CHAPTER 959*
COURT JURISDICTION AND POWER

PART I
ARREST AND ARRAIGNMENT

      Secs. 54-1 and 54-1a. Criminal jurisdiction of trial justices; of Court of Common Pleas. Sections 54-1 and 54-1a are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8721; 1955, S. 3319d; 1957, P.A. 522, S. 1; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 25, 204; 1961, P.A. 78; 352; 1963, P.A. 177; February, 1965, P.A. 331, S. 35; 1967, P.A. 152, S. 43; 549, S. 8; 630, S. 12; 1971, P.A. 72, S. 15; 870, S. 1; P.A., 74-183, S. 7, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 515, 681.)

      Sec. 54-1b. Arraignment of prisoner. Advice as to rights. Any accused, when he is arraigned before the Superior Court, shall be advised by a judge that he has a right to counsel, that he has a right to refuse to make any statement and that any statement he makes may be introduced in evidence against him. Each such person shall be allowed a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

      (1963, P.A. 126, S. 1; February, 1965, P.A. 185, S. 1; 436, S. 1; 1967, P.A. 549, S. 9; 656, S. 58; 1972, P.A. 69, S. 2; P.A. 74-183, S. 125, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 516, 681; P.A. 80-313, S. 27.)

      History: 1965 acts provided bond would cover appearance in court to which accused was bound over, allowed judge to release accused on his own recognizance and added provision setting forth exceptions to requirement re presentment of accused to first session of court; 1967 acts substituted criminal "term" for criminal "session" and, effective October 1, 1968, provided accused be advised of his rights at his arraignment rather than when he is put to plea, provided alternatives to bail and added concept of incapacity in provision re exceptions to requirement for presentment of accused at first session; 1972 act added Subdiv. (4) in exception to requirement that accused be presented at first session re persons accused of misdemeanor or offenses with lesser penalties as specified; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, reflecting reorganization of judicial system and deleted provision first added in 1965 and amended in 1967 and 1972 re exceptions to requirement for presentment at first session of court, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court and specified that accused persons who are not released on bond or on their written promise to appear are to be committed to commissioner of correction until next criminal term of court or until discharged, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 80-313 deleted provisions detailing conditions of release on bond or promise to appear.

      See Sec. 51-296 re designation of public defender for indigent defendant or codefendant.

      See Sec. 54-1j re court advice re possible immigration and naturalization ramifications of guilty or nolo contendere plea.

      See Sec. 54-94a re conditional plea of nolo contendere.

      Prior to this act held that neither failure to warn defendant of his constitutional rights nor his lack of counsel required conclusion that his confession was involuntary. 150 C. 169. Cited. 154 C. 314, 324. Presentation before circuit court session next held in circuit where offense is alleged to have been committed means the regular session of the circuit court next to be held, excluding any session on day of arrest. 155 C. 134. Right to counsel not denied where defendant made no request for same even though defendant's attorneys, during period from his arrest to his arraignment, made repeated unsuccessful efforts to communicate with him. Id., 155. Defendant was warned of his rights prior to his plea being offered but not prior to conversation with his daughter in police barracks wherein he admitted he was guilty of crimes charged. 157 C. 25. Cited. 164 C. 402. Admission into evidence of custodial statements not violation of this section. 167 C. 408. Cited. 187 C. 6. Cited. 195 C. 505. Cited. 198 C. 517. Cited. 201 C. 489. Cited. 236 C. 388.

      Cited. 34 CA 261. Cited. 43 CA 209.

      Cited. 39 CS 347.

      Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 573. Compliance by the state with the requirements of this section in no way adversely affected the defendant's right to claim that his rights were violated because the court refused to appoint counsel to represent him. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 624, 630. Motion to dismiss on ground constitutional right to counsel had been violated should be made prior to not guilty plea. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 166. Court could conclude from statements and conduct of defendant that he had effectively waived his rights. Id., 168. On-the-scene questioning of person in investigation of crime without prior warning not precluded since such person is not under restraint. Id., 195. Purpose and necessity of arraignment or presentment of accused are to fix his identity, inform him of his constitutional rights and charge against him and give him an opportunity to plead. Id., 466. Before arraignment there is no issue pending to which accused can plead and entry of nolle prosequi before arraignment is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies. Id. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 35, 40; Id., 243. Collective statement of their rights to group of accused may be sufficient compliance with section but not as to defendants with linguistic difficulties or below average intelligence. Id., 178. Defendant waived his right to counsel where he had, for six months, obtained postponements on this ground. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 58.

      Sec. 54-1c. Admissibility of confession. Any admission, confession or statement, written or oral, obtained from an accused person who has not been presented to the first session of the court, or on the day specified for arraignment under the provisions of section 54-1g, or who has not been informed of such person's rights as provided by section 54-1b or 54-64b, shall be inadmissible.

      (1963, P.A. 126, S. 3; February, 1965, P.A. 436, S. 2; P.A. 76-336, S. 2; P.A. 80-313, S. 28; P.A. 03-19, S. 127.)

      History: 1965 act added "or on the day specified in ... section 54-1b"; P.A. 76-336 substituted day "for arraignment under the provisions of section 54-63c" for day specified "in subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of section 54-1b"; P.A. 80-313 added reference to Sec. 54-64b and substituted reference to Sec. 54-1g for reference to Sec. 54-63c; P.A. 03-19 made technical changes, effective May 12, 2003.

      See note to Sec. 54-1b.

      Proof of voluntariness of confession prerequisite to its admissibility if made during illegal detention. 151 C. 246. See 371 U.S. 471. Cited. 154 C. 314, 321; 155 C. 124, 133. Confession inadmissible as defendant was not advised he could have a lawyer's services prior to interrogation and that he had right to stop answering questions at any time. 157 C. 384. Cited. 164 C. 402. Admission into evidence of custodial statements not violation of this section. 167 C. 408. Cited. 187 C. 6. Exclusionary effects of this statute do not apply to violations of Sec. 54-63c. 195 C. 505. Cited. 236 C. 388. Cited. 240 C. 205.

      Cited. 11 CA 238. Cited. 37 CA 252, 256; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 388. Cited. 43 CA 209. Cited. 44 CA 162.

      Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 573. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 346. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 35, 40.

      Sec. 54-1d. Place of arraignment. Multiple arrest warrants. Multiple credit card and automated teller machine offenses. Identity theft and related offenses. (a) For the purposes of this section, "geographical area" means the geographical area of the Superior Court established pursuant to section 51-348.

      (b) Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, defendants in criminal actions shall be presented for arraignment to:

      (1) The court in the geographical area in which the crime was alleged to have been committed;

      (2) If the arrest was by warrant, the court in the geographical area in which the crime was alleged to have been committed or in which the arrest was made; or

      (3) If the arrest was by a warrant issued pursuant to section 53a-32 or for failure to appear as provided in section 53a-172 or 53a-173, the court in the geographical area in which the crime was alleged to have been committed or in which the arrest was made, or the superior court having jurisdiction over the underlying criminal prosecution.

      (c) If the defendant was presented to the court in the geographical area in which the arrest was made for arraignment and was not released from custody after such arraignment, the defendant shall be presented to the court in the geographical area in which the crime was alleged to have been committed not later than the second court day following such arraignment. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, any defendant who has been presented to the court in accordance with this section and is the subject of one or more additional arrest warrants issued for crimes that were alleged to have been committed in one or more geographical areas, other than the geographical area in which the defendant is initially presented, shall subsequently be presented to the court in each geographical area in which such crimes were alleged to have been committed, in such order as the courts may determine, not later than the second court day following the prior arraignment. A criminal cause shall not fail on the ground that it has been submitted to a session of improper venue.

      (d) Any defendant who is charged with multiple offenses under any provision of section 53a-127b or sections 53a-128a to 53a-128i, inclusive, where such offenses were alleged to have been committed in more than one geographical area, may be presented to the court in any one of such geographical areas. The court may consolidate all such offenses into a single criminal action and shall have jurisdiction over such action.

      (e) Any defendant who is charged with a violation of section 53a-129a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2003, or section 53a-129b, 53a-129c or 53a-129d and any defendant who is charged with any other offense committed as a result of such violation may be presented to the court in the geographical area in which the person whose personal identifying information has been obtained and used by the defendant resides.

      (P.A. 74-183, S. 206, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 517, 681; P.A. 80-313, S. 29; P.A. 95-105; P.A. 98-45; P.A. 03-156, S. 8; P.A. 05-152, S. 7; P.A. 06-152, S. 14.)

