CHAPTER 821*

LAND TITLES

*Our peculiar statute against perpetuities was repealed by public acts of 1895, Ch. 249. The validity of a provision in a will is determined by the law in effect at the death of the testator. 71 C. 468; 74 C. 519; 80 C. 82; 81 C. 34. Effect of amendment to statute made in 1884. 83 C. 10. Republication of will after repeal of statute, takes provision out of its terms. 88 C. 286. Law of state where land lies determines as to its transmission. 178 U.S. 186.

Ordinarily, under an oral lease of a tenement in a building housing more than one family, the lessor neither impliedly warrants that the demised premises are in a reasonably safe condition nor impliedly undertakes to keep in reasonable repair the portion of the premises leased to and placed in the exclusive possession and control of the lessee. 150 C. 149. A promise to repair made to induce a person to become a tenant or made after the tenancy has commenced to induce the tenant to remain for a new or additional term is based on a sufficient consideration to give rise to a cause of action for negligence. Id., 418.

The right of a tenant to use the common stairway in a three-family house could be found to be a property interest sufficient to form the basis for an action in nuisance. 22 CS 373. There is a bailment to tenant of personal property included in a lease. Where bailee is unable to restore bailed property or returns it in damaged condition, there arises a presumption of negligence. 23 CS 504. Doctrine of liability for nuisance upon premises does not apply as between landlord and tenant. 24 CS 439.

Table of Contents

Sec. 47-1. Fee simple an absolute property. Colonial grants valid.

Sec. 47-2. Charitable uses.

Sec. 47-3. When fee tail becomes fee simple.

Sec. 47-4. Rule in Shelley’s case, and collateral warranties, abolished.

Sec. 47-5. Conveyance to be in writing, acknowledged and attested. Conveyance pursuant to power of attorney.

Sec. 47-5a. Persons before whom acknowledgment may be made.

Sec. 47-6. Witnessing and acknowledgment of deeds of corporations and voluntary associations.

Sec. 47-6a. Foreign business trust authorized to purchase, hold, transmit, make mortgages on, acquire and convey interests in real estate; filing of trust declaration.

Sec. 47-6b. Conveyances to nonprofit land-holding organizations.

Sec. 47-7. Conveyances and releases executed outside this state.

Sec. 47-7a. (Formerly Sec. 47-58a). Rights of aliens re real estate. Validation of real estate transfers to aliens.

Sec. 47-7b. Representation of interests of state when marketability of land titles threatened by claim of Indian tribe.

Sec. 47-8. Release of mortgage or lien in favor of state.

Sec. 47-9. Deeds of railroad companies.

Sec. 47-10. Conveyance to be recorded. Recorded conveyance not invalid or unenforceable if original documentation converted into digital or electronic form, lost or destroyed.

Sec. 47-11. County clerk’s certificates; recording in full not required.

Sec. 47-12. Change in name or status of owner of real estate.

Sec. 47-12a. Affidavit of facts relating to title or interest in real estate.

Sec. 47-13. Conveyance of property acquired prior to change of name.

Sec. 47-14. Joint tenancy; release or conveyance to other joint tenants.

Sec. 47-14a. Joint tenancy in fee simple with survivorship.

Sec. 47-14b. Conveyance or encumbrance by joint tenants.

Sec. 47-14c. Conveyance by less than all joint tenants.

Sec. 47-14d. Conveyance to one joint tenant by others.

Sec. 47-14e. Mortgage or lease by joint tenants.

Sec. 47-14f. Attachment of or lien on tenant’s interest.

Sec. 47-14g. Divorce or marriage dissolution of husband and wife joint tenants.

Sec. 47-14h. Provisions applicable to joint tenancies with survivorship.

Sec. 47-14i. Effect of death on contract by tenant to convey interest.

Sec. 47-14j. Conveyance to effect change in interests among tenants.

Sec. 47-14k. Applicability of statutes.

Sec. 47-15. Certificate of taking land by appraisal to be recorded.

Sec. 47-16. Lost deed of land in two or more towns, copy recorded.

Sec. 47-16a. Recording of certified copy of deed or other instrument recorded in land records of another town.

Sec. 47-17. Records of documents as notice of equitable rights.

Sec. 47-18. Ownership of historic memorials.

Sec. 47-18a. Notice of listing of historic structure on National Register of Historic Places.

Sec. 47-19. Leases for more than one year.

Sec. 47-20. Use of word “trustee” or “agent” in an instrument affecting real estate.

Sec. 47-21. Deeds of land by persons ousted of possession, void.

Sec. 47-22. Transferred

Sec. 47-23. Termination of parol leases for nonpayment of rent.

Sec. 47-23a. Transferred

Secs. 47-23b to 47-23f, 47-24. Security deposit refunds. Tenant not liable for rent while premises are untenantable.

Sec. 47-24a. Transferred

Sec. 47-24b. Covenant that leased property is fit for habitation.

Sec. 47-24c. Transferred

Sec. 47-24d. Tenant’s waiver of rights, when valid.

Sec. 47-25. Right to light not gained by adverse possession.

Sec. 47-26. No right to railroad, railway or canal land by adverse possession.

Sec. 47-27. Title by adverse possession by or against railroad or street railway corporation, against nonprofit land-holding organization or against investor-owned water company.

Sec. 47-28. Admissibility of award of arbitrators as evidence.

Sec. 47-29. Right of entry on land by assignee of reversion.

Sec. 47-30. Ejectment. Set-off of defendant’s improvements.

Sec. 47-31. Action to settle title or claim interest in real or personal property.

Sec. 47-32. Several defendants may be joined.

Sec. 47-33. Action to settle title to land belonging to estate of deceased person.

Sec. 47-33a. Action on agreement to sell real estate.

Sec. 47-33b. Marketable record title. Definitions.

Sec. 47-33c. Chain of title for not less than forty years creates marketable record title.

Sec. 47-33d. Interests to which title is subject.

Sec. 47-33e. Prior interests void.

Sec. 47-33f. Notice of claim filed within forty-year period.

Sec. 47-33g. Contents of notice. Recording. Indexing.

Sec. 47-33h. Excepted interests.

Sec. 47-33i. Other statutes not affected.

Sec. 47-33j. Notice not to be recorded to slander title. Damages.

Sec. 47-33k. Construction.

Sec. 47-33l. Forty-year period extended, when.

Sec. 47-33m. Short title: Dormant Mineral Interests Act.

Sec. 47-33n. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Statement of policy.

Sec. 47-33o. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Definitions.

Sec. 47-33p. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Exclusions.

Sec. 47-33q. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Termination of dormant mineral interest.

Sec. 47-33r. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Preservation of mineral interest by notice.

Sec. 47-33s. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Effect of termination of mineral interest.

Sec. 47-33t. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Savings and transitional provisions.

Sec. 47-34. Bounds between proprietors reestablished by Superior Court.

Sec. 47-34a. Unlawful destruction, disturbance or removal of surveyor’s marker or monument.

Sec. 47-35. Tobacco poles deemed to be part of tobacco-curing structure.

Sec. 47-36. Federal claim or judgment to be recorded.


Sec. 47-1. Fee simple an absolute property. Colonial grants valid. Each proprietor in fee simple of lands has an absolute and direct dominion and property in the same, and all patents and grants of lands from the General Assembly of the colony of Connecticut, pursuant to the charter of Charles II, shall be sufficient evidence of a title in fee simple to the grantees, their heirs, successors and assigns forever.

(1949 Rev., S. 7081.)

Sec. 47-2. Charitable uses. All estates granted for the maintenance of the ministry of the gospel, or of schools of learning, or for the relief of the poor, or for the preservation, care and maintenance of any cemetery, cemetery lot or monuments thereon, or for any other public and charitable use, shall forever remain to the uses to which they were granted, according to the true intent and meaning of the grantor, and to no other use whatever.

(1949 Rev., S. 7082.)

Land conveyed to a society’s committee, and their successors, passes to the successors. 2 R. 298. This statute was passed in 1684; but, as it did not appear in the printed statutes before the revision of 1702, it is generally called the statute of “1702”. In 1821 the clause of the original act, exempting such property from taxation, was struck out. Who can take under this section, and what evidence is admissible to identify devisees. 2 R. 298; 6 C. 292; 11 C. 60; 15 C. 274; 16 C. 291; 23 C. 34; 92 C. 110; 98 C. 332. Diversion of fund to another charity illegal. 3 D. 450. Division of church lands between different societies. 4 D. 360. Deaf and dumb asylum a charity. 4 C. 172. “Estates” includes money at interest. 6 C. 227. When land given to charitable uses is exempt from taxation. 7 C. 335; 10 C. 490; 11 C. 251; 14 C. 228; 36 C. 116; 85 C. 674; 87 C. 474; 88 C. 241. Diversion of fund from charitable use by return to donors illegal. 12 C. 113; 54 C. 342; 67 C. 554. Bequest to unincorporated charitable institution sustained. 17 C. 181; And also a devise. 98 C. 333. No exemption from taxation under former exempting clause unless express terms of grant impress upon the land a perpetual sequestration for the pious or charitable use. 21 C. 481. Bequest to “pious indigent young men” void for uncertainty. 22 C. 50. Devise of land to a town, income to be used for repairing highways and bridges, is for a public and charitable use. 24 C. 350. Education of Indian and African youth a charitable use. 30 C. 113. Land devoted to charitable uses, and so exempt from taxation, when conveyed in fee, becomes taxable. Id., 160. Lease for 999 years for a gross sum is practically a conveyance in fee simple, and land is taxable; such a lease is in fraud of the statute. 31 C. 407; 72 C. 370. Property conveyed to charitable uses before 1821 is not taxable unless legislature expressly makes it so; property so conveyed after revision of 1821 is taxable. 38 C. 287. Land devoted to a public use cannot be taken for another inconsistent public use without legislative authority, express or necessarily implied. 43 C. 240. Lessee’s taxable building on lessor’s exempt land. 51 C. 259. What is sufficient description of class of beneficiaries. Id., 377; 52 C. 412; 54 C. 21; Id., 352; 55 C. 166; 57 C. 147; Id., 275; 63 C. 125; id., 378; 67 C. 566; 68 C. 527; 71 C. 122; 93 C. 351. Charitable trusts are favored; 67 C. 243; 68 C. 532; 93 C. 350; 102 C. 417; 113 C. 232; but if insufficiently created, equity cannot aid them. 82 C. 504. Trust to church of particular denomination is within statute. 67 C. 565; 98 C. 322. Trust cannot be terminated; but as to cy pres doctrine, see 67 C. 566; 85 C. 309; 99 C. 33. Incidental benefit to taxpayers does not take gift out of statute. 68 C. 527. Trusts for cemetery lots. 73 C. 58; Id., 678. Under gift to “Institution for, etc., in New York”, “New York Society for” may take. Id., 670. Trust for benefit of destitute seamen; for a “home for ladies of advanced age”. 74 C. 586. These trusts are not within the statute of perpetuities. Id.; 75 C. 86; 109 C. 544. Motive which leads one to establish trust is of no consequence. 74 C. 588. Gift to advent society to combat the idea of immortality. 75 C. 83. Improper acts of trustee will not terminate it. 85 C. 309. See generally, 74 C. 586. Effect of gift to a charitable corporation. Id., 586; 90 C. 592. Trust in aid of destitute children in a home. Id. Power of legislature to order sale of property devoted to charitable trust. 5 Wall. 119. Less certainty in description of ultimate beneficiaries necessary where gift goes to charitable corporation. 100 C. 517. Public charitable corporation need not qualify in probate court as testamentary trustee, when. Id., 520. Where recipients of public charity are unascertainable, attorney general must represent them. 106 C. 590. Cited. 108 C. 140; 138 C. 146. In the case of gifts to charities the ordinary rule against accumulations does not apply. 113 C. 205. No distinction in legal effect between a charitable and a religious use. Id., 232. What constitutes a “charitable use”. 123 C. 549. Gift for establishment of chapel a charitable use. 126 C. 290. Ordinarily a bequest to such educational institutions as trustee may select is charitable. Id., 674. Acceptance of lands for use as a park charitable. 129 C. 112. There can be no essential change in the use of the land. 130 C. 527. The maintenance in perpetuity of testatrix’s home as depository for the ashes of herself and daughter not a charitable use. 133 C. 728. Property once dedicated to use of a church of polity may not be diverted to the use of a church of a different polity. 137 C. 1. Does not mean that any particular piece of land which has once been used for a cemetery must continue forever to be used for that purpose. 138 C. 434. Cited. 151 C. 517. Court held that amount in excess of particular purpose was invalid and was intestate property. Id., 527. Statute did not impair state’s sovereign power to condemn property accepted and dedicated as public park, but municipal owner is required to hold proceeds of condemnation award subject to substantially same restriction as that placed on lands by their dedication for park purposes. 154 C. 692. Discussed re restrictive covenant for use as addition to public school site, valuation when taken by eminent domain. 164 C. 337. Lands and property owned by a charitable organization devoted to a charitable public use may not be used for commercial purposes unless reasonably necessary to continue the charitable purpose of such organization. 168 C. 447. Cited. 172 C. 496. Cited. 209 C. 429. Cited. 225 C. 32.

Any organization to be classed as a charitable organization under the statute must have the administration of charity as one of its ultimate purposes. A Masonic lodge which practices charity incidental to the accomplishment of its ultimate purpose is not such a charity. 4 CS 14. Testamentary trust for the erection and maintenance of a cemetery chapel to the memory of the testator’s mother is not invalid because it is not limited to the period of perpetuities. 7 CS 251. Trust once established for any particular religious or charitable use remains for that use forever and to no other use whatever. 12 CS 352. Not essential to charitable character of use that only the mendicant, impecunious or poor receive its benefactions. 13 CS 372. This section passed in 1684. Sometimes variously known as the “Statute of Elizabeth” or as “The Statute of Charitable Uses” or as “The Statute of 1702”. 17 CS 169. Applicability of cy pres doctrine or doctrine of approximation depends on proof of general dominant charitable intent to which particular expressed intent is secondary. 27 CS 176. Since adherence to settlors’ religious limitation would defeat their dominant intent, doctrine of approximation should be invoked to allow trustees to ignore limitation. 28 CS 468.

