CHAPTER 1

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES

Table of Contents

Sec. 1-1. Words and phrases. Construction of statutes.

Sec. 1-1a. Terms relating to security in personal property.

Sec. 1-1b. Payment by bank treasurer’s or cashier’s check in lieu of certified check.

Sec. 1-1c. “Elector” defined. “Special election warned and held or called for that purpose”, means “referendum”, when.

Sec. 1-1d. “Minor”, “infant”, “infancy”, “age of majority”, defined.

Sec. 1-1e. Savings clause.

Sec. 1-1f. “Blind”, “physically disabled”, defined.

Sec. 1-1g. “Mental retardation”, “intellectual disability”, defined.

Sec. 1-1h. Identity cards.

Sec. 1-1i. Use of fees collected from issuance of identity cards.

Sec. 1-1j. Methods of payment for licenses, fees, costs or fines.

Sec. 1-1k. “Victim of crime”, “crime victim”, defined.

Sec. 1-1l. Holocaust victims’ settlement payments excluded from income for purposes of needs-based programs.

Sec. 1-1m. Applicability of marriage terms.

Sec. 1-1n. “Gender identity or expression” defined.

Sec. 1-2. Legal notices.

Sec. 1-2a. Construction of term “postmark”.

Sec. 1-2b. Construction of term “certified mail, return receipt requested”.

Sec. 1-2c. Construction of term “electronic mail”.

Secs. 1-2d to 1-2y. Reserved

Sec. 1-2z. Plain meaning rule.

Sec. 1-3. Validity of separate provisions of acts.

Sec. 1-3a. License or permit fee due on Saturday, Sunday or holiday.

Sec. 1-3b. Enforcement of subpoena powers.


Sec. 1-1. Words and phrases. Construction of statutes. (a) In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.

(b) The phrase “railroad company” shall be construed to mean and include all corporations, trustees, receivers or other persons, that lay out, construct, maintain or operate a railroad, unless such meaning would be repugnant to the context or to the manifest intention of the General Assembly.

(c) The term “banks” shall include all incorporated banks.

(d) The term “savings banks” shall include savings banks, societies for savings and savings societies.

(e) The term “public buildings” shall include a statehouse, courthouse, townhouse, arsenal, magazine, prison, community correctional center, almshouse, market or other building belonging to the state, or to any town, city or borough in the state, and any church, chapel, meetinghouse or other building generally used for religious worship, and any college, academy, schoolhouse or other building generally used for literary instruction.

(f) Words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things, and words importing the plural number may include the singular.

(g) Words importing the masculine gender may be applied to females and words importing the feminine gender may be applied to males.

(h) Words purporting to give a joint authority to several persons shall be construed as giving authority to a majority of them.

(i) The word “month” shall mean a calendar month, and the word “year” a calendar year, unless otherwise expressed.

(j) The word “oath” shall include affirmations in cases where by law an affirmation may be used for an oath, and, in like cases, the word “swear” shall include the word “affirm”.

(k) The words “person” and “another” may extend and be applied to communities, companies, corporations, public or private, limited liability companies, societies and associations.

(l) The words “preceding”, “following” and “succeeding”, when used by way of reference to any section or sections, shall mean the section or sections next preceding, next following or next succeeding, unless some other section is expressly designated in such reference.

(m) Except as provided in section 7-452, the words “legislative body”, as applied to unconsolidated towns, shall mean the town meeting; as applied to cities and consolidated towns and cities, shall mean the board of aldermen, council or other body charged with the duty of making annual appropriations; as applied to boroughs and consolidated towns and boroughs, shall mean the board of burgesses; as applied to all other districts and associations, shall mean the district committee or association committee or other body charged with the duty of making annual appropriations.

(n) “Ordinance” shall mean an enactment under the provisions of section 7-157.

(o) “Voters” shall mean those persons qualified to vote under the provisions of section 7-6.

(p) Repealed by P.A. 76-186.

(q) Except as otherwise specifically defined, the words “agriculture” and “farming” shall include cultivation of the soil, dairying, forestry, raising or harvesting any agricultural or horticultural commodity, including the raising, shearing, feeding, caring for, training and management of livestock, including horses, bees, poultry, fur-bearing animals and wildlife, and the raising or harvesting of oysters, clams, mussels, other molluscan shellfish or fish; the operation, management, conservation, improvement or maintenance of a farm and its buildings, tools and equipment, or salvaging timber or cleared land of brush or other debris left by a storm, as an incident to such farming operations; the production or harvesting of maple syrup or maple sugar, or any agricultural commodity, including lumber, as an incident to ordinary farming operations or the harvesting of mushrooms, the hatching of poultry, or the construction, operation or maintenance of ditches, canals, reservoirs or waterways used exclusively for farming purposes; handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, freezing, grading, storing or delivering to storage or to market, or to a carrier for transportation to market, or for direct sale any agricultural or horticultural commodity as an incident to ordinary farming operations, or, in the case of fruits and vegetables, as an incident to the preparation of such fruits or vegetables for market or for direct sale. The term “farm” includes farm buildings, and accessory buildings thereto, nurseries, orchards, ranges, greenhouses, hoophouses and other temporary structures or other structures used primarily for the raising and, as an incident to ordinary farming operations, the sale of agricultural or horticultural commodities. The term “aquaculture” means the farming of the waters of the state and tidal wetlands and the production of protein food, including fish, oysters, clams, mussels and other molluscan shellfish, on leased, franchised and public underwater farm lands. Nothing herein shall restrict the power of a local zoning authority under chapter 124.

(r) Definition of felony and misdemeanor repealed by 1969, P.A. 828, S. 214.

(s) When a statute repealing another is afterwards repealed, the first shall not be revived without express words to that effect.

(t) The repeal of an act shall not affect any punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect, or any suit, or prosecution, or proceeding pending at the time of the repeal, for an offense committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred under the act repealed.

(u) The passage or repeal of an act shall not affect any action then pending.

(v) All provisions of the statutes relating to annual town meetings or elections shall be applicable to biennial meetings or elections unless a contrary intent appears.

(w) “Correctional institution”, “state prison”, “community correctional center” or “jail” means a correctional facility administered by the Commissioner of Correction.

(x) Whenever a title which denotes gender is applied to an individual the title shall suit the gender of the individual.

(y) “Deposit account” includes a share account of a savings and loan association.

(z) If a statute refers to another statute of this state, the reference includes any amendments to the referenced statute unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed.

