. 8.)
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Sec. 52-571g. Strict liability of person who fails to securely store a firearm. Any person whose act or omission constitutes a violation of section 29-37i shall be strictly liable for damages when a minor or, a resident of the premises who is ineligible to possess a firearm under state or federal law or who poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other individuals, obtains a firearm, as defined in section 53a-3, and causes the injury or death of such minor, resident or any other person. For the purposes of this section, “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years.
(P.A. 99-212, S. 9; P.A. 13-3, S. 55; P.A. 19-5, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 13-3 made section applicable to injury or death caused by resident of premises who obtains firearm while ineligible to possess firearm or while posing a risk of imminent personal injury to self or others; P.A. 19-5 redefined “minor”.
See Sec. 53a-217a re criminally negligent storage of firearm.
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Sec. 52-571h. Action for damages resulting from identity theft. (a) Any person aggrieved by an act constituting a violation of section 53a-129a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2003, or section 53a-129b, 53a-129c, 53a-129d or 53a-129e may bring a civil action in the Superior Court for damages against the person who committed the violation.
(b) In any civil action brought under this section in which the plaintiff prevails, the court shall award the greater of one thousand dollars or treble damages, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. Damages shall include, but need not be limited to, documented lost wages and any financial loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of identity theft, as defined in section 53a-129a, 53a-129b, or 53a-129c. The court may award other remedies provided by law, including, but not limited to, the costs of providing not less than two years of commercially available identity theft monitoring and protection for such individual.
(c) No action under this section shall be brought but within three years from the date when the violation is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.
(P.A. 00-46; P.A. 03-156, S. 11; P.A. 09-239, S. 7.)
History: P.A. 03-156 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “a violation of section 53a-129a” with “a violation of section 53a-129a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2003, or section 53a-129b, 53a-129c or 53a-129d” and added new Subsec. (c) barring an action unless brought within two years from the date when the violation is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered; P.A. 09-239 amended Subsec. (a) by adding reference to Sec. 53a-129e, amended Subsec. (b) by specifying that damages shall include documented lost wages and financial loss suffered by plaintiff as result of identity theft and by giving court discretion to award other remedies provided by law, and amended Subsec. (c) to require action to be brought within 3 years, rather than 2 years.
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Sec. 52-571i. Action for damages resulting from trafficking in persons. Any person aggrieved by a violation of section 53a-192a may bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district where such person resides or the judicial district of Hartford against the person or persons who committed such violation to recover actual damages, statutory damages of not more than one thousand dollars for each day such person was coerced by another person in violation of section 53a-192a and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(P.A. 06-43, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 06-43 effective July 1, 2006.
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Sec. 52-571j. Action for interference with a person taking still or video images of police officer in the performance of duty. (a) For the purposes of this section, “peace officer” has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-3, except “peace officer” does not include a special agent of the federal government or a member of a law enforcement unit of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe or the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut.
(b) An employer of a peace officer who interferes with any person taking a photographic or digital still or video image of such peace officer or another peace officer acting in the performance of such peace officer's duties shall be liable to such person in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
(c) An employer of a peace officer shall not be liable under subsection (b) of this section if the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the peace officer was interfering with the taking of such image in order to (1) lawfully enforce a criminal law of this state or a municipal ordinance, (2) protect the public safety, (3) preserve the integrity of a crime scene or criminal investigation, (4) safeguard the privacy interests of any person, including a victim of a crime, or (5) lawfully enforce court rules and policies of the Judicial Branch with respect to taking a photograph, videotaping or otherwise recording an image in facilities of the Judicial Branch.
(June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-4, S. 9.)
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Sec. 52-571k. Action for equitable relief or damages resulting from deprivation of equal protection of the laws of the state committed by a police officer. (a) As used in this section:
(1) “Law enforcement unit” has the same meaning as provided in section 7-294a; and
(2) “Police officer” has the same meaning as provided in section 7-294a.
(b) No police officer, acting alone or in conspiracy with another, shall deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws of this state, or of the equal privileges and immunities under the laws of this state, including, without limitation, the protections, privileges and immunities guaranteed under article first of the Constitution of the state.
(c) Any person aggrieved by a violation of subsection (b) of this section may bring a civil action for equitable relief or damages in the Superior Court. A civil action brought for damages shall be triable by jury.
(d) (1) In any civil action brought under this section, governmental immunity shall only be a defense to a claim for damages when, at the time of the conduct complained of, the police officer had an objectively good faith belief that such officer's conduct did not violate the law. There shall be no interlocutory appeal of a trial court's denial of the application of the defense of governmental immunity. Governmental immunity shall not be a defense in a civil action brought solely for equitable relief.
(2) In any civil action brought under this section, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from a police officer's deliberate failure, in violation of section 29-6d, to record any event that is relevant to such action.
(e) In an action under this section, each municipality or law enforcement unit shall protect and save harmless any such police officer from financial loss and expense, including legal fees and costs, if any, arising out of any claim, demand or suit instituted against such officer by reason of any act undertaken by such officer while acting in the discharge of the officer's duties. In the event such officer has a judgment entered against him or her for a malicious, wanton or wilful act in a court of law, such municipality shall be reimbursed by such officer for expenses it incurred in providing such defense and shall not be held liable to such officer for any financial loss or expense resulting from such act.
(f) In any civil action brought under this section, if the court finds that a violation of subsection (b) of this section was deliberate, wilful or committed with reckless indifference, the plaintiff may be awarded costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
(g) A civil action brought pursuant to this section shall be commenced not later than one year after the date on which the cause of action accrues. Any notice of claim provision set forth in the general statutes, including, but not limited to, the provisions of subsection (d) of section 7-101a and subsection (a) of section 7-465 shall not apply to an action brought under this section.
(July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1, S. 41; P.A. 21-33, S. 9.)
History: July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1 effective July 1, 2021, and applicable to any cause of action arising from an incident committed on or after July 1, 2021; P.A. 21-33 amended Subsec. (d) by designating existing provisions as Subdiv. (1) and adding Subdiv. (2) re drawing adverse inference from deliberate failure to record any event relevant to the action, effective July 1, 2021.
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Sec. 52-571l. Action for damages resulting from stalking in the second degree by disclosing another person's personally identifying information by means of electronic communication. (a) Any person aggrieved by a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (b) of section 53a-181d may bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district where such person resides or the judicial district of Hartford against (1) the person or persons who committed such violation, or (2) any person who knowingly benefitted, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in activity that such person knew or should have known involved an act in violation of said subdivision, to recover damages and other appropriate relief, including reasonable attorney's fee. The court, on motion of a party, may issue a temporary or permanent injunction in such civil action to prevent the disclosure or continued disclosure of a party's personally identifying information, as defined in section 53a-181d.
(b) An individual who is found liable under this section shall be jointly and severally liable with each other person, if any, who is found liable under this section for damages arising from the same violation.
(c) No action shall be brought under this section but within three years from the date of the act complained of.
(P.A. 21-56, S. 4.)
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Sec. 52-571m. Action to recover damages for judgment entered against a person where liability is based on alleged provision, receipt or assistance in provision or receipt of reproductive health care services. Definitions. Exceptions. (a) As used in this section:
(1) “Reproductive health care services” includes all medical, surgical, counseling or referral services relating to the human reproductive system, including, but not limited to, services relating to pregnancy, contraception or the termination of a pregnancy and all medical care relating to treatment of gender dysphoria; and
(2) “Person” includes an individual, a partnership, an association, a limited liability company or a corporation.