Sec. 47-3. When fee tail becomes fee simple. Each estate, given in fee tail, shall be an absolute estate in fee simple to the issue of the first donee in tail.

(1949 Rev., S. 7083.)

This section affirms the common law of Connecticut. K. 118; Id., 175; 1 R. 79, 96; 2 R. 39; 3 D. 332. Issue of donee in tail, during life of donee, has no right capable of being transferred by release deed. 7 C. 250; 51 C. 45; 66 C. 408. When a fee tail vests in the immediate descendant of a person in being. 9 C. 114. When a devise vests an estate tail in the devisee. 12 C. 328. When donee in tail liable upon covenants in a deed of warranty. 23 C. 349. Estate tail by implication. 66 C. 407; 72 C. 29; 125 C. 657. Provisions in wills construed. 68 C. 207; 78 C. 362; 124 C. 448; 127 C. 115. How estate in fee tail is created by deed or will; effect. 88 C. 296. Cited. 109 C. 540. “Issue” construed not to mean “children”. 124 C. 448. This statute in terms provides for the invalidation of an estate tail by making it an estate in fee simple in the first donee in tail. 125 C. 661. Identity of the issue of the first donee in tail not ascertainable until death of donee. Id., 662. Meaning of word “issue” not the same as “immediate issue or descendants” in former statute against perpetuities. 127 C. 9.

Sec. 47-4. Rule in Shelley’s case, and collateral warranties, abolished. All grants or devises of an estate in lands, to any person for life and then to his heirs, shall be only an estate for life in the grantee or devisee. All collateral warranties of lands, made by any ancestor who had no estate of inheritance in the same, at the time of making such warranty, shall be void as against his heirs.

(1949 Rev., S. 7084; P.A. 79-602, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 79-602 made slight change in wording, splitting one sentence into two.

Rule in Shelley’s case formerly in force in Connecticut. 1 D. 299; 10 C. 448. Act of 1821 abolishing rule does not affect act of 1784 against perpetuities. 60 C. 499. Cited. 74 C. 636; 127 C. 10.

Sec. 47-5. Conveyance to be in writing, acknowledged and attested. Conveyance pursuant to power of attorney. (a) All conveyances of land shall be: (1) In writing; (2) if the grantor is a natural person, subscribed, with or without a seal, by the grantor with his own hand or with his mark with his name annexed to it or by his attorney authorized for that purpose by a power executed, acknowledged and witnessed in the manner provided for conveyances or, if the grantor is a corporation, limited liability company or partnership, subscribed by a duly authorized person; (3) acknowledged by the grantor, his attorney or such duly authorized person (A) to be his free act and deed, or (B) in any manner permitted under chapter 6 or chapter 8; and (4) attested to by two witnesses with their own hands.

(b) In addition to the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, the execution of a deed or other conveyance of real property pursuant to a power of attorney shall be deemed sufficient if done in substantially the following form:

Name of Owner of Record

By: (Signature of Attorney-in-Fact) L.S.

Name of Signatory

His/Her Attorney-in-Fact

(c) Nothing in subsection (b) of this section precludes the use of any other legal form of execution of deed or other conveyance of real property.

(1949 Rev., S. 7085; P.A. 75-309, S. 3; P.A. 79-602, S. 1; P.A. 87-265; P.A. 96-77, S. 16; P.A. 05-288, S. 160; P.A. 06-196, S. 176; P.A. 11-206, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 75-309 made grantor’s seal optional rather than mandatory, specified that duly authorized person may subscribe to conveyance where grantor is a corporation or partnership and deleted detailed listing of persons before whom acknowledgment may be made; P.A. 79-602 restated provisions and added Subdiv. indicators; P.A. 87-265 added Subsec. (b) re form for execution of deed or other conveyance of real property pursuant to a power of attorney and Subsec. (c) re use of other legal forms of deed execution or property conveyance; P.A. 96-77 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add “limited liability company”; P.A. 05-288 made a technical change in Subsec. (c), effective July 13, 2005; P.A. 06-196 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective June 7, 2006; P.A. 11-206 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to designate existing provisions re free act and deed as Subpara. (A) and add Subpara. (B) to permit acknowledgment in any manner permitted under Ch. 6 or 8.

See chapter 821a re forms of deeds and mortgages.

When an unacknowledged deed is admissible in evidence. 3 D. 500; 3 C. 398. What defect in certificate of acknowledgment is fatal. 2 C. 527; 3 C. 406; 11 C. 129. Whether a deed attested by only one witness was valid under the colony laws of 1672. 3 C. 35. The acknowledgment cannot be proved by parol. Id., 406; 11 C. 129. When chancery will supply defects in attestation. 4 C. 344; 5 C. 468; 8 C. 549. Cancellation of a deed, duly executed and delivered, does not revest the title. 4 C. 550; 5 C. 86, 262. Record of deed, defectively attested, not constructive notice. 5 C. 468; 87 C. 369. General agent of manufacturing company cannot execute deed of company’s real estate. 7 C. 214. Material alteration makes a new attestation necessary. 8 C. 289. Corporation may by vote, without power of attorney, empower agent to convey its real estate; such agent must affix corporate seal to deed. Id., 191; 27 C. 538. Signature must be made by party’s own hand. 13 C. 192. Vote of corporation authorizing execution of deed need not be under corporate seal nor recorded with deed. 14 C. 594. Witnesses must be disinterested 26 C. 195. “Personally appeared ... signer and sealer”, etc., when a sufficient acknowledgment. 30 C. 344. Unsigned recorded mortgage absolutely void. 44 C. 321. In equity, an absolute deed can by parol be proved to be a mortgage. 72 C. 720; 74 C. 252; 79 C. 340; 85 C. 46; 89 C. 178; 93 C. 66. Acknowledgment taken by agent of grantee. 77 C. 276. Deed conveys title but does not purport to express agreement of parties; counterclaim for deficiency in acreage. 97 C. 350. Delivery and acceptance necessary; leaving with maker’s own attorney is inoperative where no instructions given; requisites for valid gift inter vivos. Id., 483. Applies, by reference, to chattel mortgages. 105 C. 772. Effect of validating acts. 109 C. 312. The attestation clause of a deed which is in the possession of the grantee is prima facie proof of delivery. 146 C. 307. In proceeding to set aside a conveyance, the burden of proof on issue of undue influence rests on the one alleging it except when it appears that a stranger, holding toward the grantor a relationship of trust and confidence, is the principal beneficiary to the exclusion of others who are the natural objects of grantor’s bounty. 147 C. 474. Agreement to divide money representing income from property or proceeds from its sale was a contract and not a conveyance of land and it was not necessary it be executed in accordance with section. 156 C. 12. Cited. 207 C. 555; 218 C. 512; 232 C. 645.

Cited. 5 CA 435; 31 CA 1. Section does not indicate that a flaw in the instrument or its recordation would make it inadmissible as evidence. 51 CA 733. When read together with Sec. 47-10, indicates that only when a natural person attempts to convey property through a power of attorney must the instrument creating the power be filed with the conveyance, or have been previously filed, to have legal effect. Id. Deed was invalid because it lacked the signature of two witnesses. 87 CA 337.

A restrictive covenant and zoning restrictions are two entirely separate and unrelated limitations on the use of property; where the deeds to all the lots sold under a general development scheme contain the same restrictive covenants, each grantee is entitled to enforce them in the absence of conduct on his part constituting laches, waiver or abandonment. 22 CS 235. Where an owner of land causes a map to be made of it showing separate lots, and parks or other open areas and then sells the lots, referring in his conveyances to the map, the lot owners acquire the right to have the parks thereafter kept open for use in connection with their lands. Id., 499. A purchase of property in the name of a husband by money supplied by his wife raises a rebuttable presumption of a gift. 23 CS 1. Restrictive covenants are to be narrowly construed and are not to be extended by implication. Id., 89. Cited. Id., 298. A reservation or other restriction in a deed is the proper subject of an action for a declaratory judgment. Id., 486. Reservation should be construed so as to confer a practical right and will include by implication that which is necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the thing reserved, so long as it is not contrary to ascertained intent of parties. Id. Cited. 30 CS 56; 41 CS 225.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 221 C. 77.

Cited. 38 CA 639. Lack of adherence to the formalities in Subsec. rendered the subject deed of conveyance voidable, but not void; in the case of the subject deed, where plaintiff gave permission to or granted authority to his father to sign his name on the deed, plaintiff waived Subsec.’s directive. 67 CA 447. A grantor or a grantee of a deed cannot act as one of the two attesting witnesses required for the conveyance of property because allowing the parties to act as witnesses would negate the purpose of the witness requirement. 134 CA 265.

Sec. 47-5a. Persons before whom acknowledgment may be made. If the acknowledgment in a conveyance of real estate is made in this state, it may be made before a judge of a court of record of this state or of the United States, a clerk of the Superior Court, a justice of the peace, a commissioner of the Superior Court, a notary public, either with or without his official seal, a town clerk or an assistant town clerk; and, if in any other state or territory of the United States, before a commissioner residing in such other state or territory appointed by the Governor of Connecticut, or an officer authorized to take the acknowledgment of deeds in such state or territory; and, if in a foreign country, before any ambassador, minister, charge d’affaires, consul, vice-consul, deputy-consul, consul-general, vice-consul-general, deputy-consul-general, consular-agent, vice-consular-agent, commercial agent or vice-commercial agent of the United States, representing or acting as agent of the United States in such foreign country, or before any notary public or justice of the peace, or before any other public officer, in such foreign country, before whom oaths or acknowledgments may be given; but no officer shall have power to take such acknowledgment, except within the territorial limits in which he may perform the duties of his office. The authentication of the signature and qualification of the acknowledging officer on any instrument executed out of this state may conform either to the provisions of chapter 6 or to section 47-7.

(P.A. 75-309, S. 4; P.A. 76-436, S. 646, 681; P.A. 79-602, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 76-436 removed clerk of common pleas court as person before whom acknowledgment may be made in this state, that court having been abolished in the act, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording but made no substantive change.

See chapter 821a re forms of deeds and mortgages.

Sec. 47-6. Witnessing and acknowledgment of deeds of corporations and voluntary associations. Conveyances of real estate made to or by any corporation, or the trustees of any voluntary association, may be attested by witnesses interested therein, and may be acknowledged before properly authorized persons who are so interested.

(1949 Rev., S. 7086.)

Otherwise before this act. 26 C. 195. Effect of pleading admitting execution of deed of corporation. 74 C. 224.

Cited. 7 CA 601.

Sec. 47-6a. Foreign business trust authorized to purchase, hold, transmit, make mortgages on, acquire and convey interests in real estate; filing of trust declaration. A trust with transferable shares organized under the laws of any state, commonly known as a business trust, may purchase, hold or transmit real estate, make mortgages thereon, and acquire and convey any interest therein, in the name of such trust in the same manner as a corporation organized under the laws of this state, provided a true copy of the declaration of such trust, duly certified by the proper official of the state in which it is organized or by the secretary of such trust, shall first be filed in the office of the Secretary of the State of Connecticut.

(P.A. 73-513; P.A. 79-356, S. 12.)

History: P.A. 79-356 expanded provisions to apply with regard to trusts organized under any state’s laws where previously applicable only to trusts organized under laws of Massachusetts.

Cited. 179 C. 246.

Massachusetts business trusts are treated as corporations, and Sec. 33-411(c) and (d) probably apply to them. Inapplicable to a Maryland business trust. 32 CS 124.

Sec. 47-6b. Conveyances to nonprofit land-holding organizations. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Nonprofit land-holding organization” means a nonprofit corporation incorporated pursuant to chapter 602, or any predecessor statute thereto, having as one of its principal purposes the conservation and preservation of land, including, but not limited to, a land trust; and

(2) “Conservation restriction” has the same meaning as provided in section 47-42a.

(b) Any deed or other instrument of conveyance by which an interest in real property, including, but not limited to, a conservation restriction or easement, is conveyed to a nonprofit land-holding organization on or after October 1, 2004, shall, in addition to other requirements of law, be signed by a duly authorized officer of such nonprofit land-holding organization to indicate acceptance of such interest by the nonprofit land-holding organization.

(c) Any person who conveys any interest in real property to a nonprofit land-holding organization on or after October 1, 2004, by a deed or other instrument of conveyance that is not signed by a duly authorized officer of such nonprofit land-holding organization as required under subsection (b) of this section shall be liable for a civil penalty in the amount of five hundred dollars. Any such conveyance shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive trade practice under subsection (a) of section 42-110b.

(P.A. 04-114, S. 1.)

Sec. 47-7. Conveyances and releases executed outside this state. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1-36, any conveyance of real estate situated in this state, any mortgage or release of mortgage or lien upon any real estate situated in this state, and any power of attorney authorizing another to convey any interest in real estate situated in this state, executed and acknowledged in any other state or territory in conformity with the laws of that state or territory relating to the conveyance of real estate therein situated or of any interest therein or with the laws of this state, is valid.

(b) No county clerk’s certificate or other authenticating certificate is required for such conveyance, mortgage, release, lien or power of attorney to be valid, provided the officer taking the acknowledgment indicated thereon the date, if any, on which his current commission expires.

(1949 Rev., S. 7087; February, 1965, P.A. 167; 1967, P.A. 300; 1969, P.A. 10; P.A. 79-602, S. 3.)

History: 1965 act specified that conveyance’s validity does not depend on whether county clerk’s certificate has been affixed “provided the officer taking such acknowledgment shall have indicated thereon the date on which his current commission expires”; 1967 act specified that provisions apply “notwithstanding the provisions of section 1-36” and added reference to “other authenticating” certificates; 1969 act rephrased provision re county clerk’s or other certificates; P.A. 79-602 divided section into Subsecs. and restated provisions.

