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Sec. 53a-32. Violation of probation or conditional discharge. Arrest. Hearing.
Disposition. (a) At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge,
the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for
violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, or may issue a
notice to appear to answer to a charge of such violation, which notice shall be personally
served upon the defendant. Any such warrant shall authorize all officers named therein
to return the defendant to the custody of the court or to any suitable detention facility
designated by the court. Whenever a defendant has, in the judgment of such defendant's
probation officer, violated the conditions of such defendant's probation, the probation
officer may, in lieu of having such defendant returned to court for proceedings in accordance with this section, place such defendant in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program established pursuant to section 53a-39d. Whenever a sexual offender, as defined
in section 54-260, has violated the conditions of such person's probation by failing to
notify such person's probation officer of any change of such person's residence address,
as required by said section, such probation officer may notify any police officer that
such person has, in such officer's judgment, violated the conditions of such person's
probation and such notice shall be sufficient warrant for the police officer to arrest such
person and return such person to the custody of the court or to any suitable detention
facility designated by the court. Any probation officer may arrest any defendant on
probation without a warrant or may deputize any other officer with power to arrest to
do so by giving such other officer a written statement setting forth that the defendant
has, in the judgment of the probation officer, violated the conditions of the defendant's
probation. Such written statement, delivered with the defendant by the arresting officer
to the official in charge of any correctional center or other place of detention, shall be
sufficient warrant for the detention of the defendant. After making such an arrest, such
probation officer shall present to the detaining authorities a similar statement of the
circumstances of violation. Provisions regarding release on bail of persons charged with
a crime shall be applicable to any defendant arrested under the provisions of this section.
Upon such arrest and detention, the probation officer shall immediately so notify the
court or any judge thereof. Thereupon, or upon an arrest by warrant as herein provided,
the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unnecessary delay
for a hearing on the violation charges. At such hearing the defendant shall be informed
of the manner in which such defendant is alleged to have violated the conditions of such
defendant's probation or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that such
defendant has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled to the services
of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present
evidence in such defendant's own behalf. Sec. 53a-32a. Violation of probation by certain sexual offenders. If a defendant
who entered a plea of nolo contendere or a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to a
violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to
October 1, 2000, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, and was ordered to undergo sexual
offender treatment as a condition of probation, becomes ineligible for such treatment
because of such defendant's refusal to acknowledge that such defendant committed the
act or acts charged, such defendant shall be deemed to be in violation of the conditions
of such defendant's probation and be returned to court for proceedings in accordance
with section 53a-32. Sec. 53a-33. Termination of probation or conditional discharge. The court or
sentencing judge may at any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge,
after hearing and for good cause shown, terminate a sentence of probation or conditional
discharge before the completion thereof, except a sentence of probation imposed for
conviction of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in
effect prior to October 1, 2000, subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or
section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b. Sec. 53a-34. Unconditional discharge: Criteria; effect. (a) The court may impose a sentence of unconditional discharge in any case where it is authorized to impose
a sentence of conditional discharge under section 53a-29, if the court is of the opinion
that no proper purpose would be served by imposing any condition upon the defendant's
release. Sec. 53a-35. Imprisonment for any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981:
Indeterminate sentences; maximum and minimum terms. (a) For any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be an indeterminate
sentence, except as provided in subsection (d). When such a sentence is imposed the
court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subsection
(b) and the minimum term shall be as provided in subsection (c) or (d). Sec. 53a-35a. Imprisonment for any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981:
Definite sentences; terms authorized. For any felony committed on or after July 1,
1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and the term shall be
fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a capital felony, a term of life imprisonment without
the possibility of release unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section
53a-46a; (2) for the class A felony of murder, a term not less than twenty-five years nor
more than life; (3) for a class A felony other than murder, a term not less than ten years
nor more than twenty-five years; (4) for the class B felony of manslaughter in the first
degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than five years nor more
than forty years; (5) for a class B felony other than manslaughter in the first degree with
a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than one year nor more than twenty
years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-59(a)(1), 53a-59a, 53a-70a, 53a-94a, 53a-101(a)(1) or 53a-134(a)(2), the term shall be not less than five years nor more
than twenty years; (6) for a class C felony, a term not less than one year nor more than
ten years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-56a, the term shall be not less
than three years nor more than ten years; (7) for a class D felony, a term not less than
one year nor more than five years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-60b
or 53a-217, the term shall be not less than two years nor more than five years, for a
conviction under section 53a-60c, the term shall be not less than three years nor more
than five years, and for a conviction under section 53a-216, the term shall be five years;
(8) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the
section of the general statutes that defines the crime. Sec. 53a-35b. "Life imprisonment" defined. A sentence of imprisonment for life
shall mean a definite sentence of sixty years, unless the sentence is life imprisonment
without the possibility of release, imposed pursuant to subsection (g) of section 53a-46a, in which case the sentence shall be imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life. Sec. 53a-35c. Availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release
shall not be available as a sentence for an offense committed prior to October 1, 1985. Sec. 53a-36. Imprisonment for misdemeanor: Maximum and minimum sentences. A sentence of imprisonment for a misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence and
the term shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, a term
not to exceed one year except that when a person is found guilty under section 53a-61(a)(3) or 53a-61a, the term shall be one year and such sentence shall not be suspended
or reduced; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, a term not to exceed six months; (3) for a
class C misdemeanor, a term not to exceed three months; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general
statutes that defines the crime. Sec. 53a-37. Multiple sentences: Concurrent or consecutive, minimum term.
When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time,
or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at
a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment,
the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other and to the undischarged term or terms in such manner
as the court directs at the time of sentence. The court shall state whether the respective
maxima and minima shall run concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other,
and shall state in conclusion the effective sentence imposed. When a person is sentenced
for two or more counts each constituting a separate offense, the court may order that
the term of imprisonment for the second and subsequent counts be for a fixed number
of years each. The court in such cases shall not set any minimum term of imprisonment
except under the first count, and the fixed number of years imposed for the second and
subsequent counts shall be added to the maximum term imposed by the court on the
first count. Sec. 53a-38. Calculation of terms of imprisonment. (a) An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody or institution to which he was sentenced. Sec. 53a-39. Reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant by sentencing
court or judge. Statement by victim. (a) At any time during the period of a definite
sentence of three years or less, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for
good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the
defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed
that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced. Sec. 53a-39a. Alternate incarceration program. (a) In all cases where a defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, other than a capital felony, a
class A felony or a violation of section 21a-278, 21a-278a, 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-56b,
53a-57, 53a-58 or 53a-70b or any other offense for which there is a mandatory minimum
sentence which may not be suspended or reduced by the court, after trial or by a plea
of guilty without trial, and a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement or
the statutory penalty provides for a term of imprisonment, the court may, in its discretion,
order an assessment for placement in an alternate incarceration program under contract
with the Judicial Department. If the Court Support Services Division recommends placement in an alternate incarceration program, it shall also submit to the court a proposed
alternate incarceration plan. Upon completion of the assessment, the court shall determine whether such defendant shall be ordered to participate in such program as an
alternative to incarceration. If the court determines that the defendant shall participate
in such program, the court shall suspend any sentence of imprisonment and shall make
participation in the alternate incarceration program a condition of probation as provided
in section 53a-30. Sec. 53a-39b. Special alternative incarceration program for young male defendants. Section 53a-39b is repealed, effective October 1, 2003. Sec. 53a-39c. Community service labor program. (a) There is established,
within available appropriations, a community service labor program for persons charged
with a violation of section 21a-267 or 21a-279 who have not previously been convicted
of a violation of section 21a-267, 21a-277, 21a-278 or 21a-279. Upon application by
any such person for participation in such program the court may grant such application
and (1) if such person has not previously been placed in the community service labor
program, the court may either suspend prosecution and place such person in such program or, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of a
stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation
in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with
section 53a-30; or (2) if such person has previously been placed in such program, the
court may, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of
a stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation
in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with
said section 53a-30. No person may be placed in such program who has twice previously
been placed in such program. Sec. 53a-39d. Pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program. (a) Not later than
October 1, 1998, the Chief Court Administrator shall establish a pilot zero-tolerance
drug supervision program. Eligibility for participation in the program shall be limited
to (1) individuals who are eligible to be sentenced by the court to a period of probation,
pursuant to section 53a-29, and have been ordered by the court, as a condition of such
probation, to participate in the program, (2) individuals who are eligible to be released
on bail under section 54-63d or 54-64a and have been required by the bail commissioner
or the court, as a condition of release, to participate in the program, (3) individuals who
have been sentenced to a period of probation and, in the judgment of their probation
officers, have violated the conditions of such probation and been referred to the program
by their probation officers pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-32, and (4) individuals who have been ordered by the court, as a condition of probation, to participate in
the program pursuant to subsection (d) of section 54-56e or subsection (b) of section
54-76j and shall be based upon criteria, including a limit on the maximum number of
eligible participants, established by the Chief Court Administrator. Sec. 53a-40. Persistent offenders: Definitions; defense; authorized sentences.
(a) A persistent dangerous felony offender is a person who: Sec. 53a-40a. Persistent offenders of crimes involving bigotry or bias. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of crimes involving bigotry or bias is a person
who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k
or 53a-181l, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted
of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior to October 1, 2000. Sec. 53a-40b. Additional term of imprisonment authorized for offense committed while on release. A person convicted of an offense committed while released
pursuant to sections 54-63a to 54-63g, inclusive, or sections 54-64a to 54-64c, inclusive,
other than a violation of section 53a-222, may be sentenced, in addition to the sentence
prescribed for the offense to (1) a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years if
the offense is a felony, or (2) a term of imprisonment of not more than one year if the
offense is a misdemeanor. Sec. 53a-40c. Psychological counseling required for person convicted of sexual
assault of a minor. Any person convicted of a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a,
53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a where the victim of the sexual assault was a person
ten years of age or under shall, in addition to any fine or term of imprisonment imposed,
be sentenced to undergo psychological counseling. Sec. 53a-40d. Persistent offenders of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order or criminal
violation of a restraining order. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of
crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation
of a protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order is a person who (1) stands
convicted of assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening
under section 53a-62, harassment under section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal violation of a restraining order under section
53a-223b or criminal trespass under section 53a-107 or 53a-108, and (2) has, within the
five years preceding the commission of the present crime, been convicted of a capital
felony, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or
53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b,
53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216, assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening under section 53a-62, harassment under
section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223, criminal
violation of a restraining order under section 53a-223b, or criminal trespass under section
53a-107 or 53a-108 or has been released from incarceration with respect to such conviction, whichever is later. Sec. 53a-40e. Standing criminal restraining order. (a) If any person is convicted
of a violation of section 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-60, 53a-60a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-70,
53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e, or of
attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a, against a family
or household member as defined in subdivision (2) of section 46b-38a, the court may,
in addition to imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a, if
the court is of the opinion that the history and character and the nature and circumstances
of the criminal conduct of such offender indicate that a standing criminal restraining
order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public, issue a standing criminal
restraining order which shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for
good cause shown. Sec. 53a-40f. Persistent operating while under the influence felony offender.
Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent operating while under the influence felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d and (2) has, prior to the commission of the present crime and within the preceding
ten years, been convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection (a)
of section 14-227a or been convicted in any other state of an offense the essential elements of which are substantially the same as section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection
(a) of section 14-227a. Sec. 53a-41. Fines for felonies. A fine for the conviction of a felony shall be fixed
by the court as follows: (1) For a class A felony, an amount not to exceed twenty thousand
dollars; (2) for a class B felony, an amount not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars; (3)
for a class C felony, an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars; (4) for a class D
felony, an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars; (5) for an unclassified felony,
an amount in accordance with the fine specified in the section of the general statutes
that defines the crime. Sec. 53a-42. Fines for misdemeanors. A fine for the conviction of a misdemeanor
shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, an amount not to
exceed two thousand dollars; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed
one thousand dollars; (3) for a class C misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed five
hundred dollars; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, an amount in accordance with
the fine specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime. Sec. 53a-43. Fines for violations. A fine for a violation shall be fixed by the court
in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars. In the case of a violation defined in
any other section of the general statutes, if the amount of the fine is expressly specified
in the section that defines the offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance
with such section. Sec. 53a-44. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain. If a person has gained
money or property through the commission of any felony, misdemeanor or violation,
upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense
under section 53a-41, 53a-42 or 53a-43, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount,
fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain from the
commission of the offense. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount
of the defendant's gain from the offense and, if the record does not contain sufficient
evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For
purposes of this section, the term "gain" means the amount of money or the value of
property derived. Sec. 53a-45. Murder: Penalty; waiver of jury trial; finding of lesser degree.
(a) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section
53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d. Sec. 53a-46. Sentencing proceedings; appeal. Section 53a-46 is repealed. Sec. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence. (a) A
person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony only if a hearing is
held in accordance with the provisions of this section. Sec. 53a-46b. Review of death sentence. (a) Any sentence of death imposed in
accordance with the provisions of section 53a-46a shall be reviewed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its rules. In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate said sentence and remand
for imposition of a sentence in accordance with subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a. Sec. 53a-46c. Applicability of death penalty provisions in effect on and after
October 1, 1980. The provisions of sections 53a-46a and 53a-46b in effect on and after
October 1, 1980, shall be applicable to any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty
to a capital felony under subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of section 53a-54b on or after
June 13, 1983. Sec. 53a-46d. Victim impact statement read in court prior to imposition of
sentence for crime punishable by death. A victim impact statement prepared with the
assistance of a victim advocate to be placed in court files in accordance with subdivision
(2) of subsection (a) of section 54-220 may be read in court prior to imposition of
sentence upon a defendant found guilty of a crime punishable by death. Sec. 53a-47. Disposition of person found not guilty by reason of mental disease
or defect. Confinement and examination. Release. Section 53a-47 is repealed. Sec. 53a-48. Conspiracy. Renunciation. (a) A person is guilty of conspiracy
when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one
or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one
of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy. Sec. 53a-49. Criminal attempt: Sufficiency of conduct; renunciation as defense. (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of
mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in
conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes
them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step
in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. Sec. 53a-50. Effect of motivation on renunciation. For purposes of this part, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part,
by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more
difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if
it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal
effort to another but similar objective or victim. Sec. 53a-51. Classification of attempt and conspiracy. Attempt and conspiracy
are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted
or is an object of the conspiracy, except that an attempt or conspiracy to commit a class
A felony is a class B felony. Sec. 53a-52. Conviction; sentencing. Section 53a-52 is repealed. Secs. 53a-53 and 53a-54. Homicide defined. Murder defined; affirmative defenses; evidence of mental condition; classification. Sections 53a-53 and 53a-54 are
repealed. Sec. 53a-54a. Murder. (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause
the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or
causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this
subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed
act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from
the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the
first degree or any other crime. Sec. 53a-54b. Capital felony. A person is guilty of a capital felony who is convicted of any of the following: (1) Murder of a member of the Division of State Police
within the Department of Public Safety or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal who is exercising
authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a constable who performs criminal law
enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, a conservation
officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Environmental
Protection under the provisions of section 26-5, an employee of the Department of
Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of such employee's or person's employment
or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility, or any firefighter, while such victim was acting within the scope of such
victim's duties; (2) murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same
for pecuniary gain or murder committed by one who is hired by the defendant to commit
the same for pecuniary gain; (3) murder committed by one who has previously been
convicted of intentional murder or of murder committed in the course of commission
of a felony; (4) murder committed by one who was, at the time of commission of the
murder, under sentence of life imprisonment; (5) murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped
person during the course of the kidnapping or before such person is able to return or be
returned to safety; (6) murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual
assault in the first degree; (7) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the
course of a single transaction; or (8) murder of a person under sixteen years of age. Sec. 53a-54c. Felony murder. A person is guilty of murder when, acting either
alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm,
escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree and, in the course of and in
furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if any, causes
the death of a person other than one of the participants, except that in any prosecution
under this section, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying
crime, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant: (1) Did not commit the
homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the
commission thereof; and (2) was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any dangerous
instrument; and (3) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was
armed with such a weapon or instrument; and (4) had no reasonable ground to believe
that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious
physical injury. Sec. 53a-54d. Arson murder. A person is guilty of murder when, acting either
alone or with one or more persons, he commits arson and, in the course of such arson,
causes the death of a person. Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes,
any person convicted of murder under this section shall be punished by life imprisonment
and shall not be eligible for parole.