(b) When any person has had a judgment entered against such person, in any state, where liability, in whole or in part, is based on the alleged provision, receipt, assistance in receipt or provision, material support for, or any theory of vicarious, joint, several or conspiracy liability derived therefrom, for reproductive health care services that are permitted under the laws of this state, such person may recover damages from any party that brought the action leading to that judgment or has sought to enforce that judgment. Recoverable damages shall include: (1) Just damages created by the action that led to that judgment, including, but not limited to, money damages in the amount of the judgment in that other state and costs, expenses and reasonable attorney's fees spent in defending the action that resulted in the entry of a judgment in another state; and (2) costs, expenses and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in bringing an action under this section as may be allowed by the court.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a judgment entered in another state that is based on: (1) An action founded in tort, contract or statute, and for which a similar claim would exist under the laws of this state, brought by the patient who received the reproductive health care services upon which the original lawsuit was based or the patient's authorized legal representative, for damages suffered by the patient or damages derived from an individual's loss of consortium of the patient; (2) an action founded in contract, and for which a similar claim would exist under the laws of this state, brought or sought to be enforced by a party with a contractual relationship with the person that is the subject of the judgment entered in another state; or (3) an action where no part of the acts that formed the basis for liability occurred in this state.
(P.A. 22-19, S. 1; 22-118, S. 195.)
History: P.A. 22-19 effective July 1 2022; P.A. 22-118 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to redefine “reproductive health care services”, effective July 1, 2022.
See Sec. 54-155a prohibiting use of public resources in furtherance of an interstate investigation or proceeding concerning the provision, seeking or receipt of or assistance with reproductive health services.
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Sec. 52-571n. Action to recover damages for judgment entered against a person where liability is based on alleged provision, receipt or assistance in provision or receipt of gender-affirming health care services or reproductive health care services. Definitions. Exceptions. (a) As used in this section:
(1) “Gender-affirming health care services” means all medical care relating to the treatment of gender dysphoria;
(2) “Reproductive health care services” includes all medical, surgical, counseling or referral services relating to the human reproductive system, including, but not limited to, services relating to pregnancy, contraception or the termination of a pregnancy; and
(3) “Person” includes an individual, a partnership, an association, a limited liability company or a corporation.
(b) When any person has had a judgment entered against such person, in any state, where liability, in whole or in part, is based on the alleged provision, receipt, assistance in receipt or provision, material support for, or any theory of vicarious, joint, several or conspiracy liability derived therefrom, for reproductive health care services and gender-affirming health care services that are permitted under the laws of this state, such person may recover damages from any party that brought the action leading to that judgment or has sought to enforce that judgment. Recoverable damages shall include: (1) Just damages created by the action that led to that judgment, including, but not limited to, money damages in the amount of the judgment in that other state and costs, expenses and reasonable attorney's fees spent in defending the action that resulted in the entry of a judgment in another state; and (2) costs, expenses and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in bringing an action under this section as may be allowed by the court.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a judgment entered in another state that is based on: (1) An action founded in tort, contract or statute, and for which a similar claim would exist under the laws of this state, brought by the patient who received the reproductive health care services or gender-affirming health care services upon which the original lawsuit was based or the patient's authorized legal representative, for damages suffered by the patient or damages derived from an individual's loss of consortium of the patient; (2) an action founded in contract, and for which a similar claim would exist under the laws of this state, brought or sought to be enforced by a party with a contractual relationship with the person that is the subject of the judgment entered in another state; or (3) an action where no part of the acts that formed the basis for liability occurred in this state.
(P.A. 22-118, S. 484.)
History: P.A. 22-118 effective July 1, 2022.
See Sec. 54-155b prohibiting use of public resources in furtherance of an interstate investigation or proceeding concerning the provision, seeking or receipt of or assistance with reproductive health services or gender-affirming health care services.
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Secs. 52-571o to 52-571z. Reserved for future use.
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Sec. 52-571aa. (Formerly Sec. 52-571). Discrimination on account of membership in armed forces so as to cause deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities usually enjoyed by public. Penalty. Any person who subjects or causes to be subjected any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities usually enjoyed by the public, on account of membership in the armed forces of the state, as defined in section 27-2, or of the armed forces, as defined in section 27-103, or on account of the wearing of the uniform of such service, or who, on account of such membership or the wearing of any such uniform, deprives any other person of the full and equal enjoyment of any advantages, facilities, accommodations, amusement or transportation, subject only to the limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons, or who, on account of such membership or the wearing of such uniform, discriminates in the price for the enjoyment of any such privileges, shall forfeit and pay to the person injured thereby the greater of one thousand dollars or treble damages, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(1949 Rev., S. 8312; 1957, P.A. 163, S. 44; P.A. 07-128, S. 3; P.A. 18-72, S. 14.)
History: P.A. 07-128 substituted “armed forces” for “United States” and substituted penalty of the greater of $1,000 or treble damages, “together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee” for double damages in any court of competent jurisdiction; Sec. 52-571 transferred to Sec. 52-571aa in 2008; P.A. 18-72 made technical changes.
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Sec. 52-571bb. Discrimination on account of membership in armed forces re access to any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement. Penalty. (a) No person may deny any individual within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of such individual's membership in the armed forces of the state, as defined in section 27-2, or the armed forces, as defined in section 27-103, or on account of the wearing of the uniform of any such armed forces, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor.
(P.A. 07-128, S. 2; P.A. 12-80, S. 99.)
History: P.A. 12-80 amended Subsec. (b) to replace penalty of a fine of not less than $25 or more than $100 or imprisonment of not more than 30 days or both with a class D misdemeanor.
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Sec. 52-572. Parental liability for torts of minors. (a) The parent or parents or guardian, other than a temporary guardian appointed pursuant to section 45a-622, of any unemancipated minor or minors, which minor or minors wilfully or maliciously cause damage to any property or injury to any person, or, having taken a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner thereof, cause damage to the motor vehicle, shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor or minors for the damage or injury to an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars, if the minor or minors would have been liable for the damage or injury if they had been adults.
(b) This section shall not be construed to relieve the minor or minors from personal liability for the damage or injury.
(c) The liability provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other liability which may exist at law.
(d) As used in this section, “damage” shall include depriving the owner of his property or motor vehicle or of the use, possession or enjoyment thereof.
(1955, S. 3231d; 1959, P.A. 244; 549; 1969, P.A. 326; 1971, P.A. 314; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 75; P.A. 79-58; P.A. 82-160, S. 236; P.A. 93-26; P.A. 96-202, S. 8.)
History: 1959 acts added provision re taking of motor vehicle without permission and tripled maximum liability; 1969 act raised maximum liability from $750 to $1,500; 1971 act defined “damage” for purposes of section; 1972 act made no change in this section but did generally change age of majority from 21 to 18; P.A. 79-58 raised maximum liability to $3,000; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 93-26 raised maximum liability from $3,000 to $5,000; P.A. 96-202 amended Subsec. (a) to specify inapplicability to temporary guardians appointed pursuant to Sec. 45a-622.