(1949 Rev., S. 3639, 8873, 8890; 1955, S. 1700d, 1701d; 1957, P.A. 13, S. 1; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 78; 152, S. 1; 1961, P.A. 130, S. 1; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 1; 1967, P.A. 152, S. 9, 10; 1969, P.A. 297; 828, S. 214; 1971, P.A. 154, S. 1; P.A. 73-436; P.A. 74-127; P.A. 75-366; P.A. 76-186; P.A. 78-121, S. 87, 113; P.A. 81-269; P.A. 86-186, S. 1; P.A. 87-282, S. 1; P.A. 90-24; P.A. 92-26; P.A. 95-79, S. 1, 189; P.A. 96-77, S. 15, 17; P.A. 01-20, S. 1; P.A. 09-57, S. 2.)

History: 1959 acts repealed definition of municipal courts and eliminated “county” from the definition of public buildings; 1961 act added definitions of “penal institutions” and “correctional institutions”; 1963 act eliminated “work house” from the definition of public buildings; 1967 act redefined “penal institutions” and “correctional institutions”; 1969 P.A. 297 redefined “correctional institutions” and P.A. 828 repealed the definition of “felonies” and “misdemeanors,” effective October 1, 1971; 1971 act redefined “correction institutions”; P.A. 73-436 added Subsec. (x); P.A. 74-127 amended Subsec. (g) to provide that words which imply feminine gender also apply to males; P.A. 75-366 expanded and clarified the definitions of “agriculture” and “farming”; P.A. 76-186 repealed Subsec. (p) defining “page”; P.A. 78-121 added definition of “deposit account”; P.A. 81-269 amended Subsec. (q) by expanding the definition of agriculture to include the raising or harvesting of shellfish and by defining aquaculture; P.A. 86-186 amended Subsec. (w) to reflect restructuring of Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield as Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Medium, and Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Minimum, to add the Connecticut Correctional Center, Cheshire and to change the name of the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Cheshire to the John R. Manson Youth Institution, Cheshire; P.A. 87-282 amended Subsec. (w) to change the name of the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Minimum to the Carl Robinson Correctional Institution, Enfield; P.A. 90-24 redefined “correctional institutions” in Subsec. (w) by deleting reference to “Connecticut Correctional Camp, Portland” and by adding reference to the Eddy/DWI Correctional Unit, Middletown; the Hartell/DWI Correctional Unit, Windsor Locks; the J.B. Gates Correctional Unit, Niantic; the Jennings Road Detention Center, Hartford; the Morgan Street Detention Center, Hartford; the Union Avenue Detention Center, New Haven; the Western Substance Abuse Treatment Unit, Newtown, and made certain other technical changes; P.A. 92-26 redefined “agriculture” and “aquaculture” to include the raising or harvesting of fish and expanded the definition of “farm” to include hoophouses and other temporary structures; P.A. 95-79 redefined “person” and “another” to include limited liability companies, effective May 31, 1995; P.A. 96-77 amended Subsec. (k) to reposition “limited liability companies”; P.A. 01-20 amended Subsec. (w) to replace provisions defining “correctional institutions” and listing by name the correctional institutions, youth institutions, correctional centers, community correctional centers, detention centers, correctional units and substance abuse treatment units included within that definition and provisions construing “State Prison”, “State Prison for Women”, “jail” or “jails”, “Connecticut Reformatory” and “The Connecticut State Farm for Women” with provision that “correctional institution”, “state prison”, “community correctional center” or “jail” means a correctional facility administered by the Commissioner of Correction; P.A. 09-57 added Subsec. (z) re construction of statutory references, effective May 20, 2009.

Section does not limit power of the legislature. 81 C. 213. If the intent is clear, there is no room for construction. 75 C. 69; Id., 608; 81 C. 598; 86 C. 425; 89 C. 196; 100 C. 322; 125 C. 210; 155 C. 502; 156 C. 276. A statute must be construed to carry out intent of the legislature and when language is doubtful meaning is ascertained by all its provisions, object of passage, title, preexisting legislation on the subject and other relevant circumstances. 72 C. 148; 89 C. 196; Id., 293; 100 C. 322; 154 C. 162. Meaning of statute enacted in 1672 must be that of legal language then and since Connecticut never adopted the common law such meaning was to be found in orders of the General Court and the word of God, then the law of the land. 72 C. 148. Change in language of a statute shows intent to change the law. 144 C. 241. When two statutes appear to be repugnant, it is duty of court to construe them so that both are operative if that is reasonably possible. 145 C. 53. Interpretation of statute by commissioner who must enforce it is entitled to great weight. Id., 490. Courts must apply statutes as they find them, whether or not they think that statutes might be improved by inclusion of other or additional provisions. 148 C. 33. Construction of statute depends upon its expressed intent when it is taken as a whole. Id., 87. When court may consider legislative history of statute as an aid in interpreting such statute. Id., 341. Legislative intent is not to be found in isolated sentence but enactment must be examined in its entirety and its parts reconciled and made operative so far as possible. Id., 376. Statutes should be construed retrospectively only when mandate of legislature is imperative. Id., 447. Cited. Id., 481. Courts must assume that legislature intended a reasonable and rational result and must, when possible, construe statutes accordingly. Id., 551. Cited. 149 C. 248. A penal statute is to be strictly construed. 101 U.S. 188; 67 C. 286; 79 C. 338; 82 C. 1; Id., 539; 83 C. 300; 84 C. 47; 85 C. 23; Id., 481; 87 C. 253; 112 C. 39; 121 C. 160. However, technicality does not avoid intent. 146 C. 605. What constitutes a penal statute. 74 C. 132; 86 C. 191; 87 C. 253; Id., 461. Statutory remedy of double or treble damages penal in nature. 84 C. 47. Statute in derogation of private rights should be strictly construed. 68 C. 113; 74 C. 321; 75 C. 423; 143 C. 358. Constitutional provisions or statutes in derogation of common law to be treated in same manner. 79 C. 163; 81 C. 632. Franchise in derogation of public rights to be treated in same manner. 71 C. 657; 87 C. 183. Statute enacting settled public policy of charitable tax exemptions to be construed reasonably. 71 C. 316. Cited. 162 C. 102, 406; 165 C. 396; Id., 466; Id., 559; 166 C. 642; 167 C. 499. Commonly approved meaning of “security” taken from dictionaries. 168 C. 112. Cited. 169 C. 502; overruled with respect to holding an uninsured motorist coverage, see 219 C. 371; 170 C. 387; 172 C. 263; Id., 416; overruled with respect to holding an uninsured motorist coverage, see 219 C. 371; 179 C. 269; Id., 415; 183 C. 520; Id., 566; 186 C. 198; Id., 757; 191 C. 336; 192 C. 732; 194 C. 139; Id., 279; 196 C. 53; Id., 91; 201 C. 125; 202 C. 292; Id., 300; Id., 629; 211 C. 116; 213 C. 220; 224 C. 693; 226 C. 191; 228 C. 758; 242 C. 211. By its own terms, section does not apply to Department of Mental Retardation’s decisions regarding eligibility for services. 277 C. 594.