(b) If such violation is established, the court may: (1) Continue the sentence of
probation or conditional discharge; (2) modify or enlarge the conditions of probation
or conditional discharge; (3) extend the period of probation or conditional discharge,
provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized
by section 53a-29; or (4) revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge. If
such sentence is revoked, the court shall require the defendant to serve the sentence
imposed or impose any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may include a term
of imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended entirely or after a period
set by the court, followed by a period of probation with such conditions as the court
may establish. No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the
whole record and unless such violation is established by the introduction of reliable and
probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 32; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 12; P.A. 86-403, S. 89, 132; P.A. 95-142, S. 7; P.A. 98-130; P.A. 99-187,
S. 4.)
History: 1971 act clarified Subsec. (b) to specify that lesser sentence may be imposed when a sentence is revoked; P.A.
86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (b), substituting "conditional discharge" for "conditional release"; P.A. 95-142
amended Subsec. (a) to add provision re the arrest and return of a sexual offender who has violated the conditions of his
probation by failing to notify his probation officer of a change of address and amended Subsec. (b) to rephrase provisions,
insert Subdiv. indicators, add Subdiv. (3) authorizing an extension of the period of probation or conditional discharge and
prohibit revocation of probation or conditional discharge unless a violation is established "by the introduction of reliable
and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence" rather than by "reliable and probative evidence"; P.A.
98-130 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision that any lesser sentence imposed upon revocation may include a term of
imprisonment followed by a period of probation; P.A. 99-187 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision authorizing a probation
officer to place a defendant who, in such officer's judgment, has violated the conditions of such defendant's probation in
the zero-tolerance drug supervision program in lieu of returning such defendant to court for violation of probation proceedings and to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.
Cited. 165 C. 73. Defendant's right to counsel hereunder is of "constitutional dimension", and tests of competency are
met. 167 C. 639. Order of probation revocation was upheld where defendant moved from receiving state of Maine to
Massachusetts without reporting to Connecticut parole authorities and was convicted of possession of drugs in Massachusetts. Id. Cited. 169 C. 223, 227-229. Cited. 170 C. 118, 128. In determining issue of "unnecessary delay" principles
applicable to sixth amendment "speedy trial" determinations may be considered. 192 C. 321-323, 326. Cited. 193 C. 35,
45. Cited. 195 C. 461, 463. Cited. 204 C. 52, 57. Cited. 207 C. 152, 156, 157. Cited. Id., 565, 567. Cited. 219 C. 629, 631.
Cited. 222 C. 299, 306. Cited. 226 C. 191, 193, 195. Cited. 228 C. 487, 489. "Fair preponderance of the evidence" standard
for determining whether probation has been violated. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Davis, 29 CA 801, 813,
reversed. 229 C. 285-290, 293, 295, 298. Cited. 235 C. 469, 470. Cited. 240 C. 639. Cited. 242 C. 648. Willfulness not
an element of a probation violation; state need only establish that probationer knew of the condition and engaged in conduct
that violated the condition. 256 C. 412.
Cited. 3 CA 410, 411. Cited. 6 CA 394. Cited. 7 CA 131-134. Cited. 9 CA 59, 71-73. Cited. Id., 686, 693, 717, 719,
720. Cited. 11 CA 251, 252. Cited. 12 CA 679, 680. Cited. 13 CA 638, 639. Cited. 15 CA 34, 57. Cited. 16 CA 264, 265.
Cited. 18 CA 368-370. Cited. 19 CA 304, 318. Cited. 20 CA 572, 573. Cited. 22 CA 303, 304. Cited. 23 CA 642, 643,
645, 647; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 629 et seq. Cited. 27 CA 225, 227-229. Cited. Id., 780, 781. Standard of proof
needed to find a violation of probation discussed. 29 CA 801, 803, 807; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited.
30 CA 346, 351, 354, 355. Cited. 31 CA 278, 310; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 385 et seq.; see also 37 CA 801 et seq.
Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 33 CA 162, 163, 165, 166, see also 35 CA 520 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 1, 2, 7. Cited. Id., 46, 47.
Cited. Id., 537-539. Cited. 35 CA 107, 108. Proper standard of proof in revocation of probation proceeding is that of a
fair preponderance of the evidence; previous consideration of case, 33 CA 162, remanded for reconsideration, 229 C. 916;
original judgment reversed and case remanded for new probation revocation hearing. Id., 520, 521, 523, 524. Sec. 53a-31
et seq. cited. 36 CA 440, 446. Cited. 37 CA 72, 74. Cited. 38 CA 762-764, 766. Cited. 39 CA 175, 177. Cited. Id., 267,
277. Cited. Id., 722-724, 730, 731. Cited. 40 CA 395, 396, 400. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 45 CA 566. Reaffirmed prior
holding that proper standard of proof for revocation of probation hearing proceeding is a fair preponderance of evidence
and that revocation is on consideration of the whole record. 52 CA 557. A probation revocation hearing has two distinct
components. 56 CA 125. In determining whether defendant's probationary status should be revoked court has broad
discretion and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of court's ruling. 57 CA 743. State
may amend the factual basis for an alleged probation violation prior to a hearing under section. 60 CA 515. If a specific
condition of probation does not explicitly proscribe certain noncriminal conduct and can not be reasonably interpreted to
proscribe such conduct, defendant must receive actual notice that continuation of the conduct could result in a charge of
violation of a condition of probation. Id., 716. Willfulness is not element of the offense of violation of probation. Court's
findings that defendant violated probation were not clearly erroneous. 68 CA 367. Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in revoking defendant's probation and reinstating prison sentence after defendant's urine tested positive for opiate. Id.,
437. Court is vested with broad discretion in determining, on basis of the entire record, whether sentence of probation
should continue or be revoked, and court may require defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose a lesser sentence.
81 CA 710.
Cited. 42 CS 574, 586.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 219 C. 629, 635. Cited. 229 C. 285, 290, 295.
Cited. 10 CA 395, 402. Cited. 18 CA 368, 372. Cited. 19 CA 304, 310, 312, 317. Cited. 25 CA 421, 427; judgment
reversed, see 222 C. 299 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 1, 8, 9. Cited. Id., 537, 539. Cited. 38 CA 762, 766. Cited. 42 CA 768. Trial
court reasonably could have found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated his probation by engaging
in breach of the peace and criminal mischief and thus violated criminal laws of the state. 57 CA 64. State satisfied notice
requirements when it recited the charges constituting defendant's violation of probation during both defendant's arraignment and probation revocation hearing. 80 CA 75.
Cited. 42 CS 574, 590.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 169 C. 223, 233. Cited. 178 C. 145, 153. Cited. 219 C. 629, 635. Cited. 225 C. 46, 50. Cited. 228 C. 487, 495.
Cited. 229 C. 285, 290, 293. Court's discretion to provide right of allocution to defendant during probation revocation
proceeding is identical to discretion provided at time of original sentencing. 243 C. 339.
Cited. 1 CA 70, 71. Cited. 3 CA 410, 414. Cited. 10 CA 395, 402. Cited. 11 CA 251, 258. Cited. 18 CA 368, 376. Cited.
20 CA 572, 576, 578. Cited. 22 CA 303, 309. Cited. 23 CA 642, 653; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 629 et seq. Cited. 27
CA 225, 226, 247. Cited. 29 CA 801, 807; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 346, 350. Cited. 31 CA
660, 663. Cited. 33 CA 162, 168, see also 35 CA 520 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 1, 8. Cited. Id., 46, 55. Cited. Id., 537, 539.
Cited. 36 CA 440, 444. Cited. 37 CA 72, 83. Cited. 38 CA 762, 767, 771. Cited. 39 CA 722, 728, 729. Cited. 40 CA 395,
396, 403. Cited. 42 CA 768. Trial court has broad discretion in continuing or revoking sentence of probation. 50 CA 46.
Provides that once a probation violation is established, court may extend period of probation if original period with any
extension does not exceed periods authorized by Sec. 53a-29. 72 CA 33. Subsec. requires that violation of probation be
"established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence." This requirement is not satisfied when, as in this case,
the substance that defendant possessed was readily available for laboratory analysis to determine whether it in fact contained
cocaine, a narcotic, but was never subjected to such testing. 81 CA 409.
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(P.A. 97-151, S. 2; P.A. 01-84, S. 16, 26.)
History: P.A. 01-84 replaced reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision
(2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000," included a violation of "subdivision (2) of
subsection (a) of section 53-21" and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.
Trial court not required to notify defendant, upon entering guilty plea under Alford doctrine, that failure to acknowledge
his guilt could result in violation of condition of his probation requiring sex offender treatment. 268 C. 174.
Statute can be applied only prospectively. 69 CA 421. Trial court improperly considered defendant's refusal to admit
to guilt during sexual offender treatment as a violation of probation. Id. (judgment reversed, see 268 C. 174).
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 33; P.A. 92-260, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 11; P.A. 01-84, S. 17, 26.)
History: P.A. 92-260 added "a sentence of"; P.A. 95-142 specified that a sentence of probation or conditional discharge
may be terminated "before the completion thereof" and precluded termination of a sentence of probation imposed for
conviction of a violation of Subdiv. (2) of Sec. 53-21 or Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 01-84
replaced reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes in effect prior to October 1, 2000," and included a violation of "subdivision (2) of subsection (a)
of section 53-21", effective July 1, 2001.
Cited. 165 C. 73. Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 219 C. 752, 762. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306. Cited. 225 C. 46, 50.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Sec. 53a-31 et seq. cited. 36 CA 440, 446.
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(b) When the court imposes a sentence of unconditional discharge, the defendant
shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed without
imprisonment, probation supervision or conditions. A sentence of unconditional discharge is for all purposes a final judgment of conviction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 34.)
Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 180 C. 557, 561. Cited. 188 C. 557, 559. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 46. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Sec. 53a-31 et seq.
cited. 36 CA 440, 446.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 182 C. 595, 603.
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(b) The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and
specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, life imprisonment; (2) for
a class B felony, a term not to exceed twenty years; (3) for a class C felony, a term not
to exceed ten years; (4) for a class D felony, a term not to exceed five years; (5) for an
unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of
the general statutes that defines the crime; and (6) for a capital felony, life imprisonment
unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) the minimum term of an indeterminate
sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a
class A felony, the minimum term shall not be less than ten nor more than twenty-five
years; (2) for a class B, C or D felony the court may fix a minimum term of not less
than one year nor more than one-half of the maximum term imposed, except that (A)
where the maximum is less than three years the minimum term may be more than one-half the maximum term imposed or (B) when a person is found guilty under section
53a-59(a)(1), section 53a-59a, 53a-101(a)(1) or 53a-134(a)(2), the minimum term shall
be not less than five years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when
a person is found guilty under section 53a-60c, the minimum term shall be not less than
three years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when a person is
found guilty under section 53a-60b,the minimum term shall be not less than two years
and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced; (3) for an unclassified felony, a
term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that
defines the crime.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c), except as provided
in subdivision (2) of said subsection (c), when a person is sentenced for a class C or D
felony or for an unclassified felony, the maximum sentence for which does not exceed
ten years, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of
one year or less; except when a person is found guilty under sections 53a-55a, 53a-56a,
53a-60a, 53a-70a, 53a-72b, 53a-92a, 53a-94a, 53a-102a and 53a-103a, the court shall
not fix a term of less than one year.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 35; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 13; P.A. 73-137, S. 8; P.A. 74-186, S. 9, 12; P.A. 75-380, S. 14; 75-411, S.
3; P.A. 76-435, S. 2, 82; P.A. 77-422, S. 5; P.A. 80-442, S. 9, 28; P.A. 83-587, S. 76, 96.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to minimum sentence terms in Subsec. (d), required that sentence
be specified in the sentence in Subsec. (b), amended Subsec. (c) to add exception re Subsec. (d), to raise minimum term
for Class A felony from one to ten years and maximum term from ten to twenty-five years, to clarify exception re maximum
term of three years by specifying minimum terms and to add Subdiv. (3) re unclassified felonies and amended Subsec. (d)
to add exception re Subsec. (c)(2) and to include applicability re unclassified felonies; P.A. 73-137 removed reference to
death sentence imposed for class A felony in accordance with Sec. 53a-46 in Subsec. (b)(1) and added Subdiv. (6) re capital
felonies; P.A. 74-186 removed reference to guilt under Subdivs. (2) or (4) of Sec. 53a-60(a) in Subsec. (c)(2)(B); P.A. 75-380 added exception in Subsec. (d) re required one-year term; P.A. 75-411 deleted reference to guilt under Sec. 53a-135(a)(2) in Subsec. (c)(2)(B); P.A. 76-435 added exception in Subsec. (d) as amended by P.A. 75-380; P.A. 77-422
expanded exception in Subsec. (c)(2)(B) re required three-year and two-year minimum terms and added reference to guilt
under Sec. 53-59a; P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (a) to limit applicability to felonies committed prior to July 1, 1981,
effective on that date; P.A. 83-587 substituted "53a-59a" for "53-59a" in Subsec. (c).
Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. 176 C. 270, 271. Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 182 C. 595, 597-599, 602. Cited. 190
C. 327, 335; Id., 639, 642. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 734. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 403-406. Cited. 19 CA 440, 443, 444. Cited.
Id., 571, 574, 575. Cited. Id., 631, 635. Cited. 24 CA 612, 617. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231, 232.
Courts may impose a definite sentence for a felony of one year or less. 31 CS 350. Cited. 33 CS 705.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 171 C. 278. Cited. 189 C. 114, 116. Cited. 196 C. 655, 658.
Cited. 12 CA 403, 405. Cited. 19 CA 571, 575.
Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 114, 116, 117. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151. Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited.
195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (4) cited. 199 C. 121, 124. Cited. 211 C. 591, 612. Subdiv. (4) cited. 231 C. 545, 556. Subdiv.
(3) cited. Id., 545, 557.
Cited. 19 CA 571, 575. Subdiv. (1) cited. 24 CA 612, 615, 623. Cited. Id., 612, 618, 619. Cited. 46 CA 450.
Subsec. (c):
Subdiv. (2)(B): Rational relationship exists between the protection of public health and safety and the imposition of
nonsuspendable sentence for violent crime of second degree robbery, an essential element of which is threatened use of a
deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. 171 C. 677, 681. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 595, 599; 189 C. 114, 117. Subdiv.
(2)(B) cited. 182 C. 595, 601, 603. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 144, 153. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv.
(1) cited. 195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 197 C. 413, 427. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 485, 488, 502,
503. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 121, 124. Subdiv. (2) cited. 202 C. 343, 345. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 591, 612.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 12 CA 403, 405, 406. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 403, 406. Cited. 24 CA 612, 618.
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(P.A. 80-442, S. 10, 28; P.A. 86-220; P.A. 92-260, S. 15; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 86-220 amended Subdiv. (1) to add "imprisonment without the
possibility of release" to reflect revision made by P.A. 85-366; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (6) to add reference to "Sec.
53a-217" and provision that "for a conviction under section 53a-216, the term shall be five years", to reflect existing
minimum mandatory sentences prescribed in said sections; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 added a new Subdiv. (4) to provide a
term of not less than five years nor more than forty years for the class B felony of manslaughter in the first degree with a
firearm under Sec. 53a-55a, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and amended Subdiv. (5) to provide that
the specified sentence is for a class B felony "other than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a" and delete a reference to Sec. 53a-55a, reflecting the separate sentencing provisions established for Sec. 53a-55a in
Subdiv. (4).
See Sec. 53a-41 re fines for felonies.
Cited. 196 C. 655, 659. Cited. 197 C. 337, 353, 355, 357. Cited. 198 C. 92, 94. Cited. 200 C. 268, 279. Cited. Id., 664,
674. Cited. 201 C. 598, 600. Cited. 210 C. 519, 525. Cited. 211 C. 258, 282-285. Cited. 212 C. 31, 47. Definite sentencing
scheme for any felony under this section implicitly repealed indeterminate sentencing aspect of Sec. 21a-278(a). 214 C.
378, 382-384, 386-388. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. 225 C. 559, 562. Cited. 230 C. 109, 114,
115, 118. Cited. 234 C. 139, 143, 166. Cited. Id., 735, 748. Cited. 235 C. 502, 517. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 6 CA 680, 681. Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720, 731. Cited. 10 CA 659, 665. Cited.