New trial ordered as to second count where, in trial of causes of action alleged in two separate counts of common law negligence against child and his parents, jury returned verdict for plaintiff against child on first count and returned no verdict on second count against parents. 158 C. 553. Damage caused by auto tortiously taken by insured's son and damaged at place away from the insured's premises was not compensable to insured parents under their homeowners insurance policy coverage. 159 C. 252. Cited. 167 C. 499; 183 C. 470; 215 C. 316; 216 C. 29; Id., 563.
Parent is liable only where child himself might be required to respond in damages for his own tort. 20 CS 376. Parents sued for damage “wilfully or maliciously” caused by their child are in the same position with respect to the controlling statute of limitations as the child; cause of action is controlled by 3-year limitation under Sec. 52-577. 24 CS 320. Although child was in technical custody of welfare commissioner, he was sent home to his parents at which time he caused damage to plaintiff's automobile; held father as well as minor was liable. Id., 357. Cited. 33 CS 44. Statute, which imposes on parents of minor liability not to exceed $1,500 for property damage wilfully or maliciously caused by minor, is held constitutional on basis that regulation has rational relationship to preservation and promotion of public welfare. 34 CS 7. Cited. 38 CS 327. Control of minor is a determining factor in imposing liability under statute. 40 CS 185. Cited. 41 CS 367.
Fact that minor was technically in custody of state did not relieve father of liability under statute where son was under control of father. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 378. Cause of action brought under section governed by 3-year limitation set forth in Sec. 52-577. Id., 379. Relief of parental liability. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 672. Cited. Id., 715.
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Sec. 52-572a. Release by injured person voidable if obtained within fifteen days. (a) No person, firm or corporation whose interest is adverse to that of a person receiving personal injuries as a result of a tortious act may negotiate any contract, written or oral, or any settlement to release such person, firm or corporation from liability, within fifteen days from the date of the tortious act.
(b) Any contract, settlement or release obtained in violation of this section shall be voidable at the option of the releasor upon restoration of the consideration.
(1959, P.A. 494; P.A. 82-160, S. 237.)
History: P.A. 82-160 made minor change in wording and divided section into Subsecs.
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Sec. 52-572b. Alienation of affections and breach of promise actions abolished. No action may be brought upon any cause arising from alienation of affections or from breach of a promise to marry.
(1967, P.A. 275, S. 1; P.A. 82-160, S. 238.)
History: P.A. 82-160 changed wording slightly and deleted language which limiting applicability to causes arising “after October 1, 1967”.
The Heart Balm Act does not affect common law principles governing actions for the return of property transferred in reliance on fraudulent representations. 180 C. 369, 370. Cited. 240 C. 549.
When legislature enacted section, it expressed its intent to abolish common law actions seeking damages for a particular type of conduct, regardless of the name that plaintiff assigns to that conduct, and in determining whether an action is barred under section, court will consider underlying conduct alleged in plaintiff's complaint. 80 CA 180.
Action for criminal conversation is not barred in this state by section, which specifically prohibits actions for alienation of affections and breach of promise. 28 CS 487.
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Sec. 52-572c. Parent-child immunity abrogated in certain negligence actions. In all actions for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and in all actions accruing on or after October 1, 1979, for negligence in the operation of an aircraft or vessel, as defined in section 15-127, resulting in personal injury, wrongful death or injury to property, the immunity between parent and child in such negligence action brought by a parent against his child or by or on behalf of a child against his parent is abrogated.
(1967, P.A. 596, S. 1; P.A. 79-5.)
History: P.A. 79-5 removed obsolete reference to actions accruing after July 1, 1967, for negligence in operation of motor vehicle and applied section to actions for negligence in operation of aircraft or vessel accruing on or after October 1, 1979.
In absence of express statutory exceptions, doctrine of parental immunity from actions at law by child prevail. 157 C. 445. Cited. 200 C. 290; 207 C. 518; 224 C. 483; 230 C. 472; 234 C. 259. Doctrine of parental immunity bars action to recover for personal injuries sustained by child as result of fire that occurred at the home of child's noncustodial parent during a scheduled visit. 244 C. 692.
“Operator of motor vehicle” for purposes of statute discussed. 9 CA 290. Cited. 20 CA 619; 34 CA 866.
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Sec. 52-572d. Interspousal immunity abrogated in motor vehicle negligence actions accruing out of state. In all actions brought by one resident spouse against the other resident spouse for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle resulting in personal injury, wrongful death or injury to property, it shall not be a defense or a bar to the cause of action that such an action by one spouse against another would not lie in the state where the injury or death occurred. The rights of such spouses, including the standard of care to be applied in such action, shall be determined as if the injury or death had occurred in this state.
(1969, P.A. 623, S. 1; P.A. 74-338, S. 48, 94.)
History: P.A. 74-338 added specific mention of “wrongful death”.
Court will not interpret statute to apply before its enactment or qualify decision of court by it. 160 C. 563. Cited. 201 C. 632.
Cited. 29 CS 326; 33 CS 44.
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Sec. 52-572e. Release of joint tortfeasor. (a) For the purposes of this section the term “joint tortfeasors” means two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property whether or not a judgment has been recovered against all or any of them.
(b) A release by the injured person, or his legal representative, of one joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless, and only to the extent, the release so provides.
(1969, P.A. 143.)
Cited. 225 C. 401; 232 C. 272, 278; 234 C. 660. Enactment of statute was not intended to abrogate common law rule that a principal and agent are not joint tortfeasors, and therefore release of the primarily liable employee operated as a matter of law to release employer whose liability rested solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. 249 C. 709. Lessor and lessee of a motor vehicle are not joint tortfeasors within meaning of section and a release executed in favor of lessee also operates to release lessor. 260 C. 15.
Court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent regarding scope of the release. 72 CA 402.
Cited. 41 CS 353.
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Sec. 52-572f. Criminal conversation action abolished. No action may be brought upon any cause arising from criminal conversation.
(1971, P.A. 177; P.A. 82-160, S. 239.)
History: P.A. 82-160 made minor change in wording and deleted language limiting applicability to causes arising “after October 1, 1971”.
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Sec. 52-572g. Defenses against holder in due course of instrument in consumer goods credit transaction. (a) Any holder in due course of a promissory note, contract or other instrument, other than an instrument issued in connection with a credit card transaction, evidencing an indebtedness, signed or executed by a buyer in connection with a credit transaction covering consumer goods, as defined in section 42a-9-102 or for consumer services rendered, shall be subject to all of the claims and defenses which the buyer has against the seller arising out of the transaction or against the person or persons providing the services, limited to the amount of indebtedness then outstanding in connection with the credit transaction, provided the buyer shall have made a prior written demand on the seller with respect to the transaction.
(b) For the purposes of this section “consumer services” includes any supply of accommodations, exercise and health club programs, instruction or education, including any type of training course in any field such as personality improvement, self motivation, salesmanship and similar fields, or any work, repair or other services rendered for personal, family or household purposes.
(1972, P.A. 137; P.A. 73-466; P.A. 75-251; P.A. 76-169, S. 14; P.A. 77-604, S. 35, 84; P.A. 82-160, S. 240; P.A. 01-132, S. 176.)