Cited. 2 CA 196; 3 CA 1; Id., 240; 4 CA 168; 8 CA 581; 10 CA 18; 15 CA 323; 35 CA 464; 40 CA 359; 43 CA 801. Section not intended to limit legislative power or to affect statutory construction when intent is clear. 47 CA 68.

Cited. 20 CS 84. Statutory construction involves consideration of terms of act as a whole and circumstances and conditions existing at the time which may have affected its intent and motivated its adoption. Id., 428; 26 CS 329. What is meant by “statutory construction”. 21 CS 144. Cited. 22 CS 10, 155, 440; 24 CS 149; 29 CS 344, 397. Library of a law office held to be a “private library” within Sec. 12-81(32) as the word “private” must be accorded its common meaning taken from the dictionary. 31 CS 359. Cited. 35 CS 555; Id., 617; 36 CS 141; Id., 578; Id., 583; 38 CS 689; 39 CS 195; 43 CS 46; 44 CS 34.

When language is plain and unambiguous it need not be construed. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 181; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 368. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 367. Penal statute to be strictly construed. Id., 674. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 678.

Subsec. (a):

Usual and natural meaning of words ordinarily followed. 61 C. 12; 63 C. 388; 82 C. 232; 84 C. 306; 85 C. 484; 90 C. 367; 92 C. 254; 99 C. 118; 133 C. 290; 144 C. 516; 152 C. 312; 153 C. 209; 154 C. 162; Id., 237; 155 C. 531; Id., 573; 156 C. 33. “May” may be construed to mean “shall”; 65 C. 487; 74 C. 60; 94 C. 292; 103 C. 607; or “must”; 84 C. 650; and “shall” may permit discretion. 75 C. 509; 76 C. 405. “Passage of act” means when it goes into effect. 68 C. 426. Meaning of “personal representatives” depends on context. 71 C. 290. Letter may yield to intent; 72 C. 148; comma may be disregarded; 93 C. 515; 95 C. 723; or its omission; 97 C. 601; Id., 735; 107 C. 605; or be departed from to avoid injustice. 87 C. 446. The technical meaning of words will not be permitted to defeat intent. 74 C. 60; 77 C. 31; 83 C. 141; 93 C. 515; 100 C. 324. Penalty of “fine and imprisonment” permits either. 75 C. 350. Words having technical meaning at common law are given the same in a statute. 79 C. 546; Id., 562; 80 C. 658. “Brother” may include half-brother. 79 C. 562. Exceptions may be implied. 81 C. 320; Id., 632. General words do not include state. 82 C. 392. General words may be limited by subject matter. 89 C. 583. Effect of title. 89 C. 196; 91 C. 135; Id., 472. Where general words follow an enumeration, they apply only to persons or those of same general class as those enumerated. 126 C. 430, 431. Technical terms of trade or business have meaning they have to informed practitioners thereof. 144 C. 346; 153 C. 465. Practice of law construed. 154 C. 129. Cited. 158 C. 452. Words used in statute are to be given their commonly approved usage. Id., 461; their plain ordinary meaning. 159 C. 544. Definition of “farming” and “agriculture” includes nurseries. 160 C. 71. Cited re tax statutes. 164 C. 178. Cited. Id., 360. “Commence” defined. 165 C. 687. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary cited to define “government”, “policy” and “direct”. Id., 757. Cited. 166 C. 337; Id., 405; 170 C. 567; 175 C. 49; Id., 349; 179 C. 277; 181 C. 1; Id., 114; 183 C. 183; 185 C. 118; 186 C. 623; 187 C. 363; Id., 386; 188 C. 542; 189 C. 321; 190 C. 143; 191 C. 636; 192 C. 571; 194 C. 129; Id., 165; 196 C. 53; 198 C. 185; 200 C. 713; 203 C. 45; 205 C. 386; 206 C. 337; 208 C. 267; Id., 709; 209 C. 429; 211 C. 339; 212 C. 100; Id., 661; 213 C. 66; Id., 354; 214 C. 209; Id., 321; 216 C. 40; Id., 402; 219 C. 314; Id., 520; 221 C. 751; 222 C. 361; 223 C. 573; 224 C. 44; 225 C. 297; Id., 566; 226 C. 191; 227 C. 505; 228 C. 158; Id., 795; 230 C. 24; 234 C. 301; Id., 401; Id., 783; 235 C. 778; Id., 850; 237 C. 490; 238 C. 784; 240 C. 317; Id., 590; 242 C. 17. Term “hearing” leaves room for flexibility as required for due process. 247 C. 732. “Access” defined; to ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, it is appropriate to look to its dictionary definition. 250 C. 188. Common meaning rule applied to Workers’ Compensation Act provisions. 285 C. 348.

Cited. 1 CA 22; 2 CA 49; 3 CA 16; Id., 230; Id., 343; 4 CA 111; Id., 200; Id., 307; 8 CA 528; Id., 607; Id., 673; 12 CA 138; Id., 196; 14 CA 322; 15 CA 205; 17 CA 344; 20 CA 302; 26 CA 490; 27 CA 800; 31 CA 47; 34 CA 352; 35 CA 173; Id., 714; 36 CA 98; 37 CA 72; Id., 619; Id., 764; 38 CA 360; Id., 815; 39 CA 441; 40 CA 705; judgment reversed, see 240 C. 590; 44 CA 162; 46 CA 661.

Cited. 31 CS 216; 36 CS 59; Id., 586; 37 CS 506; Id., 596; Id., 654; 38 CS 54; 39 CS 449; 40 CS 77; Id., 194; 45 CS 33.

Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 600; 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 372.

Subsec. (b):

“Railroad” held to include street railway; 78 C. 295; to exclude it. 80 C. 40.

Subsec. (c):

“Banks” held to include industrial bank. 125 C. 319.

Subsec. (f):

Cited. 57 C. 57; 150 C. 241; 166 C. 325. Statute cannot be logically invoked for words importing plural to include the singular to make “employees” singular as it appears after the words “to insure a clear and identifiable community of interest among ...” in Sec. 7-471(3). Statute is directory but not mandatory. 175 C. 349. Cited. Id.; 187 C. 386; 214 C. 407; 218 C. 438; 223 C. 610; 239 C. 708.

Cited. 35 CS 587.

Subsec. (g):

Cited. 57 C. 57; but “widow” will not be construed to include widower. 91 C. 77. Cited. 212 C. 661; 226 C. 618.

Subsec. (h):

Cited. 211 C. 508; 220 C. 584.

Cited. 15 CA 205.

Subsec. (i):

Cited. 157 C. 126.

Cited. 29 CA 465; 40 CA 483; 42 CA 480. “Month” and “year” not construed to change intent of statutory rape legislation. 47 CA 68.