12 CA 403-407. Cited. 19 CA 571, 573-575. Cited. 23 CA 201, 205. Cited. 32 CA 759, 764. Cited. 35 CA 714, 720. Cited.
42 CA 348.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 392, 393. Cited. 235 C. 206, 227. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 285, 294, 295. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.
Cited. 34 CA 58, 93; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 674. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681.
Cited. 8 CA 177, 178.
Subdiv. (4):
Cited. 202 C. 93, 99. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.
Cited. 15 CA 416, 444.
Subdiv. (5):
Cited. 6 CA 680, 681.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 218 C. 273, 275.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728. Cited. 10 CA 486, 493.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 211 C. 258, 284. Cited. 214 C. 378, 385.
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(P.A. 80-442, S. 11, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 3; P.A. 95-19, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added provision re life imprisonment without the possibility
of release; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change.
See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
Cited. 198 C. 92, 94. Cited. 201 C. 276, 277. Cited. 207 C. 374, 386. Cited. 215 C. 231, 232. Cited. 216 C. 282, 285.
Cited. 219 C. 752, 759. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 234 C. 139, 144, 166.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 24 CA 612, 618, 622.
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(P.A. 85-366, S. 4.)
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 36; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 14; P.A. 77-422, S. 6; P.A. 92-260, S. 16.)
History: 1971 act added exception re guilt under Sec. 53a-61(a)(3) in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-422 expanded exception to
include guilt under Sec. 53a-61a; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (1) to consolidate statutory references and delete redundant
language.
See Sec. 53a-42 re fines for misdemeanors.
Cited. 169 C. 223. Cited. 178 C. 145, 153. Court in sentencing of defendant found guilty under Sec. 53a-61a must
impose a mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of
unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557, 559-561, 564. Cited. 194 C. 198, 209. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275.
Cited. 223 C. 635, 666.
Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720, 731. Cited. 19 CA 631, 635. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660;
judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 189 C. 114, 117.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 727.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 184 C. 434, 438.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 722.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 194 C. 198, 199.
Cited. 12 CA 481, 494.
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 37; P.A. 73-639, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 73-639 added provisions clarifying court's sentencing powers in cases where person is to be sentenced
for two or more counts each of which constitutes a separate offense.
Cited. 178 C. 427, 432, 436. Statute provides for three sentencing options where multiple sentences are imposed at
same time. Id., 634-639. Section authorizes multiple sentences with consecutive minimum and maximum terms. 179 C.
381-384. Cited. Id., 384-387. Cited. 184 C. 366, 367; Id., 434, 439. Cited. 185 C. 473, 478. Cited. 190 C. 327, 335. Cited.
192 C. 471, 477. Cited. 197 C. 413, 427, 428. Cited. Id., 485, 503. Cited. 206 C. 40, 55. Cited. Id., 685, 701-703. Cited.
207 C. 270, 276. Cited. Id., 276. Cited. 208 C. 420, 422. Cited. 217 C. 568, 577. Does not impose limits on trial court's
common law inherent sentencing power to stay execution of a criminal sentence. 225 C. 46, 52-54. Cited. 228 C. 384,
389. Court was not prohibited from imposing a term of incarceration consecutive to a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of release. 249 C. 645.
Cited. 7 CA 131, 135. Cited. Id., 367, 377. Cited. 9 CA 365-367. Cited. Id., 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 17 CA
307, 311. Cited. 20 CA 572, 575, 576. Cited. 26 CA 10, 12. Cited. 34 CA 503, 507. Application of section is limited to
"offenses" and since criminal contempt is not a criminal offense it is not a matter within the section's scope; however,
legislature did not intend to change existing common law in enacting this section and therefore trial court had inherent
authority to impose criminal sentence that ran concurrently with previous sentence for criminal contempt. 59 CA 145.
Cited. 30 CS 71. Cited. 36 CS 168, 169.
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(b) A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received
in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one
definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run
concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has
the longest term to run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to
arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.
(c) When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated
and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense or for an offense
based on the same act, the new sentence shall be calculated as if it had commenced at
the time the vacated sentence commenced, and all time served under or credited against
the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence.
(d) When a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment escapes, the escape
shall interrupt the sentence and such interruption shall continue until the return of such
person to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 38; P.A. 92-260, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).
Calculations of terms of imprisonment discussed. 185 C. 124-129. Cited. 230 C. 17, 18.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 185 C. 124, 131; Id., 124, 126-129, 131.
Cited. 33 CA 205, 213.
Cited. 40 CS 354, 356.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 209 C. 23-26, 28, 32-34. Subdiv. (2) cited. 217 C. 568, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 384, 388, 390. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 384, 390.
Cited. 34 CA 503, 508. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 503, 508, 509. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 202 C. 343, 347-349. Cited. 215 C. 695, 697, 699. Cited. 216 C. 220, 224. Fundamental purpose is to afford
inmate credit toward current sentence for time that he was confined as direct result of his initial trial on same charges and
therefore petitioner entitled to credit toward his prison sentence for time that he was confined in mental health facility.
258 C. 394.
Cited. 30 CA 190, 195, 196. Cited. 39 CA 455, 461, 463, 464.
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(b) At any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years,
upon agreement of the defendant and the state's attorney to seek review of the sentence,
the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the
sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation
or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could
have been originally sentenced.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any portion of a sentence imposed
that is a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense which may not be suspended or
reduced by the court.
(d) At a hearing held by the sentencing court or judge under this section, such court
or judge shall permit any victim of the crime to appear before the court or judge for the
purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether or not the sentence
of the defendant should be reduced, the defendant discharged or the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this
section. In lieu of such appearance, the victim may submit a written statement to the
court or judge and the court or judge shall make such statement a part of the record at
the hearing. For the purposes of this subsection, "victim" means the victim, the legal
representative of the victim or a member of the deceased victim's immediate family.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 39; P.A. 82-428, S. 1, 4; P.A. 84-505, S. 3, 6; P.A. 85-354, S. 1, 3; P.A. 87-538, S. 1, 3, 5; P.A. 90-261, S. 7, 19; P.A. 94-119; P.A. 95-175, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 82-428 specified applicability to definite sentences "of three years or less"; P.A. 84-505 authorized the
sentencing court or judge to order certain defendants discharged on intensive probation, effective June 13, 1984, to July
1, 1987; P.A. 85-354 added provisions to require applications for the intensive probation program to be referred to the
office of adult probation for assessment and recommendations, to specify that the period of intensive probation shall not
exceed the unexpired portion of the sentence, to authorize the court or judge to place on regular probation a defendant who
successfully completes intensive probation, to specify the period of such regular probation, and to require a defendant
discharged on intensive probation to comply with the probation conditions ordered by the court or required by the office
of adult probation; P.A. 87-538 prohibited the discharge on intensive probation of a defendant sentenced for a class A
felony, authorized the placement in the intensive probation program of a defendant with a definite sentence which includes
suspension of incarceration after a period of at least two years but not more than five years, followed by a period of
probation, if he has served at least one-half of the unsuspended portion of his sentence prior to release, and reenacted and
continued in effect on and after July 1, 1987, the provisions of this section previously effective from June 13, 1984, until
July 1, 1987; P.A. 90-261 deleted all provisions re the discharge of a defendant on intensive probation; P.A. 94-119
designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a), added Subsec. (b) authorizing the sentencing court or judge at any time
during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years to reduce the sentence or order the defendant discharged
and added Subsec. (c) making the section inapplicable to any sentence imposed for an offense carrying a mandatory
minimum sentence; P.A. 95-175 added Subsec. (d) re statement by victim re reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant.
See Sec. 51-195 re sentence review by review division.
Cited. 184 C. 366, 368. Cited. 187 C. 109, 124. Cited. 200 C. 664, 674. Cited. 208 C. 420, 429, 430. Cited. 210 C. 519,
526, 527. Cited. 214 C. 717, 718, 722-725. Does not confer continuing jurisdiction on trial court to entertain a motion for
judgment of acquittal. 230 C. 427, 432-434. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 3 CA 497-502. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 45. Term "sentence" refers to the aggregate
or total effective sentence. 19 CA 631-639. Cited. 20 CA 467-469. Cited. 21 CA 557, 565. Cited. 22 CA 601, 605. Cited.
23 CA 201, 203, 205, 206. Nothing in this section or any other statute confers on trial court jurisdiction to entertain a
motion for acquittal after service of a sentence has commenced. 32 CA 1, 3-5. Section does not violate separation of
powers doctrine. 39 CA 632-635. A definite sentence includes both its executed and suspended portions. 54 CA 387.
When the original sentence was defective, commitment for violation of probation is illegal. 31 CS 350. Cited. 40 CS
238, 241, 242. Cited. 41 CS 229, 251.
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(b) An alternate incarceration program includes, but shall not be limited to, an intensive probation program, any community service program approved by the Chief Court
Administrator and any residential or nonresidential program approved by the Chief
Court Administrator which provides care, supervision and supportive services such as
employment, psychiatric and psychological evaluation and counseling, and drug and
alcohol dependency treatment. Any defendant placed in an alternate incarceration program shall comply with any other conditions of probation ordered by the court or required
by the Court Support Services Division, as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of section
53a-30.
(P.A. 89-383, S. 3, 16; P.A. 94-128, S. 1, 3; P.A. 02-132, S. 33.)
History: P.A. 89-383, S. 3 effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994; P.A. 94-128 negated effect of P.A. 89-383, reenacting
and continuing existence of section, effective July 1, 1994; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing "program to be
conducted by the Office of Adult Probation" with "program under contract with the Judicial Department" and replacing
"Office of Adult Probation" with "Court Support Services Division" and amended Subsec. (b) by replacing "Office of
Adult Probation" with "Court Support Services Division".
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(P.A. 89-390, S. 18, 37; P.A. 90-230, S. 75, 101; 90-261, S. 10, 19; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9, S. 5, 10; P.A. 03-48, S. 2.)
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(b) Any person who enters such program shall pay to the court a participation fee
of two hundred five dollars, except that no person may be excluded from such program
for inability to pay such fee, provided (1) such person files with the court an affidavit
of indigency or inability to pay, (2) such indigency is confirmed by the Court Support
Services Division, and (3) the court enters a finding thereof. All program fees collected
shall be deposited into the alternative incarceration program account.
(c) Any person for whom prosecution is suspended and who is placed in the community service labor program pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall agree to the
tolling of the statute of limitations with respect to such crime and to a waiver of such
person's right to a speedy trial. A pretrial community service labor program established
under this section for persons for whom prosecution is suspended shall include a drug
education component. If such person satisfactorily completes the program of community
service labor to which such person was assigned, such person may apply for dismissal
of the charges against such person and the court, on reviewing the record of such person's
participation in such program and on finding such satisfactory completion, shall dismiss
the charges. If the program provider certifies to the court that such person did not successfully complete the program of community service labor to which such person was assigned or is no longer amenable to participation in such program, the court shall enter
a plea of not guilty for such person and immediately place the case on the trial list.
(d) The period of participation in a community service labor program shall be a
minimum of fourteen days for a first violation and thirty days for a second violation
involving a plea of guilty and conviction.
(P.A. 90-213, S. 3, 56; P.A. 97-248, S. 11, 12; P.A. 99-148, S. 2, 4; P.A. 03-2, S. 50.)
History: P.A. 97-248 amended Subsec. (a) to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously participated
in the drug education program established under Sec. 54-56i, and amended Subsec. (b) to require a pretrial community
service labor program established for persons for whom prosecution is suspended to include a drug education component,
effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 99-148 amended Subsec. (a) to make eligible for the program persons charged with a violation
of Sec. 21a-267, to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously been convicted of a violation of Sec.
21a-267 and to delete the provision that made persons who previously participated in the drug education program established
under Sec. 54-56i ineligible for the program, amended Subsec. (c) to replace provisions that specified differing periods of
participation in the program depending upon whether the violation was of subsection (a), (b) or (c) of Sec. 21a-279 with
provisions requiring a period of participation consisting of a minimum of fourteen days for a first violation and thirty days
for a second violation involving a plea of guilty and conviction, and made technical changes for purposes of gender
neutrality, effective July 1, 1999; P.A. 03-2 added new Subsec. (b) to establish a participation fee of two hundred five
dollars, prohibit the exclusion of a person from the program for inability to pay such fee and require that all program fees
collected be deposited into the alternative incarceration program account and redesignated existing Subsecs. (b) and (c)
as new Subsecs. (c) and (d), respectively, effective February 28, 2003.
Program intended to avoid unnecessary trials and expenditures of resources, so defendant's application for program
when trial nearly complete is justification for denying application. 51 CA 126.
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(b) Any person entering such program shall, as a condition of participating in such
program, agree to: (1) Submit to periodic urinalysis drug tests, (2) detention in a halfway
house facility for a period of two days each time such test produces a positive result,
(3) comply with all rules established by the halfway house if detained in such facility,
and (4) waive the right to a hearing.
(c) Participants in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program shall submit to periodic urinalysis drug tests. If the test produces a positive result, the participant shall be
detained in a halfway house facility for a period of two days.
(d) Any person who has submitted to a urinalysis drug test pursuant to subsection
(c) of this section that produced a positive result may request that a second urinalysis
drug test be administered, at such person's expense, to confirm the results of the first
test, except that if the participant is determined to be indigent, based upon financial
affidavits, the Judicial Department shall pay the cost of the test. The second drug test
shall be a urinalysis drug test, separate and independent of the initial test. The participant
shall be detained in a halfway house pending the results of the second test. If such second
test does not produce a positive result, the participant, if detained in a halfway house,
shall be released and the fee, if paid by the participant, shall be refunded to the participant.
(e) A participant enrolled in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program as a condition of probation may be charged with a violation of probation, if the participant's
probation officer determines that the participant has violated the conditions of probation
or the conditions of the program. A participant enrolled in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program as a condition of release may be charged with a violation of the conditions
of such person's release, if a bail commissioner determines that the participant has
violated the conditions of such person's release or the conditions of the program.
(P.A. 98-145, S. 3, 4; P.A. 99-187, S. 3; P.A. 02-89, S. 83.)
History: P.A. 99-187 amended Subsec. (a) to expand eligibility for the program by adding Subdiv. (2) to include
individuals eligible to be released on bail who have been required as a condition of release to participate in the program,
adding Subdiv. (3) to include individuals sentenced to a period of probation who have violated the conditions of probation
and been referred to the program by their probation officers, and adding Subdiv. (4) to include individuals ordered by the
court to participate in the program as a condition of probation under the accelerated rehabilitation or youthful offender
programs, and amended Subsec. (e) to make existing provisions applicable to a participant enrolled in the program "as a
condition of probation" and add provision that a participant enrolled in the program as a condition of release may be
charged with violation of the conditions of such person's release if a bail commissioner determines there has been a violation
of the conditions of release or conditions of the program; P.A. 02-89 deleted as obsolete Subsec. (f) requiring the chairman
of the Board of Parole, the Commissioner of Correction and the Chief Court Administrator to submit a report on the program
to the committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to criminal justice not later than January
1, 2000.
See Secs. 18-100e and 54-125f re pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program established by Commissioner of
Correction and chairman of Board of Pardons and Paroles, respectively.
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(1) (A) Stands convicted of manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first
or second degree, or assault in the first degree, and (B) has been, prior to the commission
of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal
correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) The crimes enumerated in
subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii)
murder, sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first
degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, or an attempt to commit any
of said crimes; or (iii) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section
53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or
prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117,
or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive,
53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83, 53-86, 53-238 and 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes
in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iv) in any other state, any
crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes
enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph; or
(2) (A) Stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated
sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and
(B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned
under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this
state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following
crimes: (i) Murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree or assault in the first degree, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii)
prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117,
or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive,
53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83 and 53-86 of the general
statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or
an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) in any other state, any crimes the
essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated
in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph.
(b) A persistent dangerous sexual offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of
sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree
or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of
imprisonment of more than one year, in this state or in any other state or in a federal
correctional institution, for (A) any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this
subsection, or (B) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section
53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or
prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53-238
or 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor
statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes, or (C) in any other
state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of
the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection or this subdivision.
(c) A persistent serious felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a
felony, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present felony, convicted of
and imprisoned under an imposed term of more than one year or of death, in this state
or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for a crime. This subsection
shall not apply where the present conviction is for a crime enumerated in subdivision
(1) of subsection (a) of this section and the prior conviction was for a crime other than
those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section.
