CHAPTER 939
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

      Secs. 53-9 and 53-10. Degrees of murder; trial. First degree murder, other homicides; death penalty or life imprisonment. Sections 53-9 and 53-10 are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8350, 8351; 1951, S. 3266d; 1957, P.A. 461, S. 3; 1963, P.A. 322; 573; February, 1965, P.A. 500; 1969, P.A. 828, S. 214.)

      Sec. 53-10a. Persons sentenced to life imprisonment prior to October 1, 1963. Any person imprisoned in any correctional institution who, prior to October 1, 1963, was sentenced under the provisions of section 53-10 of the general statutes to imprisonment in the State Prison for life without benefit of release as provided in sections 18-7, 54-125 and 54-130a shall be eligible for the same release benefits provided under said sections as any person sentenced to imprisonment for life after October 1, 1963.

      (February, 1965, P.A. 258, S. 1; P.A. 76-336, S. 25.)

      History: P.A. 76-336 replaced references to "State Prison" with general reference to "any correctional institution".

      Secs. 53-11 to 53-19. Homicide or injuries to person punishable by imprisonment for life. Assault with intent to murder. Manslaughter. Maiming with intent to disfigure; robbery with violence; armed robbery. Assault with acid or other burning substance. Aggravated assault. Assault of Correction Department or Parole Board employee. Misconduct of railroad or railway servants or motor vehicle operators. Throwing or shooting at trains, engines, motor units, railroad cars; injury or destruction. Binding, or administering drugs with intent to commit crime. Sections 53-11 to 53-19, inclusive, are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8352-8358, 8360, 8520; 1961, P.A. 210; 1969, P.A. 144, S. 1; 327; 828, S. 214; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)

      Sec. 53-20. Cruelty to persons. (a)(1) Any person who intentionally tortures, torments or cruelly or unlawfully punishes another person or intentionally deprives another person of necessary food, clothing, shelter or proper physical care shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years or both.

      (2) Any person who, with criminal negligence, deprives another person of necessary food, clothing, shelter or proper physical care shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both.

      (b) (1) Any person who, having the control and custody of any child under the age of nineteen years, in any capacity whatsoever, intentionally maltreats, tortures, overworks or cruelly or unlawfully punishes such child or intentionally deprives such child of necessary food, clothing or shelter shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years or both.

      (2) Any person who, having the control and custody of any child under the age of nineteen years, in any capacity whatsoever, with criminal negligence, deprives such child of necessary food, clothing or shelter shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8368; P.A. 05-72, S. 1.)

      History: P.A. 05-72 designated existing provisions re cruelty to any person as Subsec. (a)(1) and amended said Subsec. to add "intentionally" as the mens rea for the offense of torturing, tormenting or cruelly or unlawfully punishing another person, replace "wilfully" with "intentionally" as the mens rea for the offense of depriving another person of necessary food, clothing, shelter or proper physical care, and increase the penalty for such intentional acts to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years or both, reenacted existing provisions re negligently depriving another person of necessary food, clothing, shelter or proper physical care and the penalty therefor as Subsec. (a)(2) and amended those provisions by replacing "negligently" with "with criminal negligence" as the mens rea for such offense, designated existing provisions re cruelty to a child as Subsec. (b)(1) and amended said Subsec. to make provisions applicable to a child under 19 years of age rather than under 16 years of age, add "intentionally" as the mens rea for the offense of maltreating, torturing, overworking or cruelly or unlawfully punishing a child, replace "wilfully" with "intentionally" as the mens rea for the offense of depriving a child of necessary food, clothing or shelter and increase the penalty for such intentional acts to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years or both, reenacted existing provisions re negligently depriving a child of necessary food, clothing or shelter and the penalty therefor as Subsec. (b)(2) and amended those provisions by making them applicable to a child under 19 years of age rather than under 16 years of age and replacing "negligently" with "with criminal negligence" as the mens rea for such offense.

      Formerly trial justice could take final jurisdiction of offense against section. 115 C. 600. The word "unlawfully" does not connote "inhuman or barbarous treatment", but should be construed within the rule of statutory construction that a general word, following a particular enumeration, is intended to apply only to matters of the same general character. 165 C. 288.

      Cited. 26 CS 316. Cited. 37 CS 664.

      Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 571. Evidence that defendant, mother of premature twin babies, failed to obtain medical aid or other care for them was sufficient to support jury's verdict holding her guilty of crime of cruelty to persons upon death of one and severe illness of other child. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 698.

      Sec. 53-21. Injury or risk of injury to, or impairing morals of, children. Sale of children. (a) Any person who (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child, or (2) has contact with the intimate parts, as defined in section 53a-65, of a child under the age of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child, or (3) permanently transfers the legal or physical custody of a child under the age of sixteen years to another person for money or other valuable consideration or acquires or receives the legal or physical custody of a child under the age of sixteen years from another person upon payment of money or other valuable consideration to such other person or a third person, except in connection with an adoption proceeding that complies with the provisions of chapter 803, shall be guilty of a class C felony for a violation of subdivision (1) or (3) of this subsection and a class B felony for a violation of subdivision (2) of this subsection, except that, if the violation is of subdivision (2) of this subsection and the victim of the offense is under thirteen years of age, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

      (b) The act of a parent or agent leaving an infant thirty days or younger with a designated employee pursuant to section 17a-58 shall not constitute a violation of this section.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8369; P.A. 95-142, S. 1; P.A. 97-147, S. 1; P.A. 00-207, S. 6; P.A. 02-138, S. 4; P.A. 07-143, S. 4.)

      History: P.A. 95-142 designated existing provisions as Subdiv. (1) and amended said Subdiv. to make technical changes, added Subdiv. (2) re contact with the intimate parts of a child or subjecting a child to contact with the intimate parts of the actor, in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of the child, and specified that a person who commits the proscribed acts "shall be guilty of a class C felony" rather than "shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both"; P.A. 97-147 added Subdiv. (3) re permanently transferring, or acquiring or receiving, the legal or physical custody of a child for money or other valuable consideration; P.A. 00-207 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and added new Subsec. (b) re exemption for parent or agent leaving an infant with a designated employee pursuant to Sec. 17a-58; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (a) to change the classification of a violation of Subdiv. (2) from a class C to a class B felony; P.A. 07-143 amended Subsec. (a) to add exception that if violation is of Subdiv. (2) and victim is under 13 years of age, person guilty of violation shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which 5 years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, effective July 1, 2007.

      See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

      See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.

      Cited. 143 C. 604. Evidence of conversations between defendant and school authorities where child was enrolled admissible to show defendant had assumed custody of child; permissible to question child concerning his observation of activities in defendant's house as having bearing on question whether defendant had placed child in situation where morals were likely to be impaired. 149 C. 491. Legislative history discussed. Voluntary intoxication is a defense in a criminal action only where specific intent is an element of crime. The second part of this section does not require specific intent as an element of the crime charged. Therefore intoxication is no defense. 150 C. 245. Cited. 152 C. 197. Defendant may put his character in issue but only as to specific traits of sexual morality and decency, and character witness' testimony must be as to these traits. 157 C. 99. Cited. 160 C. 366. Cited. 162 C. 123. Separability of conduct in statutory construction, discussed. 164 C. 69. This section does not require a showing that the health of the child was impaired, but only that the conduct or the acts of the defendant were such that the health of the child was likely to be impaired. 165 C. 288. Cited. 172 C. 140. Cited. 176 C. 138. In light of prior opinions of court there is sufficient warning that acts charged are proscribed by the statute. 180 C. 54. Cited. 181 C. 406; Id., 426. Cited. 183 C. 17. Section is not constitutionally infirm since it clearly lays down a legislative policy on the subject legislated upon. Id., 17. Section does not violate the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution. Id. Section does not contravene the doctrine of separation of powers because it does not represent any delegation of legislative powers. Id. Cited. Id., 586. Cited. 185 C. 199. Cited. 186 C. 45. Cited. 187 C. 73. Cited. 188 C. 565. Cited. 189 C. 1. Cited. 190 C. 84. Cited. 191 C. 453. Statute unconstitutional when applied to instances of willing and voluntary participation by a person between fifteen and sixteen years of age. 192 C. 154. Cited. 197 C. 666. Cited. 199 C. 47. Cited. 200 C. 734. Cited. 201 C. 211. Cited. 203 C. 506. Cited. 204 C. 187; Id., 523; Id., 683. Cited. 205 C. 27; Id., 515; Id., 528. Cited. 207 C. 233. Statute unconstitutionally vague in the circumstances of this case. Id., 456. Cited. 210 C. 51; Id., 244; Id., 359; Id., 396; Id., 582. Cited. 211 C. 185; Id., 555. Cited. 214 C. 378; Id., 717. Cited. 215 C. 653. Cited. 216 C. 699. Cited. 219 C. 283. Cited. 222 C. 331; Id., 556. Cited. 224 C. 1; Id., 656; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452. Cited. 227 C. 207; Id., 829. Cited. 228 C. 393; Id., 552; Id., 610; Id., 795. Cited. 229 C. 580; Id., 839. Cited. 230 C. 43. Cited. 233 C. 502; Id., 813. Cited. 235 C. 659; Id., 746. Cited. 236 C. 189; Id., 342. Cited. 237 C. 321. Cited. 240 C. 766. Cited. 241 C. 823. Cited. 242 C. 211; Id., 296. Statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case. 248 C. 543. Medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule applies to a child sexual assault victim's statements made to a social worker acting in the chain of medical care if statements were made to obtain medical treatment and were pertinent to the treatment sought. 260 C. 1. State not required to prove specific intent under the section and evidence re victim's injuries was sufficient to support conviction under section. Id., 93. This section and Sec. 53a-59(a)(3) do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser included offenses and are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Id. Prescribes a general liability crime and defendant cannot prevail on claim that attempt charge under section is invalid based on strict liability of crime; defendant's claim that criminalizing an attempt to commit risk of injury is like criminalizing an attempted attempt is without merit; section not unconstitutionally vague based on facts of case. 277 C. 155. State was not required to prove that child's health was actually impaired by defendant's act of taking child to another country, away from child's mother, during defendant's and mother's divorce proceedings. 280 C. 660.