Deed of land in Connecticut executed in another state before a Connecticut commissioner must be executed and acknowledged according to Connecticut law. 26 C. 381. Cited. 81 C. 541.

Deed of Connecticut property properly executed and acknowledged under laws of a foreign state, valid in this state even though not in conformity with Connecticut law. 144 C. 629. Effect of statute limited to curing defects in the form or manner of execution or acknowledgment. Id. This section supplements section 47-5, it does not deal with the nature or extent of the estate which the deed purports to convey. Id. (Concurring opinion).

Sec. 47-7a. (Formerly Sec. 47-58a). Rights of aliens re real estate. Validation of real estate transfers to aliens. (a) Any alien, whether or not resident in the United States, may hold, acquire, lease, inherit and transfer real estate in this state in as full a manner as native-born citizens.

(b) Any transfer of real estate to any such alien prior to October 1, 1985, is validated.

(P.A. 85-211, S. 1.)

History: Sec. 47-58a transferred to Sec. 47-7a in 1989.

Sec. 47-7b. Representation of interests of state when marketability of land titles threatened by claim of Indian tribe. The General Assembly finds that the state has a significant interest in the stability and marketability of land titles. The Attorney General may, in his discretion, represent the interests of the state in any lawsuit where the marketability of land titles has been threatened by a claim alleging that the disputed land was originally controlled or owned by an Indian tribe and was unlawfully transferred from that tribe.

(P.A. 93-389, S. 3, 7.)

History: P.A. 93-389 effective June 28, 1993.

Sec. 47-8. Release of mortgage or lien in favor of state. Any mortgage to, or lien in favor of, the state or its Treasurer may be released by the Treasurer under his hand and official seal.

(1949 Rev., S. 7088.)

Sec. 47-9. Deeds of railroad companies. Whenever any railroad company makes and executes a deed in fee simple of any lands which that company has derived by purchase, that deed effectually conveys the title to those lands to the absolute use of the grantee.

(1949 Rev., S. 7089; P.A. 79-602, S. 9.)

History: P.A. 79-602 rephrased section but made no substantive change.

Sec. 47-10. Conveyance to be recorded. Recorded conveyance not invalid or unenforceable if original documentation converted into digital or electronic form, lost or destroyed. (a) No conveyance shall be effectual to hold any land against any other person but the grantor and his heirs, unless recorded on the records of the town in which the land lies. When a conveyance is executed by a power of attorney, the power of attorney shall be recorded with the deed, unless it has already been recorded in the records of the town in which the land lies and reference to the power of attorney is made in the deed.

(b) Any conveyance that is otherwise effective and properly recorded before, on or after October 1, 2002, in accordance with subsection (a) of this section shall not be invalid or unenforceable because the original documentation evidencing such conveyance is converted into digital or electronic form or is lost or destroyed at any time after such recordation.

(1949 Rev., S. 7091; P.A. 79-602, S. 35; P.A. 02-66, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 79-602 restated provisions but made no substantive change; P.A. 02-66 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and added Subsec. (b) re properly recorded conveyance not invalid or unenforceable if original documentation evidencing conveyance is converted into digital or electronic form or is lost or destroyed.

See Secs. 7-35aa to 7-35gg, inclusive, re Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act.

When and how delay to record at length affects title of grantee. K 72; 1 R. 61, 81, 500; 2 R. 287, 298. When parol evidence admissible to show actual time of recording. 1 R. 81. Rule that deed first recorded obtains priority, how qualified. 2 R. 239, 383; 2 C. 467; 4 C. 575; 8 C. 342; 15 C. 307; 71 C. 100. Action lies against clerk for delivering up deed before recording. 2 R. 85. Bona fide later purchaser without notice of former conveyance by unrecorded deed holds against such former purchaser. Id., 420. Whether a deed releasing an equity of redemption is valid without being recorded. 2 D. 280. Unrecorded deed not good against disseizor. 2 C. 92; Sed quaere. What writing is not required to be recorded. Id., 467. What notice of encumbrance the condition of a mortgage deed must give; 4 C. 158; 5 C. 442; 6 C. 37, 116; 7 C. 387; 8 C. 215; 9 C. 286; 12 C. 195; 13 C. 165, 376; 14 C. 77; 15 C. 562; 16 C. 260; 18 C. 257; 19 C. 29; 20 C. 240, 427, 603; 31 C. 74, 488; 46 C. 313; 73 C. 318; 74 C. 198; Id., 405; 76 C. 388; 84 C. 329; 85 C. 46; 91 C. 496; United States supreme court follows rule of state court. 91 U.S. 452. Return to grantor and cancellation of unrecorded deed does not divest grantee’s title. 4 C. 550; 5 C. 262. Covenant of seizin may be broken, although grantee by first recording has secured title. Id. Recording of deed, defective in a statute requisite does not give notice. Id., 468; 8 C. 549; 14 C. 135; 87 C. 369; Sec. 47-17. Unrecorded deed, when admissible in evidence. 7 C. 291. Action lies for fraudulent withdrawal of deed from clerk’s office. 8 C. 342. Mortgage deed recorded after death of mortgagor, good. 11 C. 174. Estate by curtesy cannot be divested by disclaimer duly signed, attested, acknowledged, and recorded. 13 C. 83. What record of power of attorney sufficient. 14 C. 32. Burden of proof rests on prior grantee who claims against subsequent deed first recorded. 17 C. 594. When conveyances may be proved by copies of records. 18 C. 311. Deed not recorded until after death of grantor good against a purchaser from his heir at law. 24 C. 211. Deed defective in formal requisite is treated in a court of equity as an executory contract for sale of land. 27 C. 104. What is a reasonable time in which to record deed. 40 C. 85. A mortgage not recorded until after attachment of the mortgaged property, where the delay is unreasonable and unexplained, is not good against the attaching creditor. Id., 214. Placing a deed on record with intent to pass title to grantee makes a legal delivery. 49 C. 570. Party lending on mortgage in good faith is not charged with notice of equities which do not appear of record. 50 C. 46. Question of priority between deed with covenants given before grantor acquired title and deed given, after title acquired, to purchaser in good faith, for value, without notice. Id., 113. Casual knowledge of prior unrecorded mortgage does not charge notice thereof against party taking second mortgage on same land nine years later. Id., 517. Absolute recorded deed, with separate unrecorded defeasance, making it a mortgage, is invalid against grantor’s attaching creditor. 51 C. 446. Provision in railroad company’s charter may render unnecessary recording conveyance of its property in land records. 52 C. 274. Grantee not affected by mistake in recording his deed; various points about priority of mortgages. 56 C. 55. Failure to discover record, no defense. 68 C. 305. Notice of building restriction by record. Id., 367. Title of trustee in insolvency takes precedence of prior mortgages unrecorded for two years. 71 C. 358. Priorities between purchaser of land and execution creditor; 70 C. 356; between attaching creditor and purchaser failing to record deed. 71 C. 364; 91 C. 423. What is reasonable time for record, question of fact; 71 C. 95; 91 C. 423; when properly recorded, deed dates back to time of delivery. 76 C. 44; 91 C. 423. Policy of our law is to show title by record; 74 C. 405; 84 C. 329; 85 C. 47; 87 C. 99; 108 C. 24; mortgage; 82 C. 306. Withholding record of mortgage to uphold mortgagor’s credit is fraudulent. 74 C. 367. Extent of notice by record. Id., 405; 76 C. 50; 80 C. 329; 102 C. 687. Priority where A, having no title, deeds land to B, then gets title and deeds to C. 76 C. 44. Deed endorsed as recorded after mortgage back, held to precede mortgage. Id., 47. Effect of knowledge of right not appearing of record. 83 C. 581; 87 C. 90; Id., 209. Effect of failure to record separate defeasance. 85 C. 46; 89 C. 444. Creditor’s rights where deed or mortgage is not recorded. 85 C. 46; Id., 696. Priority where one purchases after mechanic’s lien attaches but before record. 87 C. 316. Unrecorded deed, how far good. 89 C. 35, 45. Recording mortgage of street railway. Id., 63. Only creditor who extends credit on strength of record title can prevail over undisclosed equitable rights of third parties. 91 C. 576. Mortgagee without notice and giving value may foreclose regardless of such equities. Id., 580. That land records would have shown true title is no defense in action for fraudulent misrepresentation as to title. 94 C. 226. Distinction between constructive knowledge from land records as regards character and extent of actual title, and such knowledge in creating personal rights related to title. Id., 225. Recording of a map is inoperative unless clearly referred to in properly recorded deed. 108 C. 541. Cited. 113 C. 481. Cited. 109 C. 438. Assignment of a mortgage falls within this statute. 121 C. 268. Prior assignee of mortgage who failed to record estopped by conduct. 126 C. 101. One invoking estoppel must exercise good faith and reasonable diligence. Id. Mechanic’s lien given priority over purchase money mortgage not recorded until after materials were furnished. 130 C. 367. Cited. 132 C. 554. Lack of actual notice of restrictions cannot aid defendant since they were on record. 138 C. 188. If a deed of real property is given to secure a debt, it must describe the indebtedness with reasonable accuracy to be valid against other encumbrances. 146 C. 523. Cited. 182 C. 1. Cited. 207 C. 555. Cited. 219 C. 810. Cited. 221 C. 77.

Cited. 5 CA 429. Cited. 31 CA 696. Cited. 33 CA 197. Cited. 35 CA 682. Cited. 41 CA 754. Section does not indicate that a flaw in the instrument or its recordation would make it inadmissible as evidence. 51 CA 733. When read together with Sec. 47-5, indicates that only when a natural person attempts to convey property through a power of attorney must the instrument creating the power be filed with the conveyance, or have been previously filed, to have legal effect. Id.

Unless a mortgage is recorded within a reasonable time before the execution of a subsequent mortgage, the latter has priority. 6 CS 97. Reasonable time depends upon the facts in each particular case. 11 CS 407. Cited. 15 CS 466. Quit claim deed executed in 1936 and recorded in 1948 not good against a judgment lien recorded more than five months previously. 16 CS 428.

Sec. 47-11. County clerk’s certificates; recording in full not required. When any instrument affecting the title to real estate, executed and acknowledged in another state, has a county clerk’s certificate attached to it, attesting to the authority of the officer taking the acknowledgment, the town clerk with whom the instrument is filed for record shall not be required to record the certificate or certificates in full, provided he shall note upon the record thereof with a rubber stamp or otherwise the notation “County Clerk’s certificate of authority of officer taking acknowledgment was attached to original instrument.” That notation shall be prima facie evidence of the officer’s authority to take the acknowledgment.

(1949 Rev., S. 7092; P.A. 79-602, S. 42.)

History: P.A. 79-602 rephrased provisions but made no substantive change.

Sec. 47-12. Change in name or status of owner of real estate. Any person, corporation, limited liability company or limited liability partnership owning real estate or having an interest therein whose name has been changed, any corporation which has been merged into or consolidated with another, and any general or limited partnership which has converted to a limited liability company or limited liability partnership, shall, within sixty days after the change, merger, consolidation or conversion file with the town clerk of the town in which the real estate is located a certificate, duly acknowledged, giving the name before and after the change, merger, consolidation or conversion and the town clerk shall record and index the certificate in the land records.

(1949 Rev., S. 7093; P.A. 79-602, S. 37; P.A. 94-217, S. 33; P.A. 98-137, S. 54, 62; P.A. 98-219, S. 33, 34.)

History: P.A. 79-602 restated provisions; P.A. 94-217 made provisions applicable to any limited liability company whose name has been changed and any general or limited partnership which has converted to a limited liability company; P.A. 98-137 made provisions applicable to any limited liability partnership whose name has been changed and any general or limited partnership which has converted to a limited liability partnership, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 98-219 revised effective date of P.A. 98-137, but without affecting this section.

Sec. 47-12a. Affidavit of facts relating to title or interest in real estate. (a) An affidavit, which states facts relating to the matters named in subsection (b) of this section and which may affect the title to or any interest in real estate in this state, and which is made by any person having knowledge of the facts or competent to testify concerning them in open court, may be recorded in the land records of the town in which the real estate is situated. If so recorded, and if the affiant is dead or otherwise not available to testify in court, then the affidavit, or a certified copy of it, is admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it, so far as those facts affect title to real estate in any action involving the title to that real estate or any interest in it.

(b) The affidavits provided for in this section may relate to the following matters: Age, sex, birth, death, capacity, relationship, family history, heirship, names, identity of parties, marital status, possession or adverse possession, adverse use, residence, service in the armed forces, conflicts and ambiguities in description of land in recorded instruments, and the happening of any condition or event which may terminate an estate or interest.

(c) Every affidavit provided for in this section shall include a description of the land, title to which may be affected by facts stated in the affidavit, and shall state the name of the person appearing by the record to be the owner of the land at the time of the recording of the affidavit. The town clerk shall index the affidavit in the name of that record owner.

(1967, P.A. 373, S. 1–3; P.A. 79-602, S. 39; P.A. 05-288, S. 161.)

History: P.A. 79-602 restated provisions; P.A. 05-288 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective July 13, 2005.

Cited. 211 C. 36.

Sec. 47-13. Conveyance of property acquired prior to change of name. Any person or corporation who conveys property acquired prior to a change of name shall state in the instrument of conveyance the name under which that person or corporation acquired the property, and the town clerk shall index the record of the instrument in the name under which the property was acquired and in the name under which it was transferred.

(1949 Rev., S. 7094; P.A. 75-343, S. 1, 2; P.A. 79-602, S. 38.)

History: P.A. 75-343 applied provisions with respect to any person conveying property before changing name where previously applicable to married women who conveyed property before their marriage; P.A. 79-602 applied provisions to corporations and replaced “such” with “that” or “the” where appearing.