History: P.A. 73-466 added Subsecs. (b) and (c) and applied former provisions, designated as Subsec. (a) to holders of notes, contracts, etc. rather than to “subsequent” holders of notes, contracts, etc.; P.A. 75-251 amended Subsec. (a) to apply with respect to notes, etc. for consumer services rendered and defined “consumer services”; P.A. 76-169 deleted Subsecs. (b) and (c) re instruments issued in connection with credit card transaction for purchase of item or service; P.A. 77-604 reiterated amendments enacted in P.A. 75-251 but inadvertently omitted in P.A. 76-169; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 01-132 amended Subsec. (a) to replace Sec. 42a-9-109 with Sec. 42a-9-102 as the statutory reference for the definition of “consumer goods”.
Subsec. (a): “the amount of indebtedness outstanding” is the amount of indebtedness outstanding at the time of the buyer's written demand on seller, and assignee can avoid liability under this section only if the promissory note, contract or other instrument is reassigned back to the seller prior to the buyer making such demand; further, where a retail installment contract includes FTC holder rule language mandated by 16 CFR 433.2, the assignee's liability is cumulative to its liability under this section. 338 C. 803.
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Sec. 52-572h. Negligence actions. Doctrines applicable. Liability of multiple tortfeasors for damages. (a) For the purposes of this section: (1) “Economic damages” means compensation determined by the trier of fact for pecuniary losses including, but not limited to, the cost of reasonable and necessary medical care, rehabilitative services, custodial care and loss of earnings or earning capacity excluding any noneconomic damages; (2) “noneconomic damages” means compensation determined by the trier of fact for all nonpecuniary losses including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and mental and emotional suffering; (3) “recoverable economic damages” means the economic damages reduced by any applicable findings including but not limited to set-offs, credits, comparative negligence, additur and remittitur, and any reduction provided by section 52-225a; (4) “recoverable noneconomic damages” means the noneconomic damages reduced by any applicable findings including but not limited to set-offs, credits, comparative negligence, additur and remittitur.
(b) In causes of action based on negligence, contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or the person's legal representative to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property if the negligence was not greater than the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought including settled or released persons under subsection (n) of this section. The economic or noneconomic damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion of the percentage of negligence attributable to the person recovering which percentage shall be determined pursuant to subsection (f) of this section.
(c) In a negligence action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, if the damages are determined to be proximately caused by the negligence of more than one party, each party against whom recovery is allowed shall be liable to the claimant only for such party's proportionate share of the recoverable economic damages and the recoverable noneconomic damages except as provided in subsection (g) of this section.
(d) The proportionate share of damages for which each party is liable is calculated by multiplying the recoverable economic damages and the recoverable noneconomic damages by a fraction in which the numerator is the party's percentage of negligence, which percentage shall be determined pursuant to subsection (f) of this section, and the denominator is the total of the percentages of negligence, which percentages shall be determined pursuant to subsection (f) of this section, to be attributable to all parties whose negligent actions were a proximate cause of the injury, death or damage to property including settled or released persons under subsection (n) of this section. Any percentage of negligence attributable to the claimant shall not be included in the denominator of the fraction.
(e) In any action to which this section is applicable, the instructions to the jury given by the court shall include an explanation of the effect on awards and liabilities of the percentage of negligence found by the jury to be attributable to each party.
(f) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall specify: (1) The amount of economic damages; (2) the amount of noneconomic damages; (3) any findings of fact necessary for the court to specify recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages; (4) the percentage of negligence that proximately caused the injury, death or damage to property in relation to one hundred per cent, that is attributable to each party whose negligent actions were a proximate cause of the injury, death or damage to property including settled or released persons under subsection (n) of this section; and (5) the percentage of such negligence attributable to the claimant.
(g) (1) Upon motion by the claimant to open the judgment filed, after good faith efforts by the claimant to collect from a liable defendant, not later than one year after judgment becomes final through lapse of time or through exhaustion of appeal, whichever occurs later, the court shall determine whether all or part of a defendant's proportionate share of the recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate such uncollectible amount among the other defendants in accordance with the provisions of this subsection. (2) The court shall order that the portion of such uncollectible amount which represents recoverable noneconomic damages be reallocated among the other defendants according to their percentages of negligence, provided that the court shall not reallocate to any such defendant an amount greater than that defendant's percentage of negligence multiplied by such uncollectible amount. (3) The court shall order that the portion of such uncollectible amount which represents recoverable economic damages be reallocated among the other defendants. The court shall reallocate to any such other defendant an amount equal to such uncollectible amount of recoverable economic damages multiplied by a fraction in which the numerator is such defendant's percentage of negligence and the denominator is the total of the percentages of negligence of all defendants, excluding any defendant whose liability is being reallocated. (4) The defendant whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution pursuant to subsection (h) of this section and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
(h) (1) A right of contribution exists in parties who, pursuant to subsection (g) of this section are required to pay more than their proportionate share of such judgment. The total recovery by a party seeking contribution shall be limited to the amount paid by such party in excess of such party's proportionate share of such judgment.
(2) An action for contribution shall be brought within two years after the party seeking contribution has made the final payment in excess of such party's proportionate share of the claim.
(i) This section shall not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship.
(j) This section shall not impair any right to indemnity under existing law. Where one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnitee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnitor is not entitled to contribution from the indemnitee for any portion of such indemnity obligation.
(k) This section shall not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation.
(l) The legal doctrines of last clear chance and assumption of risk in actions to which this section is applicable are abolished.
(m) The family car doctrine shall not be applied to impute contributory or comparative negligence pursuant to this section to the owner of any motor vehicle or motor boat.
(n) A release, settlement or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person discharges that person from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the total award of damages is reduced by the amount of the released person's percentage of negligence determined in accordance with subsection (f) of this section.
(o) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, there shall be no apportionment of liability or damages between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence including, but not limited to, intentional, wanton or reckless misconduct, strict liability or liability pursuant to any cause of action created by statute, except that liability may be apportioned among parties liable for negligence in any cause of action created by statute based on negligence including, but not limited to, an action for wrongful death pursuant to section 52-555 or an action for injuries caused by a motor vehicle owned by the state pursuant to section 52-556.
(P.A. 73-622, S. 1; P.A. 82-160, S. 241; P.A. 86-338, S. 3; P.A. 87-227, S. 3; P.A. 88-364, S. 69, 123; P.A. 99-69, S. 1, 2.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and added Subsec. (d) re family car doctrine, formerly Sec. 52-572i; P.A. 86-338 added provisions re the definition of economic and noneconomic damages, the limitation of a person's liability to his proportionate share of recoverable damages, the calculation of each person's proportionate share of damages, the reallocation of an uncollectible amount of damages among other liable parties, the establishment and exercise of a right of contribution, the effect of the provisions of the section on any right of subrogation or indemnity and the applicability of the provisions of the section to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation; P.A. 87-227 substantially revised and rewrote section including, inter alia, revising the definitions, replacing “person” with “party” throughout section, making section applicable to actions for damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, including settled or released persons in the attribution of percentages of negligence, requiring the jury or court to specify any findings of fact necessary for the court to specify recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages, revising the method of reallocating an uncollectible amount of damages so that all recoverable economic damages are reallocated among the other defendants and the claimant is fully compensated for such recoverable economic damages, providing the total recovery by a party seeking contribution shall be limited to the amount paid by such party in excess of such party's proportionate share of the judgment, replacing provisions re when an action for contribution must be brought depending upon if a judgment has or has not been rendered with requirement that an action for contribution be brought within two years after the party seeking contribution has made the final payment in excess of his proportionate share of the claim and adding Subsec. (n) re the effect of a release, settlement or similar agreement on liability and the total award of damages; P.A. 88-364 made a technical change in Subsec. (g); P.A. 99-69 added Subsec. (o) prohibiting apportionment of liability or damages between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective May 27, 1999, and applicable to any civil action pending on or filed on or after August 11, 1998.