Subsec. (k):

Cited. 81 C. 149. Not construed to make state suable without its consent. 82 C. 392; 133 C. 64; 150 C. 308. Cited. 168 C. 26; 212 C. 661.

Applied to corporations. 18 CS 272.

Subsec. (m):

Cited. 175 C. 545; Id., 576; 200 C. 38.

Subsec. (q):

Regular, commercially-operated slaughtering of animals unrelated to the farm itself is not included within definition of farming. 188 C. 724. Cited. 199 C. 294; 239 C. 124.

Cited. 3 CA 53; 24 CA 163.

“Farm land” defined for tax purposes. 26 CS 160.

Subsec. (s):

Applies only to a valid repeal. 11 CS 489.

Subsec. (t):

Cited. 67 C. 289; 68 C. 515; 78 C. 425; 97 C. 14; 121 C. 199; 152 C. 85. When a saving provision exists, a crime committed prior to the effective date of the repealing act remains punishable under the terms of the prior statute. 169 C. 13. Cited. 171 C. 278. Repeal of act shall not affect any suit, prosecution or proceeding pending at time of repeal for offense committed under repealed act. 172 C. 242. Cited. 237 C. 364.

Rule of construction. 3 CS 12. Applied. 16 CS 446.

Subsec. (u):

Cited. 59 C. 367; 67 C. 48; Id., 469; 70 C. 565. Intent to affect pending action, clearly shown, will be given effect; 75 C. 447; 86 C. 425; 127 C. 420; also, where an act concerning procedure is made general in its terms. 89 C. 46. Cited. 134 C. 342. Passage of an act does not affect pending action for divorce on ground of habitual intemperance. 136 C. 191. Cited. 137 C. 343; 142 C. 29, 329. Amendment to dram shop act limiting liability did not affect pending action. 149 C. 396. “Long-arm” statute is procedural and applies to action on rights matured before its passage. 157 C. 92. Court session date changes did not affect pending action. Id., 434. Cited. 174 C. 366. Statutes should be construed retroactively only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. 177 C. 93. Cited. 187 C. 451; 201 C. 16; 202 C. 541; 203 C. 34; Id., 455; Id., 484; 204 C. 17; 217 C. 612; 235 C. 850; 237 C. 364; 239 C. 676; 247 C. 638.

Cited. 6 CA 194; 9 CA 327.

Unless intent is plain that public act or general statute repeals a special act, latter will continue in effect. 26 CS 260. Cited. 34 CS 31; 38 CS 689; 44 CS 34; Id., 297.

Subsec. (w):

Cited. 166 C. 178; 185 C. 517; 196 C. 309; 240 C. 97.

Sec. 1-1a. Terms relating to security in personal property. Unless the context of any statute requires a different interpretation, all words and terms appearing in any statute and relating to security in personal property shall be construed to mean their counterparts in subdivision (35) of subsection (b) of section 42a-1-201 and chapter 748. In particular “chattel mortgage”, “conditional sale contract” or “lien” on personal property, except a lien of the type to which chapter 748 does not apply under subdivision (2) of subsection (d) of section 42a-9-109, shall be construed to mean “security interest”; “mortgagor” and “conditional vendee” shall be construed to mean “debtor”; “mortgagee” and “conditional vendor” shall be construed to mean “secured party”.

(1959, P.A. 574, S. 9; P.A. 01-132, S. 152; P.A. 05-109, S. 40.)

History: P.A. 01-132 replaced reference to Sec. 42a-9-104(c) with Sec. 42a-9-109(d)(2); P.A. 05-109 replaced reference to Sec. 42a-1-201(37) with reference to Sec. 42a-1-201(b)(35).

Cited. 182 C. 40; 189 C. 690; 213 C. 184.

Sec. 1-1b. Payment by bank treasurer’s or cashier’s check in lieu of certified check. (a) Any payment which is required by any state statute or municipal ordinance or by any regulation of any state, municipal or other public authority to be made by certified check may be made by bank treasurer’s or cashier’s check with the same effect as though a certified check had been used.

(b) When the terms of any contract entered into in this state require payment by certified check, unless the contrary is expressly stated, “certified check” shall be construed to include any bank treasurer’s or cashier’s check.

(February, 1965, P.A. 103, S. 1, 2.)

Sec. 1-1c. “Elector” defined. “Special election warned and held or called for that purpose”, means “referendum”, when. (a) Whenever the term “elector” or “electors” occurs in the general statutes or in any special act, it shall be construed to mean an elector or electors who have attained the age of twenty-one years, except where said term is used with reference to admission to, or exercise of, the privilege of voting in an election, or in a primary or caucus of a political party and except where said term is used as a qualification for elective or appointive municipal office.

(b) Whenever the term “special election warned and held or called for that purpose”, or words of similar import, is used in the general statutes, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, it means a referendum, as defined in subdivision (2) of subsection (n) of section 9-1.

(1969, P.A. 675; 1972, P.A. 263, S. 1; P.A. 77-68, S. 1, 2.)

History: 1972 act excludes from definition of “elector” use of term as qualification for municipal office; P.A. 77-68 added Subsec. (b) defining “special election”.

Cited. 31 CS 454; 43 CS 297.

Sec. 1-1d. “Minor”, “infant”, “infancy”, “age of majority”, defined. Except as otherwise provided by statute, on and after October 1, 1972, the terms “minor”, “infant” and “infancy” shall be deemed to refer to a person under the age of eighteen years and any person eighteen years of age or over shall be an adult for all purposes whatsoever and have the same legal capacity, rights, powers, privileges, duties, liabilities and responsibilities as persons heretofore had at twenty-one years of age, and “age of majority” shall be deemed to be eighteen years.

(1972, P.A. 127, S. 1.)

Cited. 165 C. 251. Court ordered support for a minor child terminates when child reaches eighteen. 168 C. 144. Cited. 171 C. 23. In contempt action for support it is law set forth in statutes rather than contract which imposes obligations for support; no statutory authority to grant support for person over eighteen. 177 C. 47. Cited. Id., 327; 180 C. 252; 181 C. 463; 184 C. 36; Id., 121; 185 C. 156; 187 C. 6; 190 C. 141. Establishment of age of majority is read to have prospective effect only. 279 C. 207.

Cited. 1 CA 578; 8 CA 76; Id., 607; 10 CA 147; 19 CA 146.