(d) A persistent serious sexual offender is a person, other than a person who qualifies
as a persistent dangerous sexual offender under subsection (b) of this section, who qualifies as a persistent serious felony offender under subsection (c) of this section and the
felony of which such person presently stands convicted is a violation of subdivision (2)
of subsection (a) of section 53-21, or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b and the prior conviction is for a violation of section 53-21 of the general
statutes, revised to January 1, 1995, involving sexual contact, committed prior to October
1, 1995, a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 of the general statutes, committed
on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000, a violation of subdivision (2)
of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b,
53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.
(e) A persistent larceny offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of larceny in
the third degree in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October
1, 1982, or larceny in the fourth, fifth or sixth degree, and (2) has been, at separate times
prior to the commission of the present larceny, twice convicted of the crime of larceny.
(f) A persistent felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony
other than a class D felony, and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission
of the present felony, twice convicted of a felony other than a class D felony.
(g) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of being a persistent offender
under this section that (1) as to any prior conviction on which the state is relying the
defendant was pardoned on the ground of innocence, and (2) without such conviction,
the defendant was not two or more times convicted and imprisoned as required by this
section.
(h) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender,
and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature
and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of
imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of
which such person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the
crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July
1, 1981, shall sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than forty
years and, if such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present
crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in
subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section, sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life.
(i) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous sexual offender,
and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature
and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of
imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of
which such person presently stands convicted, shall sentence such person to a term of
imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of imprisonment for life, as defined in section
53a-35b.
(j) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious felony offender, and
the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and
circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration
will best serve the public interest, the court in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such person presently stands
convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the crime of which such person presently
stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, may impose the sentence of
imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.
(k) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious sexual offender, and
the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and
circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration
will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands
convicted, may impose a sentence of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute the maximum sentence
specified by section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of felony.
(l) When any person has been found to be a persistent larceny offender, and the
court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best
serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section
53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the
sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony authorized by section 53a-35, if the crime
of which such person presently stands convicted was committed prior to July 1, 1981,
or authorized by section 53a-35a, if the crime of which such person presently stands
convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981.
(m) When any person has been found to be a persistent felony offender, and the
court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best
serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section
53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the
sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree
of felony; provided the sentence imposed may not be less than three years, and provided
further three years of the sentence so imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the
court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 40; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 15; P.A. 73-616, S. 40; P.A. 76-336, S. 20; P.A. 80-442, S. 12, 28; P.A. 83-4, S. 1, 2; P.A. 85-603; P.A. 92-260, S. 18; P.A. 94-37, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 48; P.A. 01-84, S. 18, 26.)
History: 1971 act removed requirements that offenders under Subsecs. (a) and (b) have been previously convicted and
imprisoned "two or more times" and "at separate times" and redefined persistent larceny offender as one who stands
convicted of larceny in "the third or fourth degree" rather than in "the second or a lesser degree" in Subsec. (c); P.A. 73-616 corrected section reference re assault with intent to kill, substituting Sec. 54-117 for Sec. 53-117 in Subsec. (a); P.A.
76-336 substituted sexual assault in first or third degree or sexual assault in first or third degree with a firearm for "rape"
in Subsec. (a) and specified applicability of conviction for crimes enumerated in Secs. 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 prior to
October 1, 1975; P.A. 80-442 specified applicability of Subsec. (b) to persistent "serious" felony offenders, inserted new
Subsec. (d) re persistent felony offenders, relettering as necessary, amended Subsecs. (f) to (h), formerly (e) to (g), re
crimes committed on or after July 1, 1981, and added Subsec. (i) re extended incarceration effective July 1, 1981; P.A.
83-4 amended Subsec. (c) to reflect the establishment of six degrees of larceny pursuant to P.A. 82-271 by including
persons convicted of larceny in the third degree "in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October
1, 1982" and larceny in the "fifth or sixth" degree; P.A. 85-603 made a technical change to Subsec. (h) and rewrote some
of the language of said Subsec. to reflect said change; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace an obsolete reference
to the offense of "sexual assault in the first degree with a firearm" with its revised name of "aggravated sexual assault in
the first degree", and made other minor technical changes in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (d); P.A. 94-37 amended Subsec. (f) to
revise the penalty for a person found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender by replacing the provision that permitted
the court to impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized for a class A felony with the provision requiring the court to
sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than forty years and by adding the provision requiring the
court to sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life if such person has been twice convicted and
imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in Subsec. (a)(2); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (a) to delete
from category of a persistent dangerous felony offender a person who stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third
degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm and has been
previously convicted and imprisoned for more than one year for any of said crimes or any predecessor statutes, or an
attempt to commit any of said crimes, to revise and restructure Subsec. to reflect such deletion and to revise Subdiv. and
Subpara. indicators accordingly, added new Subsec. (b) re persistent dangerous sexual offender, new Subsec. (d) re persistent serious sexual offender, new Subsec. (i) re penalty for persistent dangerous sexual offender and new Subsec. (k)
re penalty for persistent serious sexual offender, relettering intervening and remaining Subsecs. accordingly, and made
provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (d) to replace in provision re the offense for which the
person presently stands convicted the reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of
subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21", to replace in provision re offenses for which the person was previously
convicted the reference to "a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21" with "a violation of subdivision (2) of section
53-21 of the general statutes, committed on or after October 1, 1995, and prior to October 1, 2000," and to add reference
to a prior conviction for "a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21", effective July 1, 2001.
Annotations to former section 53-67:
Cited. 157 C. 466. Cited. 168 C. 395.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 176 C. 270, 272. Cited. 180 C. 660, 661. Cited. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. 188 C. 27, 28. Cited. 191 C. 180, 182.
Cited. 192 C. 471, 475. Cited. 194 C. 573. Cited. Id., 692, 699. Cited. 195 C. 326-330. Cited. 197 C. 280, 281. Cited. 198
C. 158, 159, 166-168. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. 203 C. 506, 519, 521, 523, 524. Cited. 207 C. 619, 620. Cited. 218 C.
273, 275. Cited. 226 C. 601, 611. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 1, 30, 31. Cited. 31 CA 140, 148. Cited. 36 CA 401, 406. Cited. 45
CA 390. Admission of certified copy of judgment sufficient to prove persistent dangerous felony offender. 50 CA 521.
Subsec. (a):
Constitutionality of dangerous felony offender statutes has long been upheld. 173 C. 545, 548, 554, 557. Nothing in
statute precludes state from offering probative evidence to clarify an official judgment of conviction in order to prove
defendant a second offender. 194 C. 573, 574, 586-589. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 573, 586. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id.,
692, 693, 695. No viable basis for challenge to statute on the grounds of vagueness. 195 C. 326, 329-333. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 326, 330. Cited. Id., 475, 476. Cited. 193 C. 273, 275, 282. Cited. 200 C. 350. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 453, 458.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdivs. (1) and (2)(B) cited. 202 C. 509, 511. Cited. 203 C. 81, 82. Cited. Id., 506, 509, 519-522.
Cited. 206 C. 621, 622. Cited. 207 C. 276, 278. Cited. 210 C. 573, 579. Cited. 213 C. 97, 99. Cited. 216 C. 220, 221. Cited.
224 C. 445, 447. Cited. 232 C. 455, 459. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
Cited. 17 CA 490, 492. Cited. 19 CA 571, 572. Cited. 29 CA 274, 276. Cited. 37 CA 672, 674. Cited. Id., 733, 735.
Cited. 39 CA 82, 86. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 131. Jury improperly found defendant to be a persistent dangerous felony
offender because his conviction of attempted assault in the first degree is not one of the qualifying felonies enumerated in
subsection. 51 CA 171.
Cited. 43 CS 77, 82.
Subsec. (b):
Presentence report used to prove that defendant was not persistent felony offender under this subsection. 169 C. 263-
266. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Failure to allege imprisonment under provisions of the statute not considered reversible error
where proof of imprisonment was established during trial and defendant failed to request complete statement of facts. 184
C. 215, 216. Cited. Id., 369, 370. Cited. 187 C. 264, 265, 278. Cited. 195 C. 326, 331. Cited. 198 C. 158, 160, 161, 166,
167. Cited. 224 C. 397, 398, 400, 418, 419. Cited. 227 C. 711, 714. Cited. Id., 751, 753. Cited. 232 C. 455, 459. Cited.
234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
Cited. 9 CA 133, 135. Cited. 10 CA 279, 280. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3, 29, 30. Cited. Id., 375, 376. Cited. 13 CA 438, 440.
Cited. 20 CA 586, 587. Cited. 31 CA 140, 141. Cited. Id., 178, 180. Cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Cited. 35 CA 405, 407. Cited. 37
CA 733, 735. Cited. 39 CA 82, 86. Cited. Id., 789, 791. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 202 C. 369, 371. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
"By pleading nolo contendere to the charge of being a persistent larceny offender, defendant waived her right to appeal
this issue." 4 CA 676, 677, 682. Cited. 14 CA 88, 90, 97, 100. Cited. 21 CA 331, 332. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229, 232.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 195 C. 326, 329-333. Cited. 198 C. 158, 167. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Language of section and its legislative
purpose require sequence of offense, conviction and punishment for each prior felony before enhanced penalty as a persistent
offender attaches. 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Cited. 41 CA 391, 393, 404-406.
Subsec. (e):
Cited. 176 C. 270, 271. Cited. 194 C. 573, 587. Cited. 195 C. 326, 328, 329, 331. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Subsec. (f):
Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. 187 C. 264, 278. Cited. 200 C. 453, 458. Cited. 207 C. 276, 285. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338,
339. Purpose is to allow sentencing court to impose a more severe sentence than would be allowed for the substantive
offense. Subsection requires sentencing court to consider defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances
of his criminal conduct and whether extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest.
There is no requirement that sentences imposed be strictly proportional to the nature of substantive offense or offenses of
which defendant was convicted. Nature of substantive offense is only one factor to be considered by sentencing court. 254
C. 613.
Cited. 19 CA 571, 572, 574.
Subsec. (g):
Cited. 224 C. 397, 400. Cited. 227 C. 751, 754. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Cited. 12 CA 1, 29, 32. Cited. 37 CA 733, 735. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Subsec. (h):
Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Cited. 21 CA 331-335, 338. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231, 232.
Subsec. (i):
Cited. 184 C. 215, 217. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
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(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving
bigotry or bias, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character
and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that an
increased penalty will best serve the public interest, the court shall: (1) In lieu of imposing
the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a if the crime is a felony,
impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious
degree of felony, or (2) in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under
section 53a-36 if the crime is a misdemeanor, impose the sentence of imprisonment
authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor, except that
if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment
for a class D felony as authorized by section 53a-35a.
(P.A. 90-137, S. 2; P.A. 00-72, S. 10.)
History: P.A. 00-72 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference in Subdiv. (1) to "subsection (a) or (c) of section 53a-181b" with reference to Sec. "53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l" and to replace reference in Subdiv. (2) to "subsection (a)
or (c) of section 53a-181b" with reference to "section 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior
to October 1, 2000" and amended Subsec. (b) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.
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(P.A. 90-213, S. 54; P.A. 98-90, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 98-90 excepted convictions under Sec. 53a-222 from provisions of section.
Jury hearing not constitutionally required for enhanced sentence based on prior conviction; enhanced penalty provisions
do apply to defendant who committed second crime while released on written promise to appear. 62 CA 34.
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(P.A. 93-340, S. 15.)
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(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving
assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective
order or criminal violation of a restraining order, and the court is of the opinion that
such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's
criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest,
the court shall, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section
53a-36 or section 53a-35a, as applicable, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of
misdemeanor or felony, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall
impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony, as authorized by section
53a-35a.
(P.A. 95-193, S. 2; P.A. 02-127, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 02-127 applied the provisions to criminal violation of a restraining order under Sec. 53a-223b and in
Subsec. (b) added references to Sec. 53a-35a, specified "felony" in the provision concerning the imposition of the sentence
of imprisonment authorized for the next more serious crime and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality.
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(b) Such standing criminal restraining order may include but is not limited to enjoining the offender from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the
victim; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking
the victim; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim.
(c) Every standing criminal restraining order of the court made in accordance with
this section shall contain the following language: "This order shall remain in effect until
modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown. In accordance with section 53a-223a, violation of a standing criminal restraining order issued by the court pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less
than one year nor more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or
both."
(P.A. 96-228, S. 1; P.A. 98-15; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 41, 121; P.A. 99-186, S. 13.)
History: (Revisor's note: In Subsec. (c) the reference in public act 96-228 to "section 1 of this act" was deemed by the
Revisors to be a reference to section 2 of that act and therefore codified as "section 53a-110c"); P.A. 98-15 amended
Subsec. (a) to add references to Secs. 53a-181c, 53a-181d and 53a-181e; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change
in Subsec. (c), effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 99-186 amended Subsec.(a) to make provisions applicable to any person
convicted "of attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a".
See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.
Imposition of a standing criminal restraining order after defendant began serving his sentence did not constitute punishment or affect defendant's sentence and therefore, trial court had jurisdiction to impose it. 269 C. 107.
Order precluding defendant from having contact with his minor children is within scope of the statute. 81 CA 84.
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(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent operating while under the
influence felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that his history and character and
the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration
will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized
by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may
impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious
degree of felony.
(P.A. 97-291, S. 1.)
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 41; P.A. 92-256, S. 1; 92-260, S. 19; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)
History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A felony from ten to twenty thousand dollars, for a class
B felony from ten to fifteen thousand dollars, and for a class C felony from five to ten thousand dollars; P.A. 92-260
amended Subdiv. (3) to replace "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective
date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.
See Sec. 53a-35a re terms of imprisonment for felonies.
See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.
Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Failure of trial court to inform defendant of amount of fine not plain error. 65 CA 234.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728.
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 42; P.A. 92-256, S. 2; 92-260, S. 20; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)
History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A misdemeanor from one to two thousand dollars; P.A.
92-260 replaced "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.
See Sec. 53a-36 re terms of imprisonment for misdemeanors.
See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.
Cited. 178 C. 145, 153; 180 C. 557, 561. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90.
Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660; judgment reversed in part, see 232
C. 345 et seq.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 722, 727.
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 43.)
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 44; P.A. 92-260, S. 21.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in punctuation.
Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
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(b) If a person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing
conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a waives his right to a jury
trial and elects to be tried by a court, the court shall be composed of three judges designated by the Chief Court Administrator or his designee, who shall name one such judge
to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide
all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.
(c) The court or jury before which any person indicted for murder or held to answer
for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a is tried may find such person guilty of homicide in a lesser degree than that charged.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 45; P.A. 73-137, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 13, 28; P.A. 82-298, S. 4; P.A. 83-210, S. 2, 5; P.A. 92-260,
S. 22.)
History: P.A. 73-137 added reference to capital felonies in Subsec. (a) and substituted reference to Sec. 53a-46a for
reference to Sec. 53a-46, deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed person indicted for murder to plead guilty with
consent of court and state's attorney in which case court would sentence him as for a Class A felony, relettering former
Subsecs. (c) and (d) accordingly; P.A. 80-442 specified punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a and deleted reference
to death sentenced under Sec. 53a-46a in Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 82-298 amended Subsec. (b) to provide
that court shall be composed of three judges designated by chief court administrator, who shall also name one such judge
to preside, where previously one judge was the judge presiding at the session and the other two were designated by the
chief justice of the supreme court; P.A. 83-210 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) by inserting "or held to answer for murder
after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add
exception for "murder under section 53a-54d", amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that such judges or a majority of
them "shall determine the question of guilt or innocence and shall, as provided in said section 53a-46a, render judgment
and impose sentence" with "shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render
judgment accordingly", and amended Subsec. (c) to replace "him" with "such person".
See annotations to part IV.
Cited. 187 C. 6, 28.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 201 C. 435, 438.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 180 C. 382, 404. Cited. 190 C. 639, 640. Cited. 198 C. 77, 90. Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 381.
Subsec. (c):
Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree
where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 399, 400, 402,
403, 407. Cited. 181 C. 187, 200; id., 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66, 71, 72. Cited. 187 C. 6, 28. Cited. 188 C. 542, 546. Cited.
190 C. 639, 652. Cited. 193 C. 695, 732. Cited. 195 C. 232, 243. Manslaughter is not lesser included offense of felony
murder. 196 C. 421, 422, 427. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. Id., 368, 372. Cited. 206 C. 346, 359. Cited. 210 C. 78, 105.