Social custom of woman to change name upon marriage, recognized. 30 CS 385.

Sec. 47-14. Joint tenancy; release or conveyance to other joint tenants. Section 47-14 is repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7095; 1959, P.A. 677, S. 12.)

Sec. 47-14a. Joint tenancy in fee simple with survivorship. A conveyance of real estate or any interest therein by deed or will or other instrument of conveyance to two or more natural persons, among whom may be the grantor or grantors, in such form that the conveyance runs unto the grantees or devisees, whether as joint tenants or as tenants in common, and unto the survivor of them, or unto the survivor and survivors of them, and unto the last survivor’s heirs and assigns, or in such form that the conveyance runs unto the grantees or devisees for their lives, or their joint lives, with a remainder or other interest limited to the survivor of them and to the last survivor’s heirs and assigns, or in such form that the conveyance runs unto the grantees or devisees as joint tenants with right of survivorship, or in such form that the conveyance runs unto two grantees or devisees and to their heirs and assigns as tenants by the entirety, or in such form that the conveyance runs unto the grantees or devisees with the words “as joint tenants” added after their names, creates a joint tenancy in fee simple with right of survivorship added and the tenants holding under any such conveyance shall be known as joint tenants. The interests of the grantees under any such conveyance may be held by them in equal or unequal shares. Where words of inheritance are omitted as to any grantee therein except the survivor, any such conveyance otherwise legally sufficient and appropriate to convey any fee simple title to any grantee or person who becomes entitled thereto pursuant to this section and sections 47-14b to 47-14k, inclusive, by reason of any severance or otherwise, is fully effective to convey the title regardless of the omission.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 1; P.A. 79-602, S. 24; P.A. 84-70; P.A. 99-8.)

History: P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording but made no substantive change; P.A. 84-70 included conveyance of real estate “in such form that the conveyance runs unto the grantees or devisees with the words ‘as joint tenants’ added after their names”; P.A. 99-8 added provision that interests of grantees may be held in equal or unequal shares.

Mere omission of word “heirs” in grant in deed executed in 1948 held not sufficient to defeat otherwise clearly expressed intent to create fee, nor arbitrarily to reduce it to life estate. 149 C. 137. Joint tenant wife was entitled to exoneration of mortgage made by her husband on property he first owned as sole owner and later transferred to them jointly. His estate was liable for all the mortgage as the debt was incurred solely by the decedent. 158 C. 225. Cited. Id., 229. Cited. 204 C. 502. Sec. 47-14a et seq. also cited. Id.

Cited. 32 CS 227.

Although a 1956 instrument of conveyance contained no reference to the creation of a joint tenancy, it did contain some reference to survivorship; consequently, by virtue of this statute, the court will hold that a joint tenancy was created. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 664, 668.

Sec. 47-14b. Conveyance or encumbrance by joint tenants. Subject to the provisions of section 47-14e, joint tenants may, by an instrument executed by all of them, convey or encumber the estate they hold or any portion of it or interest in it in the same manner as if they held as tenants in common.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 2; P.A. 79-602, S. 25.)

History: P.A. 79-602 rephrased section but made no substantive change.

Cited as Sec. 47-14a et seq. 204 C. 502.

Sec. 47-14c. Conveyance by less than all joint tenants. Except as otherwise provided in sections 47-14a to 47-14k, inclusive, a conveyance of any interest or interests in any joint tenancy by less than all of the joint tenants to a person or persons other than one of the remaining joint tenants severs the joint tenancy as to the interest or interests so conveyed and the grantee or grantees thereof shall hold the interest or interests as tenant or tenants in common with the remaining joint tenant or tenants. When there is more than one such remaining joint tenant, the conveyance does not alter the character of the tenancy or its incidents among the remaining joint tenants.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 3; P.A. 79-602, S. 26.)

History: P.A. 79-602 changed wording slightly but made no substantive change.

Cited. 177 C. 22. Cited. 204 C. 502. Cited. 219 C. 36.

Sec. 47-14d. Conveyance to one joint tenant by others. A release or other conveyance by all but one joint tenant to the one remaining joint tenant merges the entire estate in the releasee or grantee. When there is more than one such remaining joint tenant, a release or other conveyance by one or more joint tenants to all the remaining joint tenants makes the releasees or grantees joint tenants not only as to their former interests but also as to the interest or interests so released or conveyed, unless otherwise expressly provided in the release or conveyance. A release or other conveyance by one or more joint tenants to less than all the remaining joint tenants, or to some or all of the remaining joint tenants and a person or persons other than one of them, has the same effect as if the interest or interests so released or conveyed had been first conveyed to a stranger and by him conveyed to the releasees or grantees.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 4; P.A. 79-602, S. 27.)

History: P.A. 79-602 rephrased provisions but made no substantive change.

Sec. 47-14a et seq. cited. 204 C. 502.

Sec. 47-14e. Mortgage or lease by joint tenants. A mortgage or lease executed by all of the joint tenants does not sever the joint tenancy but is valid according to its terms against the joint tenants and the survivor or survivors of them. A mortgage or lease executed by less than all of the joint tenants is a severance only to the extent that, upon the death of any joint tenant joining in the mortgage or lease, the mortgage or lease will continue to encumber the interest accruing to the surviving joint tenant or tenants by reason of that death.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 5; P.A. 79-602, S. 28.)

History: P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording but no substantive changes.

Wife, as joint tenant, had an individual interest in property capable of being leased and could be enjoined from leasing to another party where she had discriminated in refusal to rent to plaintiff under section 53-36a. (46a-91). 157 C. 20. Sec. 47-14a et seq. cited. 204 C. 502.

Sec. 47-14f. Attachment of or lien on tenant’s interest. During the life of any joint tenant his interest may be attached, made subject to a mechanic’s lien, judgment lien or other lien authorized by law, or sold on execution, all in the same manner as if he held his interest as a tenant in common; provided, upon the death of any joint tenant owning that interest, the attachment or lien or execution, unless and until it becomes invalid or unenforceable for some reason other than that death, shall likewise continue valid and enforceable against that interest as and when it accrues to the surviving tenants or tenant by reason of that death, but it shall not otherwise affect the rights or interests of any of the joint tenants, nor prevent any severance from being effected by any appropriate act pertaining to the interest of any of the joint tenants.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 6; P.A. 79-602, S. 29.)

History: P.A. 79-602 substituted “the” or “that” for “such” where appearing.

Sec. 47-14a et seq. cited. 204 C. 502.

Since the attachment of the interest of a joint tenant continues after his death, the settlement agreement between the lienor and the surviving tenant was not a “voluntary” assumption of the debt by her vis-a-vis those accommodated by the payment because until the payment was made her interest would never be free. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 664, 668.

Sec. 47-14g. Divorce or marriage dissolution of husband and wife joint tenants. Whenever a husband and wife are joint tenants in the same real estate, either together or in conjunction with others, a divorce or dissolution of the marriage, unless the divorce decree or decree of dissolution otherwise provides, severs their interests and converts them into tenants in common as to each other but not as to any remaining joint tenant or joint tenants. Such severance does not become effective as to any other persons until a certified copy of the decree or abstract of it, indicating the effective date of the divorce or dissolution, has been recorded in the land records of the town where the real estate is located.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 7; 1967, P.A. 276; P.A. 73-373, S. 32; P.A. 79-602, S. 30.)

History: 1967 act rephrased for clarity and specified that severance is effective “as to any other persons until a certified copy of the decree or abstract thereof, indicating the effective date of such divorce, has been recorded in the land records”, replacing provision whereby severance was effective at the time “such divorce becomes absolute and provision authorizing divorced person or other interested person to file copy of decree in town’s land records; P.A. 73-373 added references to dissolution of marriage; P.A. 79-602 rephrased provisions but made no substantive change.

Cited. 178 C. 254. Sec. 47-14a et seq. cited. 204 C. 502.

Cited. 28 CA 854; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 85.

Cited. 28 CS 383. Cited. 42 CS 36.

Sec. 47-14h. Provisions applicable to joint tenancies with survivorship. All provisions of existing statutes applicable to joint tenancies are applicable to joint tenancies with right of survivorship.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 8; P.A. 79-602, S. 31.)

History: P.A. 79-602 substituted “are” for “shall be”.

Sec. 47-14a et seq. cited. 204 C. 502. Cited. 224 C. 219.

Cited. 29 CS 465.

Subsec. (e):

Subdiv. (2) cited. 40 CA 595.

Sec. 47-14i. Effect of death on contract by tenant to convey interest. When any joint tenant enters into an enforceable contract to convey his interest, or a portion of his interest, severally or in conjunction with other joint tenants, and dies before the performance of the contract, such contract, to the extent that it would have been enforceable against the deceased joint tenant had he lived, shall be enforceable in rem against the interests accruing to the surviving joint tenant or joint tenants by reason of the death.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 9; P.A. 79-602, S. 32.)

History: P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording.

Sec. 47-14a et seq. cited. 204 C. 502.

Sec. 47-14j. Conveyance to effect change in interests among tenants. Any change in the nature of the interests held by joint tenants which could be effected by a conveyance or conveyances to a stranger may be effected by an instrument executed with the formalities required for deeds by the joint tenant or tenants whose interests are involved. That instrument shall not be effective until it has been recorded on the land records of the town in which the real estate is located.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 10; P.A. 79-602, S. 33.)

History: P.A. 79-602 rephrased provisions but made no substantive change.

Sec. 47-14a et seq. cited. 204 C. 502.

Sec. 47-14k. Applicability of statutes. The provisions of sections 47-14a to 47-14j, inclusive, apply to any conveyance or devise creating a joint tenancy in the manner provided in section 47-14a made prior to and existing on June 29, 1959, except to the extent that the effect of the conveyance or devise after that date is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in an action requiring that determination and a lis pendens notice of the action and the purpose of it has been recorded within one year after that date in the land records of the town where the real estate concerned is located or, in the absence of such lis pendens, a certified copy of the judgment has been so recorded within said period of one year; unless a person claims those sections do not apply to the conveyance or devise and, within one year after June 29, 1959, records a notice defining his contrary claim in the land records of the town where the land affected by those sections is located.

(1959, P.A. 677, S. 11; 1963, P.A. 637, S. 1; P.A. 79-602, S. 34.)

History: 1963 act restated provisions for clarity, substituting conveyance or devise “creating a joint tenancy in the manner provided in section 47-14a” for conveyance or devise “within their terms”, i.e. terms of Secs. 47-14a to 47-14j; P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording.

Sec. 47-14a et seq. cited. 204 C. 502. Cited. Id.

Assent to the applicability of sections 47-14a through 47-14j is presumed if the grantees do not take steps to indicate a contrary intent within a year of the effective date of the statute. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 664, 667.

Sec. 47-15. Certificate of taking land by appraisal to be recorded. When any land or interest therein, incorporeal hereditament or right to the use of water is taken by appraisal under proceedings on application or petition to any judge or court therefor, the applicant or petitioner shall, within thirty days after the appraisers have made their report or, if such report is made to a court, within thirty days after its final acceptance, file for record, in the town clerk’s office of the town or towns in which such land or interest is situated, a certificate describing the land or interest, signed by the applicant or his attorney, which certificate shall be recorded by the town clerk in the land records of the town.

(1949 Rev., S. 7098; P.A. 79-602, S. 41.)

History: P.A. 79-602 substituted “the” for “such”.

Sec. 47-16. Lost deed of land in two or more towns, copy recorded. When any conveyance of land, situated in two or more towns, has been lost after being recorded in one or more of such towns, a certified copy of the record thereof may be recorded in the other towns; and, when so recorded, shall have the same effect as a record of the original instrument.

(1949 Rev., S. 7099.)

Cited. 228 C. 795. Cited. 237 C. 613.

Sec. 47-16a. Recording of certified copy of deed or other instrument recorded in land records of another town. The town clerk of any town shall accept for recording any certified copy of a deed or other instrument affecting real property located in such town and recorded in the land records of another town, provided such copy is certified by the town clerk of the other town to be a true copy of the original deed or other instrument recorded in such other town. When such certified copy is so recorded, it shall have the same effect as a record of the original deed or other instrument.

(P.A. 04-132, S. 1.)

Sec. 47-17. Records of documents as notice of equitable rights. An unacknowledged deed, and any instrument intended as a conveyance of land, but which by reason of a formal defect operates only as a conveyance of an equitable interest in such land, and any contract for the conveyance of land, or of any interest therein, and any instrument by which an equitable interest in land is created, in which such land is particularly described, may be recorded in the records of the town in which such land is situated; and such record shall be notice to all the world of the equitable interest thus created.

(1949 Rev., S. 7100.)

Unacknowledged lease for fifteen years admissible to show that party was in possession claiming title. 1 D. 17. Recording of deed, defective in statute requisite, is not notice of its existence to third persons. 8 C. 549; 14 C. 135; 87 C. 369. Does not apply to personal property included in defectively witnessed mortgage of real estate. 102 C. 687. A claimed attorney’s lien did not constitute “notice” under the statute. 123 C. 374. Trust indenture held not a cloud on title. 125 C. 692.

Cited. 26 CA 203.

Essence of attorney’s lien. 4 CS 505. A deed purporting to convey property is under a claim and color of right and equivalent to ouster of other claimants as to whom the grantor thereafter holds adversely. 15 CS 467.

Sec. 47-18. Ownership of historic memorials. The title and ownership of all memorials, tablets and markers, designating any historic place, or in commemoration of any historic event, whether upon public or private buildings, in public parks or cemeteries or upon private grounds, shall be vested in perpetuity in the society or association erecting or placing the same.

(1949 Rev., S. 7101.)

Sec. 47-18a. Notice of listing of historic structure on National Register of Historic Places. The record owner of any historic structure or landmark in this state which is listed or under consideration for listing on the National Register of Historic Places or is part of a district listed or under consideration for listing on said National Register, shall cause notice of such listing or consideration for listing upon the land records of the town in which such structure or landmark is located.