      Cited. 2 CA 333. Cited. 3 CA 459; Id., 607. Cited. 6 CA 150. Cited. 7 CA 46; Id., 131; Id., 653. Held to be in error for a trial court to deny request for a jury instruction on issue of consent in risk of injury case involving a fifteen-year-old girl. 8 CA 216. Cited. Id., 216; Id., 313; Id., 469; Id., 528. Not constitutionally infirm as being void for vagueness. 9 CA 74. Cited. 10 CA 591. Cited. 11 CA 80; Id., 236. Cited. 12 CA 288; Id., 320; Id., 403. Cited. 13 CA 368; Id., 378; Id., 667. Cited. 14 CA 244; Id., 333. Cited. 15 CA 222; Id., 251. Cited. 17 CA 174; Id., 186; Id., 447; Id., 525. Cited. 18 CA 273; Id., 297; Id., 459; Id., 477. Cited. 19 CA 44; Id., 646. Cited. 20 CA 40; Id., 75; Id., 115; Id., 193; Id., 263; Id., 288; Id., 530; Id., 572; Id., 630; Id., 694; Id., 737. Cited. 21 CA 449. Cited. 23 CA 1; Id., 241; Id., 712. Cited. 24 CA 57; Id., 146. Not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as applied to defendant. Id., 300. Cited. Id., 330. Cited. 25 CA 235; Id., 243; Id., 334. Cited. 26 CA 81; Id., 625; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 and 31 CA 452; Id., 674; Id., 758. Cited. 28 CA 91; Id., 388; Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601. Cited. 29 CA 591; Id., 683; Id., 689; Id., 724. Cited. 30 CA 527; Id., 654. Cited. 31 CA 120; Id., 497. Cited. 32 CA 84; Id., 217; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580; Id., 773. Cited. 33 CA 133; Id., 162; Id., 205; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502. Cited. 34 CA 46; Id., 428; Id., 473; Id., 807. Cited. 35 CA 520; Id., 728; Id., 754. Cited. 36 CA 383; Id., 448; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342; Id., 525. Cited. 37 CA 21; Id., 180; Id., 388; Id., 534. Cited. 38 CA 56; Id., 125. Cited. 39 CA 267; Id., 657; Id., 702; Id., 742. Cited. 40 CA 1; Id., 132; Id., 233; Id., 395; Id., 805. Cited. 41 CA 204; Id., 287; Id., 333; Id., 701. Cited. 42 CA 147; Id., 186; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823; Id., 371; Id., 382. Cited. 43 CA 142; Id., 458; Id., 578; Id., 619; Id., 667; Id., 715; Id., 785. Cited. 44 CA 457. Cited. 45 CA 66; Id., 116; Id., 261; Id., 512; Id., 613; Id., 756. Cited. 46 CA 24; Id., 691. Although victim must be less than sixteen, there is no age requirement for the actor; thus, violation can result in adjudication that defendant is a youthful offender. Not unconstitutionally vague where defendant charged with consensual statutory rape had fair notice from the terms of the statute and from judicial opinions. 47 CA 68. Evidence presented at trial concerning death of healthy one-year-old left in defendant's care was sufficient to support conviction. Id., 188. This offense and offense of sexual assault in the fourth degree under Sec. 53a-73a(a)(1)(A) are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. 49 CA 409. Sentencing under both risk of injury and promoting prostitution statutes not a double jeopardy violation. 53 CA 627. Statute found not to be unconstitutionally vague on its face as applied to facts of case; defendant had sufficient notice that leaving three young children unattended created a situation that endangered their physical well being. 56 CA 395. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 57 CA 736. Not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad with respect to the display of pornographic material to minors. 69 CA 400. Not unconstitutionally vague with respect to Sec. 30-86 (delivery of alcohol to minor, exceptions) where defendant was merely a care provider and Department of Children and Families retained guardianship over minor in question. Id. Does not unconstitutionally interfere with rights of parents to raise children and is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of right to freedom of speech where defendant was not parent of teenaged girls and prior case law gave fair warning that conduct of showing pornographic movies to children could result in arrest. Defendant's conduct was at issue, not content of pornographic movies. Id. Evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 CA 201. Under section, relevant inquiry is whether defendant committed any act that was likely to endanger the life or limb, or impair the health, of the children, whether or not the children actually were injured. Id., 432. It is not necessary, to support conviction under section, that defendant be aware that his conduct is likely to impact a child younger than sixteen. Specific intent is not a necessary requirement of section. Rather, the intent to do some act coupled with reckless disregard its consequences is sufficient to find a violation. Id. Evidence was sufficient for jury to determine that defendant created a situation likely to impair victims' morals and actual injury was not required. 83 CA 452. Proof of wilful behavior that recklessly exposes a minor to injury may be sufficient to convict defendant of risk of injury even if defendant did not have specific intent to expose the child to risk of injury. 84 CA 464. Defendant who intentionally gave LSD to minor had requisite general intent to sustain conviction under section. 85 CA 575. Where there is armed robbery and unknown to defendant a child is present, statute applies even if no intent to harm child since conduct demonstrates reckless disregard of consequences of action. Id., 802.