Cited. 212 C. 593, 607. Cited. 214 C. 57, 63. Cited. 225 C. 55, 65. Cited. 226 C. 237, 250. Cited. 231 C. 115, 140. Cited.
240 C. 727.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 187. Cited. 17 CA 502, 521; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 40 CA 151, 164.
Cited. 42 CS 426, 429.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 206 C. 346, 359.
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 46; 1972, P.A. 56, S. 1; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
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(b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is
convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the
trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to
determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character,
background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i). Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates
that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or
that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists. Such hearing shall be conducted (1)
before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled
for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty;
(B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection
(b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been
discharged by the court for good cause, or (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant
and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.
(c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material
contained in any presentence report which may have been prepared. No presentence
information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating
factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility
under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the
admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials.
The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the
hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of
the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The
burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be
on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant.
(d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's
character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant
to subsection (b) of this section, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first
determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background
or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been established by the
evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating factors are such as do not
constitute a defense or excuse for the capital felony of which the defendant has been
convicted, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to
extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise
constitute a basis for a sentence less than death.
(e) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting
forth its findings as to the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the existence
of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant
to subsection (d).
(f) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) none of the factors set
forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in
subsection (i) exist and (3) (A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating
factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i), the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
(g) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) any of the factors set
forth in subsection (h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection
(i) exists, or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist
and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set
forth in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors, the court shall
impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
(h) The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or,
if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e), that
at the time of the offense (1) the defendant was under the age of eighteen years, or (2)
the defendant was a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, or (3)
the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant's ability to
conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired
but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (4) the
defendant was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 53a-10 for the offense,
which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation in such offense was
relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution, or (5)
the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the
course of commission of the offense of which the defendant was convicted would cause,
or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.
(i) The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following: (1)
The defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted commission
of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a
felony and the defendant had previously been convicted of the same felony; or (2) the
defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state offenses and one or more
federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may
be imposed, which offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved
the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to
another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the defendant committed
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant
procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything
of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the
receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or (7) the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a; or
(8) the defendant committed the offense set forth in subdivision (1) of section 53a-54b
to avoid arrest for a criminal act or prevent detection of a criminal act or to hamper or
prevent the victim from carrying out any act within the scope of the victim's official
duties or to retaliate against the victim for the performance of the victim's official duties.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 4; P.A. 80-332, S. 1; 80-442, S. 14, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 1; P.A. 93-306, S. 12; P.A. 95-19, S. 1; P.A.
01-151, S. 1, 2, 5.)
History: P.A. 80-332 restated provisions and referred to mitigating or aggravating factors throughout, replacing references to factors set forth in Subsecs. (f) and (g); P.A. 80-442 referred to imposition of sentence in accordance with Sec.
53a-35a(1) rather than to sentence for a Class A felony in Subsec. (e), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added a new
Subsec. (d) to specify the procedure for the determination by a jury or court of the existence of a mitigating factor and to
add a definition of mitigating factors, relettered the remaining Subsecs. and amended Subsec. (f) to replace "a sentence in
accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(1)" with "a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release"; P.A. 93-306
amended Subsec. (h) to add as an aggravating factor that the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon;
P.A. 95-19 revised section to permit the jury or court to make findings as to whether any aggravating factor or factors
outweigh any mitigating factor or factors and require the court to sentence the defendant accordingly, while retaining
provision that the existence of certain factors concerning the defendant will operate to automatically bar the imposition of
the death sentence, and, more specifically, amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the separate hearing shall not be held if
the state stipulates "that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists" rather than "that one or more mitigating factors exist"
and make technical changes, amended Subsec. (c) to make technical changes, amended Subsec. (e) to require the jury or
court to return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to "the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the
existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors
outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d)" rather than "the existence of any
aggravating or mitigating factor", amended Subsec. (f) to revise the circumstances that must be found for the court to
impose the death sentence by requiring the court to sentence the defendant to death if the jury or court finds "that (1) none
of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist
and (3)(A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more
aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i)" rather than "that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist
and that no mitigating factor exists", designated provisions of Subsec. (f) re the circumstances that must be found for the
court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release as new Subsec. (g) and amended said
Subsec. to require the court to impose said sentence if the jury or court finds "that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection
(h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exists or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors
set forth in subsection (i) exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth
in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors" rather than "that none of the factors set forth in
subsection (h) exists or that one or more mitigating factors exist", redesignated former Subsec. (g) as new Subsec. (h) and
amended said Subsec. to replace the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if the jury or court finds
that "any mitigating factor exists" and that "the mitigating factors to be considered concerning the defendant shall include,
but are not limited to" the five enumerated factors with the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if
the jury or court finds any of the enumerated factors and deleted former Subdiv. (3) as a factor that would in and of itself
bar the imposition of the death sentence the circumstance that at the time of the offense the defendant "was under unusual
and substantial duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution", renumbering Subdivs. (4) and
(5) as Subdivs. (3) and (4), respectively, redesignated former Subsec. (h) re aggravating factors as new Subsec. (i) and
amended said Subsec. to replace the provision requiring the court to impose the death sentence if no mitigating factor is
present and the jury or court finds one of the enumerated factors with "The aggravating factors to be considered shall be
limited to the following:"; P.A. 01-151 amended Subsec. (h) to add new Subdiv. (2) barring the imposition of the death
sentence on a defendant who was a person with mental retardation, as defined in Sec. 1-1g, redesignate existing Subdivs.
(2), (3) and (4) as Subdivs. (3), (4) and (5), and make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and amended
Subsec. (i) to add Subdiv. (8) establishing as an aggravating factor the commission of the offense set forth in Sec. 53a-54b(1) to avoid arrest for a criminal act, prevent detection of a criminal act, hamper or prevent the victim carrying out the
victim's official duties or retaliate against the victim for performance of the victim's official duties and make a technical
change for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.
See Sec. 53a-35b re definition of "life imprisonment".
See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.
Former Sec. 53-10 unconstitutional. 164 C. 162. Cited. 197 C. 436, 440. Cited. 207 C. 374, 375, 382, 383, 390, 392,
393, 399. Cited. 209 C. 225, 227. Cited. 212 C. 258, 260, 264. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 225 C. 559, 562. Does not
violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185, 189, 193, 229,
235, 236, 245, 252-254, 257-259, 268, 286. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 735,
748. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209, 211, 214, 236, 247, 252, 257, 260. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334, 335, 338. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital
sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409. Court upheld previous
holding that statute does not require a capital sentencer to give mitigating force to any particular proven factor solely
because that factor establishes something good about the defendant. Instead, statute leaves the decision as to whether a
proven factor is mitigating in nature to sentencer's reasoned moral judgment. 264 C. 1. Once sentencer has found an
aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no requirement that it go further and make an additional
determination that the presence of that factor justifies imposition of the death penalty. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720. Cited. 32 CA 296, 308. Cited. 36 CA 364, 366.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 278. Cited. 237 C. 332, 337. Cited. 238 C. 389. Term "judges" in
the first sentence does not entitle defendant who elected to have a jury determine his sentence at the penalty phase hearing
to have all three members of the panel before whom the guilt phase was conducted preside at such hearing. 264 C. 1.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 383-385, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 238, 266-271, 273. Cited. 235 C. 206, 257, 259. Cited. 237
C. 332, 334. Cited. 241 C. 57. The state may present evidence to rebut mitigation at the penalty phase that would not be
admissible under normal rules of evidence. Under the statute, the state like the defendant only has to meet the relevancy
standard for evidence to be allowed. 251 C. 579.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 383, 386, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 281-284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 218, 229, 234, 251,
255. Cited. 238 C. 389. Mercy is a legitimate consideration only insofar as it is related to mitigating evidence. 264 C. 1.
Requirement for capital sentencer to consider "all the facts and circumstances of the case" is not unconstitutionally vague.
Id. Lack of remorse is not listed as a statutory aggravating factor, and so may not be relied upon as an aggravating factor,
but because mitigating factors call upon jury to elect whether to exercise mercy, defendant's lack of remorse will be relevant
generally to rebut defendant's claimed mitigating factors. 266 C. 171. Jury must make its determination of whether the
proposed mitigating evidence is mitigating in nature considering all facts and circumstances of the case, but statute does
not require that mitigating evidence have some nexus to the offense. Id.
Subsec. (e):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Imposition of death penalty premised on two unanimous findings by trier of fact that (1) existence
of aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt by state; (2) existence of a mitigating factor not proved by defendant
by a preponderance of the evidence. 207 C. 374, 382, 383, 386-388, 390, 392-394. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 239, 240, 243,
244. Cited. 235 C. 206, 215, 236, 247.
Subsec. (f):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 391. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 230 C. 183,
237-240, 258, 285. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 235 C. 206, 219, 238, 245-247. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Statute requires that jury determine that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors by any amount or degree. 266 C.
171. In light of the unique nature of death penalty, of the need for reliability and consistency and the nature of rendering
a verdict requiring death penalty, jury must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh
mitigating factors and therefore it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death sentence should be imposed. Id.
Subsec. (g):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 384. Cited. 212 C. 258, 262. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237. Subdiv. (2) cited.
Id., 183, 272, 284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 247, 251. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 229. Cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (1) cited.
Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 828. Although trial court should generally use language of Subdiv. (2) in instructing jury on the
statutory mitigating factor, it is not possible that court's minor misstatement, involving such a tenuous semantic distinction,
could have misled jury. 269 C. 213. General thrust of statute as a whole persuades us that legislature intended to recognize
as mitigating, per se, only those factors that tend to reduce defendant's moral culpability for the offense and make it unlikely
that threat of execution would serve as effective deterrent. Id. "Mental capacity" as used in Subdiv. (2) is not open-ended
term referring to any and all types of mental function, but refers specifically to defendant's ability, at time of the offense,
to understand the wrongful nature and consequences of his conductLlegislature's intent in enactingsubsec. was to specify
factual circumstances under which defendant's moral culpability for committing the offense is reduced. Id. In order to
establish either prong of the mitigating factor of Subdiv. (2), defendant must show that his mental impairment had a causal
nexus with the offense, thereby reducing his moral culpability. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 364, 366.
Subsec. (h):
Subdiv. (4) cited. 209 C. 225, 229. Subdiv. (4): Meaning of "especially cruel" must include intentional infliction of
extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. 212 C. 258, 259, 265,
266, 270, 271. Cited. Id., 258, 262. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 258, 265. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (6)
cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 230 C. 183, 185, 190, 193, 242, 252, 255, 256, 258-262, 265, 274, 276, 278. Cited. Id., 183,
237, 259, 261. Subdiv. (4) cited. 235 C. 206, 214, 219, 220. Cited. Id., 206, 221, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv.
(4) cited. Id. Cited. 242 C. 409. "Same felony" means a felony that is the same in all material respects as the felony that
is committed in this state during commission of the capital felony. That requirement is fully satisfied only if the two felonies
share the same essential elements. 264 C. 1.
Subsec. (i):
To qualify as an aggravating factor that defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner, victim must have suffered extreme pain and torture beyond that necessary to cause death. 253 C. 1. Subdiv. (6)
does not apply to a capital felony committed during the course of a robbery. 261 C. 111. In order to establish the aggravating
factor defined in Subdiv. (4), state must prove that defendant murdered both victims in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner. 262 C. 537.
Subdiv. (1): To ensure that prior felony conviction that is based on a constitutionally invalid guilty plea is not used as
aggravant in a death penalty case, it is in the interests of justice that court hear evidence on whether the plea was voluntarily
and knowingly made, and defendant bears burden of establishing the constitutional invalidity of prior plea. 48 CS 279.
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(b) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that:
(1) The sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; or
(2) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating factor specified in subsection (i) of section 53a-46a.
(c) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal and, if an appeal is
taken, the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall
then render its decision on the legal errors claimed and the validity of the sentence.
(P.A. 80-332, S. 2; P.A. 81-472, S. 151, 159; P.A. 85-366, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 23; P.A. 95-16, S. 3, 5; 95-19, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 85-366 made a technical change to reflect changes made to Sec.
53a-46a by same public act; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes; P.A. 95-16 amended Subsec. (b) by deleting Subdiv.
(3) that had required the Supreme Court to affirm the death sentence unless it determines the sentence to be excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, effective April 12, 1995; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change.
Cited. 212 C. 258, 271. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on due process rights.
230 C. 183, 185, 188, 191, 193, 236, 239. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 234 C. 735, 737, 738, 746. Cited. 235 C.
206, 211, 212, 250. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 235 C. 206, 226, 227. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (3): Class of similar cases to include all convictions of a capital felony after October 1, 1973, resulting from a
trial or from a plea whether or not convictions were followed by imposition of death penalty. 225 C. 559, 560, 563. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 230 C. 183, 258, 259, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited. 234 C. 735, 736, 740, 741, 759-763. Subdiv. (3): Prohibition against
disproportionality discussed. Id., 735-738, 740-742, 745, 747, 748, 750, 752, 760-762. Cited. Id., 735, 763. Cited. 235
C. 206, 216, 227. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 220, 226, 228. Subdiv. (3) cited. 237 C. 332, 338. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C.
389. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3): Court concluded that statutory proportionality review scheme is constitutional and
that it involves the precedent seeking method of comparative, rather than traditional, proportionality review. Id.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 237 C. 332, 336, 338. P.A. 95-16, Sec. 3(b) cited. Id.
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(P.A. 83-327, S. 1, 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 24.)
History: P.A. 92-260 replaced "on October 1, 1980" with "on and after October 1, 1980".
Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185,
236. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
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(P.A. 00-200, S. 6; P.A. 03-179, S. 2; 03-278, S. 104.)
History: P.A. 03-179 replaced "prepared by" with "prepared with the assistance of" and made a technical change; P.A.
03-278 made a technical change, effective July 9, 2003.
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 47; P.A. 75-476, S. 5, 6; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 2, 115, 127; P.A. 81-301, S. 2; P.A. 83-486, S. 2; P.A.
85-506, S. 31, 32.)
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INCHOATE OFFENSES
To constitute conspiracy there need be no formal agreement between the parties; conspiracy may be established by
proof of separate acts of individual conspirators with common purpose. 129 C. 540. Principles stated which prevent a
charge of conspiracy against certain participants in unlawful acts. 132 C. 335. Conspiracy is a distinct offense, entirely
independent of the unlawful act which is its purpose. 134 C. 183. Conspiracy may be inferred from activities of accused
persons. 138 C. 292. Where a prima facie case is made out, court is entitled to take into consideration the fact that defendant
failed to testify. 139 C. 229. Declaratory judgment that a violation would exist. 142 C. 53. Cited. 145 C. 124; 150 C. 230;
152 C. 167. No formal agreement need be proven; it is enough if there is a mutual purpose to do the forbidden act. 147 C.
296. Information charging a conspiracy may properly allege acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Information charged
that defendants conspired to commit larceny and in pursuance of the conspiracy stole copper wire worth $2000. Since
larceny statute made theft of property worth more than $50 a felony, effect of the information was to charge a conspiracy
to commit a felony. Not necessary for state to prove that the unlawful object of the conspiracy was ever successfully
accomplished or that any larceny was ever committed in any amount. Confessions made by two conspirators were not
admissible to prove guilt of third conspirator. Since court made that clear in instructions to jury, third conspirator could
not complain of admission of confessions in evidence. 149 C. 640. Fact that one or more persons jointly charged with the
commission of a crime pleaded guilty is not admissible, on trial of another person so charged, to establish that the crime
was committed. A plea of guilty is, in effect, a confession of guilt which, having been made by one of those charged with
the crime, can be no more than hearsay as to another who is so charged. The state must prove the whole case against any
accused. 150 C. 195. Where one of alleged coconspirators is acquitted, this does not necessarily make fatal convictions of
other coconspirators. 151 C. 592. Crime of conspiracy at common law is unlawful combination and accomplishment of
objectives of conspiracy is not material. 157 C. 330. Once defendant had been proved to be member of conspiracy, declarations of coconspirators in furtherance of conspiracy could be used against him. 158 C. 412. Warrant authorizing search
for "...paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197" was general warrant and therefore was illegal and did not
meet constitutional requirement that search warrant particularly describe things to be seized. 160 C. 28, 33-37. Admission of
evidence that defendant denied he knew coconspirators was reversible error when interrogation was made in absence of
defendant's counsel. 159 C. 608. Essence of crime of conspiracy is unlawful combination coupled with act done and not
accomplishment of act. 160 C. 140, 149. Common law conspiracy deemed a separate and distinct crime. 162 C. 215. Cited.