Sec. 1-1e. Savings clause. Nothing in sections 1-1d, 3-94b to 3-94e, inclusive, 7-6, 7-51, 7-53, 7-54, 7-172, 9-12, 10a-207, 14-14, 14-36, 14-40a, 14-41, 14-44, 14-61, 14-73, 14-214, 14-276, 17a-1, 17a-152, 17b-75, 17b-81, 17b-223, 17b-745, 18-73, 18-87, 19a-512, 20-10, 20-130, 20-146, 20-188, 20-213, 20-217, 20-236, 20-250, 20-252, 20-270, 20-291, 20-316, 20-361, 20-590, 20-592, 26-38, 29-156a, 30-1, 30-45, 30-86a, 31-222, 38a-482, 38a-609, 38a-633, 38a-786, 45a-263, 45a-502, 45a-504, 45a-606, 45a-754, 46b-129, 46b-215, 52-572, 53-304, 53-330, 53a-70 or 53a-87 shall impair or affect any act done, offense committed or right accruing, accrued or acquired, or an obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred prior to October 1, 1972, and the same may be enjoyed, asserted and enforced, as fully and to the same extent and in the same manner as they might under the laws existing prior to said date, and all matters civil or criminal pending on said date or instituted thereafter for any act done, offense committed, right accruing, accrued or acquired, or obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred prior to said date may be continued or instituted under and in accordance with the provisions of the law in force at the time of the commission of such act done, offense committed, right accruing, accrued or acquired, or obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred.

(1972, P.A. 127, S. 83; P.A. 81-472, S. 113, 159; P.A. 85-613, S. 1, 154; P.A. 87-421, S. 8, 13; P.A. 90-154, S. 20; P.A. 92-212, S. 19; P.A. 93-181, S. 2, 4; P.A. 95-264, S. 45; P.A. 99-102, S. 51; P.A. 01-163, S. 1; P.A. 02-89, S. 1; P.A. 04-257, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 81-472 deleted reference to Sec. 30-88; P.A. 85-613 made technical changes, deleting references to Secs. 7-147l, 31-20, 46-5g and 53a-77; P.A. 87-421 deleted reference to Sec. 17-295a which was repealed by the same act; P.A. 90-154 deleted reference to Sec. 3-91 and added reference to Secs. 3-94b to 3-94e, inclusive; P.A. 92-212 deleted reference to repealed Sec. 20-283; (Revisor’s note: In 1993 obsolete references to repealed Secs. 20-282 and 53a-74 were deleted editorially by the Revisors); P.A. 93-181 deleted reference to Sec. 14-38 which was repealed by the same act, effective June 23, 1993; P.A. 95-264 added reference to Sec. 20-592 (Revisor’s note: References to Secs. 45a-546, 45a-549, 45a-552 and 45a-555, repealed by P.A. 95-117, were deleted editorially by the Revisors); P.A. 99-102 repealed Sec. 20-17 and authorized deletion of reference to said section in this section; P.A. 01-163 deleted reference to Sec. 7-56 which was repealed by the same act; P.A. 02-89 deleted reference to Sec. 27-140g which was repealed by the same public act; P.A. 04-257 made technical changes, effective June 14, 2004.

Court ordered support for a minor child terminates when child reaches eighteen. 168 C. 144. Cited. 177 C. 47.

Sec. 1-1f. “Blind”, “physically disabled”, defined. For purposes of sections 3-10e, 4a-60, subdivision (12) of section 38a-816 and sections 46a-58, 46a-60, 46a-64, 46a-70 to 46a-73, inclusive, 46a-75, 46a-76 and 52-175a:

(a) An individual is blind if his central visual acuity does not exceed 20/200 in the better eye with correcting lenses, or if his visual acuity is greater than 20/200 but is accompanied by a limitation in the fields of vision such that the widest diameter of the visual field subtends an angle no greater than twenty degrees;

(b) An individual is physically disabled if he has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but not limited to, epilepsy, deafness or hearing impairment or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device.

(P.A. 73-279, S. 1; P.A. 74-346; P.A. 75-346; P.A. 79-631, S. 41, 111; P.A. 80-259, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 74-346 added Subsec. (b) defining “physically disabled”; P.A. 75-346 clarified definition of “physically disabled”; P.A. 79-631 deleted reference to Sec. 53-34a, substituting Sec. 53-34 (later transferred to Sec. 46a-58); P.A. 80-259 added reference to Sec. 38-61(12).

Sec. 1-1g. “Mental retardation”, “intellectual disability”, defined. (a) For the purposes of sections 17a-210b and 38a-816, “mental retardation” means a significant limitation in intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior that originated during the developmental period before eighteen years of age.

(b) For the purposes of sections 4a-60, 4b-28, 4b-31, 8-2g, 8-3e, 8-119t, 9-159s, 10-91f, 12-81, 17a-210, 17a-210b, 17a-215c, 17a-217 to 17a-218a, inclusive, 17a-220, 17a-226 to 17a-227a, inclusive, 17a-228, 17a-231 to 17a-233, inclusive, 17a-247 to 17a-247b, inclusive, 17a-270, 17a-272 to 17a-274, inclusive, 17a-276, 17a-277, 17a-281, 17a-282, 17a-580, 17a-593, 17a-594, 17a-596, 17b-226, 19a-638, 45a-598, 45a-669, 45a-670, 45a-672, 45a-674, 45a-676, 45a-677, 45a-678, 45a-679, 45a-680, 45a-681, 45a-682, 45a-683, 46a-11a to 46a-11g, inclusive, 46a-51, 46a-60, 46a-64, 46a-64b, 46a-66, 46a-70, 46a-71, 46a-72, 46a-73, 46a-75, 46a-76, 46b-84, 52-146o, 53a-46a, 53a-59a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-61a, 53a-181i, 53a-320, 53a-321, 53a-322, 53a-323, 54-56d and 54-250, “intellectual disability” has the same meaning as “mental retardation” as defined in subsection (a) of this section.

(c) As used in subsection (a) of this section, “significant limitation in intellectual functioning” means an intelligence quotient more than two standard deviations below the mean as measured by tests of general intellectual functioning that are individualized, standardized and clinically and culturally appropriate to the individual; and “adaptive behavior” means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected for the individual’s age and cultural group as measured by tests that are individualized, standardized and clinically and culturally appropriate to the individual.

(P.A. 78-148, S. 1; P.A. 80-259, S. 3; P.A. 82-51, S. 1; P.A. 83-587, S. 1, 96; P.A. 99-122, S. 5; P.A. 05-288, S. 1; P.A. 11-16, S. 1; 11-129, S. 2; P.A. 12-136, S. 1; 12-143, S. 4.)