      Evidence of conviction under this section held not sufficient evidence to warrant a decree of divorce for the commission of an infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty. 21 CS 198. Defendant arrested and charged under this section after hearing was properly bound over to superior court where he was charged with aggravated assault. 27 CS 429. Cited. 29 CS 187. Presentment for this crime barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy where defendant had been convicted in circuit court for lesser offense for the same actions. 31 CS 28. Cited. 41 CS 229.

      Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 548.

      Subsec. (a):

      Subdiv. (2) cited. 240 C. 743. Statute does not contain an element of physical violence; nor does it require actual impairment of the health or moral values of child. 260 C. 486. "Likely", as used in subsection, cannot be understood fairly to encompass a meaning of either "possible" or "in all possibility" and, therefore, trial court's instructions to the contrary were improper. 269 C. 481. Subdiv. (1): In cases concerning alleged sexual misconduct, an act likely to impair a child's morals must involve physical touching of victim's person in a sexual and indecent way. Such touching, however, need not involve private parts of either victim or defendant. 273 C. 56. Subdiv. (1): In cases concerning alleged sexual misconduct, an act likely to impair a child's health, when committed in a sexual context, includes only those acts that involve direct touching of victim's person and are, or are likely to be, injurious to victim's physical health. Id. First part of Subdiv. (1) prohibits creation of situations detrimental to a child's welfare, while second part proscribes injurious acts directly perpetrated on the child. Id., 138. Subdiv. (1) intended to apply to any conduct, whether or not legal, that could reasonably result in injury to a child but where apartment was cluttered and had unpleasant odor but did not violate any statutory or regulatory standards there was insufficient notice to defendant that conditions posed risk of injury to child's mental health. 279 C. 678. Delay in seeking medical attention, placing child in dangerous situation, can be shown by circumstantial evidence where expert witness testified that victim would have screamed for at least fifteen minutes after alleged injury and mother, who arrived at home after the time of such injury, did not hear victim scream. 288 C. 290. Under the 2005 revision, section and Sec. 53a-73a(a)(1)(A) are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 291 C. 1. Offense of risk of injury to a child under Subdiv. (1) is not logically inconsistent with defense of parental justification under Sec. 53a-18(1). 294 C. 243.

