CHAPTER 951

PENAL CODE: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION;
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Table of Contents

Sec. 53a-13. Lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect as affirmative defense.

Sec. 53a-16. Justification as defense.

Sec. 53a-18. Use of reasonable physical force or deadly physical force generally.

Sec. 53a-19. Use of physical force in defense of person.

Sec. 53a-22. Use of physical force in making arrest or preventing escape.

Sec. 53a-23. Use of physical force to resist arrest not justified.


Sec. 53a-13. Lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect as affirmative defense. (a) In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.

(b) (1) It shall not be a defense under this section if such mental disease or defect was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation or injection of intoxicating liquor or any drug or substance, or any combination thereof, unless such drug was prescribed for the defendant by a prescribing practitioner, as defined in subdivision (22) of section 20-571, and was used in accordance with the directions of such prescription.

(2) No defendant may claim as a defense under this section that such mental disease or defect was based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic relationship.

(c) As used in this section, (1) the terms mental disease or defect do not include (A) an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, or (B) pathological or compulsive gambling, and (2) “gender identity or expression” means gender identity or expression, as defined in section 53a-181i.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 13; P.A. 79-49; P.A. 81-301, S. 1; P.A. 83-486, S. 1; P.A. 95-264, S. 64; P.A. 19-27, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 79-49 clarified section by adding provisions concerning effect of use of drugs, intoxicating liquors or combinations of them on defense plea; P.A. 81-301 replaced the provision that “it shall be a defense that the defendant” lacked substantial capacity with “a defendant may be found guilty but not criminally responsible if” he lacked substantial capacity due to mental disease or defect, and replaced “It shall not be a defense under this section” with “A finding of criminal responsibility shall not be barred”; P.A. 83-486 divided section into Subsecs., amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “a defendant my be found guilty but not criminally responsible if” with “it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant”, and rephrasing parts of said Subsec., amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “A finding of criminal responsibility shall not be barred” with “It shall not be a defense under this section” and amended Subsec. (c) by providing that mental disease or defect does not include “pathological or compulsive gambling”; P.A. 95-264 amended Subsec. (b) to change “licensed” practitioner to “prescribing” practitioner and referenced the definition section (Revisor's note: The reference in Subsec. (b) to “prescribing practitioner, as defined in subdivision (21) of ...” was corrected editorially by the Revisors to “prescribing practitioner, as defined in subdivision (22) of ...”); P.A. 19-27 amended Subsec. (a) by making a technical change, amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provisions re mental disease or defect proximately caused by voluntary ingestion, inhalation or injection of intoxicating liquor or any drug or substance as Subdiv. (1), adding Subdiv. (2) re discovery or knowledge or potential disclosure of victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, and amended Subsec. (c) by designating existing provisions re terms mental disease or defect as new Subdiv. (1), redesignating existing Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B), and adding new Subdiv. (2) defining “gender identity or expression”.

Sec. 53a-16. Justification as defense. In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 53a-17 to 53a-23, inclusive, shall be a defense. Justification as a defense does not include provocation that resulted solely from the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic relationship. As used in this section, “gender identity or expression” means gender identity or expression, as defined in section 53a-181i.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 16; P.A. 19-27, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 19-27 added provisions re discovery, knowledge or potential disclosure of victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression.

Sec. 53a-18. Use of reasonable physical force or deadly physical force generally. (a) The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances:

(1) A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor or an incompetent person, except a person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes as described in subdivision (6) of this section, may use reasonable physical force upon such minor or incompetent person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such minor or incompetent person.

(2) An authorized official of a correctional institution or facility may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is reasonable and authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department of Correction.

(3) A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under his or her direction, may use reasonable physical force when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to maintain order, but he or she may use deadly physical force only when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent death or serious physical injury.

(4) A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself or herself may use reasonable physical force upon such person to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to thwart such result.

(5) A duly licensed physician or psychologist, or a person acting under his or her direction, may use reasonable physical force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment which he or she reasonably believes to be adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient, provided the treatment (A) is administered with the consent of the patient or, if the patient is a minor or an incompetent person, with the consent of his or her parent, guardian or other person entrusted with his or her care and supervision, or (B) is administered in an emergency when the physician or psychologist reasonably believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent.

(6) A teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes may use reasonable physical force upon such minor when and to the extent such teacher or other person reasonably believes such force to be necessary to (A) protect himself or herself or others from immediate physical injury, (B) obtain possession of a dangerous instrument or controlled substance, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 21a-240, upon or within the control of such minor, (C) protect property from physical damage or (D) restrain such minor or remove such minor to another area, to maintain order.

(b) No person is justified in using force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense based solely on the discovery of, knowledge about or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, nonforcible, romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic relationship.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 18; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 4; P.A. 73-205, S. 6; P.A. 89-186, S. 1, 2; P.A. 90-43; P.A. 92-260, S. 3; P.A. 19-27, S. 3.)

History: 1971 act specified that force used in Subdivs. (1), (3), (4) and (5) must be “reasonable” physical force; P.A. 73-205 deleted language specifically forbidding use of “deadly physical force” in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 89-186 added new Subdiv. (6) re the use of reasonable physical force by a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes and amended Subdiv. (1) accordingly; P.A. 90-43 applied provisions of Subdiv. (5) to psychologists; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdivs. (1), (3), (4) and (6) to make technical change by replacing “it is necessary” with “such to be necessary”; P.A. 19-27 designated existing provisions re circumstances under which use of physical force justifiable and not criminal as Subsec. (a) and amended same by making technical changes, and added Subsec. (b) re discovery, knowledge or potential disclosure of victim's actual or perceived sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression.