See Sec. 52-102b re addition of person as defendant for apportionment of liability purposes.
See Sec. 52-225a re reduction in economic damages in personal injury and wrongful death actions for collateral source payments.
See Sec. 52-225d re payment of damages in lump sum and periodic installments in personal injury, wrongful death and property damage actions.
Cited. 175 C. 112; Id., 477. Section did not abrogate common law rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors, related only to modification of contributory negligence doctrine and of the doctrines of abolition, last clear chance and assumption of risk. 176 C. 523. Cited. 179 C. 372; Id., 425; 181 C. 515; Id., 650; 182 C. 236; Id., 125; 183 C. 473; 184 C. 205; Id., 594; 186 C. 370; 187 C. 339; 188 C. 607; 189 C. 601; 190 C. 285; 193 C. 15; 194 C. 645; 196 C. 341; 203 C. 607; 208 C. 82; 212 C. 509; 214 C. 1; 216 C. 200; 222 C. 775; 225 C. 566; 228 C. 441; 231 C. 77; 232 C. 559; 234 C. 660; 235 C. 107; 236 C. 625; Id., 670; Id., 820; 239 C. 798; 240 C. 694; 241 C. 399; 242 C. 169. Plain language of section provides that only negligent persons may be cited in by defendant for apportionment for liability purposes and, therefore, a person whose conduct was reckless, willful and wanton is not liable pursuant to section and cannot be added for purposes of apportionment; Supreme Court extended section as matter of common law to permit apportionment between a negligent and an intentional tortfeasor. 246 C. 223. Apportionment principles of section do not apply where apportionment complaint rests on any basis other than negligence, including strict liability, of which product liability is simply a form. 253 C. 787. By enacting P.A. 99-69, Sec. 1(o), legislature merely clarified section to preclude a common law right to apportionment between a negligent and intentional tortfeasor. 263 C. 358. Because statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants and because Connecticut is a comparative negligence jurisdiction, as indicated by Sec. 52-572o, the simpler and less confusing approach to cases where jury must determine which, among many, causes contributed to plaintiff's injury, is to couch the analysis in proximate cause rather than allowing defendants to raise a defense of superseding cause. Id., 424. Defendant may assert under a general denial that the negligence of an employer who is not a party to the action is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 287 C. 20.
Cited. 6 CA 383; 11 CA 1; 14 CA 561; 15 CA 371; Id., 392; 24 CA 446; 26 CA 220; Id., 509; 27 CA 471; 30 CA 327; 31 CA 584; 35 CA 301; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 107; 37 CA 453; Id., 515; 38 CA 685; 41 CA 61; Id., 373; Id., 856; 43 CA 453; 46 CA 18; Id., 377; Id., 391. Enactment of statute did not render general verdict rule inapplicable. 53 CA 399. Trial court should instruct jury that if it is unable to determine how much of plaintiff's damages is attributable to each of the three tortfeasors from separate motor vehicle accidents, jury may make a rough apportionment and if unable to do so, jury must apportion the damages equally among each party whose negligent actions caused injury to the plaintiff. 57 CA 134. Statute applies only to negligence actions and not to claims based on recklessness. 86 CA 728. Purpose of apportionment statute is to prevent any defendant from paying more than his or her share of award and permits inclusion on verdict form of defendant who has received a directed verdict in his favor, allowing jury to apportion liability to him even though he is relieved of obligation to pay. 90 CA 766.
Comparative negligence statute does not alter Connecticut doctrine as to proximate cause and thus does not affect the rule that failure to use a seat belt is not contributory negligence. 32 CS 89. Cited. 33 CS 187. No contribution among joint tortfeasors where both parties are negligent. 35 CS 268. Cited. 37 CS 574; 38 CS 597; 39 CS 20. Public policy concerning comparative negligence applied to Sec. 31-293 discussed. Id., 222. Cited. 40 CS 214; 43 CS 168; 44 CS 510. “Damage to property” does not include purely commercial losses. 47 CS 166.
Subsec. (b):
When plaintiff's conduct in assuming a risk is unreasonable, the assumption of risk doctrine overlaps contributory negligence and the principle of comparative negligence embodied in statute should apply. 190 C. 791. The mere availability of comparative negligence under section does not negate application of the wrongful conduct rule which precludes a plaintiff from recovering for injuries sustained as a direct result of his or her own illegal conduct of a serious nature. 311 C. 370. Defense of contributory negligence applies to claims of negligent service of alcohol to minor. 312 C. 184.
Subsec. (c):
Discussed re applicability of Subsec. (g) to actions against the state under Sec. 52-556. 247 C. 256. P.A. 86-338 replaced common-law rule of joint and several liability and provisions dealing with apportionment of liability were not repealed by P.A. 87-227. Id., 638. Provides for apportionment of liability only among those parties from whom plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. 249 C. 634. Adoption of alternative liability rule. 333 C. 206.
Subsec. (f):
Subdiv. (4): Jury entitled to attribute and divide percentage of negligence only among parties to the action. 33 CA 714.
Subsec. (g):
State, when sued pursuant to a waiver of sovereign immunity under Sec. 52-556, is not immune from reallocation of damages pursuant to Subsec. 247 C. 256.
Whether defendant made “good faith efforts” is a subjective, factual determination, and the phrase “good faith” is clear and unambiguous. 132 CA 146.
Subsec. (k):
Provision of Subsec. re impairment of right to indemnity applies to section, but not to suits under product liability act, Sec. 52-572m et seq. 205 C. 694.
Subsec. (n):
Trial court required to instruct jury to apportion liability where plaintiff had settled with named uninsured motorist carrier and defendant who had been found liable for damages. 257 C. 718. Trial court properly determined that withdrawal of the action against one of defendants did not constitute a “release, settlement or similar agreement” within meaning of statute, so as to permit an apportionment complaint by remaining defendant; a release and settlement represents a surrender of a cause of action pursuant to an agreement; a withdrawal shares few of the essential characteristics of a settlement and release and may be accomplished unilaterally and unconditionally; court construed “similar agreement” to mean an agreement having the same essential characteristics of a release or settlement, and presumed that had legislature intended for apportionment to apply to withdrawn parties, it would have used term “withdrawal” in addition to, or in lieu of “similar agreement”. 283 C. 412.
Subsec. (o):
Contributory negligence is not defense to recklessness; even if jury reasonably could have found that plaintiff's conduct was a contributory cause of accident, once jury determines that defendant's conduct was reckless, there is no apportionment of liability and damages between the parties. 266 C. 822. Apportionment under Subsec. is allowed for cause of action sounding in negligence against municipal defendant for failure to inspect pool after notice fell under negligence exception of Sec. 52-557n(b)(8). 344 C. 86.