      Subdiv. (2): Jury's finding of contact between penis and anus or buttocks area suffices as the requisite contact. 53 CA 720. Statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant whose birthday is within two years of the victim's birthday. 61 CA 738. Conviction for risk of injury to a child based on charge that health of child was likely to be impaired reversed where evidence at trial established only that child was in the presence of unsmoked marijuana. There is no case law authority to support the proposition that being in the presence of unsmoked marijuana is inherently injurious to the health of a child. 73 CA 386. Subdiv. (1): To convict defendant of the crime of risk of injury to a child, competent evidence must be presented as to whether a situation was likely to cause harm to a child. Id., 809. Subdiv. (1): State not required to prove that defendant's general intent was to impair the health of his child. All that is necessary is the general intent to perform the act that resulted in the injury. 74 CA 736. Subdiv. (1): State did not have to prove that defendant knew of the presence of the child but simply that the child was present at the time the victim was shot. 78 CA 535. Pursuant to Subdiv. (2), risk of injury to or impairing the morals of a child involves sexual contact with a child younger than sixteen "in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child ...." Sec. 53a-71, sexual assault in the second degree, contains no such similar provision. Risk of injury to a child, therefore, contains elements lacking in sexual assault in the second degree. 79 CA 591. Subdiv. (2): The legislative history supports our conclusion that a conviction under both risk of injury to or impairing the morals of children and sexual assault in the second degree do not constitute multiple punishments for the same offense because the legislature intended to create a new crime. Id. To be found guilty under the "any act" provision of section, all that is necessary is general intent to perform the act that resulted in the injury; it is unnecessary for court to instruct jury that there must be evidence that defendant intended to harm victim or knew that victim was in the area and would likely be harmed. 84 CA 263. Court's instruction that "likely" had same meaning as "possible", while improper, did not constitute reversible error or deprive defendant of due process since court also gave proper interpretation of "probable" or "in all probability" and evidence supported the verdict. 85 CA 575. Subdiv. (1): Evidence that defendant forcibly took victim's arm and attempted to pull her toward him was insufficient to prove that defendant committed an act likely to be injurious to victim's physical health. 95 CA 332. Subdiv. (2): Although trial court erred when it defined "likely" as "possibly" in the phrase "likely to impair the health or morals of a minor child", it was not reasonably possible that jury was misled and therefore defendant was not clearly deprived of a fair trial. 99 CA 251. Subdiv. (1): Examining plain language of risk of injury statute and statute providing for the justification defense of reasonable parental discipline, Sec. 53a-18(1), there is no apparent reason to bar application of Sec. 53a-18(1) to a charge under this Subdiv. Id., 713. Subdiv. (1): Mere fact that defendant does not physically touch a child while pursuing that child does not relieve defendant of criminal liability under section. 100 CA 619. Subdiv. (2): Jury's acquittal of charge under Sec. 53a-70(a)(2) did not invalidate jury's conviction under this section based on same facts. 108 CA 264. Subdiv. (1): The jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant violated the "situation" prong when he engaged the victim in flirtatious conversation, grabbed her wrist and neck and attempted to pull her forcibly through his vehicle's open window, endangering her mental health or physical well-being, or engaging in the impairment of her morals. 111 CA 259. Subdiv. (1): Not void for vagueness as applied because language is sufficient to put reasonable person on notice that opening bathroom door to look at six-year-old for voyeuristic purposes or sexual gratification is unlawful conduct. 115 CA 467. Subdiv. (1): Failure to protect a child from harm creates a situation that is violative of Subdiv., and this duty to protect logically includes a duty to supervise one's child, especially where there are known dangers that pose a risk of injury to that child; Subdiv. not void for vagueness as applied to defendant's conduct because reasonable person would recognize that allowing two-year-old child to play unsupervised in home with unlocked door near busy street presents a foreseeable risk of injury to that child. 116 CA 1. Subdiv. (1): Defendant's actions in enticing the victim into a situation for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act were not merely incidental and necessary to his performing the sexual act, instead the actions were sufficient for independent prosecution under Subdiv. 118 CA 1. Subdiv. (2): This offense and offense of sexual assault in the first degree, Sec. 53a-70(a)(2), are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Id., 180. Subsec. (a)(2) and Sec. 53a-73a(a)(1)(A), 2003 revision, are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Id., 589. Jury reasonably could have inferred that the act of an adult man placing his tongue into the mouth of an eight-year-old girl was likely to have impaired her morals. 121 CA 75. Acquittal of risk of injury to a child under Subdiv. (1) is not inconsistent with conviction on charge of reckless driving under Sec. 14-222(a) because each offense contains different elements and an acquittal on one is not inconsistent with a conviction on the other. 122 CA 631.