      History: P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court and substituted reference to Sec. 51-348 for reference to Sec. 51-156a, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 80-313 deleted specific reference to superior court and rephrased protection for criminal causes submitted to session of improper venue; P.A. 95-105 authorized the defendant to be brought to the court in the geographical area in which the arrest was made for arraignment if the arrest was by warrant and added provision that if the defendant was brought to such court for arraignment and not released from custody, the defendant shall be presented to the court in the geographical area in which the crime was alleged to have been committed not later than the second court day following such arraignment; P.A. 98-45 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a), added exception language and added new Subsec. (b) re consolidation of credit card and automated teller machine fraud offenses; P.A. 03-156 amended Subsec. (a) to add exception re Subsec. (c) and added new Subsec. (c) re place of presentment of defendant charged with identity theft or any other offense committed as a result of such violation; P.A. 05-152 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provision re arraignment at superior court having jurisdiction over underlying criminal prosecution if defendant is arrested on warrant issued pursuant to Sec. 53a-32 or for failure to appear as provided in Sec. 53a-172 or 53a-173 and by making technical changes; P.A. 06-152 added new Subsec. (a) defining "geographical area", divided existing Subsec. (a) into new Subsecs. (b)(1), (2) and (3) and (c) and made technical and conforming changes therein, inserted "in which the crime was alleged to have been committed or" in said Subsec. (b)(2), inserted "the court in the geographical area in which the crime was alleged to have been committed or in which the arrest was made, or" in said Subsec. (b)(3), added provision re presentment of defendant who is the subject of additional arrest warrants in said Subsec. (c), redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (d) and made a conforming change therein, and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (e), effective June 6, 2006.

      Cited. 187 C. 264.

      Cited. 39 CS 347.

      Sec. 54-1e. Election of place of trial when venue is in the geographical area of Derby, Ansonia, Shelton, and Seymour. Section 54-1e is repealed.

      (P.A. 75-578, S. 5; P.A. 76-436, S. 582, 681.)

      Sec. 54-1f. (Formerly Sec. 6-49). Arrest without warrant. Pursuit outside precincts. (a) For purposes of this section, the respective precinct or jurisdiction of a state marshal or judicial marshal shall be wherever such marshal is required to perform duties. Peace officers, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-3, in their respective precincts, shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person for any offense in their jurisdiction, when the person is taken or apprehended in the act or on the speedy information of others, provided that no constable elected pursuant to the provisions of section 9-200 shall be considered a peace officer for the purposes of this subsection, unless the town in which such constable holds office provides, by ordinance, that constables shall be considered peace officers for the purposes of this subsection.

      (b) Members of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety or of any local police department or any chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony.

      (c) Members of any local police department or the Office of State Capitol Police and constables and state marshals who are certified under the provisions of sections 7-294a to 7-294e, inclusive, and who perform criminal law enforcement duties, when in immediate pursuit of one who may be arrested under the provisions of this section, are authorized to pursue the offender outside of their respective precincts into any part of the state in order to effect the arrest. Such person may then be returned in the custody of such officer to the precinct in which the offense was committed.

      (d) Any person arrested pursuant to this section shall be presented with reasonable promptness before proper authority.

      (1949 Rev., S. 465; 1953, S. 195d; 1961, P.A. 239; 1971, P.A. 754; P.A. 75-567, S. 69, 80; P.A. 76-111, S. 3; P.A. 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 80-313, S. 1; 80-394, S. 7, 13; P.A. 81-472, S. 93, 159; P.A. 83-518, S. 2; P.A. 84-302, S. 2; P.A. 89-129, S. 1, 2; P.A. 96-219, S. 10; P.A. 00-99, S. 6, 154; P.A. 01-195, S. 70, 181.)

      History: 1961 act added provision authorizing members of local police departments to pursue suspects beyond their precincts and return suspects, when caught to precinct where offense was committed; 1971 act deleted the word "organized" as qualifier of references to local police departments; P.A. 75-567 substituted detectives in the division of criminal justice for county detectives; P.A. 76-111 replaced detectives with chief inspectors and inspectors of criminal justice division; P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January 1, 1979; Sec. 6-49 transferred to Sec. 54-1f in 1979; P.A. 80-313 divided section into Subsecs. and substituted references to peace officers for detailed listing of persons to which provisions apply, i.e. sheriffs, inspectors, constables, etc.; P.A. 80-394 specified applicability to sheriffs, deputy sheriffs and special deputy sheriffs, adding provision re precinct or jurisdiction of deputies and special deputies; P.A. 81-472 amended Subsec. (a) to delete reference to special deputy sheriffs since such sheriffs are included in definition of peace officers; P.A. 83-518 amended Subsec. (a) providing that constables shall not be considered peace officers for purposes of Subsec. (a) unless town ordinance so provides; P.A. 84-302 permitted certified constables who perform criminal law enforcement duties to pursue offenders outside of their precincts; P.A. 89-129 amended provision in Subsec. (c) authorizing pursuit outside of precinct to include members of the office of state capitol security; P.A. 96-219 amended Subsec. (c) by changing the name of the "Office of State Capitol Security" to the "Office of State Capitol Police"; P.A. 00-99 amended Subsec. (a) by changing reference to deputy or special deputy sheriff to state marshal or judicial marshal and amended Subsec. (c) by deleting reference to sheriffs, deputy sheriffs and special deputy sheriffs and adding reference to state marshals, effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-195 made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality in Subsec. (a), effective July 11, 2001.

      See Sec. 6-43 re special deputies.

      Annotations to former section 6-49:

      Facts held insufficient to authorize arrest without warrant. 37 C. 32. Arrest being lawful, officer is presumed to have performed all subsequent duties. 51 C. 432-434. Extends common law rule. 84 C. 167. Owner of goods stolen or any other person may retake them and tender thief to justice. 97 C. 137. Thief resisting capture is guilty of breach of the peace and may be arrested by anyone. Id., 138. Right of police to arrest for offenses in their presence and to seize implements used in lawbreaking. Id., 545. When officer must act on his own knowledge. Id., 701. Facts held sufficient to authorize arrest without warrant. 101 C. 229. Any arrest without a warrant, except as authorized by this statute, is illegal. 115 C. 282. Police officers while off duty or out of uniform are included within the coverage of this section. 120 C. 101. Speedy information which justifies arrest is information that person arrested was guilty of crime or at least implicated in it. 131 C. 224. Officer may act on speedy information if he has reasonable ground to accept it as accurate. Id., 231. Fact defendant not taken before proper magistrate not sufficient to exclude confession. 137 C. 183. Cited. 147 C. 194. Intention of officer in pursuing person admissible as a fact to be weighed with other circumstances. 148 C. 27. An accused is lawfully taken or apprehended in the act if circumstances observed by officer preceding the arrest, viewed in light of common knowledge and his own training and experience, gave him probable cause to believe that a crime was being, or had just been, committed. Evidence seized cannot be used to sustain validity of arrest. 149 C. 567. Illegal arrest and detention does not automatically render inadmissible confessions made after the arrest or during the period of detention. 150 C. 169. Officer entitled to exert force where grounds for "reasonable belief" are present. 151 C. 402. Person need not submit to unlawful arrest. 152 C. 296. In determining the validity of an arrest made without a warrant, "reasonable grounds" is to be equated with probable cause. 153 C. 41. Probable cause exists when the arresting officer has reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to believe a felony had been committed by the accused. Id., 42. Arrest made on strength of officer's own observation would be legal only if the circumstances he observed, when taken in connection with those before observed by him when weighed in the light of common knowledge, gave him probable reason or ground to believe that such a crime was being, or was about to be, committed. Id., 69, 70. Accused is lawfully taken or apprehended in the act if the circumstances observed by the arresting officer, viewed in light of common knowledge and his own training and experience, gave him probable cause to believe a crime was being, or had just been, committed. Amount of evidence necessary to furnish probable cause for an arrest without a warrant is to be measured by facts of particular case and need not be evidence sufficient to convict. Id., 152. A reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest is not unlawful even though made without a warrant. A lawful entry is necessarily an essential element of a reasonable search of a dwelling. Id. A police officer may make a reasonable search before or after an arrest without a warrant if the circumstances justified the arrest and the search was incidental to the arrest. Id., 154. Where larceny which constituted a misdemeanor was committed in New London and defendants were apprehended in Hartford by Hartford police, held that, since larceny is a continuing crime, the defendants, if transportation of the merchandise was with a continuous felonious intent, were committing larceny in Hartford and defendants' claim that arrest or search without a warrant was illegal must fail. Id., 217, 218. Member of an organized local police department is authorized to arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person who officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony and may conduct a search incident thereto without a warrant. 155 C. 385. A legal arrest may be made without a warrant when defendant was apprehended just after his sale of drugs to an informer under police surveillance of the transaction and his person could be searched incidentally to such arrest. Id., 516. Police lieutenant's arrest of defendant on speedy information was clearly justifiable when defendant was sitting armed in his car at night with narcotics on his person. 157 C. 114. Arrest for misdemeanor of breach of the peace on speedy information of others by police was proper. Search of car in which defendant was sitting made without warrant was lawful. Id., 222. Arrest of defendant for assault committed in officer's presence was lawful and search of trunk of defendant's car was lawful incident to the arrest. Id., 351. Officer's arresting defendant for disorderly conduct was proper and search incidental thereto of person was legal. Id., 485. Arrest of defendant operating stolen car could be made without warrant on grounds that he was apprehended in act and upon speedy information where arresting officer had been informed by police barracks car was a stolen car. 159 C. 201. Arrest permitted without warrant when person is "taken or apprehended in the act" if preceding arrest, circumstances in light of officers training and experience gave him probable cause for such arrest. 160 C. 140. An informant's tip as to description and location of criminal suspect and his truck having proved true was justifiable basis for arrest under statute. 161 C. 117. Cited. 163 C. 186. Felony provision cited. 171 C. 105. Cited. 174 C. 153; Id., 452. Cited. 178 C. 427. Cited. 183 C. 386. Cited. 220 C. 307.