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Sec. 52-572i. Application of the family car doctrine. Section 52-572i is repealed.
(P.A. 76-46; P.A. 82-160, S. 259.)
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Sec. 52-572j. Derivative actions by shareholders or members. (a) Whenever any corporation or any unincorporated association fails to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, a derivative action may be brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce the right, provided the shareholder or member was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complained or his membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law. The action shall be commenced by a complaint returnable to the superior court for the judicial district in which an office of the corporation or association is located. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
(b) In any action brought pursuant to this section, process shall be served on the corporation or association as in other civil actions, and notice of the service of process after its having been served shall be given to the board of directors and such other interested persons as the court deems proper. It shall not be necessary to make shareholders or members parties thereto. The costs of the action or part thereof, which shall include but not be limited to witness' fees, court costs and reasonable attorney's fees, may be charged by the court, in its discretion, against the corporation.
(P.A. 77-310; P.A. 82-160, S. 41; 82-472, S. 143, 183.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 82-472 deleted obsolete reference to counties.
See Sec. 33-720 et seq. re derivative proceedings.
Cited. 238 C. 183.
Cited. 17 CA 70. Defendant who is no longer shareholder in corporation cannot maintain derivative action on its behalf. 104 CA 810.
Cited. 39 CS 264; 40 CS 327.
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Sec. 52-572k. Hold harmless clause against public policy in certain construction contracts. (a) Any covenant, promise, agreement or understanding entered into in connection with or collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of any building, structure or appurtenances thereto including moving, demolition and excavating connected therewith, that purports to indemnify or hold harmless the promisee against liability for damage arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from the negligence of such promisee, such promisee's agents or employees, is against public policy and void, provided this section shall not affect the validity of any insurance contract, workers' compensation agreement or other agreement issued by a licensed insurer.
(b) The provisions of this section shall apply to covenants, promises, agreements or understandings entered into on or after the thirtieth day next succeeding October 1, 1977.
(P.A. 77-356; P.A. 79-376, S. 73; P.A. 01-155, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 79-376 substituted “workers' compensation” for “workmen's compensation”; P.A. 01-155 amended Subsec. (a) by substituting “negligence” for “sole negligence” and by making a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality.
Legislature, in specifically outlawing hold harmless agreements in the construction industry, showed intention that such a practice not be deemed against public policy in other situations; had legislature intended to outlaw all such provisions, it could have said so. 1 CA 54. Waiver of subrogation provision in contract was not an agreement to hold harmless or to indemnify. 77 CA 167.
Enforcing an “additional insured” clause does not violate the provisions of section. 50 CS 563.
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Sec. 52-572l. Strict tort liability, contributory negligence and comparative negligence not bar to recovery. In causes of action based on strict tort liability, contributory negligence or comparative negligence shall not be a bar to recovery. The provisions of this section shall apply to all actions pending on or brought after June 7, 1977, claiming strict tort liability notwithstanding the date on which the cause of action accrued. Nothing in this section shall be construed as barring the defense of misuse of the product or the defense of knowingly using the product in a defective condition in an action based on strict tort liability.
(P.A. 77-335, S. 1, 2.)
Cited. 203 C. 594; 207 C. 575; 212 C. 509; 229 C. 500.
Cited. 2 CA 308; 30 CA 664; 45 CA 324.
Cited. 41 CS 179.
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Sec. 52-572m. Product liability actions. Definitions. As used in this section and sections 52-240a, 52-240b, 52-572n to 52-572q, inclusive, and 52-577a:
(a) “Product seller” means any person or entity, including a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor or retailer who is engaged in the business of selling such products whether the sale is for resale or for use or consumption. The term “product seller” also includes lessors or bailors of products who are engaged in the business of leasing or bailment of products.
(b) “Product liability claim” includes all claims or actions brought for personal injury, death or property damage caused by the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, installation, testing, warnings, instructions, marketing, packaging or labeling of any product. “Product liability claim” shall include, but is not limited to, all actions based on the following theories: Strict liability in tort; negligence; breach of warranty, express or implied; breach of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent or innocent; misrepresentation or nondisclosure, whether negligent or innocent.
(c) “Claimant” means a person asserting a product liability claim for damages incurred by the claimant or one for whom the claimant is acting in a representative capacity.
(d) “Harm” includes damage to property, including the product itself, and personal injuries including wrongful death. As between commercial parties, “harm” does not include commercial loss.
(e) “Manufacturer” includes product sellers who design, assemble, fabricate, construct, process, package or otherwise prepare a product or component part of a product prior to its sale to a user or consumer. It includes a product seller or entity not otherwise a manufacturer that holds itself out as a manufacturer.
(P.A. 79-483, S. 1; 79-631, S. 106, 111; P.A. 82-160, S. 242; P.A. 84-509, S. 1; 84-546, S. 120, 173.)
History: P.A. 79-631 deleted definition of “clear and convincing evidence”, appearing as Subdiv. (f) in original act; P.A. 82-160 deleted incorrect statutory references; P.A. 84-509 amended definition of “harm” to provide that as between commercial parties, “harm” does not include commercial loss; P.A. 84-546 deleted reference to Sec. 38-370o as section to which definitions apply; (Revisor's note: The reference in the opening sentence to Secs. “52-572n to 52-572r” was changed editorially by the Revisors to Secs. “52-572n to 52-572q” to reflect the repeal of Sec. 52-572r by P.A. 93-228, S. 34, 35).
Cited. 187 C. 363; 192 C. 280; 200 C. 562; 203 C. 156; 204 C. 399. Product liability act abrogated common law indemnification principles in this area. 205 C. 694. Cited. 207 C. 575; Id., 599; 210 C. 189; 212 C. 462; Id., 509; 213 C. 136; 216 C. 65. Loss of consortium claim is not barred in action brought pursuant to product liability act, Sec. 52-572m et seq. 226 C. 282. Cited. 229 C. 213; Id., 500; 232 C. 559; 233 C. 732; 236 C. 769; 241 C. 199; 243 C. 168. “Commercial loss” does not encompass costs incurred by a commercial party in repairing or replacing a defective product or in repairing property damage caused by a defective product; “damage to property” is not limited to property owned by the party seeking to recover. 291 C. 224. Modified consumer expectation test, recognized in 241 C. 199, is the primary strict product liability test; ordinary consumer expectation test is reserved for those limited cases in which product fails to meet consumer's legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety expectations. 321 C. 172.
Cited. 1 CA 48; 3 CA 230; 8 CA 642; 11 CA 391; 16 CA 558; 30 CA 664; 31 CA 824; 36 CA 601; 39 CA 635; 41 CA 555; Id., 856; 46 CA 18; Id., 699. Sidewalk constructed using form and pour method does not constitute a “product” under section. 66 CA 681.
Cited. 36 CS 137; 37 CS 735. Legislative meaning attributed to words “claimant” and “harm” are sufficiently broad to permit an award of punitive damages in connection with a product liability claim involving only damage to property. 39 CS 269. Cause of action alleging that electricity is a product and a large surge of electricity was a defective condition in defendant's product was not improper as a matter of law and doctrine of strict liability is applicable. 40 CS 120. Cited. 41 CS 179; Id., 411; 42 CS 153; 44 CS 510. Discussion of strict tort liability on sellers of used goods; no distinction between sellers of new and used products. 45 CS 531. The two parts of the “actionable harm” test are plaintiff's discovery “that he has been injured” and “that defendant's conduct caused that injury”. 46 CS 235.