163 C. 231.
Cited. 8 CS 330; 22 CS 173; 27 CS 130, 131. Person convicted of violating act cannot be sent to Kentucky hospital by
petitioning review division of superior court. 25 CS 7. Cited. 27 CS 380; 28 CS 240. Conspiracy common law crime, when.
Id., 344. Cited. 29 CS 333. Cited. 30 CS 211.
Crime of conspiracy is a separate offense and does not merge in the act which is executed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 50, 51. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 548.
Annotations to former section 54-198:
Must be specific intent to commit crime and same overt act adopted to effectuate such intent. 141 C. 731. Cited. 143
C. 368; 156 C. 391.
Cited. 19 CS 267.
(b) It shall be a defense to a charge of conspiracy that the actor, after conspiring to
commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 48, 49; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 16.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (b) to remove reference to "affirmative" defense.
See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.
Cited. 169 C. 377, 380. Cited. Id., 517, 518. Cited. Id., 642, 643, 645. Generally may prosecute and sentence defendant
for both conspiracy to commit offense and offense itself; Wharton's rule: An agreement by two persons to commit crime
which necessarily requires participation of two persons cannot be prosecuted as conspiracy; rule currently valid only as
presumption of legislative intent (dissent noted); exception to rule when more persons than required participate. 171 C.
105. Abuse of conspiracy charge to bring in otherwise improper evidence. Id. Cited. Id., 524, 528. Cited. 172 C. 74, 75.
Cited. 174 C. 135, 136. Cited. Id., 338, 339, 344. Cited. Id., 376. Cited. 176 C. 131, 132. Cited. 177 C. 370, 371. Cited.
178 C. 67, 68; id., 163, 164; id., 649, 650. A defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when
evidence under this section is before jury. Id., 704, 708. Cited. 180 C. 481, 482. Cited. 182 C. 262, 263; id., 595, 600.
Cited. 184 C. 369, 370, 377, 378. Cited. 186 C. 426, 427; id., 648, 649; id., 696, 707. Cited. 187 C. 109, 111; id., 264, 265;
id., 513, 514. Cited. 188 C. 515, 516, 529; id., 542, 543; id., 671, 675. Cited. 189 C. 201, 202; id., 337, 339. Cited. 190 C.
259, 260. Cited. 191 C. 360, 362. Cited. 194 C. 18, 20. Cited. Id., 361, 362. Cited. 195 C. 128, 129. Cited. Id., 183, 185.
Cited. Id., 598, 604. Cited. 196 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 197 C. 201, 203. Cited. Id., 326, 327. Cited. Id.,
413, 415. Cited. Id., 644, 656. "There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of
recklessly or negligently causing a result," therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this
statute and Sec. 53a-113 is not crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1-3, 5. Cited. Id., 14, 16. Cited. 200 C. 113, 114.
Cited. Id., 310, 311, 314. Cited. 201 C. 489, 490, 496, 497, 501. Cited. 202 C. 520, 526, 527, 529. Cited. 204 C. 240, 241,
250, 257, 258. Cited. Id., 630, 636, 637. Cited. 207 C. 323, 324. Cited. 209 C. 1, 6. Cited. 210 C. 435, 438, 439. Cited.
211 C. 289, 293. Cited. 212 C. 195, 196, 199-203. Cited. Id., 387, 389. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. 213 C. 233-235.
Conspiracy charge against a defendant is barred after acquittal of sole alleged coconspirator. Conspiracy statute as "bilateral" in nature discussed. Id., 243, 250. Cited. Id., 422, 424. Cited. Id., 708, 711, 721. Cited. 215 C. 716, 718. Cited. Id.,
739, 743. Cited. 216 C. 801. Cited. 218 C. 349-351. Cited. Id., 432, 433, 435. Cited. 220 C. 602, 604, 606. Cited. Id., 765,
767, 771. Cited. 221 C. 447, 449. Cited. Id., 595, 598. Cited. 223 C. 243, 245, 248, 263. Cited. Id., 384, 386. Cited. 224
C. 322, 323. Cited. 225 C. 270, 271. Cited. Id., 347, 349. Cited. 227 C. 1, 3. Cited. Id., 32, 35. Cited. Id., 207, 210, 211.
Cited. 235 C. 397, 398. Cited. Id., 679, 682, 683. Cited. Id., 748, 750. Cited. 236 C. 176, 178. Cited. Id., 514, 517. Cited.
237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 380. Cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 708. Cited. 241 C. 322.
Cited. 242 C. 93.
Cited. 1 CA 524. Cited. 3 CA 503. Cited. 5 CA 347, 348. Cited. Id., 491, 492, 494. Cited. Id., 599, 600, 604. Cited. 8
CA 119, 120. Cited. Id., 478, 480, 481, 490. Cited. Id., 667, 671. Cited. 9 CA 548, 549. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id.,
147, 148. Cited. Id., 447, 448, 451, 453, 455. Cited. 11 CA 397-399. Cited. Id., 621, 623. Cited. 14 CA 205, 207. Cited.
Id., 445-447. Cited. Id., 605, 607. Cited. Id., 807. Cited. 15 CA 122, 123, 125. Cited. 15 CA 328, 329. Cited. Id., 539, 540.
Cited. 16 CA 18, 20, 33. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 17 CA 247, 248. Cited. Id., 648, 650. Cited. 19 CA 554, 555, 562-
564. Cited. Id., 640, 641. Cited. 21 CA 299, 301, 309, 311, 313. Cited. Id., 386, 387, 392, 403. Cited. Id., 519, 520. Cited.
22 CA 449, 450. Cited. Id., 567, 569, 577. Cited. 23 CA 502, 506. Cited. Id., 615, 617. Cited. Id., 667, 670. Cited. 24 CA
316, 318. Cited. Id., 493, 494. Cited. 26 CA 94, 100. Cited. Id., 667, 668. Cited. Id., 779, 780. Cited. 27 CA 596, 597.
Cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Cited. Id., 126, 128, 134. Cited. Id., 416, 420. Cited. 29 CA 359, 361. Cited. Id., 843, 844. Cited. 30
CA 190-192. Cited. Id., 232, 241. Cited. Id., 550, 558. Cited. Id., 654, 655. Cited. Id., 712, 713. Cited. 32 CA 224, 226.
Cited. 33 CA 253, 254. Cited. Id., 409, 410. Cited. 34 CA 751, 753. Cited. 35 CA 714, 716, 717. Cited. Id., 839, 841-843,
846, 848, 849. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited. Id., 190, 200. Cited. Id., 454, 455. Cited. Id., 556-558, 570, 571. Cited. Id.,
631, 632. Cited. Id., 672, 673. Cited. Id., 753, 755, 764. Cited. Id., 774, 775. Cited. 37 CA 219. Cited. Id., 456, 458;
judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 536, 538. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. Id., 777,
778, 800. Cited. Id., 868, 869. Cited. 39 CA 224, 226. Cited. Id., 333, 336, 342. Cited. Id., 526, 540. Cited. Id., 550, 553.
Cited. 40 CA 515, 520. Cited. Id., 789, 791. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. Id., 147, 148. Cited. Id., 495, 498. Cited. 42 CA
472. Cited. Id., 500. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 687. Cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. Id., 252. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 44 CA 338.
Cited. 45 CA 110. Cited. Id., 282. Cited. Id., 455. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 791. Elements of crime of conspiracy under
sec. discussed. 63 CA 82. Statute is bilateral in nature in that conspiracy requires a showing that two or more coconspirators
intended to engage in or cause conduct that constitutes a crime. 64 CA 384. Conviction and sentencing for multiple
conspiracy offenses based on a single agreement is double jeopardy violation. 65 CA 788. Elements of crime of conspiracy
discussed. 70 CA 393. There was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly entered
into a conspiracy to possess a narcotic substance with intent to sell. 75 CA 223.
Cited. 29 CS 344. Cited. 30 CS 211. Overt act is essential element of offense and must be alleged in information charging
conspiracy. 35 CS 96, 97. Cited. 36 CS 603, 604; 37 CS 527, 528, 531; id., 853. Cited. 38 CS 301, 302, 308; id., 374, 375;
id., 593, 594, 596.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 171 C. 524, 527, 529. Cited. 177 C. 243. Cited. 186 C. 696, 697. Cited. 187 C. 264, 271. Cited. 189 C. 752, 754.
Cited. 192 C. 383-385. Cited. 195 C. 598, 599. Cited. 197 C. 644, 645, 654. Cited. 199 C. 389, 391. Cited. 200 C. 586,
587. Cited. 201 C. 289, 290, 298, 300. Cited. 202 C. 520, 528. Cited. 203 C. 420, 421. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242. Cited. 207
C. 118, 120. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81. Cited. Id., 619, 621. Cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Cited. Id., 195, 197, 200. Cited. Id., 485, 488.
Cited. 213 C. 243, 244. Cited. 214 C. 122, 123. Cited. Id., 344, 347. Cited. 215 C. 570, 576. Cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Cited.
218 C. 151-153. Cited. 221 C. 595, 598. Cited. 223 C. 384, 386. Cited. Id., 635, 637, 638. Cited. 227 C. 32, 35, 41. Cited
erroneously as Subsec. (1). Id., 363, 365. Cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433; judgment superseded by en banc
reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 537, 538. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504. Cited. 239 C. 235. Cited. Id., 467.
Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 727. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 296.
Appellate court in State v. Torres, 41 CA 495 reversed trial court's judgment on grounds of insufficient evidence to convict,
judgment of appellate court reversed. Id., 485. Evidence was sufficient to support conspiracy conviction. 253 C. 354.
Where two defendants were tried separately and their respective juries were presented with separate, independent evidence
of their agreement to commit the crime in question, acquittal of the defendant's coconspirator did not nullify defendant's
conviction of the same charge. 257 C. 587.
Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 9 CA 313, 314, 317. Cited. 10 CA 447, 452. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed,
see 212 C. 50 et seq. Cited. Id., 605, 609. Cited. Id., 688, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 416, 417. Cited. 16 CA 89, 90.
Cited. Id., 245, 248. Cited. Id., 402, 403. Cited. 18 CA 134, 137. Cited. 19 CA 179-181, 186. Cited. Id., 195, 196. Cited.
20 CA 665, 666. Cited. 21 CA 386, 400. Cited. 22 CA 340, 341. Cited. 23 CA 502-504. Cited. Id., 602, 604. Cited. Id.,
667, 669, 670. Cited. Id., 746, 747; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 595 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 493, 498. Cited. 25 CA 3, 4.
Id., 21, 22. Cited. Id., 318, 319. Cited. 26 CA 94, 95, 99. Cited. Id., 279, 280. Cited. 27 CA 558, 560. Cited. 28 CA 126,
134. Cited. Id., 161, 162, 168. Cited. Id., 306-308. Cited. Id., 474, 475. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited.
29 CA 59, 60, 62. Cited. Id., 207, 211. Cited. Id., 843, 844, 858. Cited. 30 CA 232, 234. Cited. Id., 550, 551, 557. Cited.
31 CA 370, 371. Cited. 32 CA 842, 843. Cited. 33 CA 122, 123. Cited. Id., 339, 340; judgment reversed on issues of
sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 409, 410. Cited. Id., 647, 648, 650, 657.
Cited. 34 CA 58, 59; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 96, 97; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et
seq. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. Id., 751, 753; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 740, 742. Cited. 36
CA 41, 42. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 454, 455. Cited. Id., 483, 484. Cited. Id., 488, 489. Cited. Id., 556, 557. Cited.
Id., 672, 673. Cited. Id., 753, 755. Cited. 37 CA 156, 158. Cited. Id., 360, 361. Cited. Id., 456, 458; judgment reversed,
see 236 C. 176 et seq. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. 38 CA 434, 435. Cited. Id., 481, 483. Cited. Id., 536, 538. Cited. Id.,
777, 778. Cited. 39 CA 63, 64. Cited. Id., 224, 226. Cited. Id., 242, 244. Cited. Id., 333, 336. Cited. Id., 526, 528. Cited.
Id., 550, 553. Cited. Id., 579, 580, 599. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. 40 CA 47, 48. Cited. Id., 515, 516. Cited. Id., 526, 527,
533. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited. Id., 495. Cited. 42 CA 500. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 687. Cited. 43 CA 488. Cited.
Id., 830. Cited. 44 CA 338. Cited. Id., 499. Cited. 45 CA 270. Cited. 46 CA 640. Conviction for conspiracy to sell a
controlled substance within one thousand five hundred feet of a public housing project reversed where trial court instructed
that jury must find that conspiracy occurred within one thousand five hundred feet of public housing project. The law is
not concerned with where the plan was hatched, but with where conspirators proposed to carry out its unlawful purpose.
73 CA 386.
Cited. 44 CS 490.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 40 CA 526, 532, 533.
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(b) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subdivision (2)
of subsection (a) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal
purpose. Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly
corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter
of law: (1) Lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the
crime; (2) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to
the place contemplated for its commission; (3) reconnoitering the place contemplated
for the commission of the crime; (4) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure
in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; (5) possession of materials
to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such
unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;
(6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of
the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession,
collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;
(7) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the
crime.
(c) When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection (a) of this section, it shall be a defense that he abandoned his effort to commit
the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a
complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 50; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 17; P.A. 92-260, S. 25.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (c) to remove reference to "affirmative" defense; P.A. 92-260 made technical
changes.
See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.
Cited. 169 C. 377, 380. Cited. Id., 581. Cited. 173 C. 254, 255. Cited. Id., 317, 318, 325. Cited. Id., 360, 362, 363.
Cited. 174 C. 16, 17. Cited. Id., 142, 144. Cited. 175 C. 398, 399. Cited. 179 C. 1, 2. Cited. 180 C. 481, 482. Cited. 182
C. 207, 208; Id., 430, 432; Id., 595, 596, 598, 600. Cited. 183 C. 29, 30. Cited. 184 C. 157, 158. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164;
Id., 199, 200. Cited. 186 C. 261, 262. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Cited. 189 C. 383, 385. Cited. 193 C. 70, 76. Cited. 193 C.
602, 603. Cited. 194 C. 233, 234. Cited. Id., 241, 242. Cited. Id., 408-410, 412. Cited. 195 C. 611, 612, 618. Cited. 196
C. 36, 38. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 198 C. 124, 126. Cited. 199 C. 14, 16. Cited. Id., 155, 159. Cited. Id., 591, 593. Cited.
200 C. 30, 31. Cited. 201 C. 174, 176. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 289, 294, 297, 300. Cited. Id., 605, 606. Cited. 202
C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 509, 510. Cited. Id., 520, 527, 529. Cited. 203 C. 445, 446. Cited. Id., 484, 486. Cited. 204 C. 630,
636, 637. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Cited. Id., 616, 617. Cited. 206 C. 213, 214. Cited. 207 C. 1, 10, 12. Cited. 209 C. 34, 41,
42, 44. Cited. 210 C. 519, 521. Cited. Id., 652, 689, 692. Cited. 214 C. 454, 457. Cited. 215 C. 695, 698. Cited. Id., 716,
718. Cited. 216 C. 585, 586, 602. Cited. Id., 647, 649, 661. Cited. 218 C. 747, 748. Cited. 220 C. 384, 385. Cited. Id., 765,
767, 768, 774. Cited. 221 C. 109, 112. Cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Cited. 222 C. 718, 719, 724. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited.
227 C. 301, 302, 311, 316, 318-320. Cited. 228 C. 384, 385. Cited. Id., 393, 395, 396. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. 231
C. 235, 237. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Cited. 235 C. 397, 398. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 469, 470. Cited. Id., 502, 503,
505, 516, 518. Cited. Id., 748, 750. Cited. 236 C. 266, 267. Cited. 237 C. 501. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 748. Cited. 238
C. 389. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 413. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 389. Cited. Id., 648.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 345. Cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Cited. 6 CA 24, 25. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id.,
257, 258. Cited. Id., 367, 370. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 351, 352. Cited. Id., 496, 497, 504,
506. Cited. Id., 545, 548. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. 9 CA 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Cited. Id.,
587, 588. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. 12 CA 32, 33. Cited. Id., 163, 170. Cited. Id., 217. Cited. Id.,
395, 396. Cited. Id., 604-606. Cited. Id., 685. Cited. 13 CA 69, 74, 75. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 531, 532.