      Cited. 22 CS 6. An arrest by a police officer without a warrant is ground for an action for false imprisonment unless the arrest is authorized by this section. Id., 311. Cited. 24 CS 32. Where offenses committed by defendant and with which he is charged occurred within the hour prior to his arrest, officer acted speedily on information he had obtained. 25 CS 108. If search is incident to arrest, no warrant is needed. Id., 216. Discussion of facts which constitute acting on speedy information or on reasonable belief that a felony has been committed or is being committed. 26 CS 297. No need for issuance of warrant for seizure of articles which are taken incidental to lawful arrest. Id. Cited. 28 CS 313. "Speedy information" requirement was in derogation of common law re felonies; additional clause re felonies, added in 1945, is declaratory of common law. 34 CS 531. Modern trend prohibits warrantless entry to home to make an arrest unless there are exigent circumstances. Id., 539.

      Arrest made hour after officer saw crime committed satisfied requirement of acting on "speedy information". 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 247. Cited. Id., 467. Arrest without a warrant not unlawful merely because pursuit of defendant by Orange police officer was interrupted when defendant temporarily succeeded in eluding officer. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 42. Arrest made without warrant on "speedy information" of informer who purchased liquor sold by defendant illegally, made within half hour after sale, held lawful. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 125. Cited. Id., 533. Officers would have been justified in arresting defendants for bookmaking when telephone calls and other evidence of their illegal activity occurred in presence of officers who had entered house with search warrant, even if warrant had been illegal. Id., 603. Acting on speedy information defendant was committing crime of lascivious carriage, police officers rightfully entered her apartment building and observed her conduct from fire escape of apartment. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 35. Police officers investigating a crime on speedy information who enter a building are licensees. Id. Statute provides a less strict standard for arrests without a warrant for felonies provided they are made by members of an organized local police department. Id., 44, 50. Defendant's arrest by police officer who observed him in telephone booth, taking house bets on slips of paper officer could read, was properly made without warrant and reasonable search could be made on such arrest. Id., 51. Member of Derby police department was justified in arrest of defendant without warrant where New Haven police requested his arrest as one involved in felonious larceny in their jurisdiction. Id., 529. Defendant in resisting an unlawful arrest was not guilty of breach of the peace. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 42. Arrest by Trumbull officer of defendant as he drew up to his home in Bridgeport two hours after he had violated hit and run statute in Trumbull was valid as an arrest in immediate pursuit outside Trumbull precinct. Id., 55. Facts held sufficient to authorize arrest without warrant. Id., 228, 235, 236. Cited. Id., 613. Taken or apprehended defined. Id., 618.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 179 C. 46. Cited. 180 C. 481. Cited. 181 C. 172. As a matter of constitutional law where entry of dwelling is for purpose of conducting search under a valid search warrant, resident may be arrested under statute where police have probable cause to believe he committed a felony; arrest does not constitute violation of fourth amendment to U.S. Constitution. Id., 187. Cited. 188 C. 432, 442. Cited. 200 C. 82. Cited. 215 C. 667. Cited. 216 C. 172. Cited. 225 C. 921. Cited. 227 C. 363. Violation of Sec. 14-227a is an "offense" within meaning of this section. 228 C 758. Cited. 229 C. 125. Cited. 240 C. 489.

      Cited. 15 CA 416. Cited. 20 CA 183. Cited. 23 CA 123; Id., 487. Cited. 27 CA 370; Id., 741. Cited. 29 CA 207. Cited. 30 CA 108. Cited. 31 CA 669. Cited. 33 CA 590. Cited. 34 CA 189; Id., 201. Cited. 46 CA 633. Where prior felony conviction formed basis of a charge under this section, violation of section could not be established without presenting proof of such conviction. 64 CA 384. Does not prohibit "Terry" stops by extraterritorial police officers; rather, it prohibits full custodial arrests by extraterritorial police officers. 70 CA 297.

      Cited. 38 CS 313.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 191 C. 433. Cited. 210 C. 333. Cited. 224 C. 494. Cited. 227 C. 534. Cited. 228 C. 758.

      Cited. 6 CA 124. Cited. 11 CA 11. Cited. 21 CA 326. Cited. 26 CA 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494; Id., 805. Cited. 28 CA 708. Cited. 41 CA 779.

      "Speedy information of others" does not preclude reliance on supplementary observations made by the officer. 37 CS 755. Officer's entry into apartment was lawful and in full compliance with the statute. Arrest was made on the speedy information of others. Properly conducted search incidental to lawful arrest is not illegal even though made without a warrant. 38 CS 313. Cited. Id., 364. Cited. 39 CS 347. Cited. 40 CS 512.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 183 C. 386. Cited. 189 C. 429. Cited. 195 C. 505. Cited. 220 C. 307. Cited. 236 C. 216. Cited. 248 C. 183.

      Cited. 6 CA 124. Cited. 11 CA 11. Cited. 13 CA 69; Id., 214. Cited. 14 CA 388. Cited. 15 CA 569. Cited. 18 CA 184. Cited. 20 CA 168; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 667; Id., 521. Cited. 26 CA 481; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494. Cited. 27 CA 128. Cited. 31 CA 548. Cited. 39 CA 579. Where probable cause for warrantless arrest was established using Aguilar-Spinelli factors, trial court improperly introduced second level of review under "totality of the circumstances" analysis. 47 CA 424. Phrase "reasonable grounds to believe" is synonymous with probable cause. 59 CA 272. Warrantless arrest based on probable cause was authorized under subsection. 74 CA 802. "Reasonable grounds" as used in the statute is synonymous with probable cause. 78 CA 659.

      Subsec. (c):

      Appellate Court, in affirming defendant's conviction for operating motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, rejected defendant's argument that there can only be "immediate pursuit" for purposes of subsec. when there are findings that arresting officer personally observed illegal conduct and then followed suspect across jurisdictional boundaries. 88 CA 110.

      Cited. 37 CS 755.

      Sec. 54-1g*. Time of arraignment. Violations of protective orders. (a) Any arrested person who is not released sooner or who is charged with a family violence crime as defined in section 46b-38a or a violation of section 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e shall be promptly presented before the superior court sitting next regularly for the geographical area where the offense is alleged to have been committed. If an arrested person is hospitalized, or has escaped or is otherwise incapacitated, the person shall be presented, if practicable, to the first regular sitting after return to police custody.

      (b) Any arrested person who is charged with a violation of section 53a-223 shall be promptly presented to the superior court next sitting for the geographical area where the offense is alleged to have been committed. If the alleged offense was committed in a geographical area of the Superior Court other than the geographical area where the protective order was issued, the prosecutorial official for the geographical area of the Superior Court where the alleged offense was committed shall notify the prosecutorial official for the geographical area where the protective order was issued of the alleged violation of such protective order. On motion of any party or the court, the prosecution of such offense may be transferred to the superior court for the geographical area where the protective order was issued.