Subsec. (a):
Defendant hospital is not a “product seller” under section because it did not actively advertise the medical product for sale to patients and the transaction with the patient was primarily for services, rather than the sale of a medical product. 340 C. 93.
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Sec. 52-572n. Product liability claims. (a) A product liability claim as provided in sections 52-240a, 52-240b, 52-572m to 52-572q, inclusive, and 52-577a may be asserted and shall be in lieu of all other claims against product sellers, including actions of negligence, strict liability and warranty, for harm caused by a product.
(b) A claim may be asserted successfully under said sections notwithstanding the claimant did not buy the product from or enter into any contractual relationship with the product seller.
(c) As between commercial parties, commercial loss caused by a product is not harm and may not be recovered by a commercial claimant in a product liability claim. An action for commercial loss caused by a product may be brought only under, and shall be governed by, title 42a, the Uniform Commercial Code.
(P.A. 79-483, S. 2; P.A. 82-160, S. 243; P.A. 84-509, S. 2; 84-546, S. 121, 173.)
History: P.A. 82-160 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting incorrect statutory references; P.A. 84-509 added Subsec. (c) re the recovery of commercial loss caused by a product; P.A. 84-546 deleted reference to Sec. 38-370o in Subsec. (a); (Revisor's note: The reference in Subsec. (a) to Secs. “52-572n to 52-572r” was changed editorially by the Revisors to Secs. “52-572n to 52-572q” to reflect the repeal of Sec. 52-572r by P.A. 93-228, S. 34, 35).
Cited. 187 C. 363; 192 C. 280; 203 C. 156; 204 C. 399. Sec. 52-572m et seq., product liability act, abrogated common law indemnification principles in this area. 205 C. 694. Cited. 207 C. 575; Id., 599; 210 C. 189; 212 C. 509; 213 C. 136; 216 C. 65; 226 C. 282; 229 C. 213; Id., 500; 233 C. 732; 236 C. 769. Product liability law discussed. 241 C. 199. Modified consumer expectation test, recognized in 241 C. 199, is the primary strict product liability test; ordinary consumer expectation test is reserved for those limited cases in which product fails to meet consumer's legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety expectations. 321 C. 172. Section's exclusivity provision bars a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act based on allegations that medical device manufacturer deceptively and aggressively marketed and promoted product despite knowing it presented a substantial risk of injury. 343 C. 513.
Cited. 1 CA 48; 2 CA 308. Party has option of pleading common law theories or pleading under statute. 3 CA 230. Cited. 8 CA 642; 16 CA 558; 30 CA 664; 31 CA 824; 36 CA 601; 39 CA 635; 41 CA 555; Id., 856; 46 CA 18; Id., 699.
Cited. 40 CS 74; Id., 120; 41 CS 179; 42 CS 153; 44 CS 510.
Subsec. (a):
Provides an exclusive remedy; common law cause of action for claim within the scope of statute is barred. 200 C. 562. Product liability act provides exclusive remedy for such claims. 212 C. 462. Does not prevent plaintiff who seeks damages under product liability act for injuries caused by allegedly defective product from also asserting a claim under Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act for damages alleged to have been caused by product seller's deceptive scheme to misrepresent and conceal the product defect. 263 C. 120. Claim that defendant breached duty to warn of dangerous and hazardous condition of rented scaffolding is barred by exclusivity provision of Subsec. 284 C. 16. Wrongful marketing claim under CUTPA did not allege product defect and, therefore, is not precluded by exclusivity provision of Subsec. 331 C. 53.
Product liability claim replaces negligence and warranty actions against product sellers only. 36 CS 137.
Subsec. (c):
“Commercial loss” does not encompass costs incurred by a commercial party in repairing or replacing a defective product or in repairing property damage caused by a defective product. 291 C. 224.
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Sec. 52-572o. Comparative responsibility. Award of damages. Action for contribution. (a) In any claim under sections 52-240a, 52-240b, 52-572m to 52-572q, inclusive, or 52-577a, the comparative responsibility of, or attributed to, the claimant, shall not bar recovery but shall diminish the award of compensatory damages proportionately, according to the measure of responsibility attributed to the claimant.
(b) In any claim involving comparative responsibility, the court may instruct the jury to give answers to special interrogatories, or if there is no jury, the court may make its own findings, indicating (1) the amount of damages each claimant would receive if comparative responsibility were disregarded, and (2) the percentage of responsibility allocated to each party, including the claimant, as compared with the combined responsibility of all parties to the action. For this purpose, the court may decide that it is appropriate to treat two or more persons as a single party.
(c) In determining the percentage of responsibility, the trier of fact shall consider, on a comparative basis, both the nature and quality of the conduct of the party.
(d) The court shall determine the award for each claimant according to these findings and shall enter judgment against parties liable on the basis of the common law joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors. The judgment shall also specify the proportionate amount of damages allocated against each party liable, according to the percentage of responsibility established for such party.
(e) If a judgment has been rendered, any action for contribution must be brought within one year after the judgment becomes final. If no judgment has been rendered, the person bringing the action for contribution either must have (1) discharged by payment the common liability within the period of the statute of limitations applicable to the right of action of the claimant against him and commenced the action for contribution within one year after payment, or (2) agreed while action was pending to discharge the common liability and, within one year after the agreement, have paid the liability and brought an action for contribution.
(P.A. 79-483, S. 4; P.A. 82-160, S. 244; P.A. 84-546, S. 122, 173.)
History: P.A. 82-160 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting incorrect statutory references; P.A. 84-546 deleted reference to Sec. 38-370o in Subsec. (a); (Revisor's note: The reference in Subsec. (a) to Secs. “52-572n to 52-572r” was changed editorially by the Revisors to Secs. “52-572n to 52-572q” to reflect the repeal of Sec. 52-572r by P.A. 93-228, S. 34, 35).
Cited. 187 C. 363; 192 C. 280; 200 C. 562; 203 C. 156; 204 C. 399. Sec. 52-572m et seq., product liability act, abrogated common law indemnification principles in this area. 205 C. 694. Cited. Id., 699; 207 C. 575; Id., 599; 208 C. 82; 210 C. 189; 212 C. 462; Id., 509; 213 C. 136; 216 C. 65; 225 C. 401; 226 C. 282; 229 C. 213; Id., 500; Id., 829; 233 C. 732; 236 C. 769; 241 C. 199; 243 C. 168. Section does not contemplate, and is inconsistent with, apportionment of a percentage of plaintiff's total damages to his employer who has intervened in the action to recoup worker's compensation payments made by employer; other than provision in Subsec. (c) requiring fact finder to consider both the nature and quality of the conduct of each party, section does not limit the type of conduct that may be considered in determining plaintiff's measure of comparative responsibility. 280 C. 1. Modified consumer expectation test, recognized in 241 C. 199, is the primary strict product liability test; ordinary consumer expectation test is reserved for those limited cases in which product fails to meet consumer's legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety expectations. 321 C. 172.