History: P.A. 80-259 added reference to Sec. 38-61(12); P.A. 82-51 clarified terms used in the statutory definition in new Subsec. (b) and updated list of applicable sections in prior provisions, now Subsec. (a); P.A. 83-587 made a technical amendment; P.A. 99-122 amended Subsec. (a) to make definition applicable to Secs. 53a-59a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c and 53a-61a; (Revisor’s note: In 2005, a reference to Sec. “45a-668” was changed editorially by the Revisors to Sec. “45a-669” since Sec. 45a-668 was repealed by P.A. 04-54); P.A. 05-288 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective July 13, 2005; P.A. 11-16 amended Subsec. (a) by making definition applicable to Secs. 17a-210b, 17a-580, 46a-11a to 46a-11g, 46a-64b, 46b-84, 53a-46a, 53a-320 and 54-56d and by removing references to Secs. 17a-274 and 17a-281, added new Subsec. (b) defining “intellectual disability” and setting forth sections to which the definition applies and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), effective May 24, 2011; P.A. 11-129 deleted references to Secs. 46a-11a to 46a-11g in Subsec. (a), transferred various section references from Subsec. (a) to Subsec. (b) and added section references in Subsec. (b); P.A. 12-136 amended Subsec. (a) by redefining “mental retardation” and amended Subsec. (c) by deleting definitions of “general intellectual functioning”, “significantly subaverage” and “developmental period”, adding definition of “significant limitation in intellectual functioning” and redefining “adaptive behavior”; P.A. 12-143 amended Subsec. (b) to delete reference to Sec. 2c-2b and to make a technical change, effective July 1, 2012.

Interpreting section to allow consideration of all intelligence tests that meet the statutory criteria best furthers legislature’s intent to clarify and narrow definition of mental retardation to ensure that persons with borderline normal intelligence are not classified as mentally retarded, to prevent inappropriate commitment of such persons to mental retardation facilities and to assure that limited administrative resources are devoted to those most in need. 277 C. 594.

Sec. 1-1h. Identity cards. (a) Any person who does not possess a valid motor vehicle operator’s license may apply to the Department of Motor Vehicles for an identity card. The application for an identity card shall be accompanied by the birth certificate of the applicant or a certificate of identification of the applicant issued and authorized for such use by the Department of Correction. Such application shall include: (1) The applicant’s name; (2) the applicant’s address; (3) whether the address is permanent or temporary; (4) the applicant’s date of birth; (5) notice to the applicant that false statements on such application are punishable under section 53a-157b; and (6) such other pertinent information as the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles deems necessary. A fee of twenty-two dollars and fifty cents shall be paid to the department upon issuance to the applicant of an identity card which contains a picture of the applicant and specifies the applicant’s height, sex and eye color. The applicant shall sign the application in the presence of an official of the department. The commissioner may waive the fee for any applicant (A) who has voluntarily surrendered such applicant’s motor vehicle operator’s license, (B) whose license has been refused by the commissioner pursuant to subdivision (4) of subsection (e) of section 14-36, (C) who is both a veteran, as defined in subsection (a) of section 27-103, and blind, as defined in subsection (a) of section 1-1f, or (D) who is a resident of a homeless shelter or other facility for homeless persons. The commissioner shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to establish the procedure and qualifications for the issuance of an identity card to any such homeless applicant.

(b) An identity card shall expire within a period not exceeding six years from the date of issuance of such card. Each such card shall indicate its date of expiration. Any person who holds an identity card may be notified by the commissioner before its expiration and may renew such card in such manner as the commissioner shall prescribe upon payment of a fee of twenty-two dollars and fifty cents. The commissioner shall not provide notification by mail to the holder of an identity card if the United States Postal Service has determined that mail is undeliverable to such person at the address for such person that is in the records of the department.

(c) A distinctive identity card shall be issued to any applicant less than twenty-one years of age. The identity card shall contain a statement that it is issued subject to the same verification of the applicant’s identity as required for the issuance of a motor vehicle operator’s license. The card may thereafter be exhibited to establish the age and identity of the person to whom it was issued.

(d) The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, in consultation with the Liquor Control Commission, shall adopt regulations in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54 to carry out the purposes of this section and section 30-86.

(e) Any person who misrepresents his age or practices any other deceit in the procurement of an identity card, or uses or exhibits an identity card belonging to any other person, shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor.

(P.A. 84-478, S. 1, 5; P.A. 85-613, S. 2, 154; P.A. 87-479, S. 1, 3; P.A. 91-215, S. 3; P.A. 95-260, S. 1; P.A. 99-181, S. 36; 99-268, S. 9; P.A. 00-169, S. 22; P.A. 01-63; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-4, S. 27; P.A. 05-218, S. 1; P.A. 08-150, S. 30; P.A. 11-197, S. 1; 11-213, S. 1; P.A. 12-80, S. 51.)

History: P.A. 84-478, S. 1, effective July 1, 1985; P.A. 85-613 made technical changes; P.A. 87-479 permitted persons who are 16 to 20 years of age, inclusive, to apply for an identity card and required the issuance of a distinctive identity card to applicants under 21; P.A. 91-215 deleted requirement that photographs submitted along with applications for identity cards be validated by the office of vital statistics of the town where the applicant resides, increased the fee for such application from $4 to $10, required that such cards specify the holder’s height, sex and eye color and required that such card contain a statement re verification of holders’ identity; P.A. 95-260 divided section into Subsecs., permitted any person who does not have a valid operator’s license, regardless of age, to apply for an identity card, eliminated requirement that application be accompanied by a photograph of applicant, made technical changes in Subsec. (a) and inserted as Subsec. (b) a requirement that identity card expire not later than 4 years from its date of issuance and that each card indicate its expiration date and provisions re renewal of card; (Revisor’s note: In 1997 references throughout the general statutes to “Motor Vehicle(s) Commissioner” and “Motor Vehicle(s) Department” were replaced editorially by the Revisors with “Commissioner of Motor Vehicles” or “Department of Motor Vehicles”, as the case may be, for consistency with customary statutory usage); P.A. 99-181 amended Subsec. (a) by allowing an application for an identity card to be accompanied by a certificate of identification issued by the Department of Correction and by making technical changes re gender neutrality; P.A. 99-268 amended Subsec. (a) by adding a provision allowing for the commissioner to waive $10 fee for an applicant who has voluntarily surrendered such operator’s license or whose license has been refused pursuant to Sec. 14-36(e)(4), making a technical change and making changes re gender neutrality; P.A. 00-169 revised effective date of P.A. 99-268 but without affecting this section; P.A. 01-63 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that a certificate of identification issued by the Department of Correction may be used to obtain an identity card if it is “authorized for such use” by said department; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-4 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) to increase fee for issuance and renewal of identity card to $15, effective January 1, 2005; P.A. 05-218 amended Subsec. (b) by adding “shall be notified by the commissioner before its expiration and”, effective July 1, 2005; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “birthdate” with “date of birth”, increase issuance fee from $15 to $22.50 and add provision authorizing commissioner to waive fee for applicant who is a homeless person and requiring commissioner to adopt regulations re procedure and qualifications for issuance of card to homeless applicant and amended Subsec. (b) to increase maximum expiration period from 4 to 6 years from date of issuance of card and increase renewal fee from $15 to $22.50, effective January 1, 2009; P.A. 11-197 amended Subsec. (a) by inserting Subpara. (A), (B) and (D) designators in existing provisions re fee waivers and adding Subpara. (C) re fee waiver for blind veterans; P.A. 11-213 amended Subsec. (b) to change “shall” to “may” re notification and prohibit notification by mail if determined to be undeliverable, effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 12-80 amended Subsec. (e) to replace penalty of a fine of not more than $50 or imprisonment of not more than 30 days or both with a class D misdemeanor.