Cited. Id., 704, 705, 712. Cited. 16 CA 38, 39. Cited. Id., 284, 285. Cited. 17 CA 359, 360. Cited. 19 CA 618, 619. Cited.
Id., 631, 633. Cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Cited. 21 CA 326. Cited. Id., 386, 387, 403. Cited. 22 CA 199, 201. Cited. Id., 340,
341. Cited. Id., 449, 450. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. Id., 624, 625, 627. Cited.
Id., 697, 698. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106, 110. Cited. Id., 298, 300. Cited. Id., 334, 335. Cited. Id., 433, 434, 441. Cited. Id.,
578, 579, 582. Cited. Id., 725, 726. Cited. 27 CA 73, 74 92. Cited. Id., 403, 404. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 28 CA 34, 35.
Cited. Id., 64, 66. Cited. Id., 469. Cited. 30 CA 26, 28, 29, 35. Cited. 30 CA 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335
et seq. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371, 376. Cited. 33 CA 339, 350; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment
reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Cited.
Id., 223, 224, 226. Cited. 35 CA 51, 53. Cited. Id., 138, 139, 148, 153. Cited. Id., 740, 743. Cited. 36 CA 161, 162. Cited.
Id., 336, 337. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. Id., 805, 807. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Cited. 37 CA 62, 63;
judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501 et seq. Cited. Id., 733, 735. Cited. 38 CA 777, 779. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. 39 CA
1, 5. Cited. Id., 18, 19, 23. Cited. Id., 267, 268, 271. Cited. Id., 333, 335. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Cited. Id., 810, 811. Cited.
40 CA 60, 61. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. Id., 483, 484. Cited. 41 CA 515, 517. Cited. Id., 751-753. Cited. 42 CA 472.
Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 252. Cited. Id., 599. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 70. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 476. Cited. 45
CA 390. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 734.
Cited. 33 CS 599. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756. Cited. 38 CS 464, 465. Cited. 39 CS 347, 353.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 177 C. 140, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. 178 C. 689, 690, 694. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 430, 435.
Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 585, 587; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled
on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had
had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 585-588, 592, 594; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz,
in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly
added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 188 C. 574,
576. Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 61. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 303-305. Cited. 189 C. 303, 307, 309. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C.
822, 832. Cited. 194 C. 258, 272, 276. Cited. Id., 258, 259, 271, 272, 275. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 258, 272, 276, 277. Cited.
195 C. 651, 655. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54, 62. Cited. 199 C. 255, 257. Cited. 200 C. 30, 35. Cited. Id., 44, 45. Cited. Id., 607.
Cited. 201 C. 289, 290. Cited. 202 C. 509, 514. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 520, 526. Cited. Id., 520, 528. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205
C. 528, 532. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 616, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 673-675. Subdiv. (2) cited. 207 C. 646, 647. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 208 C. 202, 203. Cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 733, 736. Cited. 210 C. 652, 687. Subdiv. (1)
cited. Id., 652, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18, 20, 25, 27. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 441, 442. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582, 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. 212 C. 31-33. Cited. Id., 50, 52. Cited. 216 C. 492, 493. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 585, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Subdiv. (2) cited. 220 C. 408. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 652, 653.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 765, 774. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 928. Cited. 221 C. 402, 403. Cited. Id., 915. Subdiv. (2) cited. 222
C. 556, 558. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 718, 721-726. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 718, 721, 722, 724. Cited. Id., 718, 722, 726.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 224 C. 397, 399, 403, 414, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 524-526. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 616, 619.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. 229 C. 60, 62. Cited. Id., 125, 127. Cited. Id., 839, 840. Cited. 232
C. 431, 433, 434; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 431, 440;
judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 235 C.
502, 505, 517. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 502, 515. Cited. 238 C. 313. Subdiv. (2) cited. 240 C. 395. Subdiv. (2) cited. 241 C.
322. Cited. Id., 502. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 802. Subdiv. (2) cited. 242 C. 485. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a
murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or
following act of perpetration was insufficient to support conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 346. Cited. 5 CA 586, 587, 589. Cited. 6 CA 164, 165. Cited. Id., 476, 477. Cited. 7 CA 149, 150.
Cited. Id., 257, 260, 261. Subdiv. (2) cited. 8 CA 496, 505. Cited. Id., 545, 546. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 545, 547. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 462, 463. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 163,
164, 170. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 221, 222. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 12. Cited. Id., 69, 74. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.,
237, 238. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 222, 225; Id., 416,
417; Id., 704, 708. Cited. 21 CA 386, 401. Cited. 22 CA 449, 452. Subdiv. (2) cited. 23 CA 160, 161. Cited. Id., 663, 664.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 692, 693. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 27, 28, 35; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 264, 266, 267. Cited. Id., 624, 637-639. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 624, 639, 640. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 25 CA
104, 105, 110. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 104, 106, 110, 111. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 104, 110, 111. Cited. Id., 298, 305. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id., 433, 441-443. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 441-444. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 578, 582. Subdiv. (2) cited. 26 CA
52, 53. Cited. Id., 65, 66. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 114, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242-244. Cited. Id., 242, 244. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 433, 434. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 779, 780. Cited. Id., 73, 74. Cited. 27 CA 601,
602. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 290, 301, 302. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 306, 308. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 404. Subdiv. (2)
cited. Id., 548, 549, 551, 556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 39, 60, 63-65. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 262, 263. Subdiv. (2) cited.
30 CA 9, 10. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 26, 29, 31. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 470, 471, 476. Subdiv.
(1) cited. Id., 606, 607, 610, 611. Cited. 31 CA 120, 121. Cited. Id., 385, 386. Cited. 33 CA 339, 340, 350; judgment
reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see
235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 368, 369. Subdiv. (1) Id., 647, 650. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 743, 748B; judgment
reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 41, 42.
Cited. Id., 161, 162. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. Id., 718, 720, 734. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 536, 537.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 18, 19, 24. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 224, 226. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242, 244. Cited.
Id., 333, 335. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 333, 340. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 333, 341. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40
CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 387, 388. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 624, 625, 627. Subdiv.
(2) cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 287, 288, 294, 294, 296. Cited. 42 CA 264. Subdiv. (2) cited. 43 CA 488.
Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 578. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 619. Cited. Id., 680. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 785. Cited. 44 CA 6. Subdiv.
(2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 499. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45
CA 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 756. Proof of prior plan or premeditation not necessary to establish criminal liability for
attempted murder. 47 CA 401. Subdiv. (2) cited re testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 49 CA 486. Subdiv. (2) cited re showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient
to support a charge of larceny. Id. Subdiv. (2): Defendant took substantial step in hiring an agent to commit an arson even
though agent was not actually paid. To constitute a substantial step, consummation of the deed is not required. 59 CA 362.
Statutory provisions codified common law distinction between the acts of solicitation and attempt and an attempt not a
solicitation under Sec. 53a-179a. 65 CA 145. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant
intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or
the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. To be guilty of crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree defendant must
be shown to have had the mental state required to commit assault in the first degree and fact that the wounds actually
inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to
inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646. Evidence which established that defendant arranged for sale of heroin to undercover
police officer then left his residence and traveled in the direction of designated meeting place for the sale was sufficient
to find defendant guilty of attempt to commit a crime, in particular, the sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug
dependent in violation of Sec. 21a-278(b). 82 CA 111.
Cited. 41 CS 229, 232. Cited. 43 CS 46, 64.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 430, 435. Cited. 194 C. 258, 277. Cited. 205 C. 616, 617, 620. Cited. 209 C. 34, 41, 43. Cited. 211 C.
555, 587, 588.
Cited. 15 CA 704, 706, 708, 709, 711-713, 715.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 200 C. 30, 35. Cited. 221 C. 915.
Cited. 17 CA 128, 130. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant
failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that
defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 51.)
Cited. 182 C. 595, 600.
Cited. 17 CA 128, 130. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant
failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that
defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 52.)
Cited. 182 C. 595, 598, 600-602. Cited. 184 C. 369, 377. Cited. 195 C. 183, 185. Cited. 202 C. 520, 527. Cited. 204
C. 630, 637. Cited. 211 C. 18, 26. Cited. 213 C. 708, 713. Cited. 235 C. 502, 515, 517. Defendant guilty of conspiracy to
commit robbery in the first degree is subject to the minimum nonsuspendable sentence in Sec. 53a-134(b). 264 C. 593.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 10 CA 447, 456. Cited. 21 CA 299, 309. Cited. 22 CA 567, 578. Cited. 29 CA 843, 859-
861. Cited. 33 CA 253, 261, 262. Cited. 36 CA 190, 205.
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(1969, P.A. 828, S. 53; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
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HOMICIDE
Necessity of stating degree of crime in indictment; 38 C. 399; 47 C. 117; of alleging deliberation and premeditation
where it alleges first degree. 50 C. 198. Unlawful homicide perpetrated in commission of rape is in the first degree; 72 C.
729; so in commission of robbery or in attempt to rob. 110 C. 307; id., 559; 123 C. 670; 126 C. 59; 132 C. 44. Homicide
caused by driving automobile recklessly. 82 C. 671; 83 C. 437; 109 C. 491. What mental capacity necessary for first degree
murder; 57 C. 509; charge as to defense of insanity; 87 C. 7; 96 C. 242; burden of proof; id., 639; when court need not
charge as to it. 87 C. 285. Actual malice must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 43 C. 518; 64 C. 305; 78 C. 25. Malice
is implied, if homicide is willful, deliberate and premeditated; 46 C. 336; 109 C. 138; but not in the case of sufficient
provocation or uncontrollable passion. 74 C. 181. Malice is implied where an unlawful homicide is unattended by extenuating circumstances. 110 C. 307; id., 559. What constitutes malice; 64 C. 305; 74 C. 181; 128 C. 44; charge as to it; 79 C.
590; 84 C. 472; 87 C. 5; 98 C. 463; 103 C. 484; 106 C. 351; rebutted by reasonable belief that victim committed adultery
with accused's wife; 74 C. 177; 87 C. 5; 92 C. 71; evidence of statements by accused and feeling towards victim; 74 C.
177; 83 C. 261; 84 C. 472; 87 C. 5; 88 C. 177; malice presumed from circumstances of atrocity. 84 C. 152. Theft as motive.
79 C. 590; 90 C. 126. Intoxication admissible on question of deliberation; 40 C. 143; 41 C. 587; 49 C. 382; where indulged
in to nerve person to carry out preconceived plan; 48 C. 97; as bearing on malice; 64 C. 305; as a defense. 83 C. 165; 87
C. 291; 88 C. 208. Self-defense; 57 C. 313; 79 C. 590; 83 C. 261; 106 C. 455; 105 C. 349; or defense of home; 57 C. 313;
88 C. 360. Suicide of victim as a defense; her statements as to intent. 77 C. 267. Alibi. 84 C. 152; 98 C. 466. Charge as to
corpus delicti. 81 C. 22. See note re 152 C. 15, infra. Burden and amount of proof; reasonable doubt; 77 C. 267; 79 C. 590;
81 C. 22; 87 C. 573; 109 C. 139; as to malice. 78 C. 25. Homicide in general; nature and definition of degrees. 72 C. 729;
74 C. 180. When court should charge as to excuse, justification or extenuation. 84 C. 470; 87 C. 285; 98 C. 463; 103 C.
484. Murder in second degree; 87 C. 5; 128 C. 44; 131 C. 60; in case of poisoning; 19 C. 393. What facts will reduce crime
to manslaughter. 74 C. 180; 78 C. 18; 79 C. 590; 87 C. 585. Under indictment for murder accused cannot be found guilty
of any crime except murder in first or second degree or manslaughter. 132 C. 41. Bad prison food no justification. 38 C.
127. Effect of plea of not guilty; 87 C. 285; of plea of guilty; 78 C. 18; 88 C. 208. Confession or admissions by accused;
18 C. 180; 78 C. 18; 92 C. 65 et seq.; 103 C. 478; declarations before grand jury. 56 C. 413. Momentary absence of accused
from trial. 82 C. 59. Evidence equivalent to that of two witnesses; for jury to determine. 78 C. 18; 90 C. 126; 93 C. 246;
103 C. 467; 106 C. 714. Appeal as supersedeas; 82 C. 59; if decided before time set for execution by reprieve, supreme
court need not set another day. 81 C. 22. Clothes of victim as evidence; 82 C. 59; so empty cartridge shells found in
accused's room. 74 C. 649. Where four indicted together, charge that state had not made out a case as to three upheld. 87
C. 285. Abandonment of enterprise by one before murder. 47 C. 139; 97 C. 329; 110 C. 309. Evidence of other unconnected
crimes generally inadmissible; when such evidence is admissible. 92 C. 530; 97 C. 266; 103 C. 480; 120 C. 631. When
separate trials should be given persons jointly accused. 92 C. 62; 97 C. 323; 98 C. 461; 147 C. 194. Time required for
deliberation. 93 C. 246; 110 C. 561; 120 C. 629. Degree of murder is for jury; power of court to set aside. Id., 244; 106 C.
705. Admissibility of dying declarations. 90 C. 387; 93 C. 337. Mental tests of accused; expert testimony as to insanity;
reading medical textbooks. 96 C. 250. Conspiracy to steal; homicide in perpetration; abandonment of enterprise by some
of conspirators. 97 C. 329. Change of venue; alibi; testimony of accomplice. 98 C. 466; 105 C. 333. When witnesses should
be segregated. 103 C. 473. Premeditation is necessary for first degree murder. 106 C. 352. As to use and effect of verdict
of not guilty on ground of insanity, see 39 C. 595; 96 C. 243. Possession of a deadly weapon as bearing on existence of
malice. 109 C. 138; 110 C. 308. An inference of guilt may be drawn from failure of accused to take stand and deny facts
within his knowledge which tend to prove his guilt; 109 C. 144, 496; 108 C. 463; but failure of accused to take stand must
not be commented on. Id. In prosecution for homicide by reckless operation of an automobile, conduct of accused in
leaving victims lying in road without stopping, unexplained, supports an inference of guilt. 109 C. 494. Rule concerning
responsibility of conspirators to commit an unlawful act for a homicide by one of them in carrying it out. 126 C. 59; 132
C. 44, 45. Has not changed common-law definition of murder but provides more severe penalty when certain features are
present. 128 C. 44. Actual intent to kill not necessary in second degree murder. 131 C. 60. Jury may determine case under
original charge by finding accused guilty of a lesser offense where such a conviction is warranted and is the only one
warranted upon the evidence. 137 C. 114. Unskillful or improper treatment of wound by surgeons does not relieve defendant
of responsibility for his crime. Id. Distinction between murder and manslaughter is the presence of malice in the one and
its absence in the other. Court's charge held sufficient. 139 C. 89. Charge on intoxication and alcoholic psychosis sustained.
Id., 317. A killing in an attempted robbery is murder in the first degree even though killing itself is accidental. Id., 475.
Cited. 141 C. 656; 143 C. 167; 145 C. 60; 154 C. 272, 286. A wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder in the
first degree. 142 C. 117. Court refuses to adopt "Durham" rule. 146 C. 137. Assault with intent to rob within perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a robbery. Id., 227. Even if there is a confession, there must be extrinsic corroborative evidence
which will, when taken in connection with the confession, establish the corpus delicti in the mind of the trier beyond a
reasonable doubt. 147 C. 95. Standard to determine sanity or mental capacity of the defendant to commit murder. Id.
Adoption of Wigmore definition of "corpus delicti". Previous definitions overruled. 152 C. 15. Charge re what constitutes
malice upheld. 152 C. 81. History discussed; claim that guilty plea to second degree murder should have been taken before
three judges, that jury should have determined degree of homicide and that sentence should have been imposed by three
judges, disallowed. 153 C. 320 et seq. Absence of element of wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder in indictment for
murder in first degree justifies jury verdict of guilty of murder in second degree. 154 C. 624. Malice aforethought defined.