(P.A. 82-367, S. 2.)

Sec. 47-19. Leases for more than one year. No lease of any building, land or tenement, for life or for any term exceeding one year or which provides for the renewal thereof or an option to purchase such building, land or tenement, shall be effectual against any persons other than the lessor and lessee and their respective heirs, successors, administrators and executors, unless it is in writing, executed, attested, acknowledged and recorded in the same manner as a deed of land, provided a notice of lease in writing, executed, attested, acknowledged and recorded in the same manner as a deed of land and containing (1) the names and addresses, if any are set forth in the lease, of the parties to the lease, (2) a reference to the lease, with its date of execution, (3) the term of the lease with the date of commencement and the date of termination of such term, (4) a description of the property contained in the lease, (5) a notation if a right of extension or renewal is exercisable, (6) if there is an option to purchase, a notation of the date by which such option must be exercised and (7) a reference to a place where the lease is to be on file shall be sufficient.

(1949 Rev., S. 7102; 1959, P.A. 173; 1961, P.A. 205; February, 1965, P.A. 402.)

History: 1959 act added proviso re sufficiency of lease notice; 1961 act broadened provision re effectual lease to include reference to “lessee”, “successors, administrators and executors”; 1965 act required, for sufficiency of notice of lease, inclusion of addresses of parties to lease, reference to lease with date of execution, dates of commencement and termination of lease term, notation if extension or renewal right may be exercised and if there is a purchase option, notation of deadline for exercising the option.

A writing granting liberty to flow lands for a certain time is a lease within the statute. 1 R. 318. When unacknowledged lease admissible in evidence. 1 D. 17; 7 C. 420. Unacknowledged lease for more than one year, good for one year; such lease not void, but voidable by third party, as lease for more than one year. 21 C. 168. Unrecorded lease good to convey an interest against a cotenant. 25 C. 137. Under this statute a lease effectual against the lessor is equally so against the lessee. 46 C. 92. Lease not sealed or acknowledged good between the parties. 47 C. 33. Effect of unrecorded lease. 80 C. 15; Id., 453. Oral lease not to be performed within a year is within statute of frauds. 80 C. 263; Id., 503; 82 C. 413; 86 C. 32. Validating acts inoperative on unrecorded lease for more than one year. 104 C. 295; Likewise where recording is after judgment in summary process. Id. Subsequent purchaser charged with notice of instrument separate from lease. 113 C. 476. Court properly concluded that defendant was bona fide purchaser. 134 C. 349. Cited. 147 C. 411. Plaintiff had notice of defendant’s prior unrecorded lease, hence restrictive covenant in plaintiff’s subsequent lease is not enforceable against defendant. An unrecorded lease is not void but voidable by persons protected under the statute. 167 C. 294.

Cited. 19 CA 471. Cited. 33 CA 197. Cited. 42 CA 426.

Lease signed by lessor only is none the less executed in compliance with this section. 6 CS 451. Unrecorded lease valid against lessee as well as lessor. 12 CS 55. Cited. 22 CS 452.

Sec. 47-20. Use of word “trustee” or “agent” in an instrument affecting real estate. The word “trustee” or “agent”, or the words “as trustee”, or words of similar meaning, following the name of the grantee in a duly executed and recorded instrument which conveys, transfers or assigns real estate or any interest therein, with or without the name of a cestui que trust or principal appearing and without any other language expressly limiting the powers, interest or estate of the grantee, do not, in the absence of a separate duly executed and recorded instrument defining the powers of the grantee, affect the right of the grantee to sell, mortgage or otherwise dispose of the real estate or interest therein in the same manner as if those words had not been used. No person to whom such real estate or interest therein has been transferred or mortgaged by such grantee is liable for the claim of any undisclosed beneficiary or principal or for the application of any money which may have been paid by such person therefor.

(1949 Rev., S. 7103; 1969, P.A. 6; P.A. 79-602, S. 8.)

History: 1969 act added references to “agent” and “mortgage” action; P.A. 79-602 restated provisions but made no substantive changes.

Use of term “trustee” held to be a nullity. 147 C. 451.

Sec. 47-21. Deeds of land by persons ousted of possession, void. Any conveyance or lease, for any term, of any building, land or tenement, of which the grantor or lessor is ousted by the entry and possession of another, unless made to the person in actual possession, shall be void.

(1949 Rev., S. 7105.)

This section does not extend to the state. K. 221. Conveyance prohibited by the statute is void. 1 R. 100; Id., 199; Id., 402; 2 D. 151. Possession of mortgagee not adverse. 2 R. 499. What evidence is admissible. Id., 121. Reconveyance of mortgage to mortgagor, both out of possession, not within the statute. 4 D. 234. Whether conveyance of incorporeal hereditament falls within the statute. Id. Mortgage not an alienation so as to make the parties liable. 4 C. 421. When a deed releasing title by execution is void under the statute. Id., 575. Landlord is not ousted by possession of tenant. 9 C. 421. Grantee of corporation may be liable. Id. Conveyance may be void in part and valid in part under this statute. 13 C. 75; 14 C. 104; 109 C. 693. The owner of the soil of a highway may be disseized thereof, subject to the public easement. 19 C. 182. Quitclaim deed is such an alienation. Id., 471; 20 C. 262. Actual possession by any one as owner is sufficient ouster of another. Id. Receipt of rents and profits of land insufficient to prove an ouster of the holder of the legal title. 36 C. 345. Tenant of land under agreement to purchase may, after performing his contract, deny title of vendor, and thereafter his holding will be adverse. 38 C. 262. Quitclaim by ousted mortgagee to third party conveys an equitable, but no legal, title. 40 C. 90. A conveyance by an ousted grantor, made to a party to whom grantor, before ouster, had contracted to convey it, is not within the statute. 50 C. 46. Ouster which will render grantor’s deed void under this section is the same which is required to establish adverse possession. 69 C. 28; 71 C. 574; 74 C. 523; 81 C. 133; 102 C. 56; 103 C. 335; 104 C. 288; 112 C. 6; 112 C. 125. Existence of way not an ouster; 69 C. 163; nor is building jutting over land; 75 C. 662; 87 C. 31; nor is possession of life tenant ouster of remainderman; 76 C. 594; 77 C. 407. Effect of ouster. 81 C. 551. Grantor, or grantee in grantor’s name, may sue for possession of lands from which grantor was ousted. 93 C. 115. Cited. 120 C. 16; 134 C. 342. Ouster which will make deed void is same which is required to establish adverse possession. 135 C. 691. Cited. 137 C. 42. Possession necessary to constitute an ouster under this section must be of the type which would ripen into a title by adverse possession if it were continued long enough. 147 C. 689. In action to quiet title under section 47-31 if defendant had been deeded land which plaintiffs occupied, judgment should declare deed to the defendant void. 155 C. 327. Possession necessary to constitute an ouster under this section is possession that would, if continued for the requisite period, ripen into title by adverse possession. 165 C. 457.

Cited. 1 CA 481. Cited. 37 CA 153. Possession necessary to constitute ouster is possession that would ripen into a title by adverse possession if continued for the requisite period. 48 CA 436.

Cited. 3 CS 49. Cited. 4 CS 34. Cited. 5 CS 477. Defendant’s deed from his immediate predecessor in title, delivered more than fifteen years after the plaintiff’s adverse possession began was unavailing to convey the land in dispute, since such predecessor was then out of possession. 6 CS 20. Purpose is to codify the common-law rule against champerty and maintenance. Executor’s deed issued by order of probate court is not within its scope. 34 CS 31.

Sec. 47-22. Transferred to Chapter 830, Sec. 47a-3d.

Sec. 47-23. Termination of parol leases for nonpayment of rent. Section 47-23 is repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7107; P.A. 76-95, S. 26, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82.)

Sec. 47-23a. Transferred to Chapter 831, Sec. 47a-22.

Secs. 47-23b to 47-23f, 47-24. Security deposit refunds. Tenant not liable for rent while premises are untenantable. Sections 47-23b to 47-23f, inclusive, and 47-24 are repealed.

(1949, Rev., S. 7108; P.A. 75-614, S. 1–5; P.A. 76-95, S. 26, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82.)

Sec. 47-24a. Transferred to Chapter 830, Sec. 47a-5.

Sec. 47-24b. Covenant that leased property is fit for habitation. Section 47-24b is repealed.

(1969, P.A. 390; P.A. 76-95, S. 26, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82.)

Sec. 47-24c. Transferred to Chapter 830, Sec. 47a-8.

Sec. 47-24d. Tenant’s waiver of rights, when valid. Section 47-24d is repealed.

(P.A. 73-238; P.A. 76-95, S. 26, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82.)

Sec. 47-25. Right to light not gained by adverse possession. No occupant of real estate may acquire, by adverse occupation, the right to keep, sustain or enjoy any window or light, so as to prevent the owner of adjoining premises from erecting and maintaining any building thereon.

(1949 Rev., S. 7109; P.A. 79-602, S. 55.)

History: P.A. 79-602 substituted “may” for “shall”.

When grant of light or air will be implied. 62 C. 383; 79 C. 401; 80 C. 497. Abutter on street has right to light, air and view from space over highway. 104 C. 619. Cited. 208 C. 256.

Sec. 47-26. No right to railroad, railway or canal land by adverse possession. If the owner or occupant of any land adjoining any railroad or canal has, since June 10, 1831, taken into his enclosure any part of the land belonging to such railroad or canal, as located and established, or since that time has erected any building upon any such land; or, if any person takes into his enclosure any part of land belonging to a railway company within the limits of which such company has located an electric railway, or erects any building upon any part of such land, no adverse possession of the land so enclosed or built upon shall confer any title thereto.

(1949 Rev., S. 7110.)

Railroad may abandon right-of-way. 86 C. 275; 88 C. 515.

Sec. 47-27. Title by adverse possession by or against railroad or street railway corporation, against nonprofit land-holding organization or against investor-owned water company. (a) No length of possession, use or occupancy of land belonging to a railroad or street railway corporation and used for its corporate purposes shall create or continue any right in or to such land. No length of possession, use or occupancy by a railroad or street railway corporation of land belonging to another shall create or continue any right in or to such land.

(b) No length of possession, use or occupancy of land belonging to a nonprofit land-holding organization shall create or continue any right in or to such land. As used in this subsection, “nonprofit land-holding organization” means a nonprofit corporation incorporated pursuant to chapter 602 or any predecessor statute thereto, having as one of its principal purposes the conservation and preservation of land.

(c) No length of possession, use or occupancy of land classified as class I or class II land under section 25-37c and belonging to an investor-owned water company shall create or continue any right in or to such land. The provisions of this subsection shall not affect any right in or to such land acquired by length of possession, use or occupancy pursuant to law prior to October 1, 2002. As used in this subsection, “water company” has the same meaning as provided in section 16-1.

(1949 Rev., S. 7111; P.A. 99-64, S. 1, 2; P.A. 02-66, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 99-64 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and added new Subsec. (b) re title by or against a nonprofit land-holding corporation, effective May 27, 1999; P.A. 02-66 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and added Subsec. (c) re adverse possession of class I or II land belonging to an investor-owned water company.

Cited. 154 C. 674.

Section serves as a toll on time period necessary for creation and perfection of a prescriptive easement re disputed parcel while land is being used for defendant’s corporate purposes. 48 CA 251.

Cited. 14 CS 142. Cited. 17 CS 305. During the use of disputed parcel by defendant railway for corporate purposes, the time period under Sec. 47-37 (uninterrupted use for fifteen years) does not run. 45 CS 251.

Sec. 47-28. Admissibility of award of arbitrators as evidence. No award of arbitrators, made since May 20, 1841, purporting to decide the title to real estate, shall be admissible as evidence thereof, unless the submission of the parties to such arbitration is executed, attested and acknowledged as deeds of lands, nor unless such award is in writing and under the hands and seals of the arbitrators; and such submission and award shall not be effectual against any persons but the parties to the same and their heirs, unless recorded by the town clerk of the town where such estate is situated.

(1949 Rev., S. 7117.)

If submission is not executed as provided in this section, award cannot pass title. 32 C. 115. Relocation of old boundary not within this section. 87 C. 684. Cited. 181 C. 449. Parties’ failure to comply with requirements of section by recording their agreement to arbitrate land dispute and subsequent arbitration award in town clerk’s office did not deprive arbitrator and trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over case. Section’s terms are not jurisdictional in nature as between parties to the initial dispute, and failure to record or follow directives of Sec. 47-5 affects the award only as it relates to third parties. 276 C. 599.

Sec. 47-29. Right of entry on land by assignee of reversion. When, after an estate in real estate has been created by grant or devise upon express condition, the reversion, before breach of the condition, becomes vested in any person other than the grantor or his heirs, that person shall, on breach of the condition, have the same right of entry upon the real estate and the same remedy for the breach, by entry, suit or otherwise, as the original grantor or those who legally represent him would have, if still owning the reversion.

(1949 Rev., S. 7118; P.A. 79-602, S. 7.)

History: P.A. 79-602 substituted “the” or “that” for “such” where appearing.

A right of entry for condition broken was not assignable at common law; 31 C. 478; but is now by virtue of this section. 54 C. 62; 110 C. 270. Breach of condition may require reentry to revest title. 74 C. 636. Grantee of estate can avail himself only of breaches subsequent to conveyance to him. 76 C. 594. Grantee has no further rights than grantor. 84 C. 512. Deed construed to convey entire interest of grantor, including possibility of reverter. 110 C. 267.