      (P.A. 80-313, S. 26; P.A. 86-337, S. 10; P.A. 91-381, S. 5, 7; P.A. 93-75; P.A. 95-214, S. 2.)

      *Note: This section was formerly Sec. 54-63c(e). See Sec. 54-63c History re P.A. 80-313.

      History: P.A. 86-337 applied provisions to persons charged with a family violence crime as defined in Sec. 46b-38a; P.A. 91-381 added new Subsec. (b) re prompt presentment of arrested person charged with violation of Sec. 53a-110b to superior court where protective order was issued; P.A. 93-75 amended Subsec. (b) by adding procedure for determining geographic area of the superior court where person arrested for violation of protective order shall be prosecuted; P.A. 95-214 amended Subsec. (a) to include persons charged with "a violation of section 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e".

      Cited. 236 C. 388. Cited. 243 C. 205.

      Cited. 11 CA 238. Cited. 43 CA 209. Cited. 44 CA 162.

      Sec. 54-1h. (Formerly Sec. 6-49a). Arrest by complaint and summons for commission of misdemeanor. Any person who has been arrested with or without a warrant for commission of a misdemeanor, or for an offense the penalty for which is imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or both, may, in the discretion of the arresting officer, be issued a written complaint and summons and be released on his written promise to appear on a date and time specified. If any person so arrested and summoned fails to appear for trial at the place and time so specified, or on any court date thereafter, a warrant for his rearrest or a capias shall be issued and he shall also be subject to the provisions of section 53a-173.

      (1972, P.A. 69, S. 1; P.A. 84-123, S. 1.)

      History: Sec. 6-49a transferred to Sec. 54-1h in 1981; P.A. 84-123 added "or on any court date thereafter" and authorized issuance of a capias for person who fails to appear.

      Sec. 54-1i. (Formerly Sec. 54-40a). Duty of law enforcement officer before charging with a crime a person found in unconscious condition. (a) All law enforcement officers in this state shall make a diligent effort to determine if any person they find in a semiconscious or unconscious condition is wearing an identification bracelet or metal tag, or is carrying an identification card, bearing such person's name and any of the following information: A statement of an illness, such as epilepsy, diabetes or a cardiac condition, which might cause semiconsciousness or unconsciousness, a physician's name or identification of a medication, before such person may be charged with a crime. If any law enforcement officer shall determine that such a person is actually suffering from an affliction which would cause semiconsciousness or unconsciousness, he shall notify such person's physician immediately or have such person immediately transported to a physician or to some facility where the services of a physician are available.

      (b) Any person who wilfully and knowingly falsifies such identification or deliberately misrepresents such an illness shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

      (P.A. 73-202, S. 1, 2.)

      History: Sec. 54-40a transferred to Sec. 54-1i in 1981.

      Sec. 54-1j. Ascertainment that defendant understands possible immigration and naturalization consequences of guilty or nolo contendere plea. (a) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from any defendant in any criminal proceeding unless the court first addresses the defendant personally and determines that the defendant fully understands that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States, conviction of the offense for which the defendant has been charged may have the consequences of deportation or removal from the United States, exclusion from readmission to the United States or denial of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United States. If the defendant has not discussed these possible consequences with the defendant's attorney, the court shall permit the defendant to do so prior to accepting the defendant's plea.

      (b) The defendant shall not be required at the time of the plea to disclose the defendant's legal status in the United States to the court.

      (c) If the court fails to address the defendant personally and determine that the defendant fully understands the possible consequences of the defendant's plea, as required in subsection (a) of this section, and the defendant not later than three years after the acceptance of the plea shows that the defendant's plea and conviction may have one of the enumerated consequences, the court, on the defendant's motion, shall vacate the judgment, and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and enter a plea of not guilty.

      (P.A. 82-177; P.A. 97-256, S. 6; P.A. 03-81, S. 1.)

      History: P.A. 97-256 amended Subsec. (c) by imposing a three-year time period after the acceptance of the plea for the defendant to show that his plea and conviction may have one of the enumerated consequences, and deleting provision that, in the absence of a record that the court provided the required advice, the defendant is presumed not to have received such advice; P.A. 03-81 amended Subsec. (a) to replace former provision prohibiting the court accepting plea unless the court "advises" the defendant of the possible immigration or naturalization consequences of conviction if the defendant is not a citizen and setting forth specific language of such advisement with provision that prohibits the court accepting plea unless the court first addresses the defendant personally and determines that the defendant fully understands such possible consequences, add "removal" from the United States as a possible consequence and add provision requiring the court to permit the defendant to discuss these possible consequences with the defendant's attorney prior to accepting plea, amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality and amended Subsec. (c) to make provisions applicable if court fails "to address the defendant personally and determine that the defendant fully understands the possible consequences of the defendant's plea, as required in subsection (a) of this section" rather than if court fails "to advise a defendant, as required in subsection (a) of this section" and make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality.

      Court found that the time limit for filing motion was procedural in nature and therefore could be applied retroactively. 251 C. 617. Warning of deportation and denial was substantial compliance with provisions of statute since defendant was warned guilty plea implicates immigration status. 257 C. 653.

      Court need only inform defendant of potential deportation consequences rather than engaging defendant in a manner to ensure full understanding. 62 CA 805. Section is in place only to call defendant's attention to potential immigration consequences under federal law, not to inform defendant of every possible consequence of a plea. 68 CA 499.

      Sec. 54-1k. Issuance of protective orders in stalking and harassment cases. Upon the arrest of a person for a violation of section 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e, the court may issue a protective order pursuant to this section. Upon the arrest of a person for a violation of section 53a-182b or 53a-183, the court may issue a protective order pursuant to this section if it finds that such violation caused the victim to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety. Such order shall be an order of the court, and the clerk of the court shall cause a certified copy of such order to be sent to the victim, and a copy of such order, or the information contained in such order, to be sent by facsimile or other means within forty-eight hours of its issuance to the appropriate law enforcement agency. A protective order issued under this section may include provisions necessary to protect the victim from threats, harassment, injury or intimidation by the defendant, including but not limited to, an order enjoining the defendant from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the victim, (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting or sexually assaulting the victim, or (3) entering the dwelling of the victim. Such order shall be made a condition of the bail or release of the defendant and shall contain the following language: "In accordance with section 53a-223 of the Connecticut general statutes, any violation of this order constitutes criminal violation of a protective order which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both. Additionally, in accordance with section 53a-107 of the Connecticut general statutes, entering or remaining in a building or any other premises in violation of this order constitutes criminal trespass in the first degree which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than one year, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars, or both. Violation of this order also violates a condition of your bail or release and may result in raising the amount of bail or revoking release." The information contained in and concerning the issuance of any protective order issued under this section shall be entered in the registry of protective orders pursuant to section 51-5c.

      (P.A. 95-214, S. 3; P.A. 02-132, S. 56; P.A. 05-147, S. 1; 05-288, S. 183.)

      History: P.A. 02-132 replaced provisions re sending certified copy of order to law enforcement agency with provisions re sending copy of or information contained in order to law enforcement agency by facsimile or other means, replaced provisions re entry of protective orders in registry established under Sec. 46b-38c(e) with provisions re entry of information into registry of protective orders pursuant to Sec. 51-5c and made technical changes, effective January 1, 2003; P.A. 05-147 authorized the issuance of a protective order upon the arrest of a person for a violation of Sec. 53a-182b or 53a-183 if the violation caused the victim to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety and revised the language of the order to make technical changes and specify that a violation of Sec. 53a-223 is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both, reflecting the increase in the penalty for said violation made by P.A. 02-127; P.A. 05-288 made technical changes and revised required language in order re penalty for criminal violation of a protective order, effective July 13, 2005.

      Sec. 54-1l. Short title: Alvin W. Penn Racial Profiling Prohibition Act. (a) This section and section 54-1m shall be known as the "Alvin W. Penn Racial Profiling Prohibition Act".

      (b) For the purposes of this section, "racial profiling" means the detention, interdiction or other disparate treatment of an individual solely on the basis of the racial or ethnic status of such individual.

      (c) No member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, a municipal police department or any other law enforcement agency shall engage in racial profiling. The detention of an individual based on any noncriminal factor or combination of noncriminal factors is inconsistent with this policy.