Cited. 1 CA 48; 3 CA 230; 8 CA 642; 16 CA 558; 30 CA 664; 31 CA 824; 32 CA 373; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 829; 36 CA 601; 39 CA 635; 40 CS 74; 41 CA 555; Id., 856; 46 CA 18; Id., 699.
Cited. 40 CS 120; 41 CS 179; 42 CS 153; 44 CS 510. Legislature, in enacting section, abrogated claims for common-law indemnification. 49 CS 394.
Subsec. (d):
Purposes of this Subsec. and Subsec. (e) are to ensure, to the extent possible, that plaintiff is made whole by recovering the full amount of his net award, from all or any one of the defendants, and to provide that if any liable defendant pays more than its proportional share of that net award, it may seek appropriate contributions from the other liable defendants; employer who has intervened in the case to recoup workers' compensation benefits paid to plaintiff is not a party against which proportional liability may be assigned under section. 280 C. 1.
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Sec. 52-572p. Limitation of liability of product seller. (a) A product seller shall not be liable for harm that would not have occurred but for the fact that his product was altered or modified by a third party unless: (1) The alteration or modification was in accordance with the instructions or specifications of the product seller; (2) the alteration or modification was made with the consent of the product seller; or (3) the alteration or modification was the result of conduct that reasonably should have been anticipated by the product seller.
(b) For the purposes of this section, alteration or modification includes changes in the design, formula, function or use of the product from that originally designed, tested or intended by the product seller.
(P.A. 79-483, S. 5.)
Cited. 187 C. 363; 192 C. 280; 200 C. 562; 203 C. 156; 204 C. 399. Sec. 52-572m et seq., product liability act, abrogated common law indemnification principles in this area. 205 C. 694. Cited. 207 C. 575; Id., 599; 210 C. 189; 212 C. 462; Id., 509; 213 C. 136; 216 C. 65; 226 C. 282; 229 C. 213; Id., 500; 233 C. 732; 236 C. 769. Court set forth respective parties' appropriate burden of proof; product liability law discussed. 241 C. 199. Modified consumer expectation test, recognized in 241 C. 199, is the primary strict product liability test; ordinary consumer expectation test is reserved for those limited cases in which product fails to meet consumer's legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety expectations. 321 C. 172.
Cited. 1 CA 48; 3 CA 230; 8 CA 642; 16 CA 558; 30 CA 664; 31 CA 824; 36 CA 601; 39 CA 635; 41 CA 555; Id., 856; 46 CA 18; Id., 699.
Cited. 40 CS 120; 41 CS 179; 42 CS 153; 44 CS 510.
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Sec. 52-572q. Liability of product seller due to lack of adequate warnings or instructions. (a) A product seller may be subject to liability for harm caused to a claimant who proves by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the product was defective in that adequate warnings or instructions were not provided.
(b) In determining whether instructions or warnings were required and, if required, whether they were adequate, the trier of fact may consider: (1) The likelihood that the product would cause the harm suffered by the claimant; (2) the ability of the product seller to anticipate at the time of manufacture that the expected product user would be aware of the product risk, and the nature of the potential harm; and (3) the technological feasibility and cost of warnings and instructions.
(c) In claims based on this section, the claimant shall prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that if adequate warnings or instructions had been provided, the claimant would not have suffered the harm.
(d) A product seller may not be considered to have provided adequate warnings or instructions unless they were devised to communicate with the person best able to take or recommend precautions against the potential harm.
(P.A. 79-483, S. 6; P.A. 90-191, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 90-191 amended Subsec. (d) to include warnings or instructions devised to communicate with the person best able to “recommend” precautions.
Cited. 187 C. 363; 192 C. 280; 200 C. 562; 203 C. 156; 204 C. 399. Sec. 52-572m et seq., product liability act, abrogated common law indemnification principles in this area. 205 C. 694. Cited. 207 C. 575; Id., 599; 210 C. 189; 212 C. 462; Id., 509; 213 C. 136; 216 C. 65; 226 C. 282; 228 C. 905; 229 C. 213; Id., 500; 230 C. 12; 232 C. 915; 233 C. 732; 236 C. 27; Id., 769. Product liability law discussed. 241 C. 199. Modified consumer expectation test, recognized in 241 C. 199, is the primary strict product liability test; ordinary consumer expectation test is reserved for those limited cases in which product fails to meet consumer's legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety expectations. 321 C. 172. Cause of action exists under negligence or failure-to-warn provisions of section based on medical device manufacturer's alleged failure to report adverse events to regulator following approval of device, or comply with regulators' postapproval requirements. 342 C. 103.
Cited. 1 CA 48; 3 CA 230; 8 CA 642; 16 CA 558; 30 CA 664; 31 CA 824; 32 CA 373; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 829; 36 CA 601; 39 CA 635; 41 CA 555; Id., 856; 46 CA 18; Id., 699.
Cited. 40 CS 120; 41 CS 179; 42 CS 153; 44 CS 510.
Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (2) recognizes that a sophisticated buyer may not need same level of warning as an ordinary buyer would. 76 CA 137.
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Sec. 52-572r. Product liability claims against third parties. Section 52-572r is repealed, effective July 1, 1993.
(P.A. 79-483, S. 11; 79-631, S. 108, 111; P.A. 82-160, S. 245; P.A. 93-228, S. 34, 35.)
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Secs. 52-572s to 52-572v. Reserved for future use.
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Sec. 52-572w. Agreement exempting caterer or catering establishment from liability for negligence void as against public policy. (a) Any covenant, agreement or understanding in, in connection with or collateral to any contract or agreement made or entered into with any caterer or catering establishment, as defined in subsection (d) of section 30-22b, that exempts such caterer or catering establishment from liability for damages for bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the caterer or catering establishment, the agents, servants or employees of such caterer or catering establishment or the patrons at the event to which such contract or agreement pertains is against public policy and void.
(b) The provisions of this section shall apply to any covenant, agreement or understanding made or entered into on or after January 1, 2001.
(P.A. 00-159.)
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Sec. 52-572x. Motor carrier transportation contract. Indemnification against liability for negligence or intentional acts or omissions void and unenforceable. (a) For the purposes of this section, “motor carrier transportation contract” means a contract, agreement or understanding entered into, renewed, modified or extended on or after July 1, 2010, concerning (1) the transportation of property for compensation or hire, (2) the entry on public or private property for the purpose of loading, unloading or transporting property for compensation or hire, or (3) a service incidental to the activities set forth in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection. “Motor carrier transportation contract” does not include the Uniform Intermodal Interchange and Facilities Access Agreement administered by the Intermodal Association of North America or other agreements providing for the interchange, use or possession of intermodal chassis or containers or other intermodal equipment.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any provision, clause, covenant or agreement contained in a motor carrier transportation contract that purports to indemnify, defend or hold harmless, or has the effect of indemnifying, defending or holding harmless, an indemnitee from or against any liability for loss or damage resulting from such indemnitee's negligence or intentional acts or omissions shall be void and unenforceable.
(c) This section shall not apply to a contract, agreement or understanding that concerns or affects the transportation of household goods, as defined in section 13b-387.
(P.A. 10-110, S. 25.)
History: P.A. 10-110 effective July 1, 2010.
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