See Sec. 14-36h re contents and features of identity card.

Sec. 1-1i. Use of fees collected from issuance of identity cards. The fees payable to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles upon the issuance of certain identity cards in accordance with section 1-1h shall be deposited to the credit of the General Fund and in the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1985, such fees, in an amount not exceeding a total of sixty thousand dollars, shall be deemed to be appropriated for use by said commissioner for purposes of implementing the program in said section 1-1h.

(P.A. 85-413, S. 7, 8.)

Sec. 1-1j. Methods of payment for licenses, fees, costs or fines. (a) Each state agency, as defined in section 4-166, shall accept payment in cash or by check, draft or money order for any license issued by such agency pursuant to the provisions of the general statutes.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by the general statutes, the Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management may authorize any state agency (1) to accept payment of any fee, cost or fine payable to such agency by means of a credit card, charge card or debit card, or an electronic payment service, and (2) to charge a service fee for any such payment made by credit card, charge card or debit card or an electronic payment service. Such service fee shall be (A) related to the cost of service, (B) uniform for all credit cards, charge cards and debit cards accepted, and (C) applied only when allowed by the operating rules and regulations of the credit card, charge card or debit card issuer or processor involved or when authorized in writing by such issuer or processor. Payments by credit card, charge card, debit card or an electronic payment service shall be made at such times and under such conditions as the secretary may prescribe in regulations adopted in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54. Payment of a fee, cost or fine by credit card, charge card, debit card or an electronic payment service shall constitute full payment of such fee, regardless of any discount applied by a credit card company.

(May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-6, S. 86, 117; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-1, S. 2, 51; Sept. Sp. Sess. P.A. 09-7, S. 55.)

History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-1 added provisions concerning payment of license fees with a credit card, charge card or debit card, effective July 1, 1999; Sept. Sp. Sess. P.A. 09-7 designated existing provisions as Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) to authorize state agencies to accept payment of any fee, cost or fine by credit card, charge card, debit card or electronic payment service, effective October 5, 2009.

Sec. 1-1k. “Victim of crime”, “crime victim”, defined. Except as otherwise provided by the general statutes, “victim of crime” or “crime victim” means an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, emotional or financial harm as a result of a crime and includes immediate family members of a minor, incompetent individual or homicide victim and a person designated by a homicide victim in accordance with section 1-56r.

(P.A. 97-257, S. 6, 13; P.A. 02-105, S. 11.)

History: P.A. 97-257 effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 02-105 added a person designated by a homicide victim to definition.

Sec. 1-1l. Holocaust victims’ settlement payments excluded from income for purposes of needs-based programs. Any Holocaust victims’ settlement payment, as defined in subdivision (35) of section 12-701, to a Holocaust victim, as defined in subdivision (36) of section 12-701, shall be excluded from any calculation of income for purposes of determining the eligibility for, or the benefit level of, such individual in any needs-based program under the general statutes or determining the ability of such individual to repay benefits to the state as a legally liable relative of a recipient of assistance under such program.

(P.A. 00-82, S. 5, 6.)

History: P.A. 00-82 effective May 26, 2000, and applicable to applications for state assistance pending on or after said date.

Sec. 1-1m. Applicability of marriage terms. Wherever in the general statutes or the public acts the term “husband”, “wife”, “groom”, “bride”, “widower” or “widow” is used, such term shall be deemed to include one party to a marriage between two persons of the same sex.

(P.A. 09-13, S. 8.)

History: P.A. 09-13 effective April 23, 2009.

Sec. 1-1n. “Gender identity or expression” defined. As used in sections 4a-60, 8-169s, 8-265c, 8-294, 8-315, 10-15c, 10-153, 10a-6, 11-24b, 16-245r, 16-247r, 28-15, 31-22p, 31-57e, 32-204, 32-277, 38a-358, 42-125a, 42-125b, 46a-81aa, 52-571d and 53-37a, “gender identity or expression” means a person’s gender-related identity, appearance or behavior, whether or not that gender-related identity, appearance or behavior is different from that traditionally associated with the person’s physiology or assigned sex at birth, which gender-related identity can be shown by providing evidence including, but not limited to, medical history, care or treatment of the gender-related identity, consistent and uniform assertion of the gender-related identity or any other evidence that the gender-related identity is sincerely held, part of a person’s core identity or not being asserted for an improper purpose.

(P.A. 11-55, S. 2.)

Sec. 1-2. Legal notices. Each provision of the general statutes, the special acts or the charter of any town, city or borough which requires the insertion of an advertisement of a legal notice in a daily newspaper shall be construed to permit such advertisement to be inserted in a weekly newspaper; but this section shall not be construed to reduce or otherwise affect the time required by law for giving such notice. Whenever notice of any action or other proceeding is required to be given by publication in a newspaper, either by statute or order of court, the newspaper selected for that purpose, unless otherwise expressly prescribed, shall be one having a substantial circulation in the town in which at least one of the parties, for whose benefit such notice is given, resides.

(1949 Rev., S. 8890, 8892; P.A. 79-375.)

History: P.A. 79-375 rephrased provisions but made no substantive changes.

Sec. 1-2a. Construction of term “postmark”. (a) For purposes of sections 1-206, 3-114e, 3-114f, 3-114i, 4-147, 9-23g, 9-65, 9-153b, 9-311, 9-608, 10-183g, 12-146, 20-429, 31-241, 31-248, 31-249a, 33-603, 33-663, 33-929, 33-1003, 33-1053, 33-1219, 38a-716 and 42-243 (1) any reference to the United States mail or a postmark shall be treated as including a reference to any delivery service designated by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States pursuant to Section 7502 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, (2) any reference to a postmark made by the United States Postal Service shall be treated as including a reference to any date recorded or marked in the manner described in said Section 7502 of said Internal Revenue Code by a designated delivery service, and (3) any equivalent of registered or certified mail designated by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States pursuant to said Section 7502 of said Internal Revenue Code shall be included within the meaning of registered or certified mail.

(b) The Legislative Commissioners’ Office shall, in codifying the provisions of this section, make such technical, grammatical and punctuation changes and statutory placements and classifications, including, but not limited to, the addition of newly enacted material to the sections listed in subsection (a) of this section as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.

(P.A. 99-121, S. 27, 28.)