      (d) The race or ethnicity of an individual shall not be the sole factor in determining the existence of probable cause to place in custody or arrest an individual or in constituting a reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense has been or is being committed so as to justify the detention of an individual or the investigatory stop of a motor vehicle.

      (P.A. 99-198, S. 1; P.A. 03-160, S. 2.)

      History: P.A. 03-160 inserted new Subsec. (a) providing that section and Sec. 54-1m shall be known as the "Alvin W. Penn Racial Profiling Prohibition Act" and redesignated existing Subsecs. (a) to (c) as new Subsecs. (b) to (d), effective June 26, 2003.

      Sec. 54-1m. Adoption of policy prohibiting certain police actions. Data collection and reporting. (a) Not later than January 1, 2000, each municipal police department and the Department of Public Safety shall adopt a written policy that prohibits the stopping, detention or search of any person when such action is solely motivated by considerations of race, color, ethnicity, age, gender or sexual orientation, and the action would constitute a violation of the civil rights of the person.

      (b) Commencing on January 1, 2000, each municipal police department and the Department of Public Safety shall, using the form developed and promulgated pursuant to subsection (h) of this section, record and retain the following information: (1) The number of persons stopped for traffic violations; (2) characteristics of race, color, ethnicity, gender and age of such persons, provided the identification of such characteristics shall be based on the observation and perception of the police officer responsible for reporting the stop and the information shall not be required to be provided by the person stopped; (3) the nature of the alleged traffic violation that resulted in the stop; (4) whether a warning or citation was issued, an arrest made or a search conducted as a result of the stop; and (5) any additional information that such municipal police department or the Department of Public Safety, as the case may be, deems appropriate, provided such information does not include any other identifying information about any person stopped for a traffic violation such as the person's operator's license number, name or address.

      (c) Each municipal police department and the Department of Public Safety shall provide to the Chief State's Attorney and the African-American Affairs Commission (1) a copy of each complaint received pursuant to this section, and (2) written notification of the review and disposition of such complaint. No such complaint shall contain any other identifying information about the complainant such as his or her operator's license number, name or address.

      (d) Any police officer who in good faith records traffic stop information pursuant to the requirements of this section shall not be held civilly liable for the act of recording such information unless the officer's conduct was unreasonable or reckless.

      (e) If a municipal police department or the Department of Public Safety fails to comply with the provisions of this section, the Chief State's Attorney may recommend and the Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management may order an appropriate penalty in the form of the withholding of state funds from such department or the Department of Public Safety.

      (f) On or before October 1, 2000, and annually thereafter, each municipal police department and the Department of Public Safety shall provide to the Chief State's Attorney and the African-American Affairs Commission, in such form as the Chief State's Attorney shall prescribe, a summary report of the information recorded pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

      (g) The African-American Affairs Commission shall review the prevalence and disposition of traffic stops and complaints reported pursuant to this section. Not later than January 1, 2004, and annually thereafter, the African-American Affairs Commission shall report to the Governor, the General Assembly and to any other entity said commission deems appropriate the results of such review, including any recommendations.

      (h) Not later than January 1, 2000, the Chief State's Attorney, in conjunction with the Commissioner of Public Safety, the Attorney General, the Chief Court Administrator, the Police Officer Standards and Training Council, the Connecticut Police Chiefs Association and the Connecticut Coalition of Police and Correctional Officers, shall develop and promulgate: (1) A form, in both printed and electronic format, to be used by police officers when making a traffic stop to record the race, color, ethnicity, gender and age of the operator of the motor vehicle that is stopped, the location of the stop, the reason for the stop and other information that is required to be recorded pursuant to subsection (b) of this section; and (2) a form, in both printed and electronic format, to be used to report complaints pursuant to this section by persons who believe they have been subjected to a motor vehicle stop by a police officer solely on the basis of their race, color, ethnicity, age, gender or sexual orientation.

      (P.A. 99-198, S. 2, 3; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-9, S. 128, 131; P.A. 03-160, S. 1; P.A. 04-27, S. 6; 04-257, S. 83.)

      History: (Revisor's note: A reference in Subsec. (f) to "the information recorded pursuant to subsection (d) ... " was changed editorially by the Revisors to "the information recorded pursuant to subsection (b) ... " for accuracy); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-9 amended Subsec. (h) to extend the effectiveness of Subsecs. (f) and (g) from January 1, 2002, to January 1, 2003, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 03-160 amended Subsec. (b)(5) to provide that additional information does not include any other identifying information about any person stopped for a traffic violation such as his or her operator's license number, name or address, amended Subsec. (c) to require copy of the complaint and written notification of the review and disposition of such complaint to be provided to the African-American Affairs Commission and to provide that no such complaint shall contain any other identifying information about the complainant such as his or her operator's license number, name or address, amended Subsec. (f) to require that summary report be provided to the African-American Affairs Commission, amended Subsec. (g) to require the African-American Affairs Commission to review the prevalence and disposition of traffic stops and complaints and, not later than January 1, 2004, and annually thereafter, to report the results of such review to the Governor, the General Assembly and any other entity said commission deems appropriate and to delete references to the Chief State's Attorney, deleted former Subsec. (h) re limited period of effectiveness of Subsecs. (f) and (g), redesignated existing Subsec. (i) as Subsec. (h) and amended said Subsec. by substituting reference in Subdiv. (1) to personal identifying information with reference to race, color, ethnicity, gender and age, effective June 26, 2003; P.A. 04-27 made technical changes, effective April 28, 2004; P.A. 04-257 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective June 14, 2004.

      Sec. 54-1n. Complaint by victim of identity theft. Law enforcement agency's responsibilities. Any person who believes that such person's personal identifying information has been obtained and used by another person in violation of section 53a-129a of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2003, or section 53a-129b, 53a-129c or 53a-129d may file a complaint reporting such alleged violation with the law enforcement agency for the town in which such person resides. Such law enforcement agency shall accept such complaint, prepare a police report on the matter, provide the complainant with a copy of such report and investigate such alleged violation and any other offenses allegedly committed as a result of such violation and shall, if necessary, coordinate such investigation with any other law enforcement agencies.

      (P.A. 03-156, S. 7.)

      Secs. 54-1o and 54-1p. Reserved for future use.

      Sec. 54-1q. Court to advise defendant that guilty or nolo contendere plea may have consequence of suspension of driver's license. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a person in a proceeding with respect to a violation of section 14-110, subsection (b) or (c) of section 14-147, section 14-215, subsection (a) of section 14-222, subsection (a) or (b) of section 14-224 or section 53a-119b unless the court advises such person that conviction of the offense for which such person has been charged may have the consequence of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles suspending such person's motor vehicle operator's license.

      (P.A. 03-233, S. 3.)

      Sec. 54-2. Conviction and binding over by trial justice. Section 54-2 is repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8725; 1957, P.A. 522, S. 2; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 204.)

      Sec. 54-2a. Issuance of bench warrants of arrest, subpoenas, capias and other criminal process. Release conditions. Service of court process. Entry of warrants into computer system. (a) In all criminal cases the Superior Court, or any judge thereof, or any judge trial referee specifically designated by the Chief Justice to exercise the authority conferred by this section may issue (1) bench warrants of arrest upon application by a prosecutorial official if the court or judge determines that the affidavit accompanying the application shows that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person complained against committed it, (2) subpoenas for witnesses, (3) capias for witnesses and for defendants who violate an order of the court regarding any court appearance, and (4) all other criminal process; and may administer justice in all criminal matters.

      (b) The court, judge or judge trial referee issuing a bench warrant for the arrest of the person or persons complained against shall, in cases punishable by death or life imprisonment, set the conditions of release or indicate that the person or persons named in the warrant shall not be entitled to bail and may, in all other cases, set the conditions of release. The conditions of release, if included in the warrant, shall fix the first of the following conditions which the court, judge or judge trial referee finds necessary to assure such person's appearance in court: (1) Written promise to appear; (2) execution of a bond without surety in no greater amount than necessary; or (3) execution of a bond with surety in no greater amount than necessary.

      (c) In lieu of a warrant for the rearrest of any defendant who fails to appear for trial at the place and time specified or on any court date thereafter the court, judge or judge trial referee may issue a capias.

      (d) All process issued by said court or any judge thereof, or any judge trial referee shall be served by any proper officer, or an indifferent person when specially directed to do so, and shall be obeyed by any and all persons and officers to whom the same is directed or whom it may concern.