      Subdiv. (2): Lack of actual injury to morals of the victim is not relevant, as actual injury to morals is not an element of risk of injury offense. 48 CS 610.

      Sec. 53-21a. Leaving child unsupervised in place of public accommodation or motor vehicle. (a) Any parent, guardian or person having custody or control, or providing supervision, of any child under the age of twelve years who knowingly leaves such child unsupervised in a place of public accommodation or a motor vehicle for a period of time that presents a substantial risk to the child's health or safety, shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

      (b) Any parent, guardian or person having custody or control, or providing supervision, of any child under the age of twelve years who knowingly leaves such child unsupervised in a place of public accommodation, which holds a permit issued under chapter 545 for the sale of alcoholic liquor for consumption on the premises, for a period of time that presents a substantial risk to the child's health or safety, shall be guilty of a class D felony.

      (c) Any parent, guardian or person having custody or control, or providing supervision, of any child under the age of twelve years who knowingly leaves such child unsupervised in a place of public accommodation or a motor vehicle between the hours of eight o'clock p.m. and six o'clock a.m. for a period of time that presents a substantial risk to the child's health or safety, shall be guilty of a class C felony.

      (P.A. 97-298.)

      Sec. 53-22. Psychiatric examinations. The court may order any person convicted under section 53-20 or 53-21 to be examined by one or more competent psychiatrists.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8370.)

      See Sec. 17a-566 re examination of certain convicted persons for purpose of determining mental illness or drug dependence.

      Sec. 53-23. Abandonment of child under the age of six years. (a) Any person having the charge of any child under the age of six years who exposes such child in any place, with intent wholly to abandon such child, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars and imprisoned not more than five years.

      (b) The act of a parent or agent leaving an infant thirty days or younger with a designated employee pursuant to section 17a-58 shall not constitute a violation of this section.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8366; P.A. 00-207, S. 7.)

      History: P.A. 00-207 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a), making technical changes therein, and added new Subsec. (b) re exemption for parent or agent leaving an infant with a designated employee pursuant to Sec. 17a-58.

      See Secs. 53-304 to 53-308, inclusive, re nonsupport cases.

      Sec. 53-23a. Hazing. (a) For purposes of this section:

      (1) "Hazing" means any action which recklessly or intentionally endangers the health or safety of a person for the purpose of initiation, admission into or affiliation with, or as a condition for continued membership in a student organization. The term shall include, but not be limited to:

      (A) Requiring indecent exposure of the body;

      (B) Requiring any activity that would subject the person to extreme mental stress, such as sleep deprivation or extended isolation from social contact;

      (C) Confinement of the person to unreasonably small, unventilated, unsanitary or unlighted areas;

      (D) Any assault upon the person; or

      (E) Requiring the ingestion of any substance or any other physical activity which could adversely affect the health or safety of the individual. The term shall not include an action sponsored by an institution of higher education which requires any athletic practice, conditioning, or competition or curricular activity.

      (2) "Student organization" means a fraternity, sorority or any other organization organized or operating at an institution of higher education.

      (b) No student organization or member of a student organization shall engage in hazing any member or person pledged to be a member of the organization. The implied or express consent of the victim shall not be a defense in any action brought under this section.

      (c) A student organization which violates subsection (b) of this section (1) shall be subject to a fine of not more than one thousand five hundred dollars and (2) shall forfeit for a period of not less than one year all of the rights and privileges of being an organization organized or operating at an institution of higher education.