Sec. 47-30. Ejectment. Set-off of defendant’s improvements. Final judgment shall not be rendered, in any action to recover the possession of land, against any defendant who has, in good faith, believing his title to the land in question absolute, made improvements on the land before the commencement of the action, or whose grantors or ancestors have made the improvements, until the court has ascertained the present value of the improvements and the amount reasonably due the plaintiff from the defendant for the use and occupation of the land. If the value of the improvements exceeds the amount due for use and occupation, execution shall not be issued until the plaintiff has paid the balance to the defendant or into court for his benefit. If the plaintiff elects to have the title confirmed in the defendant and, upon the rendition of the verdict, files notice of the election with the clerk of the court, the court shall ascertain what sum ought in equity to be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant or other parties in interest and, on payment of it, may confirm the title to the land in the parties paying it.

(1949 Rev., S. 7119; P.A. 79-602, S. 54.)

History: P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording but no substantive changes.

By common law, such betterments could be set off against a claim for the mesne profits. 5 Coke Rep. 30; 8 Wheat. 1. This section does not impair obligation of contracts, nor deprive a person of property without due course of law, nor of his right of trial by jury. 48 C. 577; 74 C. 502. One who takes title without examining land records cannot claim betterments against prior mortgagee. Id., 411; 114 C. 93. As to application to estate upon condition. 76 C. 592. Plaintiff cannot compel defendant to take and pay for title to land. 78 C. 202. Right to betterments cannot be reached by execution against land. 83 C. 346. Statute does not apply where there is no mistake as to ownership and money expended is that of true owner. 91 C. 13. Recovery for taxes, insurance premiums, interest paid on mortgage and rent. 120 C. 528. There could be no claim to recover for occupation after commencement of action. 130 C. 491. Where, on appeal, judgment for defendants based on finding of title in them by adverse possession was reversed, case was remanded to determine damages of plaintiffs and set-off of defendants under this statute. 156 C. 510.

Trial court misinterpreted statute to limit award to value of the property and to preclude an award of use and occupancy when statute directs court to determine what equitable sum is due to plaintiff. 51 CA 186.

Defendant not entitled to compensation for alleged improvements and betterments made by her, where it was not shown that they were made in good faith. 12 CS 38.

Sec. 47-31. Action to settle title or claim interest in real or personal property. (a) An action may be brought by any person claiming title to, or any interest in, real or personal property, or both, against any person who may claim to own the property, or any part of it, or to have any estate in it, either in fee, for years, for life or in reversion or remainder, or to have any interest in the property, or any lien or encumbrance on it, adverse to the plaintiff, or against any person in whom the land records disclose any interest, lien, claim or title conflicting with the plaintiff’s claim, title or interest, for the purpose of determining such adverse estate, interest or claim, and to clear up all doubts and disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the property. Such action may be brought whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the immediate or exclusive possession of the property.

(b) The complaint in such action shall describe the property in question and state the plaintiff’s claim, interest or title and the manner in which the plaintiff acquired the claim, interest or title and shall name the person or persons who may claim the adverse estate or interest. In any such action the plaintiff may join as defendants any unknown person or persons who claim or may claim any rights, title, estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance on the property described in the complaint, adverse to that of the plaintiff, whether the claim or possible claim be vested or contingent. If in the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that there are or that there may be persons who have or may have some right, title, estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance on the real or personal property but the persons cannot be located or are unknown to the plaintiff, or both, and describes the actual or possible estate or interest of such person or persons, and how derived, so far as may be known to him from a reasonable search of the available land records or otherwise, he may join as defendants all unknown persons who may have made any such claim by stating in the summons, after setting forth the names of known claimants, the words, “and all unknown persons, claiming or who may claim any rights, title, interest or estate in or lien or encumbrance upon the real property described in this complaint, adverse to the plaintiff, whether such claim or possible claim be vested or contingent”, and it shall not be necessary to set forth therein any further description of the unknown person or persons. If, there are no known claimants, or possible claimants, to the property described in the complaint, the action shall be deemed to be maintained against all unknown persons claiming or who may claim any rights, title, estate, or interest, or lien or encumbrance upon the real or personal property described in the complaint, adverse to that of the plaintiff, whether the claim be vested or contingent, and the action may be prosecuted to judgment in the same manner and with like effect as though there had been known claimants or possible claimants designated as party defendants.

(c) If the plaintiff or his attorney annexes to the complaint in any such action an affidavit setting forth such facts and in addition sets forth the efforts which were made to ascertain the names and addresses as well as the interest or estates of the unknown persons, the court to which the action is brought or a judge thereof may make such order relative to the notice which shall be given in such cause as the court or judge deems reasonable. That notice having been given according to the order and duly proven shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction of all such unknown persons and the court may proceed to a hearing of the cause at any time that it deems proper. The court shall not be required to appoint any guardian or other person to represent such unknown persons under any legal disabilities and all such persons shall be concluded by any decree or judgment in respect to the real or personal property involved in the action.

(d) Each defendant shall, in his answer, state whether or not he claims any estate or interest in, or encumbrance on, the property, or any part of it, and, if so, the nature and extent of the estate, interest or encumbrance which he claims, and he shall set out the manner in which the estate, interest or encumbrance is claimed to be derived.

(e) No judgment for costs shall be rendered in such action against any defendant, who, by his answer, disclaims all estate or interest in or encumbrance on such property, but costs shall be taxed in his favor at the discretion of the court; and the court shall, in any such case, without further proof, render judgment that such defendant has no estate, interest in or encumbrance on such property or any part of it.

(f) The court shall hear the several claims and determine the rights of the parties, whether derived from deeds, wills or other instruments or sources of title, and may determine the construction of the same, and render judgment determining the questions and disputes and quieting and settling the title to the property.

(1949 Rev., S. 7120; 1969, P.A. 353; P.A. 75-38; P.A. 79-602, S. 50.)

History: 1969 act added provision re required procedure with respect to unknown persons who may claim interest in subject matter of the action; P.A. 75-38 restated provisions added by 1969 act; P.A. 79-602 divided section into Subsecs. and made minor changes in wording.

Statute valid; meaning of “court”; nature of adverse claims. 68 C. 273; 78 C. 100; 98 C. 554. Receiver seeking to have land freed from fraudulent mortgage should not proceed under this statute. 74 C. 368. Action does not lie where suit in ejectment for same land is pending; 76 C. 542; but under present statute does lie although plaintiff is ousted of possession. 105 C. 83; 109 C. 310; Id., 451. If action is used in place of ejectment suit, rules governing latter to be applied. 77 C. 30. Right to jury trial. 78 C. 100; 90 C. 133. Law explained; should only be used where there is no other legal remedy. 78 C. 369. Pleadings. 80 C. 330. Plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his own title; Id., 347; and if complaint fails to uphold it, demurrer lies. Id., 363. Receivership to collect rents pending action. 85 C. 434. Effect of amendment of 1915. 90 C. 73; 91 C. 500; 105 C. 83. Cestui que trust cannot use this statute to secure judgment determining effect of will creating trust. 90 C. 64; 91 C. 500. Costs are in discretion of court. 92 C. 345. Title to land under water and to riparian rights may be determined. 93 C. 506. “Cloud on title” defined. Id., 664. “Matter in demand”, as determining jurisdiction of action to remove invalid lien, is amount claimed under it; and it suffices if this appears anywhere in pleadings. 95 C. 66. Proper pleadings. Id., 399. Form of pleading. 78 C. 96, 129; Id., 369; 99 C. 127; 105 C. 84. Is available to one out of possession. 105 C. 83. Title as affected by validating acts. 109 C. 307. Giving effect to reverter does not impose a forfeiture. Id., 529. Broadened scope of this statute. 110 C. 214. Action to remove mortgage brought improperly under this statute. 117 C. 39. Judgment removing building restrictions would remove them for all time and in this regard it differs from an action to enjoin breach of restrictions. Id., 187. Validity of lien tested. 132 C. 551. One to whom property is transferred pending action may be joined as party plaintiff. 123 C. 372. Attorney who prosecuted action involving real estate acquired no right of lien. Id., 374. Cited. 134 C. 427. Where defendant makes no claim until evidence is all in, that plaintiff failed sufficiently to set forth in his complaint the nature of his claim, title or interest, court will decline to entertain claim. Id., 663. Cited. 137 C. 646. In complaint, ownership or interest of plaintiff in land must be stated and plaintiff must prove that this title or interest is in actual controversy. 146 C. 288. Plaintiff’s proof of an interest necessary to enable him to maintain an action under this section is technically distinct from his proof of facts necessary to entitle him to an affirmative adjudication in his favor. 147 C. 689. Party can obtain an adjudication of title or interest in himself only on the strength of his own title or interest as distinguished from the weakness of the title or interest of his adversaries. Id. Added claims for damages and appropriate equitable relief may be included in complaint. Id. Cited. 149 C. 129. An exclusive possession maintained over a marked and readily visible area without the consent or license of the owner may result in the acquisition of title by adverse possession even though the adverse possessor may have believed he was not assuming a possession to which he was not entitled. 151 C. 357, 358. Trial court’s judgment that defendant or its assignee was title owner set aside where assignee not made party to action. Court failed to make positive and precise determination of where title lies which this section requires. 155 C. 287. Plaintiffs, having failed to prove title in themselves by adverse possession, could not question title of defendant and there was no error in judgment of trial court finding issues for defendant. Id., 327. Recognition will be given to expressed intent of parties to deed in which there is ambiguity. To determine meaning of what parties said, testimony of parties was permitted where granting and habendum clauses were patently ambiguous. Requirements for answer and judgment in actions to quiet title reviewed. 156 C. 12. Action may be brought under section by executor to determine validity of option to purchase her real estate given by decedent as section applies to personalty as well as realty. Id., 175. Right-of-way appurtenant cannot be created without dominant as well as servient estate; hence plaintiff has burden of proving her predecessor in title owned her land on date he reserved right-of-way in his deed to defendant’s predecessor in title. Id., 387. Where executor seeks to institute action to quiet title to real property without alleging and proving that property is needed to settle claims against estate, requirements of section are not met, nor does his statutory power of “possession, care and control” over his decedents’ realty alone amount to interest sufficient to satisfy requirements of section. 159 C. 371. Failure of defendant banks to plead the nature and extent of their interest in the property was not detrimental to any of the parties since the banks which took mortgages on the property admit the title of the mortgagor and therefore have an interest essentially identical to the other defendants. 175 C. 308. Title to portion of proposed street could be acquired by adverse possession since town had not expressly or implicitly accepted it for public use. 180 C. 274. Cited. 181 C. 367; Id., 454. Cited. 183 C. 289. Cited. 211 C. 36. Cited. 215 C. 68.

Statute is construed as requiring a determination of record title before issue of adverse possession is reached; standard of proof for proving title by adverse possession is “clear and positive proof”. Court held “clear and positive” should be equated with “clear and convincing”. 1 CA 481. Cited. 2 CA 715. Cited. 3 CA 429. Cited. 7 CA 522. Cited. 10 CA 54. Cited. 13 CA 101. Cited. 27 CA 208. Cited. 40 CA 404. Cited. 42 CA 682. Cited. 43 CA 1; Id., 105. Cited. 44 CA 683. Sufficiency of chain of title tested. 49 CA 789. The inquiry is not the intent of the parties, but the intent which is expressed in the deed. 130 CA 306.

Where party is seeking reformation of a recorded deed and not seeking an action to quiet title, he cannot be required to cite in a stranger to whom he has previously deeded the land. 13 CS 1. Cited. Id., 416. Cited. 15 CS 465. Defendant’s demurrer attacking legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s replication overruled. Parties should both file substituted pleadings which comply exactly with mandate of this section. 27 CS 349. Cited. 34 CS 31. Cited. 42 CS 279. Cited. 44 CS 189; Id., 451.

Circuit court lacks jurisdiction of actions to quiet title. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 15, 16, 21.

Subsec. (a):

Cited re action to quiet title re conflicting deed provisions. 62 CA 551.

Subsec. (d):

Trial court improperly concluded that defendants failed to plead an estate contrary to that of plaintiffs’ alleged easement, because defendants expressly contested the existence of the alleged easement in their answer and therefore impliedly informed plaintiffs and the court that they were reserving their right to contest the scope of the alleged easement. 130 CA 1.

Subsec. (f):

Cited. 219 C. 36.

Trial court’s decision was grounded in written indicia of title as required by prior interpretations of Subsec. 108 CA 296.

Sec. 47-32. Several defendants may be joined. In any action to quiet title to real estate or to have declared invalid and to discharge any encumbrance on real estate, the plaintiff may join several defendants and all causes of action relating to defects in the title to any property described in the complaint, claims against the property or affecting the title to it and encumbrances on the property. In such case, the defendant shall not be required to answer or plead to any allegation of the complaint or other pleadings of the plaintiff except such as affect or pertain to the claims or defenses which he desires to interpose. When any such action is brought to the Superior Court, the court shall have jurisdiction over all of the causes of action so joined.

(1949 Rev., S. 7121; P.A. 76-436, S. 647, 681; P.A. 79-602, S. 51.)

History: P.A. 76-436 deleted references to actions brought in court of common pleas, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording.

Cited. 110 C. 214. Cited. 147 C. 689.

Circuit court lacks jurisdiction of actions to quiet title. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 15, 16, 21.

Sec. 47-33. Action to settle title to land belonging to estate of deceased person. (a) In any action brought to quiet the title to real estate or to have declared invalid or to discharge or to foreclose any mortgage or lien on real estate, if any record owner of the title to such property or any interest therein, or of property on which there is a cloud, is dead and no notice of his death or of the appointment of an executor of the will or administrator of the estate of the decedent can be found in the land records of the town in which the real estate is situated, it shall be presumed for the purpose of the action, if brought pursuant to the provisions of section 52-69, that there is no such executor or administrator unless it appears in the affidavit filed pursuant to the provisions of said section that the plaintiff or his attorney has actual knowledge to the contrary. If the plaintiff does not know whether the record owner is then living, he may make defendants in the alternative the record owner if living and, if the record owner is not living, the parties designated in said section.