Sec. 53a-19. Use of physical force in defense of person. (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and he may use such degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose; except that deadly physical force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that such other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he or she knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety (1) by retreating, except that the actor shall not be required to retreat if he or she is in his or her dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work and was not the initial aggressor, or if he or she is a peace officer or a special policeman appointed under section 29-18b, or a private person assisting such peace officer or special policeman at his or her direction, and acting pursuant to section 53a-22, or (2) by surrendering possession of property to a person asserting a claim of right thereto, or (3) by complying with a demand that he or she abstain from performing an act which he or she is not obliged to perform.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force when (1) with intent to cause physical injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of physical force by such other person, or (2) he is the initial aggressor, except that his use of physical force upon another person under such circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so, but such other person notwithstanding continues or threatens the use of physical force, or (3) the physical force involved was the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 19; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 4; P.A. 05-180, S. 1; P.A. 06-196, S. 184; P.A. 08-150, S. 49; P.A. 10-36, S. 15; P.A. 19-108, S. 3.)

History: 1971 act specified that “reasonable” physical force is justified in Subsec. (a); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes; P.A. 05-180 amended Subsec. (b) to include a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b within the purview of Subdiv. (1) and make technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality; P.A. 06-196 made a technical change in Subsec. (b)(1), effective June 7, 2006; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsec. (b) to include Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d within purview of Subdiv. (1); P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (b) to replace “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated” and make technical changes, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 19-108 amended Subsec. (b) to delete references to motor vehicle inspectors, and make technical changes.

Sec. 53a-22. Use of physical force in making arrest or preventing escape. (a) For purposes of this section, a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense means a reasonable belief in facts or circumstances which if true would in law constitute an offense. If the believed facts or circumstances would not in law constitute an offense, an erroneous though not unreasonable belief that the law is otherwise does not render justifiable the use of physical force to make an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody. A peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles who is effecting an arrest pursuant to a warrant or preventing an escape from custody is justified in using the physical force prescribed in subsections (b) and (c) of this section unless such warrant is invalid and is known by such officer to be invalid.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, a peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles is justified in using physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to: (1) Effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense, unless he or she knows that the arrest or custody is unauthorized; or (2) defend himself or herself or a third person from the use or imminent use of physical force while effecting or attempting to effect an arrest or while preventing or attempting to prevent an escape.

(c) A peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section only when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to: (1) Defend himself or herself or a third person from the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or (2) (A) effect an arrest of a person whom he or she reasonably believes has committed or attempted to commit a felony which involved the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury, or (B) prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he or she reasonably believes has committed a felony which involved the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury and if, where feasible under this subdivision, he or she has given warning of his or her intent to use deadly physical force.

(d) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, a person who has been directed by a peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles to assist such peace officer, special policeman or official to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody is justified in using reasonable physical force when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to carry out such peace officer's, special policeman's or official's direction.

(e) A person who has been directed to assist a peace officer, special policeman appointed under section 29-18b or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles under circumstances specified in subsection (d) of this section may use deadly physical force to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody only when: (1) He or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or (2) he or she is directed or authorized by such peace officer, special policeman or official to use deadly physical force, unless he or she knows that the peace officer, special policeman or official himself or herself is not authorized to use deadly physical force under the circumstances.

(f) A private person acting on his or her own account is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person whom he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense and who in fact has committed such offense; but he or she is not justified in using deadly physical force in such circumstances, except in defense of person as prescribed in section 53a-19.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 23; 1971, P.A. 826; 871, S. 8; P.A. 86-231; 86-403, S. 87, 132; P.A. 92-260, S. 7; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-6, S. 23, 28; P.A. 04-257, S. 119; P.A. 05-108, S. 6; 05-180, S. 2; P.A. 08-150, S. 50; P.A. 10-36, S. 16; P.A. 19-90, S. 4; 19-108, S. 4.)

History: 1971 acts applied provisions of Subsecs. (a) to (f) to authorized officials of department of correction and specified authority to use physical force to prevent escape from custody in Subsec. (a) and deleted former Subsec. (g) which had allowed peace officers employed in correctional facilities to use force to prevent a prisoner's escape and specified use of “reasonable” physical force; P.A. 86-231 amended Subsec. (c)(2) to add provision that the felony involve the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury and that the officer or official give a warning if feasible of his intent to use deadly physical force; P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (b); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing “believes it necessary”, “believes that such is necessary” and “believes it is necessary” with “believes such to be necessary”; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-6 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e), inclusive, to add authorized officials of the Board of Parole, effective July 1, 1994; P.A. 04-257 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e), inclusive, to delete references to an authorized official of the Board of Parole, effective June 14, 2004; P.A. 05-108 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e), inclusive, to restore references to an authorized official of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective June 7, 2005; P.A. 05-180 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e), inclusive, to include a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b within the purview of said Subsecs. and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality throughout; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e) to include Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d within purview of said Subsecs.; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsecs. (a) to (e) to replace “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated” and make technical changes, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 19-90 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by designating existing provision re effecting an arrest as Subpara. (A) and adding Subpara. (B) re preventing an escape; P.A. 19-108 deleted references to motor vehicle inspectors.

Sec. 53a-23. Use of physical force to resist arrest not justified. A person is not justified in using physical force to resist an arrest by a reasonably identifiable peace officer or special policeman appointed under section 29-18b, whether such arrest is legal or illegal.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 22; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 9; P.A. 05-180, S. 3; P.A. 08-150, S. 51; P.A. 10-36, S. 17; P.A. 19-108, S. 5.)

History: 1971 act deleted definition of peace officer; P.A. 05-180 included a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b within purview of section; P.A. 08-150 included Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d within purview of section; P.A. 10-36 replaced “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated” and made technical changes, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 19-108 deleted reference to motor vehicle inspectors, and made a technical change.