      (d) A member of a student organization who violates subsection (b) of this section shall be subject to a fine of not more than one thousand dollars.

      (e) This section shall not in any manner limit or exclude prosecution or punishment for any crime or any civil remedy.

      (P.A. 88-328, S. 1-5.)

      Secs. 53-24 to 53-33. Taking or enticing away a child. Unlawful exhibition or employment of child. Abduction of child by either parent. Kidnapping. Assault with intent to rob. Attempt to procure miscarriage or abortion. Abortion or miscarriage: Fine. Encouraging the commission of abortion. Abortion or miscarriage inducement: Class D felony. Severability. Use of drugs or instruments to prevent conception. Penalty for unlawful operation. Sections 53-24 to 53-33, inclusive, are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 4183, 8361, 8363-8365, 8367, 8371-8373, 8568; 1969, P.A. 828, S. 214; May, 1972, P.A. 1, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-614, S. 323, 610; P.A. 80-135; P.A. 90-113, S. 4.)

      Sec. 53-34. Transferred to Chapter 814c, Sec. 46a-58.

      Sec. 53-34a. Deprivation of rights of physically disabled and blind; class C misdemeanor. Section 53-34a is repealed.

      (P.A. 73-279, S. 2; P.A. 77-278, S. 2.)

      Sec. 53-34b. Deprivation of the right to breast-feed one's child. No person may restrict or limit the right of a mother to breast-feed her child.

      (P.A. 97-210, S. 2.)

      See Sec. 54-195 re general penalty provision.

      Sec. 53-35. Transferred to Chapter 814c, Sec. 46a-64.

      Sec. 53-35a. Transferred to Chapter 814c, Sec. 46a-59.

      Secs. 53-35b and 53-36. Posting of notices. Complaint to Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities; commission may issue complaint; damages. Sections 53-35b and 53-36 are repealed.

      (1949, 1955, S. 3268d; 1959, P.A. 111; February, 1965, P.A. 433, S. 2; 1967, P.A. 210, S. 2; 715, S. 5; 756, S. 1; P.A. 74-43, S. 1, 2; P.A. 75-462; P.A. 80-422, S. 50.)

      Sec. 53-36a. Transferred to Chapter 814c, Sec. 46a-91.

      Sec. 53-36b. Transferred to Chapter 814c, Sec. 46a-93.

      Sec. 53-36c. Counsel for commission. Section 53-36c is repealed.

      (February, 1965, P.A. 543, S. 4; 1967, P.A. 715, S. 6; P.A. 80-422, S. 50.)

      Sec. 53-36d. Transferred to Chapter 814c, Sec. 46a-94.

      Sec. 53-37. Ridicule on account of race, creed or color. Any person who, by his advertisement, ridicules or holds up to contempt any person or class of persons, on account of the creed, religion, color, denomination, nationality or race of such person or class of persons, shall be fined not more than fifty dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8376.)

      Sec. 53-37a. Deprivation of a person's civil rights by person wearing mask or hood: Class D felony. Any person who, with the intent to subject, or cause to be subjected, any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States, on account of religion, national origin, alienage, color, race, sex, sexual orientation, blindness or physical disability, violates the provisions of section 46a-58 while wearing a mask, hood or other device designed to conceal the identity of such person shall be guilty of a class D felony.

      (P.A. 82-14, S. 1, 2; P.A. 07-62, S. 2.)

      History: P.A. 07-62 included within offense the deprivation of rights on account of sexual orientation.

      Sec. 53-37b. Deprivation of a person's equal rights and privileges by force or threat. Any person who, acting alone or in conspiracy with another, for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws of this state or the United States, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws of this state or the United States, engages in the use of force or threat, as provided in section 53a-62, shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except that if bodily injury results such person shall be guilty of a class C felony or if death results such person shall be guilty of a class B felony.

      (P.A. 93-412, S. 1.)

      See Sec. 52-571a re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.

      Sec. 53-38. Fictitious notice of birth, marriage or death. Section 53-38 is repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8377; 1969, P.A. 828, S. 214.)

      Sec. 53-39. Malicious prosecution. Any person who falsely prosecutes another for any criminal charge, without probable cause and with malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble him, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8378.)