(b) The term “heirs”, as used in designating defendants pursuant to section 52-69, includes the heirs at law, legatees and devisees of the deceased, and all persons who might claim under them, and the term “widow” or “widower”, as thus used, includes all persons who might claim under the widow or widower, and any of those persons may appear and defend.

(c) In any such action, if the complaint is verified by affidavit, or if affidavits of fact are filed in court, the court may render such judgment therein, against any defendant not appearing to defend the action, as may be proper upon the facts so set forth, at any time, at its discretion and without further proof.

(1949 Rev., S. 7122; P.A. 79-602, S. 52.)

History: P.A. 79-602 divided section into Subsecs. and made minor changes in wording.

Action against deceased person not brought in compliance with statute a nullity. 117 C. 47.

Cited. 30 CS 135.

Sec. 47-33a. Action on agreement to sell real estate. (a) No interest in real property existing under an executory agreement for the sale of real property or for the sale of an interest in real property or under an option to purchase real property shall survive longer than one year after the date provided in the agreement for the performance of it or, if the date is not so provided, longer than eighteen months after the date on which the agreement was executed, unless the interest is extended as provided herein or unless action is commenced within the period to enforce the agreement and notice of lis pendens is filed as directed by section 52-325.

(b) The interest may be extended only by reexecution of the written agreement or by execution of a new written agreement, provided the agreement, whether reexecuted or newly executed, shall be recorded as directed by sections 47-10 and 47-17. The period provided by this section shall not otherwise be extended, whether because of death, disability or absence from the state or for any other reason. Upon the expiration of an interest the title to property affected by the interest shall not thereafter be considered unmarketable because of the expired interest.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or deny any legal or equitable rights a party may have under the agreement except the right to have the agreement specifically enforced.

(1959, P.A. 550; February, 1965, P.A. 401, S. 1; P.A. 79-602, S. 125.)

History: 1965 act applied Subsec. (a) provisions to options to purchase real property; P.A. 79-602 substituted “the” for “such” and “of it” for “thereof”.

Cited. 174 C. 592. Cited. 206 C. 454. Cited. 213 C. 676. Cited. 216 C. 509. Cited. 220 C. 453.

Cited. 6 CA 595. Cited. 18 CA 569. Cited. 19 CA 413. Cited. 23 CA 579. Cited. 40 CA 64. Cited. 45 CA 466.

Subsec. (a):

Option to purchase contained in commercial lease which must be exercised within leasehold term valid without regard to rule against perpetuities. 213 C. 676.

Death of grantor is a specific event that may act as the operative date where no date for exercising an option is otherwise provided. 57 CA 636. “Interest” is plaintiff’s ability to purchase the property and seek specific performance once the option has been exercised. 100 CA 155.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 86.

Sec. 47-33b. Marketable record title. Definitions. As used in sections 47-33b to 47-33l, inclusive:

(a) “Marketable record title” means a title of record which operates to extinguish such interests and claims, existing prior to the effective date of the root of title, as are stated in section 47-33e;

(b) “Records” means the land records of the town where the particular land is located;

(c) “Recorded” means recorded as provided by section 47-10 or section 49-5, as the case may be;

(d) “Person dealing with land” includes a purchaser of any estate or interest therein, a mortgagee, an attaching or judgment creditor, a land contract vendee, or any other person seeking to acquire an estate or interest therein, or impose a lien thereon;

(e) “Root of title” means that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a person, purporting to create or containing language sufficient to transfer the interest claimed by such person, upon which he relies as a basis for the marketability of his title, and which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being determined. The effective date of the root of title is the date on which it is recorded;

(f) “Title transaction” means any transaction affecting title to any interest in land, including, but not limited to, title by will or descent, by public sale, by trustee’s, referee’s, guardian’s, executor’s, administrator’s, conservator’s or committee deed, by warranty or quitclaim deed, by mortgage or by decree of any court.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 1; 1969, P.A. 509, S. 1; P.A. 78-105, S. 1, 4.)

History: 1969 act redefined “root of title” to change marker date for most recent conveyance or other title transaction from 60 to 40 years before time when marketability is being determined; P.A. 78-105 redefined “root of title” to include conveyances or title transactions “containing language sufficient to transfer” interest claimed.

Cited. 183 C. 59. Marketable title act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. 219 C. 81. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Reaffirmed previous holdings that Marketable Title Act extinguishes only those property interests that once existed and cannot be used to create an easement where grantor had no legal right to make the grant. 254 C. 502. Trial court properly determined that Marketable Title Act was not a special defense that had to be pleaded affirmatively by defendants, and it properly placed on plaintiff the burden of proving validity of the easement under the act. 270 C. 487.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id. Marketable Title Act applies and renders void an equitable claim to a constructive trust in farm. 130 CA 100.

Cited. 34 CS 31. Vague and general reference to “right of way” in chain of title is insufficient notice of existence of an easement and therefore null and void under the Marketable Title Act; the reason that a general reference to pre-root of title interests is not sufficient to preserve or prevent extinguishment of those interests is to avoid necessity to search record back to the root of title, as well as to eliminate uncertainties caused by such general references. 51 CS 399.

Sec. 47-33c. Chain of title for not less than forty years creates marketable record title. Any person having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who has an unbroken chain of title to any interest in land for forty years or more, shall be deemed to have a marketable record title to that interest, subject only to the matters stated in section 47-33d. A person has such an unbroken chain of title when the land records of the town in which the land is located disclose a conveyance or other title transaction, of record not less than forty years at the time the marketability is to be determined, which conveyance or other title transaction purports to create such interest in land, or which contains language sufficient to transfer the interest, either in (1) the person claiming that interest, or (2) some other person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other title transactions of record, the purported interest has become vested in the person claiming the interest; with nothing appearing of record, in either case, purporting to divest the claimant of the purported interest.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 2; 1969, P.A. 509, S. 2; P.A. 78-105, S. 2, 4; P.A. 79-602, S. 43.)

History: 1969 act applied section to cases where unbroken chain of title is at least 40 rather than 60 years; P.A. 78-105 required that conveyance or title transaction contain “language sufficient to transfer the interest”; P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording.

Cited. 183 C. 59. Marketable title act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. 219 C. 81. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. In order to establish marketable record title, a person with the legal capacity of owning land in this state must be able to show an unbroken chain of title to an interest in the land for forty years or more. 276 C. 782.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id.

Cited. 34 CS 31.

Sec. 47-33d. Interests to which title is subject. Such marketable record title is subject to: (1) All interests and defects which are created by or arise out of the muniments of which the chain of record title is formed; provided a general reference in the muniments, or any of them, to easements, use restrictions or other interests created prior to the root of title are not sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification is made therein of a recorded title transaction which creates the easement, use restriction or other interest; (2) all interests preserved by the recording of proper notice or by possession by the same owner continuously for a period of forty years or more, in accordance with section 47-33f; (3) the rights of any person arising from a period of adverse possession or use, which was in whole or in part subsequent to the effective date of the root of title; (4) any interest arising out of a title transaction which has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title from which the unbroken chain of title of record is started; provided such recording shall not revive or give validity to any interest which has been extinguished prior to the time of the recording by the operation of section 47-33e; (5) the exceptions stated in section 47-33h as to rights of reversioners in leases, as to apparent easements and interests in the nature of easements, and as to interests of the United States, this state and political subdivisions thereof, public service companies and natural gas companies.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 3; 1969, P.A. 509, S. 3; P.A. 78-105, S. 3, 4; P.A. 79-602, S. 44; P.A. 94-198, S. 10, 13; P.A. 95-169, S. 3.)

History: 1969 act substituted “forty” for “sixty” years in Subdiv. (b); P.A. 78-105 referred to defects created by or arising out of muniments forming chain or record rather than to those which are “inherent in” the muniments forming chain of record; P.A. 79-602 replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators with numeric indicators and made minor changes in wording; P.A. 94-198 added Subdiv. (6) re environmental use restrictions, effective June 7, 1994; P.A. 95-169 deleted a provision making marketable record title subject to an environmental use restriction registered with the Commissioner of Environmental Protection.

Marketability of title discussed. 183 C. 59. Cited. 219 C. 81. Marketable title act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Grantee to whom a conveyance is made with reference to a map or plat acquires a private right, or easement, in a park or other open area delineated on such map or plat, in order to secure to persons purchasing lots under such circumstances, those benefits, the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy portion of a tract laid out on the plan indicated. 276 C. 782.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id.

Cited. 34 CS 31.

Subdiv. (1):

Recording of development plan in town clerk’s office and specific reference to it in root of title and other deeds created an implied easement sufficient to satisfy requirement that an interest in real property must be specifically identified in deed in order for it to be preserved. 276 C. 782.

Sec. 47-33e. Prior interests void. Subject to the matters stated in section 47-33d, such marketable record title shall be held by its owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the land free and clear of all interests, claims or charges whatsoever, the existence of which depends upon any act, transaction, event or omission that occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title. All such interests, claims or charges, however denominated, whether legal or equitable, present or future, whether those interests, claims or charges are asserted by a person sui juris or under a disability, whether that person is within or without the state, whether that person is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are hereby declared to be null and void.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 4; P.A. 79-602, S. 45.)

History: P.A. 79-602 substituted “those” or “that” for “such” where appearing.

Cited. 183 C. 59. Cited. 219 C. 81. Marketable title act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id.

Cited. 34 CS 31.

Sec. 47-33f. Notice of claim filed within forty-year period. (a) Any person claiming an interest of any kind in land may preserve and keep effective that interest by recording, during the forty-year period immediately following the effective date of the root of title of the person whose record title would otherwise be marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath, setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack of knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone suspends the running of the forty-year period. Such notice may be recorded by the claimant or by any other person acting on behalf of any claimant who is: (1) Under a disability, (2) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf or (3) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of filing such notice of claim for record.

(b) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in possession of that land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during which period no title transaction with respect to the interest appears of record in his chain of title and no notice has been recorded by him or on his behalf as provided in subsection (a) of this section, and the possession continues to the time when marketability is being determined, that period of possession shall be deemed equivalent to the recording of the notice immediately preceding the termination of the forty-year period described in subsection (a) of this section.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 5; 1969, P.A. 509, S. 4; P.A. 79-602, S. 46.)

History: 1969 act replaced references to 60-year period with 40-year period throughout section; P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording but no substantive changes.

Cited. 171 C. 149. Cited. 183 C. 59. Cited. 219 C. 81. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id.

Cited. 34 CS 31.

Sec. 47-33g. Contents of notice. Recording. Indexing. (a) To be effective and to be entitled to recordation, the notice referred to in section 47-33f shall contain an accurate and full description of all land affected by the notice, which description shall be set forth in particular terms and not by general inclusions; but, if the claim asserted under section 47-33f is founded upon a recorded instrument, the description in the notice may be the same as that contained in the recorded instrument. In addition, each notice shall clearly state the then owner or owners of record of the property involved.

(b) Each notice shall be recorded in the land records of the town where the land described therein is located. The notice shall be indexed in the grantors’ index under the name or names of the owners of record as listed in the notice and in the grantees’ index under the name of the claimant appearing in the notice.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 6; P.A. 79-602, S. 47.)

History: P.A. 79-602 divided section into Subsecs. and made minor changes in wording.

Cited. 183 C. 59. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. 219 C. 81. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id.

Cited. 34 CS 31.

Sec. 47-33h. Excepted interests. Sections 47-33b to 47-33l, inclusive, shall not be applied to bar any lessor or successor of the lessor as a reversioner of the right to possession on the expiration of any lease or to bar or extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of an easement, or any rights granted, excepted or reserved by the instrument creating such easement or interest, including any right for future use, if (1) the existence of such easement or interest is evidenced by the location beneath, upon or above any part of the land described in such instrument of any pipe, valve, road, wire, cable, conduit, duct, sewer, track, hole, tower or other physical facility and whether or not the existence of such facility is observable, or to bar, extinguish or otherwise affect any interest of the United States, of this state or any political subdivision thereof, of any public service company as defined in section 16-1 or of any natural gas company, or (2) such easement or interest is a conservation restriction, as defined in section 47-42a, that is held by a land trust or nonprofit organization.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 7; P.A. 78-331, S. 18, 58; P.A. 01-118, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 78-331 corrected misspelling, substituting “excepted” for “accepted”; P.A. 01-118 made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and added provisions re exception for easements or interests that are conservation restrictions and are held by a land trust or nonprofit organization.

Cited. 183 C. 59. Cited. 219 C. 81. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id.

Cited. 34 CS 31.

Subdiv. (1):

Trial court properly concluded that pursuant to subdiv., the easement over plaintiff’s property as of 1996 deed was limited to the fixed location of three existing conduits, which constituted partial exercise of the easement, and that because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of damages resulting from partial encumbrance of the property, defendants were entitled to a directed verdict. 270 C. 487.

Sec. 47-33i. Other statutes not affected. Nothing contained in sections 47-33b to 47-33l, inclusive, shall be construed to extend the period for bringing an action or for doing any other required act under any statute of limitation, nor, except as herein specifically provided, to affect the operation of any statute governing the effect of the recording or the failure to record any instrument affecting land.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 8.)

Cited. 183 C. 59. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. 219 C. 81. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id.

Cited. 34 CS 31.

Sec. 47-33j. Notice not to be recorded to slander title. Damages. No person may use the privilege of recording notices under sections 47-33f and 47-33g for the purpose of slandering the title to land. In any action brought for the purpose of quieting title to land, if the court finds that any person has recorded a claim for that purpose only, the court shall award the plaintiff all the costs of the action, including such attorneys’ fees as the court may allow to the plaintiff, and in addition, shall decree that the defendant asserting the claim shall pay to the plaintiff all damages the plaintiff may have sustained as the result of such notice of claim having been so recorded.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 9; P.A. 79-602, S. 48.)

History: P.A. 79-602 restated provisions and added specific references to Secs. 47-33f and 47-33g.

Cited. 183 C. 59. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. 219 C. 81. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 31 CA 87. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id.