      (e) Whenever a warrant is issued under this section or section 53a-32, the court, judge or judge trial referee may cause such warrant to be entered into a central computer system. Existence of the warrant in the computer system shall constitute prima facie evidence of the issuance of the warrant. Any person named in the warrant may be arrested based on the existence of the warrant in the computer system and shall, upon any such arrest, be given a copy of the warrant.

      (1959, P.A. 28, S. 27; February, 1965, P.A. 194, S. 1; 1967, P.A. 10, S. 1; 152, S. 44; 549, S. 10; P.A. 74-183, S. 126, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 518, 681; P.A. 77-576, S. 38, 65; P.A. 79-216, S. 1; P.A. 80-313, S. 2; P.A. 84-123, S. 2; P.A. 00-209, S. 4; P.A. 01-72, S. 1; P.A. 04-127, S. 8.)

      History: 1965 act added authority of judge to issue subpoenas and warrants; 1967 acts deleted language in last sentence qualifying power of judge as being "when the circuit court is not in session" and, effective October 1, 1968, added provisions for alternatives to bail; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court and deleted references to powers of other unspecified courts and judges, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-576 added detailed provisions re procedure for issuance of bench warrants and clarified provisions with respect to crimes which are not bailable, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 79-216 made minor wording changes; P.A. 80-313 divided section into Subsecs., restated power to issue bench warrants in Subsec. (a) and deleted detailed provisions re procedure re issuance of bench warrants and arrests made on bench warrant; P.A. 84-123 amended Subsec. (a) by authorizing the issuance of capias for defendants who violate a court order regarding any court appearance, added a new Subsec. (c) re the issuance of a capias in lieu of a rearrest warrant, and redesignated former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 00-209 made technical changes and added new Subsec. (e) authorizing the entry of a rearrest warrant into a central computer system, providing that the existence of the warrant in the computer system is prima facie evidence of its issuance and authorizing the arrest of a person based on the existence of the warrant in the computer system; P.A. 01-72 amended Subsec. (a) by adding "or any judge trial referee specifically designated by the Chief Justice to exercise the authority conferred by this section" and amended Subsecs. (b) to (e) by adding references to judge trial referee; P.A. 04-127 amended Subsec. (e) by deleting reference to "rearrest" warrant and adding reference to Sec. 53a-32.

      See Sec. 52-56(d) re execution or service of capias in any precinct by state marshal of any precinct.

      See Sec. 54-64b re release following arrest on court warrant.

      Annotations to former statute: At common law justice might take recognizance for appearance at adjourned sitting. 4 D. 98; 14 C. 209. In action on recognizance to town, claim against town cannot be set off. 45 C. 354. A bond to appear on adjournment and abide the order of court is not forfeited when principal appears but refuses to give bond on appeal. 51 C. 499. Taking recognizance after adjournment. 77 C. 38. When bond on adjournment should run to state. 85 C. 324. Cited. 110 C. 173. Cited. 224 C. 29. Cited. 229 C. 125.

      Service on defendant by exhibiting warrant so he could read it was sufficient compliance with this section. 28 CS 19.

      Failure to produce witness who is within reach and who would naturally have been produced permits, but does not require, inference that evidence of witness would have been unfavorable. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 298. Issuance of warrant upon application of police officer, whose information concerning defendant's criminal act was based upon New Haven police reports, was issuance upon probable cause. "Probable cause" is a practical concept and may be based upon hearsay. Id., 529. Cited. Id., 685.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 181 C. 562. Cited. 187 C. 292. Cited. 202 C. 443. Cited. 233 C. 403.

      Cited. 38 CS 377.

      Subsec. (a):

      Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C. 612; 205 C. 298.

      Subdiv. (1) cited. 27 CA 307.

      Sec. 54-2b. Transferred to Chapter 960, Sec. 54-56a.

      Sec. 54-2c. Traffic violator need not appear in court, when. Schedule of fines established. Section 54-2c is repealed.

      (1967, P.A. 429; 1969, P.A. 455; 1971, P.A. 436; P.A. 74-183, S. 128, 291; P.A. 75-577, S. 123, 126.)

      Sec. 54-2d. Notation in computer network of actions taken by law enforcement agency to execute certain warrants. Not later than thirty days after the entry of the issuance of any rearrest warrant or arrest warrant for a violation of probation into the paperless rearrest warrant network, the law enforcement agency for the municipality in which the accused person resides shall, if such network is available and accessible to such agency, enter a notation in such network of the actions, if any, that have been taken by such agency to execute the warrant and apprehend the accused person.

      (P.A. 06-99, S. 2.)

      Secs. 54-3 and 54-4. Issue of warrant after arrest. Trial justice may issue criminal process to be served anywhere in the state. Sections 54-3 and 54-4 are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8722, 8723; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 204.)

      Sec. 54-5. Transferred to Chapter 960, Sec. 54-56f.

      Secs. 54-6 to 54-12. Criminal jurisdiction of municipal courts. Limit of jurisdiction of municipal courts. Jurisdiction over violations concerning overweight commercial vehicles. Bonds on adjournment of hearing. Copies of files and records for Superior Court and state's attorneys on bindover; notice when proceeding pending on seized property. Appointment of court interpreters in municipal and trial justice court. Appeal from municipal court or trial justice. Sections 54-6 to 54-12, inclusive, are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7579, 8726, 8730, 8731, 8733, 8741; 1953, S. 3096d; 1955, S. 3097d; June, 1955, S. 3096d; November, 1955, S. N229; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 138, 204; 1961, P.A. 179; 1963, P.A. 49; 1971, P.A. 321; P.A. 73-116, S. 16; 73-667, S. 1, 2; P.A. 74-183, S. 130, 291; P.A. 76-336, S. 1; 76-436, S. 521, 681.)

      See Sec. 47a-23 re notice to quit possession of premises and service of such notice.

      See Sec. 54-2a re issuance of bench warrants, subpoenas, capitas and other criminal process.

      Secs. 54-13 and 54-14. Transferred to Chapter 961, Secs. 54-96a and 54-96b, respectively.

      Secs. 54-15 and 54-16. Binding over on probable cause. Jurisdiction of Common Pleas Court on appeals. Sections 54-15 and 54-16 are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8727, 8742; 1949, S. 3320d; November, 1955, S. N230; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 141, 204; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 61.)

      Sec. 54-17. Transferred to Chapter 961, Sec. 54-95a.

      Sec. 54-17a. Presentation in one judicial district for offenses charged in various districts where defendant to plead guilty. When any person is arrested in any judicial district upon a criminal charge within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court and any indictment or information is pending against him in the superior court for one or more other judicial districts, he may, with his consent and that of the state's attorney for each such judicial district, be presented in the judicial district where the first warrant served upon him originated for all of the offenses to which he intends to plead guilty.

      (1961, P.A. 251; P.A. 73-116, S. 17; 73-667, S. 1, 2; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 4, 127.)

      History: P.A. 73-116 added references to judicial districts; P.A. 73-667 changed effective date of P.A. 73-116 from October 1, 1973, to April 25, 1973; P.A. 78-280 deleted references to counties.

      Cited. 25 CS 202.

      Sec. 54-18. Transferred to Chapter 890, Sec. 51-353a.

      Secs. 54-18a to 54-21. Transfer of criminal cases between Superior and Common Pleas Court. Certain cases to be tried at first term. Search when cruelty is suspected. Search warrants in cases of cruelty to animals. Sections 54-18a to 54-21, inclusive, are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8724, 8745, 8787; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 143; 1961, P.A. 517, S. 70; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 63; 652, S. 10; 1971, P.A. 590; P.A. 73-116, S. 19; 73-667, S. 1, 2; P.A. 74-183, S. 134, 291; P.A. 76-336, S. 10; 76-436, S. 525, 526, 681.)

      See Secs. 53-247 to 53-253, inclusive, re cruelty to animals.

      See Sec. 54-33a et seq. re searches, generally.

      Secs. 54-22 to 54-24. Transferred to Chapter 961, Secs. 54-82i to 54-82k, inclusive.

      Secs. 54-25 and 54-26. Release on recognizance. Witnesses in courts of other states. Sections 54-25 and 54-26 are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8746, 8762; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 147; P.A. 76-336, S. 10; P.A. 80-313, S. 61.)

      See Sec. 54-82k for successor provisions.

      Sec. 54-27. Transferred to Chapter 890, Sec. 51-348a.

      Sec. 54-28. Transferred to Chapter 890, Sec. 51-352b.

      Secs. 54-29 to 54-31. Seizure of obscene literature and gambling implements. Illegal articles and implements to be destroyed. Judges of city courts may act. Sections 54-29 to 54-31, inclusive, are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8752-8754; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 148, 204; 1963, P.A. 652, S. 10.)

      See Sec. 54-33a et seq. re searches, generally.

      Sec. 54-32. Transferred to Chapter 945, Sec. 53-243a.

PART II*
SEARCHES

      Sec. 54-33. Search warrants for gambling and lottery implements. Section 54-33 is repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8756; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 149; 1963, P.A. 652, S. 10.)

      See Sec. 54-33a et seq. re searches, generally.

      Sec. 54-33a. Issuance of search warrant. (a) As used in sections 54-33a to 54-33g, inclusive, "property" includes, without limitation, documents, books, papers, films, recordings and any other tangible thing.

      (b) Upon complaint on oath by any state's attorney or assistant state's attorney or by any two credible persons, to any judge of the Superior Court or judge trial referee, that such state's attorney or assistant state's attorney or such persons have probable cause to believe that any property (1) possessed, controlled, designed or intended for use or which is or has been used or which may be used as the means of committing any criminal offense; or (2) which was stolen or embezzled; or (3) which constitutes evidence of an offense, or that a particular person participated in the commission of an offense, is within or upon any place, thing or person, such judge or judge trial referee, except as provided in section 54-33j, may issue a warrant commanding a proper officer to enter into or upon such place or thing, search the same or the person and take into such officer's custody all such property named in the warrant.

      (c) A warrant may issue only on affidavit sworn to by the complainant or complainants before the judge or judge trial referee and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant, which affidavit shall be part of the arrest file. If the judge or judge trial referee is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, the judge or judge trial referee shall issue a warrant identifying the property and naming or describing the person, place or thing to be searched. The warrant shall be directed to any police officer of a regularly organized police department or any state police officer, to an inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice or to a conservation officer, special conservation officer or patrolman acting pursuant to section 26-6. The warrant shall state the date and time of its issuance and the grounds or probable cause for its issuance and shall command the officer to search within a reasonable time the person, place or thing named, for the property specified. The inadvertent failure of the issuing judge or judge trial referee to state on the warrant the time of its issuance shall not in and of itself invalidate the warrant.

      (1963, P.A. 652, S. 1, 3; February, 1965, P.A. 439; 574, S. 46; P.A. 74-183, S. 138, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 530, 681; P.A. 77-504; P.A. 79-14, S. 3; P.A. 80-313, S. 8; P.A. 81-227, S. 3; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 39, 121; P.A. 00-31; P.A. 01-72, S. 2; P.A. 04-147, S. 2.)

      History: 1965 acts authorized search of person and made grammatical correction; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas in Subsec. (b), reflecting reorganization of judicial system, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 added reference to assistant state's attorneys and deleted reference to prosecuting attorneys and to court of common pleas in Subsec. (b), reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-504 added Subdiv. (3) in Subsec. (b) authorizing issuance of search warrant to discover property constituting evidence of offense or evidence that a person participated in the commission of an offense; P.A. 79-14 added exception re Sec. 54-33j in Subsec. (b)(3); P.A. 80-313 substituted "may" for "shall" in Subsec. (c) provision re issuance of warrant on sworn affidavit; P.A. 81-227 amended Subsec. (c) by authorizing judges to direct search warrants to conservation officers and patrolmen acting pursuant to Sec. 26-6; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (c), effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 00-31 amended Subsec. (c) to require the warrant to state the date and time of its issuance and to add provision that the inadvertent failure of the issuing judge to state on the warrant the time of its issuance shall not in and of itself invalidate the warrant, and made technical changes in Subsecs. (b) and (c) for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 01-72 added references to judge trial referee in Subsecs. (b) and (c); P.A. 04-147 amended Subsec. (c) to authorize a warrant to be directed to an inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice and make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality.

      See Sec. 54-154 re taxing of expenses in search and seizure cases.

      Former statute did not authorize seizure of contraceptive material. 126 C. 428. Under former statute, obscene materials could be seized regardless of who possessed them or of knowledge or intent in such possession. 146 C. 78. This section and sections 54-33b to 54-33g, inclusive, passed subsequent to Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 643) which held that evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure is inadmissible in state courts. Prior to such passage if search and seizure were incidental to lawful arrest, they were not unreasonable. 149 C. 567. Cited. 153 C. 8. Judge issuing search warrant not required to recite in warrant the grounds on which he found probable cause. Id., 708, 709. Warrant calling for search and seizure of passenger automobile includes whatever was an integral part or component of that automobile, e.g., dust on floor, stains on interior, seats and cushions. 155 C. 145. Neither the recital that affiant had information from reliable informant nor statement that apartment sought to be searched had been under surveillance were sufficient grounds for issuance of warrant; warrant issued was illegal. Id., 385. Cited. 165 C. 239. Cited. 169 C. 322. Cited. 170 C. 618. Cited. 181 C. 562. Cited. 196 C. 471. Cited. 206 C. 90. Cited. 219 C. 529. Cited. 224 C. 29. Cited. 226 C. 514.

      Cited. 10 CA 561. Cited. 30 CA 249.

      Search and seizure which, though without warrant, is consented to is not within exclusionary rule. But mere acquiescence in and peaceful submission to demands of searching officers is not to be construed as consent. 23 CS 41. Defendant's application for order to return articles illegally seized was denied. Id. Where search warrant is issued and executed, presumption is that proper legal procedure was observed and burden is on defendant to overcome presumption. Id., 405. Even though evidence was obtained as result of illegal search and seizure, defendant was not entitled to motion to suppress evidence in advance of trial. 24 CS 36. But see now section 54-33f. Arrest for minor traffic violation did not justify search of car without a warrant. 25 CS 229. If stolen goods were in plain sight, search might have been justified. Id. Reference in warrant, after specifying drugs and named instruments for using them, concluded "and any other paraphernalia" which could be used in taking drugs and was too broad; items not specifically mentioned in warrant could not be used in evidence. 28 CS 19. Cited. 41 CS 1.

      Where judge had before him no information which permitted him to make an independent judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant, the issuance of such warrant was in violation of the constitution and the evidence seized as a result of its execution is not admissible in defendants' trial. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 97, 98. An unsigned and undated search warrant is fatally defective, invalid and void and confers no authority to act thereunder. Id., 641, 644. Supporting affidavit sufficient when it recited several instances of information by others of defendant operating his home for pool selling and police surveillance of activity of defendant in community. Name of informant need not be disclosed. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 603. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 46. Motion to suppress evidence obtained by search and seizure under warrant issued fourteen days before actual seizure granted on grounds execution of warrant was not made within reasonable time. Id., 468. Affidavit in support of search warrant for violation of pool selling statute, that set forth underlying circumstances, reasons informants were reliable, actual betting transactions and personal observation of defendant by affiants was sufficient. Id., 669.

      Subsec. (b):

      Subdiv. (1) cited. 179 C. 23; 192 C. 98. Cited. 229 C. 125.

      Possession or control of property is relevant, not ownership. 57 CA 396.

      Subdiv. (1) cited. 1 CA 315.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 179 C. 522. Search warrant, unsigned by judge, was not legally "issued". 184 C. 95. Cited. 188 C. 183. Neither this section nor the commonly approved definition of "affidavit" requires assigned jurat; judgment of appellate court in State v. Colon, 32 CA 402, reversed, 230 C. 24.

      Cited. 14 CA 356. Cited. 32 CA 402; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 24. Cited. 39 CA 369.

      Sec. 54-33b. Search of person. The officer serving a search warrant may, if such officer has reason to believe that any of the property described in the warrant is concealed in the garments of any person in or upon the place or thing to be searched, search the person for the purpose of seizing the same. When the person to be searched is a woman, the search shall be made by a policewoman or other woman assisting in the service of the warrant, or by a woman designated by the judge or judge trial referee issuing the warrant.

      (1963, P.A. 652, S. 2; P.A. 80-313, S. 9; P.A. 01-72, S. 4.)

      History: P.A. 80-313 rephrased provisions but made no substantive changes; P.A. 01-72 made a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality and added reference to judge trial referee.

      See note to Sec. 54-33a.

      Origin of former statute re search of person. 126 C. 433.

      Cited. 28 CS 23.

      Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 46. Search of person on premises of store searched under warrant was constitutional as statute provides for reasonable searches and seizes, not unreasonable ones. Id., 637.

      Sec. 54-33c. Application for warrant. Execution and return of warrant. Copy of affidavit to be given to owner, occupant or person named in warrant; exceptions. Disclosure of affidavit limited by prosecuting attorney, when. (a) The applicant for the search warrant shall file the application for the warrant and all affidavits upon which the warrant is based with the clerk of the court for the geographical area within which any person who may be arrested in connection with or subsequent to the execution of the search warrant would be presented with the return of the warrant. The warrant shall be executed within ten days and returned with reasonable promptness consistent with due process of law and shall be accompanied by a written inventory of all property seized. A copy of such warrant shall be given to the owner or occupant of the dwelling, structure, motor vehicle or place designated therein, or the person named therein. Within forty-eight hours of such search, a copy of the application for the warrant and a copy of all affidavits upon which the warrant is based shall be given to such owner, occupant or person. The judge or judge trial referee may, by order, dispense with the requirement of giving a copy of the affidavits to such owner, occupant or person at such time if the applicant for the warrant files a detailed affidavit with the judge or judge trial referee which demonstrates to the judge or judge trial referee that (1) the personal safety of a confidential informant would be jeopardized by the giving of a copy of the affidavits at such time, or (2) the search is part of a continuing investigation which would be adversely affected by the giving of a copy of the affidavits at such time, or (3) the giving of such affidavits at such time would require disclosure of information or material prohibited from being disclosed by chapter 959a. If the judge or judge trial referee dispenses with the requirement of giving a copy of the affidavits at such time, such order shall not affect the right of such owner, occupant or person to obtain such copy at any subsequent time. No such order shall limit the disclosure of such affidavits to the attorney for a person arrested in connection with or subsequent to the execution of a search warrant unless, upon motion of the prosecuting authority within two weeks of such person's arraignment, the court finds that the state's interest in continuing nondisclosure substantially outweighs the defendant's right to disclosure.

      (b) Any order dispensing with the requirement of giving a copy of the warrant application and accompanying affidavits to such owner, occupant or person within forty-eight hours shall be for a specific period of time, not to exceed two weeks beyond the date the warrant is executed. Within that time period the prosecuting authority may seek an extension of such period. Upon the execution and return of the warrant, affidavits which have been the subject of such an order shall remain in the custody of the clerk's office in a secure location apart from the remainder of the court file.

      (1963, P.A. 652, S. 4; 1971, P.A. 291; P.A. 76-155; P.A. 85-306; P.A. 89-247; P.A. 97-40, S. 8; P.A. 99-215, S. 9; P. A. 01-72, S. 5.)

      History: 1971 act set ten-day deadline for execution of warrant and required that copy of warrant be given to owner or occupant of dwelling, structure etc. to be searched or to the person named in the warrant; P.A. 76-155 set forty-eight-hour deadline for giving copy of warrant and added provisions re requirement that copy of warrant application, affidavits be given to owner, occupant or person named in warrant; P.A. 85-306 required the applicant to file a detailed affidavit with the judge before the judge may dispense with the requirement of giving a copy of the affidavits; P.A. 89-247 added provisions re filing of copy of search warrant application with clerk of court, re prohibition of clerks' disclosing information pertinent to the application, re protection of rights of an arrested person's attorney to disclosure of affidavits and re time limits on orders which dispense with requirement that copy of warrant application and affidavits be given to interested parties within forty-eight hours and divided section into Subsecs.; P.A. 97-40 changed "issuance" to "execution" of warrant in Subsec. (a); P.A. 99-215 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting provision requiring filing of copy of warrant and that search be conducted within one business day of execution and prohibiting clerk from disclosure of information re application or affidavits of search warrant and substituting provision that any person arrested in connection with or subsequent to execution of search warrant would be presented with return of warrant; P.A. 01-72 amended Subsec. (a) by adding references to judge trial referee.

      See note to Sec. 54-33a.

      Return on search warrant, not defective. 163 C. 107. Cited. 165 C. 239.

      Cited. 7 CA 265. Cited. 10 CA 347. Cited. 14 CA 356. Cited. 15 CA 251. Cited. 18 CA 477.

      Cited. 28 CS 23. Omission of signature from copies of warrant and affidavits served on defendant held harmless error; exclusionary rule discussed. 35 CS 225. Cited. 36 CS 570. Cited. 40 CS 20.

      Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 46. Execution of search and seizure warrant fourteen days after its issuance held unreasonable lapse of time although officers' daily surveillance made this the opportune date for search. Motion to suppress evidence seized granted. Id., 468.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 239 C. 793.

      Sec. 54-33d. Interference with search. Any person who forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates or interferes with any person authorized to serve or execute search warrants or to make searches and seizures while engaged in the performance of his duties with regard thereto or on account of the performance of such duties, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both; and any person who in committing any violation of this section uses any deadly or dangerous weapon shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.

      (1963, P.A. 652, S. 5.)

      See note to Sec. 54-33a.

      Cited. 165 C. 239.

      Cited. 11 CA 47. Cited. 24 CA 330.

      Cited. 30 CS 211.

      Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 176.

      Sec. 54-33e. Destruction of property. Any person who, before, during or after seizure of any property by any police officer authorized to make searches and seizures, in order to prevent the seizure or securing of any property named in the warrant by such police officer, breaks, destroys or removes or causes the breaking, destruction or removal of the same, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both.

      (1963, P.A. 652, S. 6.)

      Cited. 165 C. 239. Cited. 173 C. 450.

      Cited. 26 CA 667.

      Cited. 30 CS 211.

      Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 46. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 176.

      Sec. 54-33f. Motion for return of unlawfully seized property and suppression as evidence. (a) A person aggrieved by search and seizure may move the court which has jurisdiction of such person's case or, if such jurisdiction has not yet been invoked, then the court which issued the warrant, or the court in which such person's case is pending, for the return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that: (1) The property was seized without a warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. In no case may the judge or judge trial referee who signed the warrant preside at the hearing on the motion.

      (b) The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing.

      (c) The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial.

      (1963, P.A. 652, S. 7; 1967, P.A. 4; 1969, P.A. 292, S. 1; P.A. 80-313, S. 10; P.A. 01-72, S. 6.)

      History: 1967 act added proviso prohibiting judge who signed warrant from presiding at hearing on motion; 1969 act authorized aggrieved person to make motion "in the court in which his case is pending" for return of property and to suppress its use as evidence; P.A. 80-313 reorganized provisions and divided section into Subsecs.; P.A. 01-72 amended Subsec. (a) by making technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and adding reference to judge trial referee.

      See note to Sec. 54-33a.

      History discussed. 152 C. 90. Cited. 154 C. 314, 321. Neither statement that affiant had information from reliable informant nor that apartment sought to be searched had been under police surveillance was sufficient grounds for issuance of warrant, hence search warrant was illegal. 155 C. 385. Motion to suppress evidence consisting of several marked bills found on defendant immediately after he was observed selling narcotics to an informer, obtained by search incident to his lawful arrest for commission of felony of illegal sale of narcotics, properly denied. Id., 516. Ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence of narcotics seized by arresting officer from stolen car in defendant's possession without obtaining search warrant was superseded by ruling during trial admitting narcotics as evidence. Where defendant driver of stolen car had been arrested and drugs were found in car on custodial search by arresting officer, motion to suppress use of drugs in evidence properly denied. 159 C. 201. Cited. 169 C. 322. Person aggrieved by search and seizure may move to suppress for use as evidence anything obtained upon warrant when there is not probable cause for believing the existence of grounds for warrant. 170 C. 618. Cited. 195 C. 668. Cited. 216 C. 150, see also 26 CA 423, 27 CA 291, 223 C. 902, and 225 C. 10, reversing judgment of appellate court in State v. Marsala. Cited. 223 C. 903. Cited. 226 C. 514. Cited. 239 C. 793.

      Cited. 10 CA 561. Cited. 14 CA 605. Cited. 27 CA 370. Cited. 31 CA 548.

      Use of motion to suppress. 29 CS 423. Motion to dismiss, motion to suppress, difference. 30 CS 211. This section implements fourth amendment of U.S. Const. and Art. I, Sec. 7 of the Conn. Const. and is analogous to rule 41 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; purposes of rule. 33 CS 129.

      Evidence obtained by an immediate search of defendant's apartment after her arrest for liquor violation was admissible. Search without warrant was an incident to a lawful arrest. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 125. Where officers went beyond directives of warrant for search of defendant and certain premises and searched automobiles, evidence obtained wa