      A conviction in a lower court, although reversed on appeal, is conclusive evidence of probable cause unless the plaintiff can establish that his conviction was obtained by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means. 147 C. 704. Cited. 224 C. 29.

      Sec. 53-39a. Indemnification of state police, State Capitol police, certain special police and local police. Whenever, in any prosecution of an officer of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, or a member of the Office of State Capitol Police or any person appointed under section 29-18 as a special policeman for the State Capitol building and grounds, the Legislative Office Building and parking garage and related structures and facilities, and other areas under the supervision and control of the Joint Committee on Legislative Management, or a local police department for a crime allegedly committed by such officer in the course of his duty as such, the charge is dismissed or the officer found not guilty, such officer shall be indemnified by his employing governmental unit for economic loss sustained by him as a result of such prosecution, including the payment of attorney's fees and costs incurred during the prosecution and the enforcement of this section. Such officer may bring an action in the Superior Court against such employing governmental unit to enforce the provisions of this section.

      (P.A. 73-627; P.A. 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 80-33, S. 2, 3; P.A. 84-48, S. 16, 17; P.A. 89-82, S. 10, 11; P.A. 96-219, S. 9; P.A. 03-97, S. 2; P.A. 10-68, S. 1.)

      History: P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-33 applied provisions to members of the office of capitol security and persons appointed as special policemen for state capitol building and grounds; P.A. 84-48 included reference to special policemen for other areas under the supervision and control of the joint committee on legislative management; P.A. 89-82 expanded reference to state capitol building and grounds to include legislative office building and parking garage and related structures and facilities; P.A. 96-219 changed the name of the "Office of State Capitol Security" to the "Office of State Capitol Police"; P.A. 03-97 added provision re action in Superior Court against employing governmental unit to enforce provisions of section, effective June 3, 2003; P.A. 10-68 replaced provision re legal fees necessarily incurred with provision re attorney's fees and costs incurred during prosecution and enforcement of section.

      Indemnification for attorney's fees sustained "as a result of such prosecution" does not authorize recovery of such fees sustained as a result of separate action to enforce right to indemnification under this section. 186 C. 623. Court will not interpret section "to encompass indemnity for any and all criminal prosecutions of police officers for sexual assault". 206 C. 100. Cited. 229 C. 479. Cited. 234 C. 539. Court concluded that entry of a nolle plus the passage of thirteen months, which results in automatic erasure of relevant records under Sec. 54-142a, constitutes a dismissal for purposes of this section. 240 C. 590. Section waives state's sovereign immunity from suit. 258 C. 680. Although section waives immunity from liability, it does not waive immunity from suit. 263 C. 74.

      Cited. 25 CA 599. Cited. 40 CA 705; judgment reversed, see 240 C. 590. In applying three-part test set forth in Crotty v. Naugatuck to determine whether conduct will be found to have occurred "in the course of his duty", court found that since the charged crimes filed by state against plaintiff police officer alleged that he was an active participant in an illegal drug trafficking enterprise, such illegal activities cannot be said to be fulfilling duties of a police officer or something incidental to it and are incompatible with duties of a police officer, plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving that he was entitled to economic indemnification under statute and court properly rendered judgment in favor of the city. 94 CA 445.

      Sec. 53-40. Blackmail. Section 53-40 is repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8379; 1969, P.A. 828, S. 214.)

      Sec. 53-41. Tattooing of persons restricted. Section 53-41 is repealed, effective May 23, 1994.

      (1953, S. 3269d; 1963, P.A. 27; P.A. 94-105, S. 3, 4.)

      Sec. 53-41a. Surveillance devices in dressing rooms prohibited. No department or clothing store shall install or in any manner use a closed-circuit television system, a two-way mirror, a peephole or any other surveillance device, including any mechanical device in any dressing room available to the public. Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three months or both.

      (February, 1965, P.A. 214; P.A. 85-287.)

      History: P.A. 85-287 prohibited department or clothing stores from using or installing a two-way mirror, peephole or other surveillance device including any mechanical device, in any dressing room available to the public and provided for a fine or prison term for persons convicted of a violation of this section.

      Sec. 53-41b. Ear piercing. Section 53-41b is repealed, effective May 23, 1994.

      (1969, P.A. 360; 1971, P.A. 20, S. 1; P.A. 78-99, S. 2, 3; P.A. 94-105, S. 3, 4.)