History: P.A. 99-121 effective June 3, 1999.

Sec. 1-2b. Construction of term “certified mail, return receipt requested”. (a) For purposes of sections 1-100oo, 1-206, 2-71r, 4-176, 4-180, 4-183, 4a-52a, 4a-60q, 4a-63, 4a-100, 4e-34, 4e-35, 7-65, 7-148w, 7-247a, 7-473c, 7-478e, 8-3b, 8-3i, 8-7d, 8-26b, 8-169r, 8-293, 9-388, 9-608, 9-623, 10a-22c, 10a-22i, 10a-34a, 10a-109n, 12-35, 12-157, 12-242ii, 12-242jj, 13a-80, 13a-85c, 13a-123, 15-11a, 16-41, 16-50c, 16-50d, 17a-103b, 19a-87, 19a-87c, 19a-209c, 19a-332e, 19a-343a, 19a-486a, 19a-486c, 19a-486d, 19a-497, 19a-507b, 20-205a, 20-325a, 21-63, 21-80, 22-7, 22a-6b, 22a-6u, 22a-30, 22a-42d, 22a-42f, 22a-66d, 22a-137, 22a-178, 22a-225, 22a-228, 22a-250, 22a-285b, 22a-354p, 22a-354s, 22a-354t, 22a-361, 22a-371, 22a-401, 22a-403, 22a-433, 22a-436, 22a-449f, 22a-449l, 22a-449n, 22a-504, 22a-626, 23-46, 23-65j, 23-651, 23-65p, 25-32, 25-32e, 25-331, 25-34, 25-204, 25-234, 29-108d, 31-57c, 31-57d, 31-355, 32-613, 33-663, 33-929, 33-1053, 33-1219, 34-521, 35-42, 36a-50, 36a-51, 36a-52, 36a-53, 36a-82, 36a-184, 36a-493, 36b-62, 36b-72, 38-323a, 38a-344, 38a-676, 38a-724, 38a-788, 42-158j, 42-161, 42-181, 42-182, 42-186, 42-271, 45a-716, 46b-115w, 46b-128, 47-42d, 47-74f, 47-88b, 47-236, 47-284, 47a-11b, 47a-11d, 47a-13a, 47a-14h, 47a-56b, 49-2, 49-4a, 49-8, 49-8a, 49-10b, 49-31b, 49-51, 49-70, 51-90e, 52-57, 52-59b, 52-63, 52-64, 52-195c, 52-350e, 52-351b, 52-361a, 52-362, 52-565a, 52-605, 52-606, 53-401, 53a-128, 53a-128d, 53a-207 and 54-82c and chapter 965, any reference to certified mail, return receipt requested, shall include mail, electronic, and digital methods of receiving the return receipt, including all methods of receiving the return receipt identified by the Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service in Chapter 500 of the Domestic Mail Manual or any subsequent corresponding document of the United States Postal Service.

(b) The Legislative Commissioners’ Office shall, in codifying the provisions of this section, make such technical, grammatical and punctuation changes and statutory placements and classifications, including, but not listed in subsection (a) of this section as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.

(P.A. 10-179, S. 40; P.A. 11-137, S. 2; 11-237, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 10-179 effective May 7, 2010; P.A. 11-137 amended Subsec. (a) by adding references to Secs. 4-176 and 4-180, effective July 8, 2011; P.A. 11-237 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting reference to Sec. 46a-82e.

Sec. 1-2c. Construction of term “electronic mail”. Wherever in the general statutes or public acts the term “electronic mail” is used, such term shall be deemed to include an electronic delivery service that delivers communications to their intended recipients by matching an electronic mail address to a person’s United States Postal Service physical address and uses security methods such as passwords or encryption.

(P.A. 12-185, S. 1.)

Secs. 1-2d to 1-2y. Reserved for future use.

Sec. 1-2z. Plain meaning rule. The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.

(P.A. 03-154, S. 1.)

Construing the plain meaning of Sec. 22a-19 and its relationship to other statutes, court concluded that Sec. 22a-19 allows town to intervene in judicial review of decisions of its wetlands and zoning commission, does not conflict with Secs. 8-1 and 22a-42, which delegates municipal authority to the agencies, and does not yield an absurd or unworkable result. 280 C. 405. Statute did not overrule the principle that ambiguous statutory language is not unconstitutionally vague if the legislative history establishes a clear meaning. 284 C. 573. Under section, ambiguity determination is not limited to the statute itself, but requires viewing the statute at issue in context of other related statutes. Id., 838. The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. Plain meaning rule applied to Workers’ Compensation Act provisions. 285 C. 348. Because Sec. 14-164(c) is ambiguous re implicit waiver of sovereign immunity, such ambiguity means waiver of sovereign immunity is not implied and therefore no extratextual evidence is necessary. 293 C. 382.

When application of alternative minimum tax credit statute resulted in double taxation and a mathematical impossibility that an individual would ever be eligible to recoup a credit, which was an absurd or unworkable result, court looked to extratextual evidence to determine statute’s meaning. 98 CA 439. Under section, cannot look beyond text of statutory language if that language, as applied to facts of the case, is plain and unambiguous and does not yield a bizarre or unworkable result. 105 CA 124.

Cited. 49 CS 43.

Sec. 1-3. Validity of separate provisions of acts. If any provision of any act passed by the General Assembly or its application to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of such act.

(1949 Rev., S. 8893.)

If statute is partially invalid, valid part may stand if it and the invalid part are not so mutually connected and dependent as to indicate legislative intent that they are inseparable. 146 C. 78. To overcome presumption of separability it must be shown the portion declared invalid is so mutually connected and dependent on remainder as to indicate an intent they should stand or fall together, and to warrant belief the legislature would not have adopted remainder independently of invalid portion; similarly when application to distinct classes of persons is at issue. 171 C. 141. Cited. 191 C. 336; 199 C. 693; 201 C. 435; 215 C. 675.

Cited. 32 CA 656; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345.

Cited. 30 CS 87.

Sec. 1-3a. License or permit fee due on Saturday, Sunday or holiday. Any state or municipal license or permit fee which is due and payable on a date certain which falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday shall be payable on the next business day thereafter.

(P.A. 75-196.)

Sec. 1-3b. Enforcement of subpoena powers. Whenever any section of the general statutes or any section of any special act authorizes any person, committee, board, officer, commission, council or agency to issue any subpoena, and such section does not specifically provide for the enforcement of such subpoena, if the person to whom such subpoena is issued fails to appear or if having appeared refuses to testify or produce the evidence required by such subpoena, the Superior Court, upon application of such person, committee, board, officer, commission, council or agency, shall have jurisdiction to order such person to appear or to give testimony or produce such evidence, as the case may be.

(P.A. 78-143.)

Cited. 225 C. 700.