Cited. 34 CS 31.

Sec. 47-33k. Construction. Sections 47-33b to 47-33l, inclusive, shall be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title as described in section 47-33c, subject only to such limitations as appear in section 47-33d.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 10; P.A. 79-602, S. 49.)

History: P.A. 79-602 made no substantive change.

Cited. 183 C. 59. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. 219 C. 81. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id.

Cited. 34 CS 31.

Sec. 47-33l. Forty-year period extended, when. If the forty-year period specified in sections 47-33b to 47-33k, inclusive, has expired prior to two years after July 1, 1969, such period shall be extended two years after July 1, 1969.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 11; 1969, P.A. 509, S. 5.)

History: 1969 act replaced 60-year period with 40-year period and “January 1, 1968” with “July 1, 1969”.

Cited. 183 C. 59. Cited. 239 C. 199. Marketable Title Act cited. Id.

Cited. 3 CA 550. Conn. Marketable Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 44 CA 683. Marketability of Title Act cited. Id. Cited. 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act, Sec. 47-33b et seq. cited. Id.

Cited. 34 CS 31.

Sec. 47-33m. Short title: Dormant Mineral Interests Act. Sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, may be cited as the “Dormant Mineral Interests Act”.

(P.A. 87-283, S. 1.)

Sec. 47-33n. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Statement of policy. (a) The public policy of this state is to enable and encourage marketability of real property and to mitigate the impact of dormant mineral interests on the full use and development of both surface estate and mineral interests in the property.

(b) Sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, shall be construed to effectuate their purpose to provide a means for termination of dormant mineral interests in real property that impair marketability of the property.

(P.A. 87-283, S. 2.)

Sec. 47-33o. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Definitions. As used in sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive:

(1) “Mineral interest” means an interest in a mineral estate, however created and regardless of form, whether absolute or fractional, divided or undivided, corporeal or incorporeal, including a fee simple or any lesser interest or any kind of royalty, production payment, executive right, nonexecutive right, leasehold or security interest in minerals, regardless of character, whether fugacious or nonfugacious, organic or inorganic.

(2) “Minerals” includes oil, gas, coal, other liquid, gaseous and solid hydrocarbons, oil shale, cement material, sand and gravel, road material, building stone, chemical substances, gemstones, metallic ores, fissionable ores and nonfissionable ores, colloidal or other clays, steam or other geothermal resources, and any other substances defined as minerals by the law of this state.

(3) “Mineral estate” means any interest in or ownership of minerals which are or may be situated in, on or under land, the fee estate of which is owned by any other person or entity. The term “mineral estate” includes, but is not limited to, a fee interest, a leasehold interest, a life use and any term which is measured by the life of another or by the happening of a future event, whether contingent or noncontingent, and includes any easement or license in, over and across the land in which the minerals are located for the purpose of obtaining access to and removing the minerals.

(P.A. 87-283, S. 3.)

Sec. 47-33p. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Exclusions. (a) Sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, do not apply to:

(1) A mineral interest of the United States or an Indian tribe, except to the extent permitted by federal law.

(2) A mineral interest of this state or an agency or political subdivision of this state, except to the extent permitted by state law other than sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive.

(b) Sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, do not affect water rights.

(c) Sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, do not affect the meaning of the terms “minerals”, “mineral interest”, or “mineral estate” for purposes other than said sections.

(P.A. 87-283, S. 4.)

Sec. 47-33q. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Termination of dormant mineral interest. (a) The owner of the fee simple title to any real property subject to a dormant mineral interest in any other person or entity may maintain an action to terminate such dormant mineral interest. A mineral interest is dormant for the purpose of sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, if the interest is unused within the meaning of subsection (c) of this section for a period of twenty years immediately preceding commencement of the action. The action shall be brought in the manner of and requires the same notice as an action to quiet title to real property under sections 47-31 to 47-33, inclusive, and may be maintained whether the owner of the mineral interest or the whereabouts of the owner is known or unknown. No disability or lack of knowledge of any kind on the part of any person suspends the running of the twenty-year period. If the court finds that the mineral interest described in the complaint is unused within the meaning of subsection (c) of this section for twenty or more years preceding the commencement of the action, it shall enter a decree declaring the dormant mineral interest to be extinguished and terminated.

(b) In an action to terminate a mineral interest pursuant to sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, the court, upon application of any person alleging to be an owner of a mineral interest in the land described in the complaint shall permit such person to record a late notice of intent to preserve such mineral interest in accordance with section 47-33r upon payment to the plaintiff of such litigation expenses as the court may award. In this subsection “litigation expenses” means costs and expenses as may be determined by the court to have been reasonably and necessarily incurred in the preparation for and the prosecution of the action, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. Upon the recordation of such late notice of intent to preserve a mineral interest, the court shall dismiss the action unless the plaintiff within fifteen days of the court’s order permitting the recording of such late notice of intent to preserve the mineral interest files a motion with the court for permission to continue the action as an action to quiet title of the land described in the complaint, pursuant to sections 47-31 to 47-33, inclusive. If the court grants such motion, the action shall continue as an action to quiet the title to such land in the manner provided by law.

(c) Any of the following actions taken in relation to any mineral interest constitutes use of that mineral interest for the purpose of this section if the action was taken by or under authority of the owner of the mineral interest:

(1) Production, geophysical exploration, exploratory or developmental drilling, mining, exploitation, development or other active mineral operations on or below the surface of real property which is subject to a mineral interest. Injection of substances for purposes of disposal or storage is not an active mineral operation within the meaning of this subdivision. Active mineral operations constitute use of any mineral interest owned by any person in any mineral that is the object of the operations.

(2) Payment of taxes on a separate property tax assessment of the mineral interest or on a mineral transfer or severance tax relating to the mineral interest.

(3) Recordation of an instrument that transfers, leases, conveys, assigns or divides a mineral interest, or creates a security interest or lien against such mineral interest, including an instrument that evidences a transfer of the title to such mineral interest, such as a probate certificate of distribution or devise.

(4) Recordation of an instrument for the purpose of preserving and keeping effective a mineral interest in accordance with section 47-33r.

(5) Recordation of a certified copy of a judgment or decree which makes specific reference to the mineral interest, provided such judgment makes reference to or includes a legal description of the fee estate which is subject to the mineral interest and the names of all record owners of such fee estate and is indexed by the town clerk in the grantor index in the names of all such record owners of the fee estate.

(P.A. 87-283, S. 5.)

Sec. 47-33r. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Preservation of mineral interest by notice. (a) Any person claiming any kind of mineral interest may preserve and keep effective that interest by recording a notice of intent to preserve the mineral interest or a part thereof. The mineral interest is preserved in each town in which the notice is recorded. A mineral interest is not dormant for the purposes of sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, if a notice in accordance with this section is recorded within twenty years immediately preceding commencement of an action to terminate the mineral interest, or pursuant to subsection (b) of section 47-33q after commencement of the action. Such notice may be recorded by the owner of the mineral interest or by any other person acting on behalf of any owner of such interest who is: (1) Under a disability, (2) unable to assert a claim with respect to the mineral interest on his own behalf or (3) one of a class whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of recording such notice.

(b) The notice may be executed by or on behalf of a co-owner for the benefit of any or all co-owners or on behalf of the owner for the benefit of any or all persons claiming under the owner or persons under whom the owner claims.

(c) To be effective and to be entitled to recordation, the notice referred to in section 47-33q shall contain the following:

(1) An accurate and full description of all land affected by the notice, which description shall be set forth in particular terms, and not by general inclusions; but, if the mineral interest asserted under section 47-33q is founded upon a recorded instrument which creates, reserves or evidences the mineral interest, the description of the land affected by the notice may be the same as the description of the land subject to the mineral interest as contained in that recorded instrument.

(2) The then owner or owners of record of the fee simple interest of the land described in and affected by the notice.

(3) A full and complete description of the mineral interest which is claimed.

(4) A reference to any recorded instrument or instruments which created, reserved or otherwise evidenced the mineral interest, stating the names of the parties to each such instrument, the date of each such instrument and the volume and page of the land records where the instrument is recorded. If the mineral interest claimed was not created by or reserved in or evidenced by a recorded instrument, the basis of the claimant’s title in the mineral interest described in the notice shall be set forth with particularity.

(P.A. 87-283, S. 6.)

Sec. 47-33s. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Effect of termination of mineral interest. A court order or decree terminating a mineral interest, when recorded, merges the terminated mineral interest, including express and implied appurtenant surface rights and obligations, with the surface estate in shares proportionate to the ownership of the surface estate, subject to existing tax liens or assessments.

(P.A. 87-283, S. 7.)

Sec. 47-33t. Dormant Mineral Interests Act: Savings and transitional provisions. (a) Except as otherwise provided in sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, upon October 1, 1987, apply to all mineral interests, whether created before, on or after October 1, 1987.

(b) An action may not be maintained to terminate a mineral interest pursuant to sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, until two years after October 1, 1987.

(c) Sections 47-33m to 47-33t, inclusive, do not limit or affect any other procedure provided by law for extinguishing an abandoned or dormant mineral interest.

(P.A. 87-283, S. 8.)

Sec. 47-34. Bounds between proprietors reestablished by Superior Court. When the boundaries of lands between adjoining proprietors have been lost or become uncertain and they cannot agree to establish the boundaries, one or more of them may bring a complaint to the superior court for the judicial district in which the lands or a portion of them are situated. The court may, upon the complaint, order the lost and uncertain bounds to be erected and established and may appoint a committee of not more than three disinterested property owners. The committee shall give notice to all parties interested in the lands to appear before it and, having been sworn, shall inquire into the facts and erect and establish the lost and uncertain bounds and may employ a surveyor to assist therein and shall report the facts and their doings to the court. If the court finds that the parties were duly notified, it may confirm such doings; and certified copies of the report and decree shall be recorded in the records of the town in which the lands are situated, and the bounds, so erected and established, shall be the bounds between the proprietors.

(1949 Rev., S. 7126; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 127; P.A. 79-602, S. 53; P.A. 80-483, S. 125, 186.)

History: P.A. 78-280 substituted “judicial district” for “county”; P.A. 79-602 restated provisions; P.A. 80-483 made technical grammatical correction.

Consideration of what is a lost boundary, and various other points under this section. 31 C. 433; 35 C. 118. Committee may report conclusion as to boundary without detailing the facts. 33 C. 154. Party to proceeding under this section estopped from claiming contrary to finding of committee. 52 C. 23. The surveyor employed under this section should be as disinterested as the committee. 67 C. 345. Finding by committee that boundaries not lost is conclusive. 87 C. 70. Admissibility of declarations of deceased persons concerning boundaries. 105 C. 147. Cited. 178 C. 258. Cited. 179 C. 574.

Committee does not deal with title; mission is to establish from evidence lost boundary lines or those which have disappeared. 12 CA 549.

Cited. 10 CS 167. Where description of property in deeds is uncertain and witnesses are indefinite, redress should be sought under this section. Id., 267. Cited. 40 CS 272.

Sec. 47-34a. Unlawful destruction, disturbance or removal of surveyor’s marker or monument. (a) Any person who knowingly injures, destroys, disturbs or removes any marker properly placed on any tract of land or street or highway line by a surveyor, or by any person at the direction of a surveyor, for the purpose of designating any point, course or line in the boundary of such tract of land, street or highway, shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a surveyor licensed under chapter 391, or a person acting at the direction of any such licensed surveyor, may remove an existing marker in order to place an upgraded marker in the same location.

(c) Any person who knowingly injures, destroys, disturbs or removes any monument that has been established by the National Geodetic Survey or Connecticut Geodetic Survey for use in the determination of spatial location relative to the Connecticut coordinate systems specified in section 13a-255 or precise elevation datum shall be fined not less than two thousand dollars or more than five thousand dollars.

(1971, P.A. 804; P.A. 88-99; P.A. 03-115, S. 82; P.A. 04-257, S. 75.)

History: P.A. 88-99 increased fine from not more than $50 to not less than $150 nor more than $500 and added Subsec. (b) permitting surveyor or person acting at the direction of any such surveyor to remove existing marker in order to place upgraded marker in same location; P.A. 03-115 amended Subsec. (a) to include any marker placed on any street or highway line and to increase the minimum fine from $150 to $500 and the maximum fine from $500 to $1,000, and added Subsec. (c) to establish a fine for any person who knowingly injures, destroys, disturbs or removes any monument established by the National Geodetic Survey or Connecticut Geodetic Survey for use in determination of spatial location re Connecticut coordinate systems or precise elevation datum, effective June 18, 2003; P.A. 04-257 made a technical change in Subsecs. (a) and (c), effective June 14, 2004.

See Sec. 52-560a re encroachment on open space land.

Cited. 15 CA 458. Cited. 46 CA 46.

Sec. 47-35. Tobacco poles deemed to be part of tobacco-curing structure. Tobacco poles used in any structure utilized for the curing of tobacco in the leaf shall be deemed for all purposes an integral part of such structure.

(1949 Rev., S. 7127; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 119.)

History: 1971 act deleted provision which had included tobacco poles as “fixtures within the meaning of section 53-127”.

Sec. 47-36. Federal claim or judgment to be recorded. If the United States of America, or any official or agent in its behalf, claims any lien or encumbrance on, or interest in, land situated in this state, whether or not as a lien referred to in section 49-32a, or if any judgment, order or decree of any United States court or official or bankruptcy referee affects any title to or rights concerning land situated in this state, the instrument evidencing or describing that claim or a certified copy of that judgment, order or decree, or a lis pendens giving notice thereof as authorized by section 52-325 may be recorded in the land records of the town in which the land is situated and may be indexed and released in the same manner as other claims, judgments, orders or decrees. Until so recorded, that claim, judgment, order or lis pendens shall not be effective against the land or constitute constructive notice thereof.

(1953, S. 2956d; P.A. 79-602, S. 40.)

History: P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording.