JUD Committee Hearing Transcript for 02/28/2007

REPRESENTATIVE LAWLOR: Please take a seat. We'll get started. Our normal process is the first hour of the public hearing is reserved for state officials and local chief elected officials.

We have four names on the state official list. We'll go through those for the first hour, and then after that, we'll go on to the members of the public.

There's about, it looks like about 15 people signed up to testify. If you haven't already signed up to testify, and you would like to testify, please sign the sheet on the left-hand side over there. First to be signed up Chief State's Attorney Kevin Kane. Is he here? Welcome back.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Good afternoon, Representative O'Neill. Thank you very much for hearing us today. I'm here to speak on two bills [inaudible] the Committee. One is Raised Senate Bill 1245, AN ACT CONCERNING A TENDER YEARS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE.

First, when we were here last week, we talked about working out some kind of compromise package with regarding to the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault statutes, and it might be good to include this in that discussion for two reasons.

One is right now the Connecticut Evidence Code Committee is considering a proposal similar to this, but not quite like it.

It would be desirable, I think, if whatever this Legislature decided to pass was similar to what the Code of Evidence Committee passed. I would hope that they would be in agreement, at least substantially on this bill, if it is passed.

Another reason is that this bill, the way it's worded is a little broad. The way it's worded at present applies to all statements by a child under the age 16 years relating to any crime.

What the state is most concerned about and what the state feels is critical is a bill or a statute that would deal with statements made by children under 13, which the Legislature is most concerned about protecting, and that's consistent with other statutes of the Legislature relating to sexual assaults on the child or to child abuse by somebody in authority or a current authority over that child.

We're not concerned about statements, say, of one child of another in a playground fight or some type of dispute between children of age difference.

We're really concerned of protecting children from sexual assault and child abuse by people, and if not, parents or people similar to parents or people having some apparent authority over a child, if we could get those in.

And we're concerned. There are complicated issues with regard to Supreme Court law, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Connecticut Supreme Court, regarding testimonial evidence and things like that, which the Evidence Code Committee is concerned about, I think this bill generically addresses.

But I would ask that this be held up and see if we can work something out along with the other package with regard to that.

The other bill that I'm here on to testify against is Raised House Bill 7235, AN ACT CONCERNING CRIME VICTIMS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE VICTIM ADVOCATE.

The two principal parts of the bill, although I think it all is a potential for creating problems with the criminal justice system as we have it in Connecticut now.

But with the regard to the authority that the victims' advocate is seeking to be able to appeal, to have standing to appeal issues or decisions of the trial court and the subpoena power of the victim advocate.

I think both of those cases the appeal thing would [inaudible] third party into a criminal case. All of a sudden, you'd have the State of Connecticut, the defense, and the victim advocate all acting in cross-purposes maybe.

The criminal process and criminal trials have gotten complicated enough over the years to inject a victims' advocate with the power to appeal without setting forth any limitations even on what it is that he would seek to appeal from or what remedy the appellate court could possibly impose after an appeal, and how that would affect and delay the due process rights of a defendant in a case, or even the rights of the public and the victim to have a case reach finality as soon as reasonably possible.

Giving appellate rights in a case like this would inject something into the process that would just wreak havoc on it. The subpoena power certainly is something that is unnecessary.

When the victims' advocate functions at his best, he does so by getting the different parts of the criminal justice system to work together, understand each other, and complement each other.

Giving the victims' advocate subpoena power, especially when the state doesn't even have subpoena power at the moment, is something that certainly seems undesirable for the same reasons that the Division has been opposed to this bill over the years. Thank you very much.

REP. LAWLOR: Thanks, Kevin, and just a bunch of technical questions. First of all, on the Tender Years Exception Proposal, this is something you made reference to the other day in the context of how to more effectively prosecute cases involving sex offenses against children.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Yes.

REP. LAWLOR: And I think you're right. I think there's probably, this would add an important tool to ensure that if the goal is the longest sentence as possible for the true child predators, this seems like it would help accomplish that goal.

But my understanding, there is a bit of a history here too, right? At one time it was actually possible to, and maybe I'm wrong, I'm just trying to remember the whole story, to present evidence from a child in a child sex abuse case where the child may not necessarily be testifying in front of the offender, or at least the defendant.

Did something happen that made it more complicated to do, or just a little bit more of the history [inaudible]?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Yes, Sir, it did, in a couple of ways that are important. We used to have, for instance, a very broad constancy of accusation rule, although that rule probably required the witness or victim to testify before the out-of-court statements were admissible.

The Connecticut Supreme Court correctly limited that rule quite a bit because of the due process rights of the defendant, so we've been getting fewer and fewer of those types of out of court statements.

The other restrictions occurred, we had maybe broader interpretations of the medical exception to the hearsay rule.

We had some broader interpretations of some hearsay exceptions, which made it, in the past, easier for the state to get in out-of-court statements of child victims. The courts have, on their own, on a case-by-case basis, restricted that.

What we're trying to do is look at these rules very closely and comprehensively, and a good example would be the forensic interviews.

Around this state, particularly with the multidisciplinary teams and the assistance of hospital and sexual assault counselors and child advocacy centers, we have devised practices of interviewing, doing forensic interviews of children and video recording those interviews in a manner which many people feel are very, very reliable and could come in.

Sometimes those statements are allowed under the medical exception to the hearsay rule. Some judges feel that that's permissible. Others don't. There are some differing opinions on that.

We'd like to craft a statute that would enable us, the state would like to craft a statute that would enable us to get in those forensic interviews, at least the video recordings of those forensic interviews, because they seem to the state to be sometimes the most reliable evidence that exists.

That was a long answer to your question. I'm sorry I went on too long.

REP. LAWLOR: It's an appropriate long answer though, because I think these types of technical issues are lost on most Members of the Legislature, myself included, because they are so complex.

But in essence, what we're talking about is the extent to which children can testify in these types of cases. And I think for understandable reasons, children have a hard time telling the story.

And there may have been earlier statements, which were more detailed and more helpful. And under certain circumstances, that information can be admitted before the jury in the actual trial. And so how that works is what we're talking about now, right?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Yes.

REP. LAWLOR: And you've got some proposals, maybe more precise than the one before us right now, that might help accomplish that, while still respecting the right of a defendant to confront witnesses against him or her, that type of thing.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Yes.

REP. LAWLOR: On the issue of the crime victims bill, your characterization of injecting a third party into the court proceedings is an interesting one, right?

But my question to you is, given the fact that the State Constitution was amended in 1996 to provide explicit rights to victims of crime, what would be the remedy for an apparent violation of one of those rights?

I mean, how would a victim vindicate his or her rights in a situation where there's a clear violation of that right? I mean, how would one seek to address?

How do you end up in front of a judge making an argument that a particular right was violated if the criminal trial consists of two parties and two parties [inaudible] the state and the defendant? How do you get in front of the judge?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Well, getting in front of the judge, the trial judge is one thing. And then I think there this has been done.

We have had situations where, for instance, there was a plea agreement made. The defendant came into court and pled guilty in the trial court.

The plea was accepted by the trial court, and the victim was inadvertently possibly not notified of the plea agreement, and of the opportunity to appear and object to the plea agreement.

That type of situation has been worked out fairly consistently in the past when the victims become aware of it, or when the victims' advocate has become aware of it.

And at least we have worked out a situation where the victim could appear and make his or her position known in a situation where the trial court had the authority to vacate the plea agreement.

With regard to sentencing, it's much easier because there, as long as the defendant is notified, the defendant can appear and be heard at sentencing.

As a manner, I think, in the trial level to deal with that by possibly having the defendant brought back and re-sentenced. The court then can go back and vacate the plea and order a new trial.

REP. LAWLOR: I guess my question is, you describe as a practical matter how it's happened for the most part.

But I guess as a technical matter, what would happen if the actual parties to the case, the prosecutor and the defendant for whatever reason jointly decided to ignore or partly ignore a right guaranteed by the constitution? How would you vindicate that?

So if in the situations you have described, what happens if prosecutor says, look, I don't care. We're just not doing it. And the defense says, yes. We're happy with what already transpired.

Granted, the victim wasn't notified or wasn't presented or whatever it happen to have been. That's just the way it is. Sorry about that. How would a victim get his rights vindicated?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: As it stands now, the victim probably couldn't, and that's maybe why the victims' advocate wants that.

REP. LAWLOR: Right.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: There would be no remedy other than the hope that the state and the court would find a good faith way to address it.

REP. LAWLOR: But can there be a right guaranteed by the Constitution where there's no remedy provided?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: I think there can be, and I think in this situation, the problem is, does the remedy create such a problem that the whole system would fall down. It's a little like throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

Giving an appeal, the right of a victim then suddenly to appear and appeal after the sentence has been imposed would wreak such havoc that I think this Legislature, I would hope the General Assembly would find its best or find a way or at least hope that we can work these cases out on the trial court level without creating the problem of appeal and long delays and uncertainty of judgments, and having judgments that don't have any finality.

The problem in this bill is there is nothing specified as to what it is that the victims' advocate would seek to appeal from, what types of orders he would seek to appeal from. It's extremely broad.

If the victims' advocate came back specific and said, we want to have the authority to appeal in this limited situation, then maybe that could be considered and debated whether that would be wise.

But this is just blanket authority giving the victims' advocate the right to appeal without specifying what it is that he or she wants to appeal from, what limitations would be put on that right of appeal, that it's the state's position that this would create such havoc with the system that it shouldn't be passed.

REP. LAWLOR: What if it were limited only to the ten rates numerated under the state constitution? What if it were limited inaudible] of violations of those, alleged violations of those rights?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: If we can't come up with a decent victims notification system, which is part of what has been submitted to the General Assembly with regard to a notification program, an automated notification system, if we can't come up with a decent and functioning victims notification system, then maybe that's something that ought to be thought of.

Right now, we do our best to operate and notify victims as we can. I would ask the Legislature to give us time, and if we're going to have a victims notification system that works out, I think that will assure the constitutional rights of the victims, and hopefully it would work out so that there would be no need to do this.

If we don't have that, I just think creating appellate rights would be an impossible situation right now.

We could have victims coming in at any time, either having been notified in advance and not liking the results or not having paid attention, or deciding after the judgment that they don't like the outcome, even though they didn't bother to appear and be heard. And allowing them to appeal and stay the sentencing would just create a problem.

REP. LAWLOR: Is the problem the technicalities, the time limits, for example, on appeals? Is that the problem, or is there really a theoretical problem whether or not a victim should, in essence, become under certain circumstances a third party to the case, withstanding to seek appellate relief if a right is apparently denied?

Since we're talking about hypothetical, I'll give you a hypothetical. What if there were a case where a plea deal had been reached and the prosecutor had made a recommendation and the defense attorney had indicated that his client or her client would accept it.

And there was a discussion about whether or not we should notify the victim. We want to do this at 2:00. We don't have time to notify the victim. A decision is made. Let's not do it. And it was clear that that took place.

Then on the following day, the victim arrives saying, wait a minute. I had asked to be notified. The prosecutor had my current cell phone number in the file.

And it's not a question of finding me. I was available. I was aware that this could happen any day, and I wasn't notified. What, if anything, would be the remedy there in the absence of this?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: In that situation, after the plea, but before the sentence was imposed, the request could be made that the court vacate the plea.

REP. LAWLOR: Let me change my hypothetical to make it clearer. What if the sentence was imposed, as it frequently is, at the time of the plea?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: As it stands now, there'd be no remedy.

REP. LAWLOR: I guess that's the theoretical problem we have. What is the value of putting this in? After all, it is in the constitution. It's not like some statute or some best practices recommendations in the actual constitution. And if it kind of, sort of means nothing when push comes to shove, I think is a problem.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: I don't think that we can say that it means nothing. I think the system right now is making a very great effort to comply with the constitutional requirements and the statute requirements of notification. I think if we did something like this.

I'll change the hypothetical a little bit. What if, in that situation, the victim appeared in court and said I didn't get a chance. I wasn't notified. I wasn't notified and I object now.

The court, after an evidentiary hearing, made a finding of fact that the victim was in fact notified properly. Now the victim has just changed his mind for whatever reason. Then the victims' advocate could appeal that decision.

REP. LAWLOR: If the victim were actually in the courtroom?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: At the time, yes.

REP. LAWLOR: What would be the allegation of constitutional violation? You have a right to be notified and be present.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: No. My example is, let's say there was a plea agreement made. The prosecutor and the defense attorney worked out a plea agreement. Decided that on such-and-such a date, the defendant would plead guilty.

The victim was in fact notified prior to that plea, and chose, for whatever reason, not to appear and object. The plea was accepted by the court on that date.

And then later one, after the plea, but before the sentencing, the victim suddenly appeared in court or victim appeared in court at the time of sentencing and said, I object to the plea agreement. I was never notified.

And the trial court goes on and holds the hearing to determine whether or not the victim was notified. And the trial court finds that the victim in fact was notified. Makes that finding a fact after hearing that the victim was notified.

To be able then to allow the victim to take an appeal and stay the sentencing, the question is, how many remedies do we want to pile on top of each other just because it is a constitutional right. It is a constitutional right. It has to be protected. There have to be remedies if that is violated.

The question is how far should the remedies extend. It's the position of the state that allowing the victims' advocate to have the right to appeal in the circumstances set forth in this statute is going much too far.

REP. LAWLOR: I'll end the hypothetical now, but it sounded to me like what you said earlier was there may not actually be a remedy. And so I guess that's the dilemma.

If in fact there is no remedy, it seems like it's like advice in the Constitution, not a requirement. I think most prosecutors I know would certainly abide by the constitutional directives, but I guess there's an interesting theoretical question.

What if there was a clear decision to simply ignore it because you could, and if there is no remedy, it's obviously an option to simply ignore it. I think that creates a problem for us, not only under the constitution, but as a matter of public policy. Anyway, Senator McDonald.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just follow up on something that that line of questioning between yourself and Representative Lawlor.

If this wasn't specifically written with respect to the victim advocate, but if the victim herself wanted to appeal, would your position change at all?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: No, it would not change.

SEN. MCDONALD: So it's not the representational nature of the victims' advocate, but the status of the victim as a whole?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Yes.

SEN. MCDONALD: What if there were appellate rights? What if the right to appeal was limited in some way such that if the defendant filed an appeal, then the victim would be able to file a cross-appeal of some sort? Would that change your position?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: No, it would not change.

SEN. MCDONALD: Because one of the things I heard you say was that you were worried about extra appellate work, so my thought was that if there was already an appeal, if the process was already underway, why not join all of the issues at that time?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Because it would just add.

SEN. MCDONALD: Briefing.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: It would make the three party appeal, three briefs to respond to, a whole new set of reasons for setting aside the conviction, if there was a conviction to be set aside, and it would just make the uncertainty and lack of finality of the process so much more difficult for the public to deal with.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you. Further questions?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: I am concerned that the Committee may think we're being cavalier with victims' rights here. We're not.

I remember starting as a prosecutor, when I can remember prosecutors saying to victims, I'm not going to talk to you. You're not a part of the system. This is the State of Connecticut versus the defendant, and wouldn't have any discussions with the victims at all.

We've come a long, long way since those days. We have tried very hard to accommodate victims. I think we do.

And I'm not suggesting that constitutional rights are just something written on paper and shouldn't have some mechanism for enforcement. And shouldn't be paid attention to greatly.

I think constitutional rights are important for us to recognize. I'm just saying not every constitutional right has to have an appellate remedy available for it, especially a remedy that doesn't have time limitations and doesn't have things like that. That's my reason for my concern. It looks like I caused another question.

REP. LAWLOR: You did. Representative O'Neill.

REP. O'NEILL: Can you think of any other constitutional rights where there is no vehicle for vindication by way of court action through an appeal, some way to get in front of, other than the trial court judge, where you can pursue your claim that your constitutional rights have been violated? Are there any others that come to mind?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Not right now. Not off the top of my head. No.

REP. O'NEILL: Thank you.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: If I come to any, I'll send a letter.

REP. LAWLOR: Representative Stone.

REP. STONE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. While you don't feel that the bill before us, which would provide an appellate remedy for the victims' advocates office, is the way to go, do you have a recommendation on a vehicle through which we can provide a remedy short of giving the victims' advocate the right to appeal?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Not with regard to appellate rights.

REP. STONE: Anything?

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Yes. To help victims, yes. I think an automated victim notification system, which is the subject of a report that we have filed with the General Assembly, is putting into effect a good victims notification system. I think would do away with these types of issues.

REP. STONE: With the exception, of course, of the issue of whether the victim has received notice or not because if the allegation is the victim has not received notice, they won't be in the courtroom.

They won't be present in court. They won't be able to see the proceedings or participate in the proceedings. Therefore, my suggestion is it wouldn't hold.

With the exception of the notice, if there are certain rights that the victim is entitled to, which they are being denied during the course of the proceedings, after notice, they're present, what do you feel about giving the victims the right to either file or pursue an interlocutory appeal or an immediate appeal during the proceeding, and try to get redress from a court as to what their rights are or are not? So you resolve that question while the criminal case is pending, not once it's over.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: I would want to hear first from the Judicial Branch as to whether or not they could cope with such a system. One of the reasons of my concern is, take this for an example, Representative Stone.

The victim has a constitutional right to talk to the prosecutor. It doesn't say how long the prosecutor has to spend with that victim, how many times the prosecutor has to spend with that victim, how detailed the conversations have to be with the victim.

Let's say the prosecutor does do his or her best to speak with the victim, explain the state's position, listen to the victim's concerns, try to address those concerns, and the victim just is absolutely not accepting of what the prosecutor wants to do and wants to talk more and more and more.

And the prosecutor says, I've spoken and I can't speak anymore. I can't possibly do it.

REP. STONE: Right.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: So the victim wants to take an appeal from that. Now that would, in my mind, just be ridiculous.

REP. STONE: Well, short of the proposal that we have in front of us about filing an appeal post plea, post sentencing, why wouldn't the prosecutor's officer also want to get that issue resolved during the penance of the action?

So if there is no question as to whether the victim's rights, again, it's hard to deal with the notice issue because they're not there.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Right.

REP. STONE: So if there's no question that the victim's rights were protected during that particular criminal proceeding, it would seem to be in your office's best interest to resolve that.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Yes, it would.

REP. STONE: Immediately, rather than wait. And I know there may be logistical issues about timing and suspension of proceedings and perhaps incarceration pending resolution of a case. I understand that.

But it just seems to me, and I happen to share the Chairman's concern, that if we have a constitutional right, a constitutionally guaranteed right, without any ability to seek a remedy in the event those rights are either in fact violated or even allegedly violated, that somewhere within the system we've broken down.

We have to find some way to reach some sort of remedy. That's all. And we can continue the discussion at a later time, but thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Thanks. If there are no further questions, thanks again, Kevin.

CHIEF STATE'S ATTY. KEVIN KANE: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Next is Jim Papillo.

JAMES PAPILLO: Good afternoon, Representative Lawlor and distinguished Members of the Judiciary Committee.

For the record, my name is James Papillo, and I'm the State Victim Advocate for Connecticut. I thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony to support of Raised House Bill 7235.

The State of Connecticut continues, and I agree with Chief State's Attorney Kevin Kane, Connecticut has continued and continues to make great strides in the areas of victims' rights.

Since adopting the Victims' Rights Amendment to our State Constitution just over ten years ago in 1996, Connecticut has enacted many laws intended to provide genuine opportunities for crime victims to effectively participate in the criminal justice process, and to require that victims' concerns are addressed by all professionals within the criminal justice system.

Connecticut's victims' rights laws serve to promote respect for crime victims, their safety, privacy, and the interest they have in seeking justice.

In addition, such laws serve to foster administrative and judicial sensitivity to the difficulty experienced when crime victims are unexpectedly drawn into an often indifferent, but always confusing criminal justice system, often at the very time they are trying to cope with injury and trauma of personal loss.

Connecticut's Victims' Rights Amendment affords crime victims the same protection and status of rights provided to those accused of committing crimes.

These state constitutional rights, along with the many other statutory rights afforded Connecticut crime victims, represents a formal acknowledgement on the part of our state lawmakers, particularly this committee, that crime victims have an important participatory role in Connecticut's criminal justice system.

Subsequent to incorporating victims' rights into our state constitution in 1996, our state lawmakers have continued to demonstrate their strong support for a commitment toward protecting and expanding the rights of crime victims in our state.

For example, sensing the need for an independent watch dog agency to oversee the enforcement of victims' rights in Connecticut, our Legislature in 1998 created the Office of the Victim Advocate to help enforce, protect, and further crime victims' rights.

The Victim Advocate has been given broad authority to monitor the provision of services to crime victims by state agencies and private entities, receive and investigate victim complaints regarding their treatment by the criminal justice system, intervene in court proceedings to advocate for victims' rights when their rights have been violated, and to make recommendations to the Legislature, to the victim service providers, and the criminal justice professionals for changes in state policies and laws to help further and protect crime victims' rights in Connecticut.

The OVA's independence from the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches of government is a vitally important feature of the Office, one that is necessary for achieving satisfactory results from agencies and for providing redress for crime victims.

To be effective, the Victim Advocate must be free to criticize in appropriate situations, governmental agencies, officials, public employees, and other professionals involving the criminal justice system.

The need for independence is readily apparent, given the Victim Advocate's broad oversight jurisdiction, which includes all crime victims, criminal justice agencies, victim service providers, and victim advocacy groups.

The public, particularly those Connecticut citizens who have been victimized by crime, have responded enthusiastically to the creation and to the work of the OVA.

Since its inception, OVA clients have sought and received a variety of services, including information, support, investigation, and in-court advocacy.

The OVA has also received strong support from Connecticut lawmakers. The OVA has worked effectively with many members of the Connecticut General Assembly on legislation to further and enhance victims' rights for Connecticut citizens.

Now beyond the specifics, there's a growing sense among the Victim Advocate, his staff, and others in the victim community as well that throughout the State of Connecticut, victims' rights and the many issues affecting crime victims have received more attention of late from the criminal justice and law enforcement officials.

Further, this greater attention to victims' rights is beginning to make a difference for crime victims throughout Connecticut in terms of their meaningful participation in the criminal justice process, but there is clearly much more work that needs to be done.

The consistent enforcement of crime victims' rights within our criminal justice system is a priority issue that must be addressed. All too often, crime victims are not enforced. Their rights are not enforced because they have not been incorporated into the daily functioning of all criminal justice professionals.

Implementation of rights is often arbitrary and based upon the individual practices and preferences of criminal justice officials.

Additionally, with the exception of the creation of the Office of the Victim Advocate, victims have lacked any enforcement mechanisms, thereby leaving them without adequate remedies to enforce their rights when they are violated.

Much work remains ahead to insure that rights for crime victims are honored and respected to the same degree, as are the fundamental rights of the accused and convicted offenders.

We wouldn't tolerate lapses in the enforcement of rights for those accused and convicted. We should not tolerate such lapses for crime victims.

Raised House Bill 7235 contains a number of important proposals that further and enhance victims' rights, and several that would enable the Office of the Victim Advocate to more effectively carry out its statutory mission with respect to investigating complaints and protecting the rights of crime victims.

You have my written testimony that addresses each of these proposals in some detail. In addition, I've made an attempt to meet with each member of this committee individually to discuss these proposals.

Although I've met with most members, I have not yet had the opportunity to meet with each and every one of you, mostly because of scheduling conflicts.

I certainly would be more than happy to meet with any member of this Committee to discuss these proposals and to address any questions or concerns that you might have.

I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you, and I'd be happy to address any questions you might have about my testimony today or the written testimony that I have submitted to the committee.

REP. LAWLOR: Thanks very much, Jim. In some of the questions and answers you heard earlier, I guess the hypothetical are being thrown around, but do you have any real examples of clear violations of the state constitution where there was no apparent way to resolve that problem?

I know there's been thinks reported in the newspapers, etc. But I didn't know if you had an example. You don't have to use names or anything, but just to give us an example of how this might actually happen.

JAMES PAPILLO: We get approximately 900 complaints into our office each year. Just about every complaint that we receive involves some violation of the state constitutional right or one of the statutory rights that support the constitutional amendment.

I guess the one response that I have, and I don't know what percentage of the 900 of the complaints that come to us where the case has already been resolved, but my sense is that, in those cases, there clearly would be situations of violations, which could not be remedied at that point.

Our best opportunity to intervene legally would be when we get a call from a crime victim and the prosecution is still pending.

When that victim alleges that there's been a violation, then at least we can entertain some possibility of intervening legally, whether at the trial court level or possibly at the appellate court level.

I think Representative Stone seemed to indicate in his questioning that I think we framed the proposal to have the authority to seek some remedy on behalf of crime victims.

It's worded in such a way that it contemplates the potential or possible use of an interlocutory appeal. So it isn't the case that we're looking for the authority to file an appeal only after sentencing.

But it may be, and in fact, in my discussions with the Public Defender's Office, they seem to encourage me to think along the lines of filing an interlocutory appeal and that that may be the best way to seek a remedy on a number of the issues contained in the constitutional amendment.

But I think we've left the door open because we're not guided by case law and other statutory law.

And I think the intent was, at least in reading the legislative history surrounding the creation of the agency and the constitutional amendment, these issues worked their way through the court system, just like any other legal rights.

So we would look to the courts basically to help us determine the appropriate mechanism, whether it be an interlocutory appeal, whether it be, you know, it's unclear whether victims at this point have party status.

My sense is, they don't have party status, and would not be able to file a regular appeal like a criminal defendant would in a criminal matter.

But clearly there's common law basis for filing [inaudible] error, and that's one way of getting these issues before a higher court.

We're hoping that the courts in the state, the higher, the Appellate Court and/or the Supreme Court of Connecticut, will help fashion the mechanism by which it's appropriate for victims to seek a remedy, and also address the issues where there are no remedies for these rights.

And I disagree with the position that I believe that you can't have rights, especially constitutional rights, without providing some form of remedy.

And if the Legislature doesn't provide the remedy, then there's precedence for the highest court in the state of fashioning a remedy or at least issuing some mandate or directive to the Legislature to create a remedy for these.

But ultimately, I think it's bad law and it just isn't done not only in the State of Connecticut, but in other states where when we afford citizens state constitutional rights, we don't do that without ultimately providing some form of remedy for those rights.

Whether it's the Legislature that provides the remedies of the citizens, in this case the crime victims need to look to the court system to fashion remedies. Well, we're looking to have the authority to do exactly that.

REP. LAWLOR: Can I just ask? You've been doing this for quite some time. Has there ever been a situation where an appellate court at any level has declared some action of a judge, a prosecutor, or anybody else to have been in violation of the state constitution? Has that ever taken place?

JAMES PAPILLO: We have filed on two matters writs of error. That goes directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The Supremes, in rendering their decisions, bypass really the victims' rights issues that were raised, so we were ultimately not successful.

My sense is that the way our enabling legislation is worded, I think it's clear from the language that the expectation is and was that we would be there in that way for crime victims.

We have the authority to file a special limited appearance in trial court proceedings. And like any other attorney, we're duty bound by the ethical provisions to not leave a client or the client victim high and dry.

If it's appropriate to consider taking or seeking some appellate relief, we should be there to do that. We don't have a directive saying that we can't do it.

The problem is, because we're a state entity, on the two occasions where we did file a writ of error, the Supreme Court weighs the issue, not surprisingly, on its own, questioning whether, as a state entity, we have the clear statutory authority to take that action.

Now to protect the victims' interests in those cases, I hired private counsel to file an appearance in addition to mine so that had they addressed that issue, which they didn't, but had they and ruled against.

Because we don't have the clear, expressed statutory to take or to seek appellate relief, then instead of the case being dismissed for that reason, the private counsel would still be there to protect the concerns and the interests of the crime victim.

But we're a small agency. We have a small budget. If my read of the legislative history is correct, that that was the idea and the intent that we'd be there in that way for crime victims, then I'm simply asking for the expressed authority to do it, so that in the future I don't have to spend scarce and limited funds on hiring private counsel.

REP. LAWLOR: Apart from your own involvement in these things, are you aware of any private counsel, apart from the counsel you had hired that was able to get an appellate court or higher to order, to declare that there had been a violation of the constitutional [inaudible] victims rights?

JAMES PAPILLO: No, I'm not aware of any case.

REP. LAWLOR: And for what it's worth, as the Legislator who was the principal sponsor and the person who explained the bill on the floor of the House and the constitutional provisions, the proposal to amend the constitution on the floor of the House, I agree with your interpretation.

That was clearly my intent, and I believe it was the intent at the time to allow for some remedy in court in the event that there had clearly been a violation of the constitutional provisions. I think you're right in that. Are there any questions for Mr. Papillo? Senator McDonald.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Aren't there other provisions of the State Constitution that don't have expressed judicial remedies attached to them, or have you not looked at them?

JAMES PAPILLO: My understanding is, there have been provisions, and I forget the exact provision. I'm trying to.

There's a case, and I can't think of the name of the case, but the general idea is that there was a constitutional provision. There was no remedy for violations of that provision, a remedy neither supplied by a court or by the Legislature.

The individuals harmed brought an action, an appeal, and brought it up through the Connecticut Supreme Court.

I believe the gist of the Connecticut Supreme Court decision was, or ruling was that in cases like that where there is no remedy that has been fashioned by the lawmakers, by the Legislature, then the court could take jurisdiction and could fashion a remedy on the theory that basically it would be wrong to create these rights without some remedy for violation. Because otherwise, without remedies, then how weighty or how meaningful are the rights?

SEN. MCDONALD: Right, and so there's a whole line of cases that allow for an implied right of action to enforce statutory or constitutional provisions that don't have expressed remedies attached to them, right?

JAMES PAPILLO: I believe so, yes.

SEN. MCDONALD: So why doesn't that work for victims?

JAMES PAPILLO: I'm not sure it doesn't work for victims. The only reason why I'm asking for the expressed authority, if that's the genesis of your concern.

We need the expressed authority in order to remove the obstacle. Basically it's a budgetary obstacle.

If we are to intervene legally on behalf of the crime victim in the future and file a writ of error, for example, and it seems that that may be the way to seek a remedy in these types of cases, because victims don't have party status.

Then if I have the clear statutory authority, then that's going to remove the one concern the Supreme Court will have. And it's hard to predict how they will rule.

I clearly don't have the expressed authority, and without having private counsel along with me, then the case ultimately will be dismissed, and that's not a good outcome.

SEN. MCDONALD: Rather than doing [Gap in testimony. Changing from Tape 1A to Tape 1B.]

JAMES PAPILLO: --that's a possibility.

SEN. MCDONALD: I mean, you know, I understand the issue that you've raised. And frankly, I think you've raised it for three or four years running now.

JAMES PAPILLO: It's been longer than that.

SEN. MCDONALD: I've been only been around for three or four years, but I'm just trying to figure out why other avenues haven't been explored. You could have had a ruling on that right now that could have bound the entire state into declaratory judgment action, right?

JAMES PAPILLO: I'm not sure that that's the best way for us to proceed. We are viewing these rights to have the same status, the same meaning that any other statutory or constitutional provision has.

And although victims may not have party status within the criminal prosecution, there is another avenue by way of a writ of error that is really specifically designed for non-party people who have interests in the outcome of the proceeding to seek a remedy for violations of their rights.

That seemed to me to be pretty clearly perhaps the best way, the most efficient way to go. I also had concerns that I didn't want. I was concerned about taking an interlocutory appeal on these cases because that would stay the criminal proceedings.

And I didn't want to seek remedies or to pursue seeking remedies for crime victims, and at the same time, being accused that the assertion or the protection of these rights ultimately was leading to hanging up cases in the criminal justice system.

SEN. MCDONALD: I appreciate that. I think you're missing my point though. You're talking about micro level remedies about a writ of error in a particular case.

I'm talking about a declaratory judgment action, a class action declaratory judgment action that would resolve the issue for you and the entire state.

JAMES PAPILLO: I've thought long and hard about that. We may be, as an agency, moving in that direction of thinking that that may be the only way.

But if the lawmakers, if the General Assembly were to grant us. I'd rather not go in that direction at this point, although I'm beginning to see that that may be the only way to address these concerns.

But that, coupled with the fact that we don't have the resources as a state agency to take that on ourselves, and I don't know who we would look to for the assistance. We don't have the budget to bring others onboard to proceed in that way.

But in terms of, you're speaking in terms of a class action lawsuit. That might bring movement within the system to address some of these chronic problems. That may very well be the best way to approach the problem.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

REP. LAWLOR: Are there other questions? Representative O'Neill.

REP. O'NEILL: Just briefly on the issue of declaratory judgments and class actions, I don't remember all the requirements, but with respect to a class action, who would the class be exactly?

Since you've given this some thought, would it be all people who have had their rights violated or all crime victims? You need to get the class certified and there's a series of steps.

JAMES PAPILLO: We would have to start with a group of citizens who, as crime victims, have had their state constitutional and/or statutory rights violated.

REP. O'NEILL: And I'm trying to think of who would the defendant be in this action?

JAMES PAPILLO: The State of Connecticut.

REP. O'NEILL: Usually you sue a department or an agency or somebody like that. Would it be just named to the State of the Connecticut? I'm trying to imagine who.

JAMES PAPILLO: I think the important players in the criminal justice system would be the Chief State's attorney's Office. It would be the Judicial Branch.

Those are the main players within the criminal justice system who ultimately have, I think, the responsibility to make certain that rights are being honored and respected and enforced.

REP. O'NEILL: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Are there further questions? Senator Roraback.

SEN. RORABACK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow up on Representative O'Neill's question, I think there's a statutory and a practice to provision that allows you to go to court and get a question answered if it's uncertain, right, under the movement of a declaratory judgment.

Is the uncertain question whether or not you have standing to bring an appeal? Is that's what is uncertain?

JAMES PAPILLO: Well [inaudible].

SEN. RORABACK: I mean, that's why you're here. You're asking us for a bill that [inaudible] bring an appeal.

JAMES PAPILLO: Correct. The proposal has been made to provide expressed authority to file or to seek appellate relief. I don't know whether that's to file a traditional appeal or to take some other avenue for seeking appellate relief on behalf of crime victims.

We don't have the expressed authority. The fact that the Supreme Court raised that issue on its own, and I know they do that typically when our Attorney General for the State of Connecticut takes some legal action.

The courts are typically looking to make certain that, as a state entity, that the state entity has the expressed authority to take that action.

And I think you have to read between the lines. You have to read the legislative history to extract, which I think is support for us taking that action. But we clearly don't have the expressed authority to do it.

SEN. RORABACK: And I guess what I'm hearing Senator McDonald and Representative O'Neill say, it would probably help this Committee if the court gave us their take on this issue. Then we could proceed.

Maybe it would obviate the need for us to do anything. And if it didn't obviate the need, then we'd know what we need to do to make them happy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you. Other questions? If not, thanks again.

JAMES PAPILLO: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Next is Brian Carlow.

ATTY. BRIAN CARLOW: Good afternoon, Representative Lawlor and members of the committee. My name is Brian Carlow. I'm the relatively new Deputy Chief Public Defender, having been in that position since September.

I am here today to speak. I was intending initially to speak with respect to just Raised Senate Bill 1245. But after sitting and listening to the discussion on Raised House Bill 7235, I just wanted to just make a quick comment with respect to that.

It seems to me that, as someone who has sort of advocated for clients' constitutional rights for my entire career, I think certainly I would agree with the sentiment here that if there is a constitutional right that's afforded, and in this case to victims of crimes, that there must be some redress to a situation where that right is not being vindicated, that right is not being honored.

I think there were significant concerns, and if it's through the appellate process, if that were to occur after the trial has finalized, certainly the discussion here, and Representative Stone mentioned that as well, the idea of some kind of an interlocutory appeal.

And in fact, there are provisions. And this is another constitutional right, but in the situation where courtrooms are closed and the press is excluded from courtrooms, there is an expedited process for review of that trial court decision.

It impedes the process of the trial very little. But it may be a manner that if the claims were limited to those articulated within the constitution and there were provisions for whether we call it an interlocutory appeal, and I'm not sure exactly what the language is for the newspaper first amendment claim.

But it's not going to impede the progress of the trial. It's not going to interfere with the final judgment piece of it. And then you can have someone take a look at the trial court's decision to determine whether or not in fact their rights have been vindicated.

Just as an aside, and I've been in the courtroom for a lot of years now, so I tend to go back to sort of the practical effects of these things.

And I think the fact is that if there were some interlocutory vehicle by which these issues could be addressed, I think all the parties.

And I am not suggesting in any way that the parties don't take the rights of victims very, very seriously, but they may in some sense redouble their efforts to make sure that those rights are vindicated because, in the context of a trial, whether it is the state or whether it is the defense or whether it is the judge, no one wants to see that process stopped.

So I think that may well be the practical effect of affording some interlocutory. And again, I'm using that term much more generally. Interlocutory way to vindicate or attack the issue as to whether or not these rights had been vindicated.

I just wanted to add that piece to that. We have written testimony with respect to Raised House Bill 7235, and we would rely on that.

In terms of Raised Senate Bill 1245, the tender years exception, and I guess I'm hopping, in essence, from some constitutional rights to other constitutional rights.

And I do not sit before you, nor have I ever claimed throughout my entire legal career that I am a legal scholar. There are certainly legal scholars out there. I am not one of them.

But based upon my reading of the statute, and reading of the U.S. Supreme Court case law, and this is all set forth in my written testimony, the position of the Office of Chief Public Defender, is that there are significant constitutional problems with respect to the way that proposed legislation is presently drafted.

In fact, with respect to even what the state is attempting to get to, there may be significant constitutional problems.

Our Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington laid out very strict rules in terms of when any statement can be introduced in the context of a criminal case.

To the extent that the statement is testimonial, and they don't do a very good job certainly in that case of defining what is and what is not testimonial, to the extent that it is a testimonial statement, that statement, if it was not subject to cross-examination, either previously or at the trial itself, simply cannot be admitted under federal law. That ruling of the court is very clear.

In terms of non-testimonial, and again I would submit to you that that line in the middle as to what's testimonial and what is not testimonial is not a very clear line.

In terms of what is non-testimonial, that would again fall under the old case of Ohio v. Roberts, which requires a significant indicia of reliability. The language of the proposed legislation seems to lessen that standard.

We are certainly cognizant of the fact that it is an important interest that in cases such as these, and even speaking from a defense perspective, that relevant and material evidence get before the trier of fact in the context of a criminal trial.

At the same time, being able to insure that that testimony is both truthful and accurate as it can possibly be is also critically important.

That's what the Supreme Court was doing when they decided Crawford. That's what the Supreme Court was talking about when they decided Ohio v. Roberts. That's what our Supreme Court did when they decided State v. Whelan and State v. Troupe.

There are a variety of laws of cases that have been decided that are trying to balance those two interests, the constitutional right to confrontation, and the rights and the policy decisions of getting relevant and material evidence in front of the trier of fact.

One thing that I would note, and this was pointed out earlier today, this whole idea of trials, and I've had the opportunity over the course of my career to try several of these cases, is that there are still on the books, and I've noted that in the written testimony as well, provisions for if there is a situation where, because of the relationship between the complainant, the child complainant and the accused, the testimony can be given outside of the courtroom.

It can be given in a closed courtroom. The statute is very specific as to who could be there, and it is limited to only the necessary parties.

There are, in fact, provisions that, under some circumstances, the defendant, the accused himself may not be in the room, and may not be in sight of the child while the child is testifying.

The key piece of that legislation is, however, that counsel for the accused has the right to cross-examine the child. I think there are certainly provisions, and that statute outlines other provisions that are protections for the child/victim.

Some of them, I would submit to you based upon my experience, as a practical matter, aren't very necessary. They talk about not raising your voice and being respectful.

From my history, that any lawyer, I mean you get these images of these lawyers banging their fists on the table and asking children questions and coming at them very strongly.

As a practical matter, that happens in the context of the criminal trial. The jury is then ready to go out and render their verdict before they hear anything else.

While I think it's appropriate to have those on there, as a practical matter, I don't think that happens very often.

But my point is that there are protections on the books as we have them now that would protect child complainants in the context of these cases to make it so that their testimony is more easily given and more reliably given.

The other thing that I would note, and Chief State's Attorney Kevin Kane noted this as well, as recently as yesterday the Evidence Code Oversight Committee met to address this specific issue.

While I was mentioning before in my disclaimer that I am not a constitutional scholar, I think there's some folks that are on that committee that if they're not, they certainly are a lot closer, and I think there's actually a couple on there that would qualify.

And I think they're going to be looking at, number one, the need for some new legislation, but in addition to that, making sure that it comports with all the state and federal constitutional laws, so that when we do enact something, either through the Evidence Code, which I would submit would be the most appropriate place to do it.

But [inaudible] through this body, that it is something that balanced those needs appropriately, could pass constitutional muster, and is not going to result in a situation down the road where now we have cases coming back and having to be retried because there was constitutional, either federal or state, violations that occurred during the course of that case.

I would be more than happy to answer any questions that you might have. I appreciate the opportunity to come here and speak to you today to address these issues.

REP. LAWLOR: Thanks, Brian. Senator Kissel.

SEN. KISSEL: Thank you very much, Chairman Lawlor. Attorney Carlow, very good to see you once again.

ATTY. BRIAN CARLOW: Thank you.

SEN. KISSEL: I know that Attorney Del Prete Sullivan had prepared the remarks on the initial subject, so I guess you covered both of those.

I actually am very interested in trying to work with the Chief State's attorney on this sexual predator issue. And when we had a colloquy last week, I offered to work on it.

And I'll be very honest. Just earlier this week, they said they're ready and willing to move forward. I understand your concerns regarding these other folks that are looking at the Code of Evidence.

Nonetheless, what I'd like you to do, if it's at all possible, your office to do is in Chief State's Attorney Kane's prepared statement, he indicates that at least 39 states have a tender years exception to the hearsay rule.

I would guess that some of those have been on those state's books for a while. They probably withstood some appeals.

And if you could just sort of call out the two or three that you feel are the best, as far as balancing or protecting the rights that you're concerned with, I think it might be helpful to our state, as we examine this.

There's no guarantee anybody is going to accept this or it may be completely out of whack with what this other group is looking at.

But what I think would be sort of a good end is, if we don't have this, if we could take, as an example, one of the states that have a very tough, from your perspective, fairly limited exception, so it has the safeguards to protect those concerns that you're concerned with.

I'm guess there's two or three out there. So that maybe as I begin discussions with the Chief State's attorney, can sort of look at what that office has proposed, what these other states have out there, if they'd been around for a while, if they've had some appeals go up regarding them, and they've withstood it.

Granted, their state constitutions aren't going to be the same as ours. But all that being said, I'd like to see that maybe perhaps in this Legislative Session, and it's ambitious, but if at least the framework of a possible compromise on this issue couldn't be gleaned. Do you think that's possible?

ATTY. BRIAN CARLOW: We have absolutely no problem with getting that information, and I have not done that search yet. Most of those states who have passed statutes were pre-Crawford statutes, so I think what you're suggesting is a very important piece.

Which of those subsequent to Crawford have passed constitutional muster and that's something, which we certainly can find out where those states are, what the language is, and which states have, because I think that's an important piece.

If we have language of a statute that's pre-Crawford, which is the United States Supreme Court case, that hasn't been challenged under Crawford, that's not going to be nearly as helpful because we're in that same sort of dark area where we're really not sure whether it passes constitutional muster.

But we will certainly do that. We will find those. We will see what language there is out there that seems to address and balance those issues appropriately, and see which of those have been challenged, so that we can get some sense.

I think any that have been challenged haven't made it back up there yet, up to the U.S. Supreme Court, but certainly we can get that information, and certainly get it to the members of the committee. That's not a problem.

SEN. KISSEL: And you're so much further along the line of legal scholar than I am, but when was Crawford decided?

ATTY. BRIAN CARLOW: 2004.

SEN. KISSEL: So clearly from your perspective, if it's post-Crawford, it probably hasn't gone all the way back up. I think that's a fair assumption.

So we might be in sort of dangerous waters, but there still may have been some reviews in that period of time. Is that what you're saying?

ATTY. BRIAN CARLOW: There certainly may have been some state reviews in that period of time. And there may be guidance we can take from Crawford to try to address the issues that Crawford raises.

The thing that Crawford does very well is it tells you, if it's testimonial, what you need to do. And if it's non-testimonial, what that means. What it doesn't do very well, and Davis, which was the case after that, starts to define a little bit which are testimonial.

The police station interview by the police officer, that would clearly be testimonial. The offhand statement to the mother or father, aunt or uncle, would be non-testimonial. Those extremes are pretty easy.

It's as you get to the middle, and one of the difficult positions we may be in, and again Chief State's attorney Kane was talking about these forensic group interviews.

Based upon my work with this, I think those clearly fall within the testimonial range. So I think that really limits what any state can do in terms of admissibility within the context of a criminal trial. I may be wrong about that, but at least that's my initial sense.

But in terms of taking a look at it and trying to work through where those real issues are, we'd be more than happy to do that.

SEN. KISSEL: Well, as a former special public defender, I think that you folks have to be a part of this process too.

And just realizing the nuances and complications just in this little, and it's not really little, but in this aspect of trying to cobble together any kind of enhanced laws that would affect sexual predators and especially those who prey on minors.

I don't want to give up the ghost and say that we need to have a special taskforce to study this for a year. I'd like to think that we could maybe do something this long Legislative Session because this is really, strike while the iron is hot.

And there seems to be a feeling in this building that we can make some strides in that direction, but I think that your insights and wisdom, and the insights and wisdom of the folks in the Public Defender's Office, will be invaluable in moving down this path, so that everybody's rights are balanced. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you. Are there other questions? Representative O'Neill?

REP. O'NEILL: In your testimony, you site the case of State v. Jarzbek, which sustained the validity of the statute that's already on the books, 54-86g.

I guess I have a couple of questions. How often is that statute utilized by the State's Attorneys Office?

ATTY. BRIAN CARLOW: I think that that would vary quite a bit jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In New Haven, which is where I was, I was down in the judicial district, Public Defender's Office for about 15 years.

It was used quite a bit down there. Some of them may have been because there was a facility set up at a local university that could accommodate the videotaping process. I think that's a much less burdensome process than it was maybe 15 years ago.

I could not speak to other jurisdictions. I can certainly find out that information, and I could probably get a pretty accurate sense, say, over the last five years of how many there have been that the Public Defenders Office has been involved in.

That would not take me. I could certainly do that, get that information probably by the end of this week or beginning of next week.

REP. O'NEILL: But at a minimum, it's something that is used 10 times a year or 20 times? I mean it's not something that's just used once or twice a year.

ATTY. BRIAN CARLOW: No. My sense from looking at the various list serves that I'm on, and you will see Jarzbek questions come up maybe a couple of times a month.

So if I had to guess, which I'm really reticent to do in front of this group, but in the range of 15 to 20 times a year. It may be more than that. It may be a little less.

But I think I can get a pretty good sense because I know about what percentage of the criminal docket we handle, so I think I could extrapolate from the number based upon what my folks tell me out in the field as to how many they've done.

REP. O'NEILL: The second question is, given what the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford, and I understand in your testimony you say that the key element to holding was cross-examination is the key ingredient to being successful in terms of getting past a confrontation clause question.

Is Jarzbek in any way subject to that? It does call for cross-examination, but the defendant can be excluded from the proceeding. Do you have any sense that Jarzbek might, because the Jarzbek case was 1987? Crawford obviously is 2004.

Crawford wasn't in existence at the time of the Jarzbek case by the State Supreme Court. Any chance Jarzbek might itself [inaudible] before 86g might itself be subject to a Crawford challenge?

ATTY. BRIAN CARLOW: I would hope some day down the road our appellate lawyers don't make me eat these words, but I think the focus really was cross-examination.

And the cross-examination, in some context, in State v. Outlaw is another state case, which I think would stand up to Crawford analysis, where the cross-examination actually occurred at a previous proceeding.

What Jarzbek did was it balanced sort of the face-to-face confrontation in those circumstances that said that that statute was appropriate.

I would think that Jarzbek and the procedures, as long as there's cross-examination, would pass the constitutional muster set forth in Crawford.

REP. O'NEILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you. Are there other questions? If not, thanks again, Brian. That was great.

ATTY. BRIAN CARLOW: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: No, seriously. I mean there was a lot of good legal information, and it's helpful to our decision. But it would avoid problems upfront if we can.

We're done with the first hour. There's one more person signed up, the Judicial Branch, Attorneys Ment and Fuller. We'll get to you in a minute.

I will just call some members of the public first, and I know you guys get paid by the hour, right? It was a joke.

All right. First is Susan Giacalone, to be followed by Edith McClure and Debbie Florence.

SUSAN GIACALONE: Good afternoon, Representative Lawlor and the Members of the Judiciary Committee. For the record, my name is Susan Giacalone. I'm here on behalf of the Insurance Association of Connecticut. I have submitted written testimony, so I will keep my comments brief.

I'm here to testify on two bills, Raised Senate Bill 1244, AN ACT REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF LIMITS OF AN INSURANCE POLICY, and also Raised Senate Bill 1241, AN ACT CONCERNING OFFERS OF COMPROMISE.

I'd like to first address Raised Senate Bill 1241 real briefly. All this bill is seeking to do is extend the provisions that were encompassed in the public act that dealt with the medical malpractice cases. On the offer of compromises, that extended what needs to be done prior to filing an offer of comprise.

There would have to be certain information that has to be provided, which has been a problem that we've been trying to get addressed for years.

That in a personal injury action, the same information is exchanged, whether it's a medical malpractice case, an auto case, a slip and fall.

We're just saying that the protections provided in the act that was passed in 2005 for the medical malpractice reforms be extended to provide those same protections and those same requirements in filing an offer of compromise.

The only other change there is we're seeking the response time for a plaintiff to respond to a defendant's offer was changed to 60 days.

Originally all the previous laws was ten days. It made sense that the plaintiff, someone who has control of the information, ten days was ample time to respond to a defendant's offer, but it was expanded to 60 days with the medical malpractice reforms.

Raised Senate Bill 1244 is a bill that this committee has seen, this legislative body has seen for years. It has rejected, and we would like to argue rightfully so.

It seeks to require disclosure of policy limits without a case going to suit. It has been amended over time. It says within 14 days of a claim if an attorney is involved.

Our argument there is we don't understand why you need to have what the policy limits are prior to an action being in suit. That the injuries should dictate what the treatment is and what the settlement is.

Our experience has been that in those few states, very few states that have anything and nothing that's to the extent that's encompassed in the bill before you, it has actually been the driving force in settlements and driving up settlement demands, that that becomes the floor of what a demand is. It becomes a search for deep pockets.

You'll hear some arguments that we only could get this information if we go into suit. I don't know of many suits that are filed solely to get that information of what the policy limits are. Suits are filed because you can't resolve claims.

It's also seeking information that's private information that, once it's in suit, it falls under the exception to some privacy laws that we, as insurers, are subject to like [inaudible].

Also, there have been, as the debate has gone on this bill in the past, it talks about we need to know if they had minimal coverage. We need to go to other people. I'll wrap up real quickly. [Inaudible] before three minutes.

That you're talking all suits, not just your talking your minimum auto claims. You're talking every type of claim out there, and again it would just be the driving force of what the demands would be, and it shouldn't dictate treatment. Thank you, and I'll wrap up.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you. Questions? Representative Fox.

REP. FOX: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your testimony. First, with respect to the offers of compromise, I realize that we enacted that fairly recently. Can you describe what the experience has been with respect to the change overall?

Not a lot of cases have been filed with respect to the October 1, 2005, date, but I'm trying to get some feel as to how it's working, because I think there's probably going to be some questions by litigants.

SUSAN GIACALONE: Quite honestly, most of my members aren't involved in medical malpractice world, so we're not seeing the impact of that change that we're seeking to have expanded to civil suits.

We have not seen it because we're not dealing in that world. It is a change, though, that we have sought as an industry prior to the medical malpractice reforms for years prior, because what has happened in the past is that offers were filed when a suit was initiated. When the claim originally even arose, because it gets the clock start ticking.

Where you have limited time as a defendant to respond to that offer, and how do you respond with knowledge if you don't really know what the injury is out there. That's what our argument has been all along, and it's no different--

REP. FOX: And I understand that.

SUSAN GIACALONE: So we don't have any experience on our end because it doesn't extend to us right now. Our experience has been that we are getting these offers immediately.

We don't have the information. We don't know what their meds are. We don't know what's related to the injury. We don't know what permanencies are, and the clock is already ticking on the offer.

REP. FOX: No, and I understand that. And the strategy could be to file an offer quickly and then to reject an offer later on after the 60 days pass.

SUSAN GIACALONE: Correct. The clock is ticking.

REP. FOX: Then also with respect to the extending or reducing the time back on defendants' offer of judgments. It's clearly 60 days for the defendants to respond to a plaintiff's offer of judgment, right?

SUSAN GIACALONE: Correct.

REP. FOX: What's the reason for going back to the ten days? Is there a real need for that?

SUSAN GIACALONE: It's just on the plaintiff side. We don't really understand why it was extended. When it was extended to the defendants, we understood because we have to get information to be able to respond to that.

It was originally 30 days. It was originally 10 days for plaintiffs, 30 days for defendants. It was extended to 60 days for defendants.

The plaintiffs have the knowledge. They know what their injury is. They know what they're looking for, for a demand. We don't understand why they need 60 days.

We understand why a defendant needs 60 days because you need to get the information. You don't have the information of what the injury is, what the demand is or what the permanencies are, how it relates.

Where the plaintiff already has all that knowledge, arguably, because they're the ones who control the claim, and they're the ones in control of the information.

REP. FOX: But ten days seems a little tight as well.

SUSAN GIACALONE: We're just saying, that was what the original law--

REP. FOX: I know it was, no, and I remember it was. Yeah.

SUSAN GIACALONE: For forever.

REP. FOX: All right. Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Other questions? If not, thanks again, Susan.

SUSAN GIACALONE: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Next is Edith McClure. And as Ms. McClure comes up, let me just make a couple of announcements.

For those of you who aren't accustomed to testifying here at the Legislature, first of all, everything that you testify about, everything you say will be taken down in a verbatim transcript, which becomes an official part of the record of our proceedings.

This is actually, what's happening today is a very important part of the lawmaking process. All of your testimony is a formal part of the proceedings, and it's all kept together with the files that we have on each bill.

And Legislators typically look at that, as we go through the Session, to find out why people were for or against a particular bill.

If the bill ends up becoming law, it may be years later that judges and lawyers will go back and look at the arguments for and against a bill in the public hearings to determine what was the intent of the bill, because many times courts have to decide what was the legislative intent behind the bill.

So it's not just what the Legislators say. It's also what members of the public say when they testify for and against bills. People try and determine what was the need for the bill in the first place, for example.

If you have submitted written testimony, that is also kept with the bill. Under all the technology available to us now, what we do is we put all of your written testimony online immediately.

So right now members of the committee can read everything that you've handed in earlier. It has been scanned in and is now available online.

Members of the public who may be watching at home on CT-N and other services can also do the same thing and read your written testimony.

You may notice that many Legislators who are members of this committee are not in the room at the moment. Legislators are coming and going, because there are a number of meetings going on right now.

In fact, I'm a member of another committee, which has been meeting the whole time we've been here. But Legislators do try to catch up later on by reading your testimony at that point.

And finally, we ask that you attempt to limit your original presentation to about three minutes. That's the bell that you're hearing. And Legislators are permitted to ask questions after you're done testifying.

Sometimes that can be a minute or two, and other times it can go on for an hour, which you've already seen here a little bit, so we apologize about that.

But we will remain here until everyone who has signed up to testify has actually testified. Based on the signup sheet and the time right now, I figure we'll be here until about 5:00 or so.

But it could be later, and we'll stay until whenever it's necessary. On Monday night, we were here until about 10:15 or so at night, so just to give you a sense. I apologize. Please go ahead, Ms. McClure.

EDITH MCCLURE: Representative Lawlor and Members of the Judiciary Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today to comment on Raised House Bill 6058, AN ACT CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT OF PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS.

My name is Edith McClure. I'm a member of the Executive Committee of the Family Law Section, and also a fellow in the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. My practice for now over 27 years has been in the area of family law.

On behalf of the Executive Committee of the Family Law Section, the whole Family Law Section, I respectfully request that the Judiciary Committee not act on Raised House Bill 6058.

This bill would establish a presumption that a premarital agreement is enforceable, unless the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that the agreement was not entered into voluntarily with fair, reasonable disclosure, and opportunity to review the agreement with independent counsel.

There is also a provision in the statute, as it exists now, that would be eliminated, which would allow consideration of whether an agreement is unconscionable when enforcement is sought. A similar bill was introduced in 2006, and I testified before this committee at that time.

I testified that, believe it or not, I had testified when the Premarital Agreements Act was considered and, yes, I keep being quoted in various opinions where the Supreme Court is looking back at what the legislative intent was.

Raised House Bill 6058 would change so much of the basic bill, as to make an agreement essentially the same as a commercial contract. Enforceable even if unconscionable at the time enforcement is sought, as long as it was not unconscionable at the time it was made.

The stated purpose of Raised House Bill 6058 is to strengthen the enforceability of premarital agreements. A recent Supreme Court case, Friezo v. Friezo, and I've given this site in my written testimony has already accomplished that.

This case came down on February 6, 2007, and Attorney Wes Horton was quoted in the Connecticut Law Tribune as saying, so many people were concerned about how easy it was to break prenuptial agreements, but now we have the answer. It's going to be real tough.

I agree with Attorney Horton's analysis. The stated purpose of this bill under consideration now has already been realized.

Last year when I appeared before this committee, I referred to research, which I had done about trial court decisions concerning premarital agreements.

And only two even considered the issue of unconscionability when enforcement was sought. And in both of those cases, may I continue for a brief time?

In both of those cases, the trial court upheld the premarital agreement. Basically that is my testimony. The rest is in written form. I thank you for the opportunity to comment today.

The Family Law Section respectfully requests that the Judiciary Committee reject this bill. I would be glad to answer any questions, which anyone may have.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you very much. Are there questions? If not, thanks, Edith. Next is Debbie Florence, and then Steve Ment and Deb Fuller, and then they'll be followed by Carl Anderson.

DEBBIE FLORENCE: Good afternoon, Representative Lawlor and members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Debbie Florence and I'm here today in support of Raised House Bill 7235, AN ACT CONCERNING CRIME VICTIMS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE VICTIM ADVOCATE.

I would like to begin by saying that I think the Office of the Victim Advocate has been doing and continues to do an outstanding job in the State of Connecticut, standing up for victims' rights.

The agency that fights hard for victims' rights needs to grow in size if they are to succeed in addressing the systemic problem still facing crime victims in our state. In addition, the State Victim Advocate must be given the tools necessary to do the job that they are assigned to do.

The State Victim Advocate must be given subpoena power to adequately investigate complaints for crime victims.

The State Victim Advocate must have the clear authority to seek legal remedy when victims' rights have been violated. Please give the State Victim Advocate the tools he needs to better protect our rights.

As you all are aware, there are continuing systemic problems in our criminal justice system when it comes to honoring and respecting crime victims. Crime victims are not provided adequate information about their rights and how to assert their rights in criminal proceedings.

This information is required to be provided crime victims under current law. Several of the proposals in this bill further those rights and will help enforce the rights crime victims already have.

I would like to address one proposal that has affected my case. When a defendant is convicted and files an appeal, the crime victim should be notified of this and provided information about the appeal, what the issues are in the appeal, the date, the time, and the place of the hearing on the appeal, and finally, the outcome of the appeal.

Crime victims maintain an interest in the case, even after the offender has been convicted and sentenced. And I'm sure that you can understand this.

Just over a year ago, this situation occurred in my case. The offender, who had murdered my daughter Jenny, who was pregnant at the time, filed an appeal of his conviction. I was never informed of this until it was too late.

Jim Papillo called me the day of the hearing, and he asked me if I was going. He had found out that morning from a court docket list posted on the judicial branch website.

Jim asked me if I was going to attend. When I told him I had not received notice, he immediately took action in making phone calls to help me.

After a short time, I received an invitation to view the proceedings on tape and an apology from the State's attorney also. I accepted the invitation to view the tape for my own information, but the point is, once again, my rights were violated, like so many other crime victims in our state.

I believe there has to be some accountability to help insure that the Connecticut victims' rights laws are respected and carried out within our criminal justice system.

I strongly urge the Committee to support the other proposals in the bill before you to better assist all crime victims in Connecticut.

All these proposals just make sense, and I hope that you agree that they are worthy of your strong support. I thank you very much for taking this time to consider my testimony.

REP. LAWLOR: Thanks very much, Debbie. And I know it's not your first time testifying before our Committee, but so far you've got a very good track record of success, so hopefully this will be another example of that.

DEBBIE FLORENCE: Thank you very much, and it's good to see you all too.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you very much. Are there any questions? If not, thanks again. Next is Steve Ment and Deb Fuller.

STEPHEN MENT: Good afternoon. Representative Lawlor, Members of the Judiciary Committee, my name is Stephen Ment, and I am here today on behalf of the Judicial Branch with Debbie Fuller.

We each have one bill that we would like to testify on today, and I'll go first on Raised House Bill 7235, AN ACT CONCERNING CRIME VICTIMS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE VICTIM ADVOCATE.

My written testimony has a number of the Judicial Branch concerns. As many of them are concerns that we've raised previously, I just wanted to focus right now on a couple of specific operational concerns that are new to this bill that had not been in any prior version of it.

The first section I wanted to speak briefly about would be Section 5. Section 5 of the bill creates a burden on the Judicial Branch by shifting the responsibility for providing notice to a victim that a defendant has applied for accelerated rehabilitation from the defendant to the court.

We're very concerned with this initiative. As many of you may know, our clerks' offices are currently quite understaffed. Currently, there are 70 essential vacancies, which we cannot fill, due to budgetary constraints.

As a matter of fact, Judge Lavery will be appearing before our appropriations subcommittee workgroup to impress upon the committee just the difficulties that are going on in our clerks' offices processing the paperwork that they need to do now.

This requirement, we fear, will just compound a situation, which is already troublesome. We have folks working in the evenings, on weekends to try and catch up, and we're fearful of what this added responsibility could mean.

The other section that I wanted to touch briefly on was Section 8. Section 8 requires the establishment of a Crime Victim Assistance Center at each courthouse. We're not really sure what is intended here.

For members of the committee, for your information, information for crime victims is available now in all courthouses. Some courts have court service centers and others have court information desks, both of which have brochures, pamphlets, and other court forms.

If it's the intent of this section to require the branch to create a center within court, we need to oppose it. We have neither the space, nor the staff to implement it.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the bill. I'd be pleased to answer any questions you may have now, or after Attorney Fuller testifies.

DEBORAH FULLER: Good afternoon. On behalf of the Judicial Branch, I appear before you today to oppose Raised House Bill 6674, AN ACT CONCERNING THE TRANSFER OF JUDICIAL MARSHALS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

The Judicial Branch operates 46 courthouses across the state, consisting of over 400 courtrooms and almost three million square feet of space.

Security of the thousands of people who enter our buildings each day on matters ranging from a simple traffic offense to the most serious civil family or criminal matters is of paramount concern to us.

We addressed security concerns in the design of our courthouse and the technology we employ. However, there is no more important element in security than the skilled professional staff of judicial marshals.

This proposal would transfer our judicial marshal force from the branch to the Department of Public Safety.

We are strongly opposed to it because we do not believe that it will improve security in our courthouses, and we are certain that it would cause confusion and duplication of efforts.

Judicial marshals are thoroughly integrated into ever facet of courthouse operations. To separate them out and make them part of the Executive Branch would be a major disruption.

Decisions on matters such as how many judicial marshals should be assigned to a particular location or courtroom on a given day must rest with the administrative judges working in concert with the chief judicial marshals and the chief clerks to assess the number and types of cases heard that day, as well as other circumstances that may affect security on any given day.

There can be no ambiguity with respect to the lines of authority with such matters. And we believe that transferring judicial marshals to an outside entity would create ambiguity.

As members may be aware, the function of courthouse security was transferred by the Legislature to the Judicial Branch in 2000 when the county sheriffs were abolished. Since that time [Gap in testimony. Changing from Tape 1B to Tape 2A.]

--administration of the marshals. In July of 2005, the Commission of Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies granted our Judicial National Training Academy accreditation. The academy is one of only 13 such accredited academies in the United States.

These improvements provide ample evidence as to why this bill would constitute a step backwards. In conclusion, once again, we would urge the committee not to act favorably on this bill. Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Thanks. I'm not [inaudible] courthouse if a crime is a committed in a courthouse? Who's got jurisdiction to make the arrest?

DEBORAH FULLER: If a crime is committed in a courthouse, we contact the State Police.

REP. LAWLOR: Yeah, how come you don't contact the local police?

DEBORAH FULLER: I don't know. I think because it's a state building. I believe that's why, but I can find out.

REP. LAWLOR: [Inaudible] for example is where there was [inaudible] serious conduct, which is treated very minimally by the State Police in at least one courthouse that I'm aware of, a crime.

DEBORAH FULLER: Where was it?

REP. LAWLOR: I don't want to give you the details right now, but I was just curious. I think part of the problem is when the State Police showed up, they seemed to be oblivious to the whole situation and didn't really inquire into what really happened, and ended up with relatively minimal charges, which kind of defied logic if you knew the whole story.

So I'm just curious about that, but you don't care who has got jurisdiction, the State Police of the local police, do you?

DEBORAH FULLER: I don't think that we care about that. I don't believe so, but I'd have to get back to you on that one. I have to check.

REP. LAWLOR: I suppose we could change that if it's a state statute. Attorney Ment, I just want to ask you on the whole issue of the AR notices. You make some valid points.

I'm sure you're aware of the problem that gives rise to this, right? Victims getting the mail and notice from the actual defendant at their home address, right?

And for some people, I can imagine why that might be somewhat unsettling, and so I think the proposal would be to at least have it come from some person, some neutral party, or someone not necessarily adversely interested in the victim in this situation, let alone from the defendant.

If that doesn't exactly work, do you have a better solution how we can accomplish the goal that I think is behind the bill without overwhelming the clerks' offices?

STEPHEN MENT: My colleagues may not like my answer, but the first thing that comes to my head would be either perhaps the State's attorneys Office in the local courts because they would already have the victim contact information. The clerk wouldn't even have that.

Perhaps they could do it, or perhaps it could come from the counsel for the defendant. Those would be two quick ideas that come to mind.

REP. LAWLOR: I think as a practical matter, it does come from counsel of the defendant, but still if I were the victim, especially any kind of threatening type situation, there might be some make you a little nervous to get.

I'm wondering, do you think there might be some way that if everything was filled out, except for the address, the clerk's office could simply accept the envelope, which was fully paid for, and just write in the address and send it out and accept receipt of the card back, and stick it in the file when it returns? Is that--

STEPHEN MENT: We're certainly amenable to talking to see if we can come to an understanding about how this can best be [inaudible].

REP. LAWLOR: Because I'd be understanding [inaudible] yes, I think that might be some type of solution where we avoid the situation where the victim gets a letter in the mail from the offender in situations where [inaudible] that their home address wasn't being provided to a bad guy, the alleged bad guy. You can imagine how that would make people nervous.

STEPHEN MENT: Sure.

REP. LAWLOR: Are there other questions? Senator Kissel.

SEN. KISSEL: Yeah, just a [inaudible] along the lines of where Chairman Lawlor was going. My recollection when I was doing criminal defense work was quite often a lot of these matters, I would have to talk to the state's attorney regarding the AR application.

I know it's supposed to be one crime that you get AR can't be serious and there's certain criteria, but there might be a series of events over the course of an evening, and so part of that AR application is, well, who should we send the notice to?

Quite often, there's a dialog that goes on between defense counsel the state's attorney, and they may say, well if you send it to X, Y, and Z, that'll be okay. And they put a note in the file.

I actually agree with you wholeheartedly. I think for the clerks, A, they'd have to go over, more likely than that, the police report to try to figure out who indeed the victims are, and that's not always clear. And who is of the most concern for the state's attorney moving forward.

A long the lines of trying to come up with some kind of solution, I don't know if it's some sort of pre-prepared envelope or something like that. I don't know if the problem is that the victims necessarily see that this is a form.

No matter who sends it, the form is going to be signed by the applicant. And so to try to break that link, I think it's a little difficult.

But I also think that the costs involved might, again it may have changed since I was doing it, but it always had to be certified mail, return receipt requested.

So they get the green card so that you know that the application was received by somebody, and that's not inexpensive.

You start multiplying that out, then I think that would bolster your argument that it's not only time consuming, but this is a serious expense involved with this as well.

STEPHEN MENT: I would agree, Senator. Thank you. I believe that's a very valid point.

SEN. KISSEL: Always trying to help you folks out.

STEPHEN MENT: Much appreciated.

SEN. KISSEL: And regarding that other matter, regarding State Police and the local police, I know there was an incident in a parking garage, a very tragic incident that occurred close to a courthouse.

Was that something where State Police were notified as well, or was that state and local police, that horrific shooting that took place?

DEBORAH FULLER: I don't know the specifics of that. But that was not courthouse property. That was a municipal parking lot.

SEN. KISSEL: Thank you very much. I appreciate that it was a municipal parking lot. Just giving some asides here from our wonderful co-chair of this committee.

But that a horrific event, and I think that, unfortunately, as the years have gone on, I don't know if it's because we have a more violent society or what, but I hear from prosecutors more and more that they'd have encounters with some of the folks that they've been dealing with in just the normal practice of law.

We went through that whole series of people calling in with bomb threats not too long ago, and I don't even know, did we ever get to the bottom of what happened there? I mean, was there one guy that was doing it?

DEBORAH FULLER: I think there was an arrest made in those, wasn't there, Stephen?

STEPHEN MENT: Yes.

DEBORAH FULLER: I happened to be taking the day off on the day that that happened when all the courthouses had to be closed down, but Stephen was there.

STEPHEN MENT: Thank you. Yeah. Unfortunately, I don't recall the disposition of the matter, but I do recall there being an arrest.

SEN. KISSEL: Just my recollection, the haze is that they did get somebody that did some of the threats, but that there might have been some other copycats that may never have gotten [inaudible].

Unfortunately, these are all issues that we have to try to come to terms with. Involving your concerns about that other portion regarding the victims trying to have another area of the courthouse, I mean, here we have ample testimony regarding Manchester where they don't have any room to even have attorneys have privacy to consult with their clients regarding plea bargains and things like that.

So that's just one of many examples that space is really at a premium in these courthouses, and so I'm very sympathetic to what we need to do regarding victims.

And I do believe that you can't have a constitutional right without remedy. And whether they decide to pursue it through some legal challenge, like in Horton v. Meskill or [inaudible] or something like that.

We'll have to deal with that, but I think your points are all well taken. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you. Further questions? Representative Stone.

REP. STONE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the bill regarding the transfer of function of the judicial marshals, marshals from the judicial department to the Department of Public Safety.

Within the courthouses now, obviously there are judicial marshals. Is there a chief judicial marshal in each courthouse?

DEBORAH FULLER: There's a chief judicial marshal for each judicial district. I'm not sure if there is one in each. There must be a supervisory marshal in each courthouse, I presume.

REP. STONE: Within any particular courthouse, who makes the final call, sort of judgment call, so to speak, on security? Is it the presiding judge, the judge in the particular courtroom, or is it the supervising judicial marshal within the court building?

DEBORAH FULLER: I'm not exactly clear. I did ask specific questions about it. Within each courthouse within a JD, I would assume that it's the supervisory marshal in consultation with the presiding judge, but I could be wrong on that.

REP. STONE: But you have expressed a concern in your written testimony as to, I'll call it, command of control or lines of authority. At some point, someone is going to make a decision as to how best to insure the safety of a courthouse.

I guess I'll ask the question again. If you don't know, that's fine. You can get me the answer. But is that final arbiter of how best to safeguard the courthouse, does that rest within the discretion of the court or the judge?

DEBORAH FULLER: Yes.

REP. STONE: Or within the discretion of the person charged with insuring the public safety of a courthouse, i.e., of a judicial marshal?

DEBORAH FULLER: I believe ultimately it rests with the presiding judge, but I'll get back to you, to be clear on that.

I know that within, as far as a JD goes, the final say is in the administrative judge in consultation with the chief judicial marshal and the chief clerk.

However, as far as in each courthouse, and of course [inaudible] JD has the most [inaudible] separate locations within JD of any of them. I'll clarify that.

REP. STONE: And in addition to overseeing, if that were the case, to being the final arbiter on issues of safety within the courthouse, the Judicial Department also oversees these judicial marshals relative to personnel matters, grievances, and things of that nature. Would that be correct?

DEBORAH FULLER: Yes.

REP. STONE: And has the Judicial Branch, have they established procedures and protocol for handing grievances, work related issues, outside of the safety aspect, but in terms of the personnel issues that they deal with on a day-to-day basis?

DEBORAH FULLER: Absolutely.

REP. STONE: They have a process now.

DEBORAH FULLER: Yes.

REP. STONE: Is that the same process employed for the judicial marshals, as is the process for any other employee of the Judicial Branch, or is it a different procedure?

DEBORAH FULLER: I believe it's very similar. It certainly may be differentiated by the union contract to some degree. But again, if you want specifics on that, I'll get back to you.

REP. STONE: And obviously there are other state buildings. There are state properties that we in fact do provide security for.

Are you aware of how, for example, security is provided at the building on the corner of Capitol Avenue and Washington Street? Do you know who provides the security for that building?

DEBORAH FULLER: The state office building?

REP. STONE: Yeah.

DEBORAH FULLER: I think there's a private security--

REP. STONE: Is there? I don't know the answer to that.

DEBORAH FULLER: I know that when I've gone there, there's a person wearing a uniform that's a private security.

REP. STONE: We may go visit a mutual friend of ours that works in that building.

DEBORAH FULLER: [inaudible]

REP. STONE: [inaudible] You indicated in your written testimony that notwithstanding the fact that the judicial marshals were transferred to the Judicial Branch in 2000, that some five years later, you've got this accreditation from the Law Enforcement Agency, this Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies.

In taking aside for a moment the fact that these judicial marshals are presently under the Judicial Department, do you think that these marshals, in that they provide security, wouldn't they be better placed within that department within state government that provides security for all of us, i.e. the Department of Public Safety?

Doesn't it seem like a more natural fit? And whether we made this mistake in 2000, I'm not asking you to comment on that, but wouldn't it seem like a more natural fit that these individuals be within the jurisdiction of that organization, that state agency that provides public safety rather than under the Judicial Department?

DEBORAH FULLER: I don't really necessarily think so because I don't think that, although they perform a security function, I don't think that they are police officers or exactly the same as police officers.

And I don't think that the Department of Public Safety, I mean they have a state case and they have jurisdiction over certainly the state and certain types of crimes within the state and certain [inaudible] but they certainly don't perform all the security functions within the state.

REP. STONE: All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DEBORAH FULLER: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Are there other questions? If not, thanks again.

DEBORAH FULLER: Thank you for your time.

REP. LAWLOR: Next is Carl Anderson. Mr. Anderson will be followed by Mary Deenihan Hamel, Barbara Leitao, Joe Belliveau.

CARL ANDERSON: Representative Lawlor, distinguished Members of this Committee, good afternoon. My name is Carl Anderson. I practice law in Norwich, Connecticut, with the Anderson Law Firm. I serve as the president of the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association.

Today I'm here to very briefly supplement our written testimony with respect to the Raised Senate Bill 1241, which is AN ACT CONCERNING OFFERS OF COMPRISE.

I will also discuss briefly the Raised Senate Bill 1244, REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF LIABILITY AND TRUST LIMITS PRIOR TO THE INSTITUTION OF SUIT.

And lastly, a housekeeping bill, Raised Senate Bill 1270, which deals with NOTICE IN THE DRAM SHOP ACTION WHERE A DEATH OR INCAPACITY IS AT ISSUE.

Let me discuss the offer of compromise bill first. Very briefly, CTLA opposes this bill. For some reason, we're revisiting the time within which a plaintiff needs to respond to an offer of judgment.

This issue was discussed at length and a bipartisan effort resulted in a time period of 60 days back in 2005. I believe there was an attempt last year to limit that time back to ten days. Now we see it again in this bill.

I've been practicing law for 40 years. We all know that ethically you must disclose to a client any offer. And if I receive an offer of judgment from the defense side, admittedly, most of the time, they're inadequate, but not always.

I must disclose that offer immediately. To do this within ten days is really impossible. It's not impossible, but it's very, very unlikely that we can give that offer to the client, have the client discuss the matter with the family or the lawyer or financial advisor within a ten-day period. I see no reason at all why we're back to ten days. It should remain at 60 days.

The other portion of the bill, I think discourages filing offers of judgment by plaintiffs. You have to submit unlimited HIPAA forms, medical release forms that really lead to a fishing expedition on our clients' personal healthcare.

You're not going to do that and you're not going to file an offer of judgment. Offers of judgment help settle cases leading to a reduction of lawsuits, which is an important part of our process. So we are opposed to that Raised Senate Bill 1241 for those reasons.

As far as the disclosure of liability insurance policy limits prior to the institution of suit, as you all know, at the present time, the carriers have to disclose the policy limits once we are in suit.

In other words, you can move for a disclosure in production and they must comply in writing with the applicable liability limits.

If the carriers, and most of them don't disclose them prior to the institution of suit, we then must bring a lawsuit just to get the limits. The limits have nothing to do with the value of the case.

If you have a case with $25,000 in medical bills and factures of both femurs and there's a minimal policy of $20,000, you have to settle a case before suit.

You need to know, to intelligently evaluate the file, whether or not you're going to proceed to try to attempt a mediation of the case or bring it to suit. So there's no downside in disclosing policy limits prior to the institution of suit.

I must also say that Rhode Island has that bill. The bill you have before you is patterned after the Rhode Island bill, the Mass bill, and the Vermont bill, so we think that it makes sense.

I have another reason why I think it's important to disclose limits prior to suit. That is, if we have minimal limits, and minimal limits in Connecticut are now 20/40, $20,000 per person, $40,000 per accident. Many, many cases are worth more than that.

You need to exhaust the policy limits to assert an underinsured motorist claim. You have to have and prove that you've exhausted the claim. And without disclosure of the limits, you don't have that indignation.

Again, it just encourages bringing more lawsuits to get the information because you can't proceed [inaudible] without that information.

If I may, Representative Lawlor, just conclude by talking briefly about Raised Senate Bill 1270. That's a Dram Shop Action.

The law has been that when a person dies in an accident or needs a conservator and there's a matter pending before the probate court, the present law has been for some time that there's 120 days within which a fiduciary will be appointed.

And then, during that 120-day period, there's a tolling of the notice requirement to the purveyor of the alcohol involved in a Dram Shop Action.

Unfortunately, last year when the notice requirement issue was discussed here and a bill was passed increasing the notice from 60 days to 120 days, there was left out a provision when a fiduciary is necessary.

The bill we are proposing in Raised Senate Bill 1270 addresses that issue so that the probate court has ample time to appoint a fiduciary or a conservator who then would have legal authority to act on behalf of that individual or state and proceed with the notice requirements.

That is the purpose of the Raised Senate Bill 1270. It's a housekeeping bill. I just had a situation in Brooklyn, at the Brooklyn Probate Court. It was a fellow died as a result of an automobile accident. There was drinking involved.

It was a very convoluted process in terms of who should represent the estate. There were several hearings. It was 130 days post accident before a fiduciary was appointed. So the 120-day period, under our present law, had run with 120 days.

That is just not right. We should have had more time after the fiduciary was appointed. And under the present act submitted under Raised Senate Bill 1270 does that. That's my remarks.

Again, the written testimony has been submitted. I commend you to it. It's a privilege to be here. I'll be happy to answer any questions, Representative Lawlor.

REP. LAWLOR: Great. Thank you very much, Carl. Are there questions from Members of the Committee? Senator Kissel.

SEN. KISSEL: Thank you very much. Thank you for coming to testify this afternoon.

CARL ANDERSON: My pleasure, Sir.

SEN. KISSEL: Over the last few years, I've been very sympathetic to the notion of trying to obtain, from insurance companies, the policy limits, and I think that you raise a number of valid points, especially if one is trying to prepare to eventually make a claim against the uninsured or underinsured policy.

Time is ticking away in some of these. Sometimes it's very close. And sometimes it's a close call as to whether the damages actually will reach a threshold where you can make a claim against the uninsured, underinsured.

It's interesting because, with the testimony filed this afternoon by the Insurance Association of Connecticut, they have a slew.

They have a dozen folks that have signed on in opposition to this, and everything from the Connecticut Food Association, the Medical Society, Lumber Dealers, they've all lined up in opposition to what I think is a fairly innocuous proposal.

How would you respond to their primary concern that this is just going to lead to fishing expeditions? Because I come at it from sort of the small town personal injury attorney point of view where we don't have time for fishing expeditions.

If there's going to be some large firm with a class action that's going to be going after hugely deep pockets, they're going to invest the resources and nothing is stopping them from bringing a lawsuit in any event.

It just strikes me that what you're looking for is fairly reasonable, so, A, how would you respond to the fishing expedition concerns?

And, B, since you've noted and appended copies of the laws from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont, has there been any giant spike in terms of litigation in those states?

Or the adverse implications raised by the insurance folks, have they come to pass in those other states, to the best of your knowledge?

CARL ANDERSON: Thank you very much, Senator Kissel. I really view that I don't really understand the opposition from so many people about disclosure of policy limits prior to suit. Particularly when they must disclose policy limits subsequent to suit.

The long and short of it is, right now we can get this information providing you spend $400 or $500 to bring a lawsuit, and it's really unnecessary. The long and short of the answer is it's not a fishing expedition. It's not a deep pocket issue at all.

It's a very practical issue. As I indicated, particularly when you're analyzing whether or not you should proceed to try a case when you have a $100,000 case and you find out later on it was a $20,000 policy.

You might have taken a different approach, and maybe you mediated [inaudible] or certainly try to settle the case within the policy, and then proceed on if you're lucky and fortunate enough to have underinsured motorist coverage.

I don't understand the opposition to it. It makes sense to disclose the limits. It encourages settlements. It facilitates settlements, and there's really no downside to doing it.

It's got to be requested in writing. There's got to be a reasonable time to respond. And other than that, I don't see a downside to it.

SEN. KISSEL: I was just going to say as a very brief follow up, and I apologize for interrupting. I appreciate your testimony, but I can see how folks on the committee might have different views on this issue, and if there's any empirical evidence out there.

I know you folks are great at marshaling resources and data, but you've sited these three other New England states that have a very similar law.

And if there's anything out there that can show, all right, number of civil litigation claims five years prior to the passage of the law, five years after the passage of the law.

No spike. No bump. No anything. In fact, if matters have settled out, it might even eventually dropped a tad.

I don't know, but I think that that would really bolster our ability to try to get what I think is this common sense piece of legislation through this building this year.

CARL ANDERSON: Thank you very much, Senator.

REP. LAWLOR: Other questions? Representative O'Neill.

REP. O'NEILL: Yeah. I noticed in the case of Vermont, this actually seems to be related to the insurance again uninsured motorist. It's part of that section, it kind of looks like.

But do all of the states involved have uninsured motorist? I mean it seems like this kind of relates to the got to find out if you're going to be able to do an uninsured motorist claim because you need to know whether you're going to exhaust limits.

CARL ANDERSON: That's really the issue, and I think I alluded to it in my testimony. One of the conditions preceding to bringing an underinsured motorist case where the defendant or wrongdoer has insurance, but it's less than the injured person's liability insurance, it triggers this underinsured motorist situation.

You must exhaust the underlying policy, and that's pretty standard in most states. So you need to know what the policy limits are, and you've got to have that in order to properly protect your client's rights.

REP. O'NEILL: Because it seems like, at least certainly in the Vermont one, it's tied right into that statute related to underinsured and uninsured motors.

CARL ANDERSON: Right. I haven't studied the Vermont statute exhaustively. I point this out that other states, neighboring states, have a similar statute that we're proposing here.

REP. LAWLOR: Are there other questions? Carl, thanks again.

CARL ANDERSON: My pleasure. Thank you very much.

REP. LAWLOR: Next is Mary Deenihan Hamel.

MARY DEENIHAN HAMEL: Good afternoon, Representative Lawlor and Members of the Judiciary Committee. I'm Mary Deenihan Hamel, and I live in Torrington.

And I'm here today to support the passage of Raised House Bill 7235, AN ACT CONCERNING CRIME VICTIMS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE VICTIM ADVOCATE.

I am a victim survivor of domestic violence and sexual assault. This was not a choice that I made and, in fact, was a situation that I desperately was trying to get out of while I was going through this.

The criminal justice process I had to endure was long and exhausting, to say the least, both for me, as well as for my family. It was emotionally draining and it reduces a person to a nothing, regardless of the intent of the attorneys involved.

Throughout this process, I was told that I had rights, but these rights were never enforced and seemed to be superseded by the man who raped me.

He had more rights than I did, and his rights seemed to be honored and respected by the system to a much greater extent than my rights as a crime victim.

I did contact the State Victim Advocate, James Papillo, for his assistance, and he was able to work with the prosecutor to see that certain rights of mine were enforced. However, there was no remedy for many of my rights that had been violated.

There was, at the time, really no recourse for me legally to address these violations to my rights, or even get them to be respected. The one sentence that I constantly heard too often throughout the criminal justice process was, I'm sorry, there's nothing I can do.

This is not acceptable to me. And until this is not said again, I will be wherever I am needed to make this change. I urge you to support the commonsense proposals of the State Victim Advocate contained in Raised House Bill 7235.

First, crime victims need and want our State Victim Advocate to have the tools necessary to legitimately investigate complaints from crime victims, and to seek remedies when those in the system insist on violating rights.

I'm tired of hearing the same objections to these proposals raised by those in the system who obviously don't want to see victims' rights attain the respect the citizens of Connecticut demanded when they supported amending our state constitution in 1996 to give crime victims rights.

The Office of the Victim Advocate needs to be an office with teeth, which can bite when necessary, just like the police department, the Office of the State's Attorney, and the Public Defender's Office.

Each of the other proposals in the bill would provide the level of protection that crime victims deserve. Crime victims, whether they are related to the offender or not, if the crime charged involves violence of any type should be protected by a protective order.

No contact orders offer no real protection since they are not backed up by penalties sufficient to keep offenders away.

The proposal to have victims' rights and services information prominently displayed in each and every courthouse in the state is an extremely important proposal, because not every crime victim qualifies for the services of a court based victim advocate.

Information regarding rights and how to assert your rights must be made available to every crime victim. Our state constitution demands it.

If an offender has violated his or her probation, the crime victim should be allowed to know this and should be heard by the court to protect restitution orders and other orders that were ordered by the court in the original sentencing.

No crime victim should be contacted directly by the defendant during the criminal prosecution. The current law that requires criminal defendants to directly notify the victim via mail of his or her application for AR should be changed.

The court clerk should be the one contacting victims. Many victims will have felt re-victimized by learning the defendant has learned where the crime victim lives.

Time is running out, time is gone, so I'll point out, unlike criminals, most crime victims are involved in the criminal justice system not because they choose to be.

[Inaudible] deserve to have the rights and protections given them by all lawmakers and the citizens of our state honored and respected to the same degree as the rights given to criminal defendants. Thank you for an opportunity to be heard today. If there's any [inaudible].

REP. LAWLOR: Thanks very much, Mary. We're sorry that you had to endure such an ordeal, but I think you're doing the right thing now in advocating for changes in public policy.

MARY DEENIHAN HAMEL: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: I think your colleagues would tell you that it does pay off over time. Other questions? If not, thanks again.

MARY DEENIHAN HAMEL: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Next is Barbara Leitao.

BARBARA LEITAO: Good afternoon. I'm here to support Raised House Bill 7235 for crime victims, and would like to present my story on how I became a crime victim, what obstacles I had to go through with both the judicial system and the court-based victims advocate, and suggestions on how to improve such services.

On April 29, 2005, my brother, Leo Carrier, was tragically killed in a motorcycle accident while on his way to work to Connecticut Natural Gas.

Mourning him are his wife, his three minor children, Leo, age 16, Brian, age 14, Brittany, age 11, my mother, my sister, and of course myself. Our dad predeceased my brother's death.

The defendant was arrested on or about July 11, 2005 and was charged with negligent homicide with a motor vehicle and failure to grant right of way. I am unsure of the arrest date because at no time were any family members notified of the defendant's arrest.

After reading about other court cases that happened after my brother's accident, I contacted the court on January 10, 2006, to find out what was going on with my brother's court case.

I was told the next court date was three days later. Both my mother and I attended this and all subsequent court hearings that we knew about.

After speaking with the prosecutor, my mom and I realized that we had missed four court dates since the offender had been arrested because no one from the court, including the court-based victim advocate, notified us.

I asked the prosecutor and the victim advocate why we were never notified, and the victims advocate's response was pointed toward the East Hartford Police Department. Imagine the shock in finding out that court process was already underway without our knowledge.

We can only imagine how things may have differed if we had been included from the start. Since this was the first time my family had had any dealings with the court system, we had no idea on what to expect or what was going on inside the courtroom.

My family and I were not told of our right to object or support any plea agreement, or of our right to address the court regarding any proposed plea agreement.

We were only informed that we could address the court at the sentencing hearing, and we were not given the opportunity to object or support the plea.

So what were we told? We were provided a booklet entitled Rights of Crime Victims of Connecticut.

Going through a traumatic experience such as this, this booklet did not do us victims any justice. One is confused, numb, and just baffled over the court experience, the terminology, process, and seeing the defendant.

Crime victims would benefit greatly from a guide, as proposed in Raised House Bill 7235 that a court informs crime victims of their rights and instructs them on how best to exercise those rights.

I had to complete a research paper for school, and I wrote my hypotheses on whether or not the Judicial Branch Court-Based Victim Advocate should be held accountable for notifying all immediate family members of court dates.

After a thorough review of the rights that crime victims had and while writing this paper, it occurred to me that several of our Connecticut state past constitutional rights had been broken.

Connecticut Law Article 29 establishes that victims in all crime prosecutions have the following rights, the right to notification of court proceedings, the right to attend the trial and all other court proceedings, the right to object or support any plea agreement and to make a statement to the court prior to the acceptance by the court of the plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

Crime victims have rights, which are protected by law, such as the right to be notified of court proceedings, including arrest, arraignment, and release of offender.

Two noted requirements of Connecticut's statutory citations are, the State's Attorney shall notify any victim upon request of all judicial proceedings, including defendant's arrest, arraignment, release, guilty plea, trial and sentencing per Connecticut General Statute 51-286e.

And the State's Attorney shall notify a homicide victim's family of arraignment date, time, place, and contact person for case status per General Statute 51-286d.

We were never notified when the defendant was arrested and further of the four subsequent court proceedings. It wasn't until I contacted the court for information. Even then, our rights were violated again.

I am pleading to you as lawmakers to make it right for victims. The voices of victims must be heard. Just imagine for one moment if you were in my shoes. Victims look just like you and me. Victims don't choose to become victims.

I strongly urge the committee to support the following proposals contained in Raised House Bill 7235 to better the treatment and services available to crime victims.

One, provide the State Victim Advocate with authority to pursue appellate relief on behalf of crime victims. Two, improve all notification requirements for crime victims.

Three, publish meaningful information that would truly assist the victims through the criminal justice process. Four, develop forms so crime victims have the proper tools to fulfill their obligations by law.

And five, further protect crime victims by insuring that their personal contact information remains confidential when informing the court and the State's Attorney of their intent to exercise rights. I thank you for the opportunity to testify and for your consideration.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you very much. It's a compelling story, and we're sorry for the loss that your family experienced.

BARBARA LEITAO: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Are there any questions? Representative O'Neill.

REP. O'NEILL: Did anyone talk to you about the possibility of filing some sort of a lawsuit in nature of a declaratory judgment?

I don't know if you were here previously when we talked about this as an alternative to the bill that's in front of us as a way to get some sort of relief.

BARBARA LEITAO: I've written several letters to several different organizations, and I get the same response. We're sorry about your story. I just feel like I'm beating a dead horse.

I understand and I appreciate that concept. I just don't understand or I don't think or feel that that would come to any kind of resolution other than me spending money. I don't think. I'm beating a dead horse. I believe that.

REP. O'NEILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. LAWLOR: And I think it's worth noting that there is a state law that says that anyone in the position that your family found themselves in, a victim of a violent crime, must be supplied by the police officers, the investigating officers, a card explaining how to access services and what your rights are, that type of thing.

And it's our understanding that that is very rarely actually done, even though there's a law, a specific requirement that's been on the books for, I don't know, 15 years now.

So we share a lot of the frustrations you're explaining here, and sometimes we're frustrated because we pass a law, not to mention the constitutional amendment, and it does seem like, in effect, it's ignored at the end of the day.

We understand people are overwhelmed with work, but these are legal obligations imposed upon people that work for the state, and who have the powers of the state, like local police.

I don't know. We'll keep trying to figure out what to do about it, but it is a high priority up here. That's for sure.

BARBARA LEITAO: Thank you. I appreciate it.

REP. LAWLOR: Sure. No problem. Are there other questions? And Barbara, just to be clear, neither you, nor anybody in your family, I take it, got a card from the police when the incident happen regarding victims' rights?

BARBARA LEITAO: I don't know if my sister-in-law received one or not. I don't know.

REP. LAWLOR: All right.

BARBARA LEITAO: But I know none of us were contacted for court. That's why we missed court, and that has a big impact.

REP. LAWLOR: Sure. Thanks very much.

BARBARA LEITAO: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Next is Joe Belliveau.

JOSEPH BELLIVEAU: Good afternoon, Representative Lawlor and Members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Joe Belliveau, and I am in support of Raised House Bill 7235, AN ACT CONCERNING CRIME VICTIMS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE VICTIM ADVOCATE.

Crime victims in Connecticut need to have more rights to protect them. In many cases, they are being re-victimized by the system, and we need to address these issues.

For example, when a defendant applies for accelerated rehabilitation, he is required to notify his or her victim. It must be terrifying to the victim to know that the offender has their private information in order to contact them.

Most, if not all, would feel very threatened by this. The confidentiality of the victim should be protected at all costs. This bill proposes to correct this.

Also, it seems that criminals are well aware of their rights under the justice system, while the victims are usually not very informed as to what services are available to them. Victims' needs are just as important as the defendant's.

The creation of a client victim assistance center at each court site is crucial to protecting victims' rights. In addition, giving more power and authority to the State Victim Advocate would help to insure that the victims' best interests are being addressed.

I believe that Raised House Bill number 7235 is a move in the right direction and urge you to support it.

Earlier, the testimony that was given today was regarding accelerated rehabilitation that is a budget restraint on the courts to have the courts handle this versus the defendant.

I did some quick calculations. If you took, I would just say, 10,000 individuals applying for AR, and you assess a processing fee of $25 when they come in and give you the envelope, you're looking at $250,000. That should either open the door to open either full-time or part-time clerk personnel to handle this.

The cost for a certified letter with the new price increase that's going to be forthcoming, it won't even exceed $6. So you have $19 extra to play with and to the budget.

I think that would eliminate the defendant getting all the information and sending the letter. I just want to again say thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak on behalf of this bill.

REP. LAWLOR: Thank you, Joe. I think they actually do charge quite a bit of money to apply for AR. I forget how much it is. Is Deb still here? It's $135 to apply for accelerated rehabilitation--

JOSEPH BELLIVEAU: I'm talking about as far as handling the letter to the victim. You can do a separate fee on top of it.

REP. LAWLOR: [Inaudible] all I'm saying is they already get a lot of money, so just there you go.

JOSEPH BELLIVEAU: But then again, they are the ones that are looking for a special pass.

REP. LAWLOR: They don't get special passes. Other questions? Thanks very much, Joe.

JOSEPH BELLIVEAU: Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Next is Shirley Pripstein.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: She had to leave.

REP. LAWLOR: Then Kate Haakonsen is next. Attorney Haakonsen will be followed by Kevin Hennessey and Beverlee Dacey.

KATE HAAKONSEN: Good afternoon, Representative Lawlor and Members of the Judiciary Committee. I'm here on behalf of the Family Law Section of the Connecticut Bar Association.

My name is Kate Haakonsen, and I am here to request on behalf of the section that the Judiciary Committee not act on Raised House Bill 6068.

It's striking to me that the last several pieces of testimony have been talking about how awkward it is for people who are victimized to feel that they have an inadequate remedy.

Committee House Bill 6068 is really also about taking away remedies because what it would do, although be it in the family court context, is take away the only financial remedies that spouses have for the bad acts of their spouses in the context of the divorce case.

This bill has been kicking around for two or three Sessions, and the first time it came up, we were told by one of the original proponents, actually the only original proponent, that this was really about protecting spouses who wanted to pursue their outside love interests after a divorce was filed from having that kind of activity held against them.

What this bill does is so much more than that. And frankly, I could have argued with the validity of that idea in the first place, but this [Gap in testimony. Changing from Tape 2A to Tape 2B.]

--the court rendering financial remedies to spouses, financial remedies being the distribution of assets and the award of alimony, regardless of whether their case is filed is a no-fault case, irretrievable breakdown, or whether it's filed on fault grounds.

So that if this bill became law, we would be in a position of saying to our clients, on the one hand you don't have to worry about what you do to your spouse before or after the marriage or before or after the divorce because you're not going to be held financially responsible for anything.

As long as you haven't broken a criminal law and as long as there's no tort cause of action that can be brought against you, you're off scot-free because the court can't entertain any evidence about what you did and how it affected your marriage or your spouse.

On the other hand, a potential client comes in and tells you a tale of woe about a spouse who has met people on the Internet, spent all the family money at Foxwoods, flown all over the country to meet people in motels, gotten involved in significant substance abuse, or millions of other things that I could tell you about, having done this for now over 28 years.

You have to say to that spouse, I'm sorry, but the court doesn't care about any of that. And I can't present any of that testimony. You're never going to get to tell your story to anybody except me. And there's nothing I can do about it.

We in the Family Section think that this was a terrible public policy. It will make the public feel worse about the court system than it already feels, and really do a disservice.

And what it won't do is it won't take the emotion out of the case. It will just take away the outlet, the ability to discuss the reason for the emotion. Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Thanks very much. Are there questions from the Committee? If not, thanks again.

KATE HAAKONSEN: You're welcome.

REP. LAWLOR: Next is Kevin Hennessey.

KEVIN HENNESSEY: Good afternoon, Representative Lawlor and Members of the Committee. My name is Kevin Hennessey. I'm a staff attorney with the Connecticut Business & Industry Association.

I'm here today to testify on two bills, one supporting Raised Senate Bill 1241, AN ACT CONCERNING OFFERS OF COMPROMISE. I submitted some written testimony.

So I'm going to kind of take my time to talk about the other bill, the bill that I'm opposing. That's Raised Senate Bill 1244, AN ACT REQUIRING THE DISCLOSURE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY LIMITS PRIOR TO THE FILING OF A CLAIM.

We're already heard about this a couple times today. I just wanted to reiterate a few points. First, the way the bill is written currently, it's going to address all liability insurance.

It appears that there had been some questions and discussions about the uninsured motorists, but this is going to have a negative impact on every type of liability insurance carrier, whether you're a business, whether you're a doctor, whether you're an automobile driver.

The disclosure of the limit prior to the filing of a claim is going to drive up the floor of settlements negotiations. The biggest concern we have is currently under the system when a lawsuit is filed. The plaintiff has to put in a request for their damages.

Once they put in that request for the damages, and then a pretrial discovery occurs, they receive the information on the policy limits. If they receive the information before putting in that request, they're going to know the liability limits are X amount of dollars.

And you know what? Rather than going off of what your actual injury is, let's go for a little higher. See if we can get a little more money out of them. The biggest concern is it's going to drive up the cost and drive the cost of lawsuits is bad for everyone involved.

And again, I just wanted to allude to the fact that although Massachusetts and Rhode Island do have this right now, currently there are about 40 states that do not have the disclosure of policy limits prior to the filing of a claim.

The federal government does not have that either, so it's a small minority of states that do have that.

And although it probably doesn't affect whether or not the suits settle, our biggest concern is it's going to affect the amount of money involved. I'd be happy to answer any questions that the committee might have. Thank you.

REP. LAWLOR: Thanks. Senator Kissel.

SEN. KISSEL: Thank you very much, Chairman Lawlor. I have a question. In the testimony that was given to us by the folks from the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association, and maybe this was a tactical error on their part, but one of the statutes that they used as an example is Vermont.

In my reading of the Vermont law, which Representative O'Neill noted, was apparently within their uninsured motorist section of laws. And I think it's helpful if I just sort of read this section.

It says, within 30 days of receipt of a written request by a person legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of motor vehicles for bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, or for property damage resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, an insurer that may be liable to satisfy part of all of the claim under a policy subject to this chapter shall provide a statement by a duly authorized agent of the insurer setting forth the names of the insurer and insured and the limits of liability coverage.

To my mind, the way Vermont has drafted their legislation, it would be very narrowly tailored towards those areas that I feel are of the utmost concern to the folks in the Trial Lawyers.

In other words, it's the automobile accident where you have to find out what's out there and then proceed to plan your strategy to maximize recovery for the victim of the negligent operation of the motor vehicle.

And it would strike me that if we moved forward with language that mirrored Vermont's that I can't.

I mean, I know you'd have to go back and consult with your folks, but I can't imagine that folks in the Connecticut Business & Industry Association would have too much concern if it only applies to motor vehicle matters.

KEVIN HENNESSEY: You're probably right, Senator Kissel. Thank you for reading the statute to me. And that would be my understanding as well.

However, I would like to be able to review it and consult with some of our member companies and try and get some feedback before I gave you a definitive answer.

But I agree that it would be something that I'm sure probably, if it dealt specifically with uninsured motorists, it would not concern the business industry as much.

Still, I'm not sure on that, but certainly wouldn't concern them as far as business liability goes. That would be much more dangerous.

SEN. KISSEL: Thank you, and again, it's always a half a loaf. And the trial lawyers might not be completely enamored with it, but I think it would cover 95% of what their concerns. And I'd like to see it get on the books and start addressing their needs.

At the same time, I'm sure the insurance folks wouldn't be too happy if, all of a sudden, 13 out of the 14 folks that sign that objection were pealed away because, if it was narrowly drafted, they may not have any concerns.

But that's what we try to do around here is we try to, if it's at all possible, we try to work out compromises so that we can help effectuate a better running of the state and more access to justice within the court system.

And so I would throw that out there. I would suggest that it would be helpful if you bounce that off of your membership. You may be committed to moving forward down and just having a blanket opposition.

But I really feel like the Vermont statute seems to be the one that really gets to the nub of all of this. And my personal druthers are that perhaps we could move down that path. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

REP. FOX: Thank you, Senator. Any other questions for Members of the Committee? Hearing none, thank you, Mr. Hennessey.

KEVIN HENNESSEY: Thank you.

REP. FOX: Next we have Beverlee Dacey, followed by Raphael Podolsky. Good afternoon.

BEVERLEE DACEY: My name is Beverlee Dacey. I live in Easton, and I came to speak in support of Raised House Bill 7235. I didn't come with anything prepared because I really wanted to hear what others had to say first and respond accordingly.

I personally am categorized as a victim, but I'm really not a victim. The victim in my family is my mother, who was killed on April 6, 2005, by a drunk driver.

And she was just out doing an errand on I-95, driven off the road at 1:00 in the afternoon by a gentleman who was so intoxicated he had a blood alcohol level of 0.28, which I think most of us would find unfathomable.

It's very unfortunate, I think, that so many of us are here to speak to you, because if indeed your bill were functioning properly, I don't think we would need all the help we've had to solicit to get through the justice process, and that troubles me personally, and I think it should trouble you, as Legislators.

The bill is extraordinary, necessary, and a blessing for those of us who are grieving and don't know what to do when we're trying to hold ourselves together emotionally and see that the person we loved so dearly is properly represented in the courtroom.

You know, a comment was made about the appeal process and injecting a third party to the proceedings when there is a third party who is a part of the proceeding, and that's the deceased individual in many cases. They have no voice. They're just a docket number.

And the only way anyone pays any attention to them is through those of us who persist within the courthouse to remind everyone that, yes, indeed there was a human life that was lost, as was in my case.

What I went through is unfathomable to see the resolution of my mother's case. It just was finally resolved at Christmas, which is almost two years later.

And it took an act of Congress to get us there. And actually, it was a credit of the Office of Victim Advocacy that we finally saw it happen.

After my mother was killed, we had no idea that there were any resources available to us within the courthouse, and I just happened one day, in my frustration and sadness, to call MADD. And it was through MADD that I found out that we had any rights at all.

So there's really this black hole out there that exists to the general public that we even have any kind of rights, and so that to me is the initial obstacle that needs to be addressed here.

When I look at this bill, I see this bill in its entirety, and I realize that all of the pieces, if you were to take one of them out of the puzzle, the puzzle loses its image.

It's a bill that in totality solves the problem because there are so many areas right now that are dysfunctional. I had an experience where the judge suggested we didn't need to be there, I didn't need to be there.

There was an experience where there was information not given to us, the prosecutor not wanting to speak with us, the prosecutor not being in the courtroom for five months of proceedings.

And had I not been there and gotten information, the prosecutor didn't even know what had happened, and these were very, very, very important proceedings that he hadn't been a party to. So that our system was all disjointed.

So I've come to speak to you today to encourage you to look at the elements of this bill in its entirety. I can give you another illustration that I think is very important. It has to do with that AR Clause.

In our case, as part of the sentence, the defendant was given a no-contact order. He's not allowed to contact us at all or communicate with us at all. How do you solve that problem with the current law or the current guidelines?

I think that we need to empower this office. One has the feeling in the courthouse, and I can't impress this upon you enough, and I pray none of you have to face it. We are perceived, those of us who are there to represent our loved ones, as an unnecessary evil.

And you feel like you're some kind of a leper in the courthouse. And it's painful, and it's sad, and it's distressing.

And you only have the fortitude to keep on going because you think about how much you love that person who's not there anymore, and how they're counting on you to do this for them.

There's no reason for us to feel that way. And the fact that that office has hundreds of people contacting them means something is really wrong, and I can't impress upon you enough to please fix it.

Not for me. It's too late for me. But for everyone else who is going to be facing this down the road and to legitimize the rights that you've now, and the citizens of this state, have given to all of us who are going to be facing this down the road.

And that's all I'm going to say because my time is up, even though I could say a lot more. So thank you.

REP. FOX: Thank you very much, Ms. Dacey, and our sympathies and condolences to the loss of your mother.

Can I ask you a question as far as, you testified that you were not aware that the Office of Victim Advocate existed until the people from MADD told you so.

BEVERLEE DACEY: I wasn't aware of my rights, of our rights at all, that we even had any rights until I happened to contact the MADD office, and they sent me some literature.

And you know, as you probably can imagine, when you're grief stricken, you can't even think straight. To try to decode the literature was daunting, and it took months before I even began to comprehend what was available to me and my family.

There are no real resources out there. If you happen to get lucky, and you are resourceful yourself, you finally get the answers. But there are so many people out there who can't do that for whatever reason. And we are leaving them hamstrung by not providing them these resources.

That's why I'm trying to emphasize to you, I think this bill in its entirety is essential. You take out one or two pieces of it, and the whole thing comes crashing down. It becomes meaningless.

REP. FOX: How much time passed from the accident itself until you finally got in touch with somebody from the courthouse?

BEVERLEE DACEY: Probably four months, and then it was only out of my frustration with the fact that nothing was happening. The person who killed my mother still does not believe that he killed her. He claims she hit him.

So the fact of the matter is, we went through an entire trial. This thing went all the way to the end. Coupled, you want to hear horror upon horror.

This gentleman, six months after he has this accident, gets arrested in Stamford for cocaine manufacturing and laundering.

Two weeks after his trial finally ends in December with my mother's case, he takes a plea in Stamford and gets consecutive sentencing to coincide with the sentence he received from my mom.

There was no way for me to acquire a stitch of information about that other aspect of his court proceedings, nor now do I have any information of the possibility of getting any information about his pursuing an appeal. So here we are. Here you sit, unable to do anything further.

REP. FOX: Thank you. Are there questions from Members of the Committee? Representative Spallone.

REP. SPALLONE: Thank you for your testimony. I had one question. When you testified a few moments ago, you mentioned something about the State's Attorney not being present. And I just wondered if you could elaborate a little.

Traditionally in our courts, when a case is on the docket, nothing happens unless the State's Attorney is in the courtroom and calls the case. So I wondered, did you mean the attorney who tried the case later wasn't present? What did you mean by that?

BEVERLEE DACEY: There were instances where there was no one from the State's Attorneys Office there. And there would be just another continuance, another continuance, and another continuance.

And I listened to all of you and your concern for budget and proper utilization of our financial resources.

And I used to sit there in horror thinking about the amount of money that was being wasted by proceeding after proceeding, and continuance after continuance because there was no one there.

REP. SPALLONE: Was the defendant represented by counsel and, if so, was it a public defender or private counsel?

BEVERLEE DACEY: He started out with private counsel. He's very wealthy. And then after he blew up a lot of money in cocaine smoke, he secured a public defender. The public defender was there.

REP. SPALLONE: When the cases were continued, I assume that there was a State's Attorney in the courtroom at the time of the continuance when the judge continued the case to another date.

BEVERLEE DACEY: Not all the time, no.

REP. SPALLONE: And I understand that you're, I mean, you're not a regular there, fortunately. Unfortunately, you had to attend, so some of the proceedings are confusing.

And was it your understanding whether there were any, and it might be hard from your perspective, whether maybe there were plea negotiations going on during those court dates when the case was continued?

BEVERLEE DACEY: There were definitely plea discussions that occurred regarding plea negotiations. This gentleman made it clear he was not going to take a plea. And so, consequently, that's why there were so many continuances.

REP. SPALLONE: Thank you for your answers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BEVERLEE DACEY: I don't know if I've answered your question. Thank you very much.

REP. FOX: Any other questions from Members of the Committee? Hearing none, thank you for your testimony. Our next witness is Raphael Podolsky, and good afternoon.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Good afternoon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is Raphael Podolsky. I'm a lawyer with the Legal Assistance Resource Center of Connecticut, which is part of the Legal Aid and Legal Services Programs.

I'm here to speak on two of the family bills that are on your agenda, Raised House Bill 6068 and Raised House Bill 6058. In both of them, I would ask the Committee to take no further action on the bills and not move them forward.

Raised House Bill 6068 is a bill that would prohibit the consideration of the cause of a divorce when an alimony is issued, an alimony order or property settlement is done in a family case.

This creates some significant problems within the framework of our own caseload. The first thing is that it seems to me there is kind of confusion about where the cause of the divorce comes into play. The cause of the divorce is very relevant to alimony and property settlement.

It's not relevant to child support. Child support is something that we do based on people's ability to pay, and really just involves an analysis of what the prospective earning capacities are of the two parties.

Alimony and property settlement have always taken into consideration how would the parties have gotten to the point they've gotten to. So in that sense, considering the cause of the divorce is a legitimate thing.

Our client base often has cases that involve domestic violence where one spouse has been battered or has been intimidated, and it may well be a significant cause leading to the divorce.

It's very important that the court can hear information about that in deciding how to address issues of alimony.

Second, it creates kind of an odd situation because, by making this irrelevant in a no-fault divorce, it means if you want to put in front of the court what the circumstances were, you must plead a fault based divorce.

So it actually creates incentives to do two-count or three-count pleading in divorce cases, taking us backwards away from no-fault grounds towards trying to use a fault ground as a way of getting in the evidence that you need to get in, so the court will hear it when the time comes for alimony decisions.

And that's just going to slow everything down in the court system, so I would ask you not to move that bill forward.

The second bill is Raised House Bill 6058, which deals with unconscionability at the time of enforcement of a prenuptial agreement.

The doctrine in Connecticut is that an agreement can be unconscionable, either at the time that it's entered into or at the time it's enforced. This bill would say you cannot consider unconscionability at the time of enforcement.

It ignores the fact that divorce itself is an equitable action and it's the goal of the court to do equity to all the parties. And it's interesting because in one of the Supreme Court cases addressing this issue, McHugh v. McHugh, it's a 1980 case.

The Supreme Court said, an antenuptial agreement will not be enforced where the circumstances of the parties at the time of the dissolution are so far beyond the contemplation of parties at the time the agreement was made as to make enforcement of the agreement work an injustice.

That's the underlying principle, and you don't want to take that principle out. The bill, in a sense, ignores the fact that circumstances can sometimes change radically.

It can have to do with the health of the parties, their employability, their behavior during the marriage. There are all sorts of things that make for significant change.

The doctrine in the Connecticut courts has been, you have to have a very persuasive reason why you should not enforce the agreement so that there really is not problem, to my knowledge, of little tiny things being a basis for not enforcing an agreement, but major things maybe.

In regard to both of these, I believe the system now adequately takes care of the situations, and it would be best not to try to change that. Thank you.

REP. FOX: Thank you. Any questions? Representative O'Neill.

REP. O'NEILL: You didn't win the lottery today, did you?

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: No, this was fine. I actually was fairly embarrassed at the lottery I won last time.

REP. O'NEILL: Just one quick question. You mentioned your client base when you were talking a little earlier. Do you see a lot of prenuptial agreements?

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: No. The prenuptials, I said the client base in reference to the alimony orders. The people we see are very poor. In many cases, we're only dealing with child support. We're not dealing with alimony. We're not dealing on an ordinary basis with the prenuptial agreement.

But in the context of Raised House Bill 6068, we do see circumstances where alimony is relevant to the final divorce order. Typically, in our client base, it has to do with domestic violence.

REP. O'NEILL: Thank you.

REP. FOX: Do we have any other questions from Members of the Committee? Hearing none, thank you.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Thank you very much.

REP. FOX: The next witness is Anthony Pizighelli, followed by Michael Georgetti. Good afternoon.

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: Good afternoon, Representative Fox. Greetings, ladies and gentlemen of the Committee. First, let me thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak today.

I'm Anthony Pizighelli, president of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 731. We represent just over 700 judicial marshals within the State of Connecticut.

And I'm here to speak today on behalf of Raised House Bill 6674, a bill that would transfer responsibility for court security and prisoner transportation from the Judicial Branch to the Department of Public Safety.

Before I begin, I'd like to tell you a little bit about my qualifications. I have over 26 years of training and experience as a law enforcement officer. I'm a former corrections officer, and Fairfield special police officer.

I'm a founding member of the Department of Homeland Security and a member of the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary, where I served for two years as Flotilla marine safety officer.

It was my responsibility to coordinate and plan with state, local, and federal authorities the participation and response for Coast Guard Auxiliary members in Flotilla's 24-02's area of responsibility in the event of an emergency, natural disaster, or terrorist incident.

Upon assuming responsibility as the business agent for Local 731 in 2004, I enrolled in and completed a paralegal training course, specializing in the field of litigation.

I tell you this because I want you to understand that when I speak today, I'm speaking from the life experience of a well-trained, law enforcement-oriented individual trained in emergency response, but with a working understanding of the functions of the court systems, labor relations, and labor dispute process.

In December of 2006, I was elected president of this Local. Let me say that I am not here today to condemn or bash the Judicial Branch. In fact, I have a great respect for the court system and the men and women who serve as judges.

They do an outstanding job of interpreting the law and handling the already overworked judicial system. I do, however, believe very strongly that, as stated in our laws, the Judicial Branch's primary function is the interpretation of law.

They have tried to manage court security. But just as you would not ask a lawyer to patrol the streets of your city, it is unfair to ask the Judicial Branch to run a law enforcement agency. And statutorily, it is a fundamental function of judicial marshals to enforce the law.

Why transfer to the Department of Public Safety? Perhaps we should first ask the question what public safety involves.

Public safety involves the protection and the prevention of the general population from all manner of significant danger, injury, damage, or harm.

This protection is typically provided by emergency services organizations such as police agencies, fire, and EMS. These are also the core functions of a judicial marshal.

Judicial marshals are currently governed by several divisions within the Judicial Branch, Judicial Marshal Services, Human Resource Management, and Court Operations with Judicial Marshal Services and Human Resource Management answering to Court Operations.

On December 1, 2000, the Judicial Branch assumed responsibility for court security. Judicial Marshal Services has been six years under the administration of the Judicial Branch.

What have they achieved over that time period? Are the courts actually any safer now than they were under the Sheriff's Department?

No, I don't believe that they are. In fact, when this Local was founded in 1999, we had 975 special deputy sheriffs. Today that number has dwindled to just over 700 judicial marshals.

The Honorable Judge Lavery made an outstanding case for more judicial marshals last week. I found him to be both genuine and sincere in his concern for the safety of the courthouses.

I only wish what he now deemed critical staffing problems were addressed three years ago when this Local filed a prohibitive practice complaint at the Labor Board on that very same matter. Yet, the situation has not improved.

Staffing has been a major concern of this Local for the past three years. We are told there was no money to hire new judicial marshals to staff the courts.

And there is no money for new equipment. Fortunately, funding does exist to create seven new court planner positions with an annual salary of $75,000 each.

One thing the Judicial Branch has excelled in is training. Judicial marshals, our members receive very good training, but they have become apprehensive of using that training and their equipment for fear of extreme discipline, as a result of court operations investing the matter.

The judicial marshals I represent believe if they use their equipment, may I please continue?

REP. FOX: Sure. Thank you.

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: Believe if they use their equipment, they will either lose their job or be suspended without pay. This belief stems from a very real understanding of the past history of discipline in these matters.

Because of this belief and understanding, judicial marshals have nicknamed their equipment suspension spray and termination sticks.

When the security force is afraid of excessive abuse of discipline, they hesitate. That delay, that split second of hesitation, could cost someone their life.

They need to know that when they act under the color of law, the agency they work for will support them. The judicial marshals I represent have no faith the Judicial Branch will support them.

The threat of discipline extends beyond the regular duties of a judicial marshal. Yesterday, a directive was issued to all the chief judicial marshals that no union official was to wear their uniform to attend this hearing today.

If they did, they would be disciplined for disobeying a direct order. I have to ask the question of why. How could their presence harm the Judicial Branch?

Is it because you would see that I am not here today in support of this bill? I ask all judicial marshals in support of this bill to stand. Thank you.

I believe it is only because judicial marshals on the job today are extremely good at their profession that no major incident has occurred inside of a courthouse.

The tragic shooting in Middletown of Attorney Julie Porzio, whose life was actually saved by a judicial marshal, Charles Epstein, is but the most recent example of the system breaking down.

Epstein, along with other judicial marshals responded to the shooting, stepping into harm's way without hesitation to protect the public and aid the wounded. Fortunately, this tragedy unfolded outside the courthouse, but it could have just as easily happened inside the building.

When her client's estranged husband tried to smuggle his firearm into the building, the marshal at the front door caught it. Let us ask ourselves what would have happened to that marshal if Mr. Bochicchio refused to take the gun outside.

What if he pulled it out of his briefcase and opened fire? Would the marshal at the front door even survive long enough to call for help?

The marshal at the front door doesn't even have a bulletproof vest to give them the opportunity to survive, let alone fend off an armed assault.

When we asked the Judicial Branch for bulletproof vests for marshals assigned to front doors and prisoner transportation, Judicial Marshal Services thought it was humorous we wanted bulletproof vests.

They told us they didn't have any money to buy them. If we bought them, our people could wear them, provided they met their specifications. That was two years ago.

We are currently holding a fundraiser to try and buy those vests. Yet the Judicial Branch has not allocated any money to provide such an essential tool for our members.

Judicial Marshal Services could not purchase bulletproof vests, but they were able to acquire thousands of plastic bags specially treated to make sure that they don't contain peanut oil, forms, and property tax so they could hold cell phones at the front doors of courthouses.

Perhaps it is because we see more cell phones than guns. But when that gun does come through the front door, the first line of defense is the judicial marshal.

We're not allowed any type of non-lethal defensive weapons like tasers because they've been deemed too intimidating by Judicial Marshal Services.

We asked for safer working uniforms with embroidered badges and nametags like many law enforcement agencies are changing to. We were told that judges don't want that paramilitary look in the courthouses. It's too intimidating.

In fact, I understand recently a judge in Stamford ordered two corrections officers who were dressed in that fashion to wear judicial marshal uniforms so they wouldn't taint the jury in the case, and they were ordered to sit in the audience.

I would also like to point out that two weeks ago, in the Derby Courthouse, a judicial marshal disarmed a man carrying a loaded 22-caliber handgun inside of his coat.

That man was arrested for carrying a weapon without a permit, and it was later determined he had several federal warrants.

In 2005, we raised concerns over unsafe, worn out transportation vehicles. To date, none of those transportation vehicles we complained about have been replaced.

In fact, Judicial Marshals Services believed it is perfectly acceptable to transport prisoners in an ordinary rental car.

When we complained about that, Judicial Marshal Services obtained a run of the mill station wagon, which has no security features, such as doors that cannot be opened from the inside, a screen separating the prisoner from the driver, and doesn't even have a two-way radio in it.

Several years ago, Judicial Marshal Services created a centralized transport unit to reduce overtime. The outcome of this was increased mileage, poor maintenance of vehicles, increased spending on fuel and overtime.

The removal of transportation vehicles from individual courthouses, this leaves many courthouses without a prisoner transport vehicle to evacuate the building in an emergency.

During the 2005 statewide bomb scare, at least one courthouse reported to me they had no vehicle for evacuation and had to handcuff their prisoners outside the courthouse to a fence.

SEN. MCDONALD: Excuse me, Sir. Are you almost--

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: Yes, I am almost done.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you.

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: Judicial has not. They'd never tested their security systems or their plans and protocols. But there is a chief who did test security. He would hide keys in courtrooms to see if people would find them.

He also took it upon himself to create a facsimile explosive device, bring it into a courthouse, and hide it. Unfortunately, he neglected to tell anyone that he was planning to do this.

Fortunately, the courtroom he hid it in was closed that day. He received a written warning and a promotion to court planner.

The Branch will tell you, there are uniform statewide policies. What they won't tell you is that those policies can be overridden by the administrative judge.

In fact, it is actually the administrative judge who determines if an inmate should be restrained in the courtroom. If so, should they be cuffed in the front or the rear?

This is clearly a security related matter and an administrative judge should not be burdened with that.

I have submitted my testimony, and I don't want to take much more of your time, but I will say that judicial marshals are sworn peace officers in the State of Connecticut. We have powers of arrest.

We're restricted by policy from using those powers of arrest. And when we do affect an arrest, we take the person into custody. We read them their rights.

We search them. And then we have to call the State Police, and we have to pull the trooper off the road to process our arrest. That is demeaning. It is embarrassing. It is a waste of resources, and a danger to public safety.

When the trooper is at the courthouse handling our arrest, he's not on the road. He's not visible. He can't respond to other public safety emergencies.

Last, but not least, I would like to also point out that one reason we're not allowed to make arrests is the inherent conflict of interest of us affecting an arrest. The judicial marshal affects an arrest at the front door and is allowed to process that arrest.

The next step in the process is for that individual to be arraigned by a judge who must determine impartially if the person that's been arrested, if the marshal had probable cause to make that arrest. The judge is essentially the marshal's boss.

Now I understand why we're not allowed to process our own arrests. The Judicial Branch and the judicial marshals have to work together, but to keep them under the same branch of government and allow things to continue the way that they're going, believe me when I tell you from all my experience, all my training, it's just a matter of time before someone gets killed in a courthouse because the people that are running security are trying really hard to do it, but they just don't have the skills, the experience to do it.

Their mindset is not security. It's not enforcement of the law. It's protecting the rights of the innocent. It's keeping a neutral appearance for all people in front of the court, which is fine. That's their job.

But somebody has to take that next step and determine what is required to keep these people safe.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you.

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: When we tell somebody that you need to evacuate a building, we're telling the people that because there's a very real chance that they're in danger and that they're going to get hurt if they don't leave. You can't have judges--

SEN. MCDONALD: [Inaudible] thank you. Are there any questions? Representative Gonzalez.

REP. GONZALEZ: Good afternoon, and thank you for coming. I'm a little bit disappointed because when we were working to change the system years ago, I was very involved, and I was very involved because I was one of you guys years ago in, I think 1987 to 1996.

I knew at that time when I got involved, it was because we were at that time going through some changes, and it was for the better. But it seems like it's not. Instead of getting better, it got worse.

I've got a couple of questions. When you said that you received order from the judges, are you telling me that the judges are your bosses?

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: Yes, Ma'am.

REP. GONZALEZ: But I thought that when we changed the system. Do you have the commission?

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: I'm sorry.

REP. GONZALEZ: You have the marshal. You have--

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: We have the marshals. We have a director--

REP. GONZALEZ: A director, right.

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: --of Judicial Marshal Services. He reports to the Chief Administrative Judge.

REP. GONZALEZ: So [inaudible] I believe then, instead of wishing the system get better, that we gave you guys to the judges.

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: That's pretty much what happened.

REP. GONZALEZ: That's not right. I don't think that the judges should control [inaudible] you guys [inaudible]. Who [inaudible] the security report? Who decided that? Again is it the judges who decide who is going to work where?

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: No. That is decided by either the site supervisor or the Chief Judicial Marshal. But the judge decides the protocols for what's going to be going on in the courtroom, if we're going to have prisoners handcuffed, if they're not going to be handcuffed.

Staffing issues and where the people are assigned within the buildings is generally done by the supervisor, unless a judge says specifically he either wants or does not want a specific marshal in his courtroom.

REP. GONZALEZ: Who [inaudible] that order [inaudible] guys come to this public hearing? Who ordered that?

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: It came from all the chiefs. They got an e-mail from somebody. I don't know who it was.

REP. GONZALEZ: You say all the chiefs, are you saying your supervisor or from the judges?

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: The Chief Judicial Marshal in each district was sent an e-mail advising them to order all union officials not to wear their uniforms to this hearing.

REP. GONZALEZ: I think you have the right [inaudible] employee, because years ago [inaudible] to the state, but you're a state employee, so you have the right to complain if you have [inaudible].

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: I understand that, and that's exactly what we're trying to do. We just want the people of Connecticut to be safe in the courthouses.

And we've tried everything we can with the Labor Board, with Labor Relations, with contract negotiations to resolve these issues, and we've hit a dead wall. So we're now trying to exercise our rights legislatively to try to correct the problems.

REP. GONZALEZ: So we trying to correct the problem years ago, and now what we're doing is [inaudible] to the hands of the judges who they think they are above the law. Thank you very much.

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: Thank you.

SEN. MCDONALD: Are there any other questions? Representative Hurlburt.

REP. HURLBURT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you for coming here today. I'm a new member to the General Assembly, but I had the opportunity a few weeks ago to sit down with a couple of constituents that are marshals.

As we went through probably an hour of what had happened with our negotiations, how they are being treated in the courts, it was very enlightening to me because I didn't realize that people were treated that way, and especially from the supervisors like [inaudible].

So I want to thank everybody here for the testimony. And I encourage all of you to contact your individual Legislators because, if they were as in the dark as I was about this a few weeks ago, it would be a great push to get more action on this thing and hopefully get this bill out of Committee just because I was stunned, frankly, at the way that you guys were treated.

So thank you very much for your testimony today. Please contact your other representatives and senators so that we can try and move this bill forward. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you. And forgive me. Actually, were there any other questions from Members of the Committee? Forgive me.

I came in after you had already started your testimony, but do you know if the Department of Public Safety has taken any kind of position on this legislation?

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: I do not know that, but I can tell you that the functions of the Judicial Marshal Services need to be moved to the Executive Branch, whether that means the Department of Public Safety, Protective Services, Criminal Justice, I don't know.

But we have to. We need really to be able to do our jobs and protect the courts and the people of Connecticut, and we can't do that right now.

SEN. MCDONALD: I understand your position. I'm just trying to figure out if you know if anybody has actually spoken to anybody in the Department of Public Safety about the proposition.

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: I do not know that. No.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you. Thank you very much for your testimony.

ANTHONY PIZIGHELLI: Thank you, sir.

SEN. MCDONALD: Next is Michael Georgetti.

MICHAEL GEORGETTI: Good afternoon, Committee. I want to thank you for the privilege to speak to you today. I'm in support of Raised House Bill 6674. I'm not going to go into a lot of detail about my background, 22 years at a factory and now I'm a judicial marshal for almost three years now.

I just want to bring up a few points. When a judicial marshal makes any type of an arrest, i.e., a breach of peace, let's say, the State Police can come in, say that it was not a valid arrest. This leads to a detainment issue, which Representative Lawlor brought up earlier.

If the person in our custody is hurt while being subdued and is subsequently released by the Connecticut State Police, it opened the Judicial Branch to a lawsuit.

Whenever an arrest, as you'd heard, is made in the courthouse, we have to call a trooper to get dispatched to our courthouse to finish the paperwork. This pulls the trooper off the highway, shortens their manpower on the roads.

The judicial marshals department would not be subject to influences from the judges and/or any other judicial agency in regards to the security, like judges refusing to leave the building during the bomb threats.

Judges not allowing us to wear our pat down gloves because they think it looks intimidating while we are processing, ready to take down a drug dealer down, and we want to glove up before we touch this individual.

We give them a cursory pat-down when he gets into the holding cell area, and it looks too intimidating to wear gloves in some of the judges' courtrooms. It's to our safety that we're wearing these gloves.

The judicial marshals functioning as a police agency as a separate entity, does an arrest made by the Hartford Police Department get processed at the West Haven Police [Gap in testimony. Changing from Tape 2B to Tape 3A.]

Functional and separate entity from the State Police. This would prevent any conflict of operations with the State Police and will help expedite onsite arrests at the courthouse.

I want to give you an example, and it's going to knock your socks off when you hear this. I'll give you, on Friday, February 2, 2007, at 9:20 a.m., we made a firearm arrest at the Derby Courthouse.

Marshal Merkle-Loso, also delivered a baby this past summer in the courthouse, spotted a five-shot one round spent 22-revolver in a man's overcoat pocket.

This man was here for a traffic violation. She called the supervisor to the x-ray machine. We checked it out, and the supervisor said to arrest him.

I handcuffed him. I read him his rights. I did the property forms. We did everything we were supposed to do. Then we called the State Police.

The man told me that his permit to carry was revoked two years earlier because he is a convicted felon.

When the State Police arrived, they said this convicted felon was wanted on federal drug charges. They took custody of him from us and left the courthouse.

On Monday, this convicted felon was back because the State Police did not get to arraign him. So when he went before the judge, it was over his 48 hours to be arraigned and was released on a PTA.

He was put back on the streets. When I gave him his overcoat, as he was leaving, he joked to us and patted his pocket. He goes, ooh, what's this? A bulge in my pocket.

You know, taking this as a joke, not treating us like the professionals we are, thinking he got over on us.

I'd like to end by saying that there were others that wanted to speak today, but felt that if they did, they would be retaliate against.

I want to say to all of you, if I am retaliated against for speaking today, I will contact each and every one of you for support in getting it stopped. Retaliation could mean anything from shift or post assignment changes to termination or rejection of promotions.

It's a shame that in this day in age, a person not only needs to worry about a fair wage, but also retaliation from higher ups when trying to improve the quality of our lives. I want to thank you for being able to speak today.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you very much. If anybody does retaliate against you for your testimony here, I hope you do contact all of us.

MICHAEL GEORGETTI: Absolutely.

SEN. MCDONALD: Are there any questions from Members of the Committee? Representative Gonzalez.

REP. GONZALEZ: Yes. I want to [inaudible] comment. Any problems or retaliation [inaudible] my commitment to you guys that [inaudible]. I don't think that it is right.

Like I said, when we changed the system [inaudible] 2000, I thought it was for the best. And I don't know [inaudible] you guys.

MICHAEL GEORGETTI: I want to thank you for that, and just to point out to you that the idea was great to get us into another place like Judicial. All right.

But what ended up happening is we ended up going from eight high sheriffs to having 80 judges as bosses, and it's not working.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you very much. Any other questions from Members of the Committee? Thank you for your testimony, Sir.

MICHAEL GEORGETTI: Thank you.

SEN. MCDONALD: Next is Gerald Nelson.

GERALD NELSON: Greetings, ladies and gentlemen of the Committee. First, let me thank you for allowing me to speak today. I'm Gerald Nelson, New Haven District Vice President for IBPO Local 731. I'd like to begin by telling you a little bit about myself.

In 1981, I graduated from the University of Southern Mississippi with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Criminal Justice. I then went on active duty with the U.S. Army as a tank officer in Germany for three years.

In 1984, upon my separation from service, I became a certified police officer for a period of nearly ten years.

I also served as an armed security guard for Litton Industries, a division of Northrop Grumman, at their shipbuilding facility in Pascagoula, Mississippi, where I became an assistant shift supervisor. This facility employed approximately 21,000 people and is a major supplier of warships to the U.S. Navy.

While there, I was heavily involved in the restoration of the USS Cole and post 9/11 security concerns. I tell you this so that you understand I have a strong background in law enforcement and security concerns.

I've been asked to speak to you today over prisoner transportation concerns in support of Raised House Bill 6674.

About 20 prisoner transportation vehicles operate out of New Haven, transporting prisoners to courthouses in New Haven, Meriden, Derby, Milford, Bridgeport, Norwalk, Stamford, Bantam, Litchfield, Danbury, and Waterbury daily. This activity on average results in the movement of over 600 prisoners each day.

Many of the vehicles used for this activity are designed to carry either 18 or 22 prisoners, and all of these have over 120,000 miles on them.

Some of the mechanical failures that have occurred in the last year are transmission failure, break failure, no air conditioning in the prisoner compartment during heat emergency days, inadequate or no heat, broken door locks, broken steps on the rear bumpers, broken door locks on the crew compartment, and numerous other malfunctions.

The radio system installed in the vehicles is totally inadequate and, in many locations, cannot be used to contact the transportation supervisor.

Transportation personnel widely use their personal cell phones to maintain contact with their supervisor and coordinate their activities with other vehicles.

For over one year now, this Local and myself have expressed concern over the condition of these vehicles to Judicial Branch. We are continuously told vehicles are on order, but none arrive.

On February 7, 2006, I was told by a court planner the vehicles had been ordered and would arrive in August. Of course, he did not say August of what year.

Prisoners with special needs, such as wheelchair bound, were transported by use of a rental care at cost to the state.

When marshals expressed concern about this to Judicial Branch, the Branch supplied a station wagon for use. Just because the doors do not secure, there's no prisoner screen, and no two-way radio, does not seem to matter.

The mindset is to get the prisoners to court and all the other security and safety concerns seem to be secondary. We ask for help from Branch and we get blank stares.

Recently, the Chief Administrative Judge assigned a 15-passenger van in New Haven, which is used to transport courthouse personnel between the courthouse and the various parking lots and a judicial marshal drives it.

I could expand on this and other issues, but time constraints restrict my comments. I would like to thank you for this opportunity to speak to you today and wish you all well. I'd be happy to answer any questions as best as I can.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you very much, Mr. Nelson. Are there any questions from Members of the Committee? Thank you.

GERALD NELSON: Thank you, Sir.

SEN. MCDONALD: Carol Soldi-Hall followed by Waldren “Pokey” Phillips.

CAROL SOLDI-HALL: Ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, my name is Carol Soldi-Hall. I am the secretary for IBPO LOCAL 731.

I've been working as a judicial marshal for almost seven years now, beginning as a special deputy sheriff. Forgive me. I didn't prepare testimony. I'm trying to go from notes.

SEN. MCDONALD: You can just speak from the heart too, if it helps.

CAROL SOLDI-HALL: I don't want to ramble, as I'm sure I see three minutes goes by really quickly. We submitted a transcript from interest arbitration that we had.

The speaker or person answering questions at that arbitration was Joseph D'Alesio, the Executive Director of Court Operations and Executive Secretary of the Judicial Branch.

In that testimony, he freely admits, under oath, that Judicial could not possibly assign marshals by seniority because they need the ability to discriminate.

In his testimony, he makes a statement that all marshals are not created equal. You can find this testimony in box number 63, beginning at line 9, and going on until line 19.

The statement is made that if a matter is moved into a courtroom where the marshals may not be capable, due to age or lack of certification, what he is saying is that the Judicial Branch could not function without being allowed to discriminate in its daily assignments of duty.

This practice, though illegal, has existed for the last six years under the Judicial Branch's watch.

Again, referring to the transcript, under block 68, beginning on line number 11, Mr. D'Alesio states again, not everybody is made equal, so you have to have a balance. It's size, male, female, strength, whatever you need and how the mixes are put together.

Gender is considered when mentioning you could be staffing a very dangerous court with the wrong mix of people. I believe the State of Connecticut Police are not allowed to discriminate based on age or gender.

Judicial marshals all receive the same training and I would respectfully request that we are transferred to the Department of Public Safety where we can operate in a department that understands the job of protecting the public and operates safely without the use of discrimination.

We've had numerous safety issues since we've come under the Branch's employ. I know in my own district, we've had numerous requests. We have problems with radios. Radios are a lifeline to everybody that enters the courthouse.

Should an emergency arise, we need to have working radios. Our batteries go dead. We may get an hour out of a battery. It's dead. Two days ago, I went through three batteries.

Now if something had happened before I realized my battery was dead, it could have been a disaster. A battery charger costs $400. We asked for three.

We got one because of budget constraints, but yet as our president mentioned, they purchased cell phone bags and tags at what we've all been told is a cost of merely $2 million, so as not to inconvenience the public.

My feeling is, it's a bigger inconvenience to the public should something happen due to the lack of safety equipment that we all have. We're trying to perform our jobs to the best of our abilities.

What we need is people in charge that understand our job, so they can make the policies that are necessary to keep everybody that enters the courthouse safe. And I believe that bit would fall under the Department of Public Safety. Thank you.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you very much. Are there any questions from the Committee Members? Thanks for your testimony.

CAROL SOLDI-HALL: Thank you very much.

SEN. MCDONALD: Waldren “Pokey” Phillips, followed by Richard Pivarnik.

WALDREN PHILLIPS: Good evening, Senator, Representative Lawlor, and Members of this distinguished Committee.

I am back before you again six years and some odd months later because I was here when we went through the major change from the sheriff system to the marshal system.

I am also that same individual that disarmed an assailant in New London with a handgun in his shoe. I received a Silver Star for Bravery and certain commendations from this committee, as well as going into the Policemen's Hall of Fame.

I'd just like to say that, in doing all of that, I did that for the citizens for the State of Connecticut. It wasn't for me. I had to act. I was an officer. I was presented with a challenge, and I had to act.

So as all my other colleagues, we do this job day in and day out without question. And we do it selflessly. We don't ask to go into harm's way. We just go because that's the nature of the beast.

Our forefathers were very bright and they didn't have all these doctor's degrees like we have today, because when they came up with the idea of separation of powers, they knew exactly what they were doing.

Because, and I'll just go through this quickly, the Judicial Branch. Well, let me start from, the Legislative Branch creates the law. The Judicial Branch interprets the law. And the Executive Branch executes the law.

We are under the Judicial Branch right now, and we can't perform our functions because they won't allow us to, because I would venture to say that they may get into a problem someday when some attorney will say that you can't have all these bites of the apple.

In other words, you can't be judge, jury, and hangmen too. So we need to be extracted out of that venture of government and placed where we can be and do the best for the State of Connecticut and the citizens of the State of Connecticut.

With that, I can't think of anything else to say other than, please, hear our cries and move us where we need to be so that we can effectively serve the citizens of the State of Connecticut. Thank you.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you. Are there any questions? Thanks very much, Sir. Richard Pivarnik. How did I do on the last name?

RICHARD PIVARNIK: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Judicial Marshal Richard Pivarnik. I'm proud to speak to you today, not for myself, but for the men and women that I work with.

Marshals like myself do an undauntly task of keeping you safe when you enter into a judicial building here in the State of Connecticut.

Inside the Connecticut General Statute, it talks about moving from the sheriffs department to the newly created judicial marshals and the powers we hold by that position. I want to thank you for that.

What I don't understand is the idea that a judge or clerk or deputy clerk can dictate what security is in a courtroom, what it is, what it was, or what it will be at any given time.

Judge Lavery gave you a great speech and I sincerely thank him with no disrespect intended to him in any way, shape, or fashion. His speech was full of facts and figures the Judicial Branch had long before presented them to you.

Those figures were tabulated and calculated by people like me and presented to the Judicial Branch long before he came into his office.

They were presented to the Judicial Branch management who discarded them due to budgetary restraints and because of being under the Judiciary System.

We had more people than now and it was completely out of their control to manage an affect in a safe manner insuring the correct level of service to the citizens of the State of Connecticut.

Where is it written that a judge's qualifications include security analysis, transportation expert, or fire safety expert?

Why does it make sense that a person in a warehouse can deny the needed department for equipment [inaudible] needed is apparent and demonstrated? With [inaudible] anticipated equipment being used by the staff to control a situation.

We are here not to make you feel bad. And we don't want your pity. We're not asking for pity. What we want is to work for an agency that has the safety of the people, the State of Connecticut, and the court staff in mind.

When you approve or deny a request for more staff, better trucks, better training, another method of managing staff, and lastly, the ability to [inaudible] our jobs without the worry of upsetting a judge.

When judge decided that weapons in the courtroom or on a person, on the person of a marshal or a police officer can be intimidating to the public.

When the judge who instructs us to work in the safety, the safety of dealing with 13 prisoners and only 5 marshals, and one [inaudible] for the management, despite public safety and judicial policy, which means that we have a ratio of two judicial marshals for each prisoner.

It is a judge who has no security or law enforcement experience dictating that a marshal remove leg shackles from a previously convicted murderer because it runs. In the state policy that runs the State Police will go. If he runs, the State Police would go get him.

The things I mention to you, I saw and experienced firsthand. We work for an agency that does not take us seriously, and while the Judicial Branch may make several comments about wishing to professionalize and extend our positions, deem us to be more important than a court clerk.

We are asking to be placed in an agency that understands what we do and why we do it. The safety of our marshals, the court staff, judges, and the public and even prisoners is what we worry about on a daily basis.

In many cases, we push through the docket so that our case flows [inaudible] get at moving cases and completely disregarding safety in the process. If the Branch invited all of you on a tour tomorrow, you would see the very best that they can show you.

Several of you have been in the Elm Street lockup in New Haven, and then again in the beautiful lockup in Stamford. [Inaudible] courthouse has an elevator, which had been moving prisoners, and it broke down and it was down for six months.

Prisoners had to be moved from the block through public areas, and then into the courtrooms, which endangered the marshals moving the prisoners, the victims of the crime, and the families of the victims.

Why this was not fixed in a timely manner, no one can answer. Funding and red tape, good guess. We have cellblocks that have locked doors, but nobody has keys for them.

We have access to cellblocks and passage blocks that don't lock because the Branch feels that it's too expensive to put a card reader in place of the lock.

Our radios are such that if you are a block away from the courthouse, in the basement of the courthouse, in the parking lot of the courthouse, and the call goes out for assistance, you may not hear it or might not receive the call.

Yet the Branch does not feel that this is an acceptable experience to upgrade or properly supply the equipment. Earlier, a lady testified that she did not know who was in charge at what time.

Another [inaudible] that they've stuck on us and all the people that they have brought down from Judicial into the court buildings, there are times that we don't know who is in charge, and that's a sin.

Under the Department of Public Safety, they have set rules and positions, so we would know everything that's going on at any time, the same as a police department operates.

Lastly, I would like to clarify that these comments or [inaudible] comments [inaudible] I've been involved and I'm a veteran of 38 years in law enforcement, first with the [inaudible] police department, moved to sheriffs department, and now with the marshal service, marshal service and sheriffs department totaling 17 years. I'm in my 18^th year.

We work in the most unsafe environment and our bosses ignore it. Since I have the powers of arrest and I exercise that power according to Judicial Policy & Procedure, our agency then notifies the Connecticut State Police to re-arrest the person [inaudible] information gathered by the judicial marshal like me or one of my colleagues in making the first arrest.

The person is then brought to the [inaudible] police barracks, in our case would be troop G, for processing the following day. And the following day brought to the courthouse to be arraigned. Does that make any sense? It doesn't really.

Thank you for your time, and thank you for listening to me. I read this, so I am a little bit nervous. I'd be glad to answer any questions that I can.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you for your testimony, Sir. Are there any questions? I appreciate you taking the time to be here.

RICHARD PIVARNIK: Thank you again.

SEN. MCDONALD: James Zuercher.

JAMES ZUERCHER: Thank you [inaudible].

SEN. MCDONALD: After Mr. Zuercher, is there anybody else who would like to testify before the Committee?

JAMES ZUERCHER: You said it right the first time, wrong the second time. [Inaudible] thank you for having me here today and listening to me speak to you. I had all kinds of different things and notes I was going to present you with, but I've decided not to do that.

As most of my fellow marshals who were here today told you about their past experiences, I began law enforcement in 1985. My father was a police officer before me.

I worked for my hometown police department [inaudible] for two years as a special police officer. After that, I owned and operated a private security guard firm employing 32 full-time employees.

Subsequently to that, I worked at a university in Rhode Island doing security work there, and then I took the job as a special deputy sheriff in 1999, one year before the transition to judicial marshal services.

I currently hold the position of security manager for a private financial firm, where I am the supervisor for 26 armed personnel.

I can tell you, as a trained security analyst, what we have in the judicial marshal services is [inaudible] expectation by the Branch as to security needs of the Branch and the buildings in which we service.

Quite often when we approach a supervisor or chief, or even an administrative judge through property channels with a security concern, that concern is overlooked backed upon the docket and moving the docket, just as information is thrown around from judge to judge as though it would be something of trivia to one another and a competition.

And I say this to you knowing full well that I myself, who has already felt the hand of discrimination by the branch, would be possibly open for that once again by my testimony here today. Quite frankly, I am scared of it.

But the fact of the matter is, as I have told Mr. Fox in the previous discussions, and also Mr. Lawlor in previous discussions, we live in a very dangerous world. We're placed in harm's way deliberately by the nature of our job.

And to have our people who we work for totally disregard our safety and the safety of the public who come into our buildings and demand that we assist them, expect that we assist them, and look at us in time of need as being the person who is going to fix their problem, whatever it may be.

But then have our own employer inhibit us from doing that by policy and procedure right here in the Connecticut Judicial Statutes where we have, under 53a, Section 3, subsection 9. It mentions judicial marshals as peace offers.

According to Judicial Policy & Procedure, that power ends the second our shift is over. If we intercede and assist in any way, shape or form, are we covered by the Branch or not?

If I'm on a train and I'm in uniform and something happens, am I expected to intercede and help out? Or should I stand there because I don't have any power? According to Policy & Procedure, that would be a huge debate, and I may be open for disciplinary action because of it.

These things we are concerned with. These are things we don't feel are fair. These are things that we think that if we were not within the Judicial Branch, we would have an opportunity to address properly by people who understand what we do.

Thank you. We don't necessarily look at our job as being one that ends at 5:30 or 5:15. Under the sheriffs department, we had peace officer status.

We were in power 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Many of our veterans are veterans of prior law enforcement, and therefore, feel a dedication and duty to the citizens of the State of Connecticut.

We don't understand why that's changed and why that's forced to be changed by people who don't have a grasp as to what we do.

We have people of higher authority than us by the nature of their job telling us that we can't do certain things even though we tell them that it's in their best interest from a security standpoint to do a certain thing.

Be it [inaudible] leg shackled who has several different [inaudible] warrants. We know he's a flight risk. We know he has a high bond. We know that he's already assaulted a judge, that he's already assaulted an attorney.

And have him tell us, no. That's quite all right. It'll somehow taint the jury. It causes a problem. It makes it very difficult for us to do our jobs. We are faced with a constant battle just to do our jobs in this way. We just don't feel it's fair.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you very much. Are there any questions? Representative Gonzalez.

REP. GONZALEZ: Since 2002, after we changed the system, what kind of training have you guys been through and how often?

JAMES ZUERCHER: Training is a regular basis training. We're supposed to go for re-certification based upon the Red Cross Certifications.

And a third-party training program that they do for the baton, for the OCAT training, for the management of aggressive behavior.

These things are checked and rechecked by several different instructors at the academy who do a very good job at what they do. We have to be certified to do our jobs.

And if we are missing one particular item, if you don't pass certification of your baton, your baton is taken away from you and you're sent back to work.

REP. GONZALEZ: And they don't send you back to training?

JAMES ZUERCHER: They send you for retraining. If you don't pass, you still lose the baton.

REP. GONZALEZ: So that means that you go [inaudible] training and if you don't pass the training [inaudible] back to the training?

JAMES ZUERCHER: No. If you go to training, and you fail that training procedure, they give you an opportunity to go back and retest or retrain for that item.

If you fail that item again, then you may go back to your post without the item you're training it, if it's pepper spray, baton, or things of that nature. We have several marshals statewide who aren't able to do their job effectively because of this policy.

REP. GONZALEZ: Thank you.

SEN. MCDONALD: Is there anything further? If not, thank you very much, Mr. Zuercher.

JAMES ZUERCHER: Thank you.

SEN. MCDONALD: If there are no other members of the, is there another member of the public? Please come forward, Air. Good afternoon. If you would just identify yourself for the record.

KEN MILLER: My name is Ken Miller, and thank you for allowing me to testify. Chairmen and Members of the Committee, I'd like to thank you again for allowing me this opportunity to speak in favor of the proposed legislation regarding the Office of the Victim Advocate.

I am not an expert on the criminal justice system, but I suspect that it's much like a pyramid that has been inverted. At the top is a large number of crimes, which actually occur.

Below that is the smaller number of crimes, which are reported to the police. So fewer are the crimes that are prosecuted, and finally, the very small number that lead to convictions.

In the process, there are many systems and processes that have been carefully planned to try to insure fairness and justice, punishment and remediation. There are rights for the accused and rights for the victim.

I'm here to talk about the rights for the victim. It is believed that only 20% of sexual assaults are reported, but it is unclear what percentage of those that are prosecuted and finally what percent lead to convictions.

There are likely to be many reasons why women don't report sexual assaults, including embarrassment, shame, fear, and the sense that nothing will be done.

It is important to find out why the percentage of reported assaults is so low, and hopefully to empower women of all ages, races, and cultural groups to come forward.

For the 20% who do report an assault, it is believed that many of the cases are not considered prosecutable. And again, there may be many reasons for this.

Some of these may revolve around the circumstances of a crime itself, but perhaps some are due to the criminal justice procedures, which may not be optimal for the victim.

Is it reasonable for a 15-year-old girl to be interviewed by a 35-year-old male detective who may not be trained to work with adolescents?

Is it reasonable to be upset when a 25-year-old woman who has spent 12 hours in the emergency room is not willing to give a statement immediately?

Is it reasonable to ask a woman to submit to the medical procedure of obtaining a rape kit and then not allow her access to the results?

There are many important questions to ask, including what percentage of rape complaints lead to convictions. How does this percentage change with the age, race, and ethnicity of the victim and the alleged perpetrators?

Number two, what are the reasons why a rape complaint is not signed by a prosecutor or a judge? Number three, how often do the standard operating procedures of the police fail to facilitate criminal charges or convictions?

And number four, how often are the standard operating procedures of the police department not followed? For example, should a detective write up a warrant who has never met the victim?

The State of Connecticut has charged the Office of the Victims Advocate with a task of representing the needs of victims, and one of the associated responsibilities is to study how the present criminal justice system does or does not meet these needs.

Presently, the path between a criminal charge that is signed by a judge and a verdict is somewhat transparent to the victim to assure that their rights were respected.

On the other hand, the path and the journey between when a complaint by a victim and the allegation is investigated and potentially dropped by the police, the prosecutor, or the judge is not transparent. I'll finish briefly.

If the satisfaction with the investigation of their claim proceeds in a fashion that the victim does not feel is fair to them, there really is very little recourse right now.

The Office of the Victim Advocate is an office, which has been charged with representing the victim. Yet, for this office to do their job, it requires the ability to have records to review.

If my car is repaired poorly or if I receive poor medical care, the records can be requested by a state agency and they are supplied, or a subpoena can be issued. Similarly, the OVA needs can request police records, but it also needs the ability to subpoena records on behalf of victims.

I doubt that any local, state, public, or private agency wants to have its actions scrutinized. Nonetheless, when criminal investigations have been done well and services have been excellent, there should be nothing to hide from the OVA.

On the other hand, if the investigations have been poor, the services have been poor, this gives the victim some recourse.

Allowing the OVA this ability to investigate cases vigorously will also help them improve the access to excellent services by improving our understanding of the victims' experiences at the present time. Thank you.

SEN. MCDONALD: Thank you. Are there any Members who have questions? If not, thank you very much, Sir.

KEN MILLER: Thank you.

SEN. MCDONALD: If there are no other members of the public, we'll call the public hearing to a close. Thanks very much.

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]