Id., 627. Court should have permitted defendant to change his plea where it appeared trial court's concern that defendant
be exposed to possible electrocution if found guilty on trial for first degree murder was prime basis for denial; defendant
must decide risk. 157 C. 492. Length of time necessary to form specific intent may be long or short. 158 C. 341. Voluntary
drunkenness, while no excuse for crime, may make person mentally incapable of intent of premeditation which is element
of murder in first degree. Id. Preconviction bail in capital cases is governed by section 8 of article first of constitution as
well as Sec. 54-53. Cited. 159 C. 264. Evidence produced by state was adequate to show defendants were in danger of
being convicted of capital offense under this section, hence bail could be denied under exception provided in section 8 of
article I of state constitution. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 347. Cited. 161 C. 219. Cited. 166 C. 630. Trial judges direction to jury
not coercive in context of circumstances in which given. 167 C. 408.
Where accused pleaded guilty to second degree murder, fact that court in imposing sentence did not consist of a presiding
judge and two other judges and that no witnesses were heard and that the degree of crime was not determined by a majority
of the judges did not invalidate the conviction. 20 CS 127. Cited. 26 CS 175.
Annotations to former section 53-10:
Failure of deceased to exercise due care not a defense. 110 C. 61. Act of accused need not be immediate cause of the
death. Id., 62. Cited. 139 C. 401; 141 C. 656; 150 C. 459; 152 C. 344; 154 C. 272, 275. Not retroactive. 142 C. 29.
Constitutionality of statute re recommendation for life imprisonment. 145 C. 60. Death penalty does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of eighth amendment to U. S. constitution and court will not vitiate legislative determination of punishment for crimes. 158 C. 341. Preconviction bail in capital cases is to be governed by Sec. 54-53 in light
of section 8 of article first of state constitution. 159 C. 264. Cited. 161 C. 219. Cited. 169 C. 13.
Annotations to former section 53-11:
Court had authority to impose consecutive life sentences for two second degree murders. 152 C. 600-602. Cited. 154
C. 622, 624.
Cited. 25 CS 473.
Annotation to former section 53-13:
The intentional inflicting of a wound from which death ensues within a year and a day may be either murder or manslaughter. 44 C. 540. If blow produces condition which results in death, this sufficient; reasonable doubt. 87 C. 573. By reckless
driving of automobile. 82 C. 671; 83 C. 457; 109 C. 491. One who engages with others in a common purpose to carry on
an activity in a reckless manner or with wanton disregard for the safety of others is guilty of involuntary manslaughter,
even though he is not present when the homicide occurs. 138 C. 281. Distinction between murder and manslaughter is the
presence of malice in the one and its absence in the other. 139 C. 89. Cited. 153 C. 325. Cited. 163 C. 305.
Cited. 22 CS 175; id., 497, 499; 23 CS 248; 25 CS 473; 26 CS 216; 27 CS 73. Sentence of not less than five nor more
than ten years in state prison confirmed by review division where defendant had in jealousy killed woman with whom he
lived after observing her with another man. Id., 353. Sentence of not less than five nor more than ten years should stand
where defendant entered a fight between his two companions, knocked victim to the ground and stabbed him with his
knife. Id., 370.
Annotations to former section 53-17:
What constitutes "gross negligence". 120 C. 234. Cited. 130 C. 147. Contributory negligence no defense to gross or
wilful misconduct or gross negligence. 154 C. 23. Age of accused not a criterion in determination of his gross or wilful
misconduct or his gross negligence. Id. Statute does not require actual contact between accused's vehicle and deceased or
vehicle in which deceased was riding. Id.
Cited. 25 CS 84; 26 CS 36; 27 CS 232.
Annotations to chapter 952, part IV:
Unconstitutionally broad discretion. 164 C. 162. Cited. 184 C. 597, 598.
Sec. 53a-54a et seq. cited. 45 CA 591.
Cited. 40 CS 498, 501.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 54, 55; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)
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(b) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease, mental defect or
other mental abnormality is admissible, in a prosecution under subsection (a) of this
section, on the question of whether the defendant acted with intent to cause the death
of another person.
(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of
section 53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 15, 28; P.A. 83-486, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 26.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(2), deleting reference
to death penalty imposed as provided by Sec. 53a-46a for capital felony, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 83-486 amended
Subsec. (a) by replacing "acted" with "committed the proscribed act or acts"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to add
exception for murder under Sec. 53a-54d.
See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.
See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.
Cited. 171 C. 241. Cited. 173 C. 414, 415. Cited. 176 C. 508, 509; 177 C. 1, 2, 8-10. Cited. 178 C. 450, 452, 460; Id.,
626, 627. Cited. 179 C. 1, 2; Id., 431, 432. Cited. 180 C. 141, 142. Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant
indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of
mind required is different. Id., 382, 383. Cited. Id., 589, 590. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66; Id., 388-390; Id.,
497, 498; Id., 603, 604, 606. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Cited. 186 C. 261, 262; Id., 476, 477. Cited. 188 C. 626, 629, 642.
Cited. 189 C. 303, 304, 308; Id., 346, 347. 190 C. 639, 642. Cited. 191 C. 233, 235; Id., 545, 546. Cited. 194 C. 408-411.
Cited. Id., 416, 419. Cited. Id., 483. Cited. Id., 530, 560. Cited. 195 C. 475, 476. Cited. 196 C. 667, 676. Cited. 197 C. 60,
61. Cited. Id., 180, 181. Cited. Id., 337, 340. Cited. Id., 436, 438, 460. Cited. Id., 507, 509, 522. Cited. 198 C. 124, 126.
Cited. Id., 209, 210. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 542, 543. Cited. Id., 560. Cited. Id., 573, 574. Cited. Id., 644, 646.
Cited. 199 C. 102. Cited. Id., 155, 159. Cited. Id., 163, 164, 166, 178, 179. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. Id., 718, 720. Cited.
200 C. 553, 558. Cited. 201 C. 174, 175. Cited. Id., 190, 191, 198. Cited. Id., 276, 280. Cited. Id., 368, 369. Cited. Id., 605,
606. Cited. 202 C. 18, 19. Cited. Id., 75. Cited. Id., 86, 91. Cited. Id., 316, 317. Cited. 203 C. 212, 213. Cited. Id., 641,
642. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242, 257. Cited. 205 C. 279, 280, 282. Cited. Id., 298, 300. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 616,
619. Cited. 206 C. 182, 183. Cited. Id., 213, 214. Cited. Id., 323, 325. Cited. Id., 346, 348, 349. Cited. Id., 512, 513. Cited.
Id., 678. Cited. 207 C. 374, 377. Cited. Id., 646-648. Cited. 208 C. 125, 127, 145. Cited. 209 C. 225, 229, 239. Cited. Id.,
290, 292. Cited. Id., 622, 623. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81, 106. Cited. Id., 304, 305. Cited. Id., 519, 521. Cited. Id., 631, 632.
Cited. Id., 652, 654, 696. Cited. 211 C. 215, 216. Cited. Id., 289, 292, 296, 316. Cited. Id., 441, 442. Cited. 212 C. 325,
326. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 612, 613. Cited. 213 C. 97, 98. Cited. Id., 243, 244, 255. Cited. Id., 388, 389. Cited.
Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 579, 580. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. Id., 708, 721. Cited. 214 C. 57, 59. Cited. Id., 77, 78, 82.
Cited. Id., 118. Cited. Id., 454, 457. Cited. Id., 476, 477. Cited. Id., 493, 495. Cited. Id., 616, 617. Cited. 215 C. 231, 232,
253. Cited. Id., 277, 278, 281. Cited. 215 C. 570, 579, 580. Cited. Id., 646-648. Cited. Id., 695, 697. Cited. Id., 739, 742.
Cited. 216 C. 139, 140, 142, 148, 149. Cited. Id., 188, 189. Cited. Id., 282, 296. Cited. Id., 301, 302. Cited. Id., 585, 602.
Cited. Id., 699, 710, 718. Cited. 218 C. 349, 350. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. Id., 714, 717. Cited. 219 C. 16, 20. Cited. Id.,
596, 597. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. Id., 270, 272. Cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 602-604, 606.
Cited. Id., 765, 767, 771, 774. Cited. 221 C. 58, 59. Cited. Id., 93, 94. Cited. Id., 109, 111, 112. Cited. 222 C. 506, 510.
Cited. 223 C. 273, 274. Cited. Id., 674, 675, 678. Cited. 224 C. 63, 64. Cited Id., 168, 171. Cited. Id., 372, 373, 378. Cited.
225 C. 55, 56, 74. Cited. Id., 114, 116, 120. Cited. Id., 524-526. Cited. Id., 609, 610. Cited. 226 C. 20, 28. Cited. Id., 237,
238. Cited. Id., 497, 499. Cited. 227 C. 231, 233. Cited. Id., 301, 302, 309-311, 316, 318-320. Cited. Id., 417, 419. Cited.
Id., 456, 457, 476. Cited. Id., 566, 567. Cited. 228 C. 62, 76. Cited. Id., 118, 128. Cited. Id., 281, 282, 303. Cited. Id., 412,
414. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 328, 333. Cited. Id., 691, 694, 701. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited.
Id., 115, 116. Cited. Id., 235, 237. Cited. 233 C. 44, 51. Cited. Id., 215, 216. Cited. 234 C. 139, 142. Cited. Id., 324, 334,
339, 350. Cited. Id., 381, 382. Cited. Id., 683, 684. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209. Cited. Id., 274, 275, 322. Cited. Id., 397, 398.
Cited. Id., 413, 414. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. 236 C. 189, 196. Failure of trial court to instruct jury on extreme emotional
disturbance was error; judgment of appellate court affirming judgment of trial court in State v. Person, 36 CA 448 reversed,
Id., 342, 351. Affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cited. Id. Cited. Id., 514, 516, 517. Cited. 237 C. 58,
59. Cited. Id., 339, 340. Cited. Id., 364, 368. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 694. Under appropriate circumstances defendant
can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, the same person; judgment of appellate court
in State v. Williams, 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id., 588. Cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 481. Cited.
240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 727. Cited. Id., 743. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 605. Cited.
Id., 666. Cited. 247 C. 318. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional
facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration was insufficient to support
a conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 181, 184. Cited. Id., 223, 224. Cited. Id., 470, 472. Cited. 10 CA 357. Cited. 12 CA 32, 33. Cited. Id.,
217. Cited. 17 CA 502, 504; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. Id., 602, 623. Cited. 19 CA 111, 144; judgment
reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 440-442. Cited. Id., 609, 612. Cited. Id., 674, 675, 682. Cited. 22 CA 669, 670.
Cited. 24 CA 115, 116. Cited. Id., 244, 245. Cited. Id., 692, 693. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Cited. Id., 433, 444. Cited. Id.,
456, 461. Cited. 26 CA 259, 260, 262, 265. Cited. 27 CA 1-3. Cited. Id., 520, 521. Cited. 28 CA 416. Cited. Id., 548, 549,
556. Cited. Id., 425, 426. Cited. Id., 608, 609, 611. Cited. Id., 771, 772, 774. Cited. 29 CA 386, 388. Cited. Id., 452, 453.
Cited. Id., 499, 501, 504. Cited. 30 CA 677, 679, 681. Cited. 32 CA 170, 172. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. Id., 763. Cited.
34 CA 103, 104. Cited. Id., 317, 318. Cited. 35 CA 438, 439, 444, 447. Cited. Id., 541, 543. Cited. Id., 762, 763. Cited. 36
CA 250, 251. Cited. Id., 345, 346. Cited. Id., 364, 365, 370, 371. Cited. Id., 448, 449; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342
et seq. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. Id., 506, 507. Cited. Id., 516, 517. Cited. Id., 556, 558. Cited. 37 CA 749, 750, 754.
Cited. 38 CA 371, 374. Cited. Id., 434, 435. Cited. 39 CA 18, 19, 23; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Cited. Id.,
242-244, 252. Cited. Id., 224-226, 236. Cited. Id., 632, 633. Cited. 40 CA 151, 163. Cited. Id., 318, 322. Cited. Id., 387,
388. Cited. 41 CA 604, 613. Cited. Id., 809. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 549. Cited. 44
CA 6. Cited. Id., 70. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 476. Cited. Id., 790. Cited. 45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 261.
Cited. Id., 584. Cited. 46 CA 216. Cited. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 578. Cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id., 684. Cited. Id., 734. Evidence
was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to conclude that defendant intended to cause victim's death. 55 CA 469. It is
possible to commit attempted murder without creating risk of any physical injury to another person. 56 CA 592. Failure
of trial court to inform defendant of intent requirement under statute not plain error. 65 CA 234.
Cited. 40 CS 38. Cited. Id., 498, 500. Cited. 42 CS 10, 11. Cited. Id., 426, 427, 432. Cited. 43 CS 367, 370.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 172 C. 65, 69. "Extreme emotional disturbance" guidelines. 177 C. 1, 3, 4, 7. Cited. Id., 487, 489, 491, 512.
Cited. 180 C. 171, 173, 177. Cited. 181 C. 268; Id., 284, 285; Id., 406, 408. Cited. 182 C. 66, 68; Id., 142, 168; Id., 388,
395; Id., 585, 587, 592; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on
remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had
had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.; Id., 603, 607. Cited. 184 C. 121, 122, 125. Cited. 186 C. 414, 415, 419,
422, 423; id., 574-576, 585, 586. Cited. 187 C. 6, 8. Cited. 189 C. 303, 304, 306. Cited. 190 C. 219, 233. Cited. 191 C.
27, 28. Cited. 192 C. 700. Cited. 193 C. 474, 475. Cited. Id., 646, 667. Cited. 194 C. 376, 380, 383, 387. Cited. Id., 392,
393. Cited. Id., 416, 418. Cited. Id., 530, 559. Cited. 195 C. 166, 167, 170. Cited. Id., 232, 233. Cited. Id., 651, 652, 655.
Cited. 196 C. 557, 558. Cited. 197 C. 106-108. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. 198 C. 53, 62. Cited. Id., 77, 79. Cited. 199 C.
102, 104. Cited. 200 C. 224, 225. Cited. Id., 553-555, 560. Cited. Id., 607, 608. Cited. Id., 642, 643, 650. Cited. Id., 743,
744. Charge on this defense was inadequate under the circumstances. 201 C. 174-176, 179, 180. Cited. Id., 244, 245. Cited.
Id., 368, 372, 373. Cited. Id., 534, 535. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 429, 430. Cited. 204 C. 207, 208. Cited. Id., 259,
260. Cited. 205 C. 370, 371. Cited. Id., 578. Cited. Id., 723, 724. Cited. 206 C. 229, 231, 239. Cited. Id., 300, 301. Cited.
Id., 391, 392. Cited. 207 C. 374, 385. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. Id., 455, 456. Cited. 209 C. 596, 597. Cited. 210 C.
481, 483. Cited. Id., 619-621. Cited. 211 C. 441, 442. Cited. 212 C. 258, 259. Cited. Id., 351, 352. Cited. Id., 593, 594.
Cited. 213 C. 708, 710, 711. Cited. 214 C. 122, 123. Cited. Id., 146, 147, 149. Cited. Id., 161, 162. Cited. Id., 344, 347.
Cited. Id., 540, 541. Cited. 215 C. 739, 740, 743. Cited. 216 C. 492, 493. Cited. Id., 585-587, 593. Cited. Id., 699, 701,
702, 708, 717. Cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Interpretation of section not to require reasonableness of a defendant's extreme
emotional disturbance to be determined solely from his subjective viewpoint. Id., 648, 649, 651-655, 657, 658. Cited. 218
C. 349, 351, 383. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. Id., 714, 716. Cited. Id., 747, 748. Cited. Id., 766-768. Cited. 219 C. 16, 17,
19. Cited. Id., 234, 235. Cited. Id., 295, 296. Cited. 220 C. 285, 298. Cited. Id., 385, 388. Cited. Id., 408. Cited. 221 C.
128, 129. Cited. Id., 430, 431. Cited. 222 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 506, 508. Cited. Id., 718-720, 725, 726. Cited. 223 C. 41, 42,
44. Cited. Id., 127, 128. Cited. Id., 207, 209. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 384-386. Cited. Id., 411, 412. Cited. Id., 535,
537. Cited. Id., 635, 637. Cited. 224 C. 196, 197. Cited. Id., 325, 326. Cited. 225 C. 114, 116, 118, 122, 127. Cited. Id.,
609, 610, 627. Cited. 226 C. 237, 253. Cited. 227 C. 301, 309. Cited. Id., 389, 391. Cited. Id., 448, 449. Cited. 228 C. 62,
63. Cited. Id., 118, 119. Cited. Id., 384, 385. Cited. 229 C. 328, 329. Cited. 230 C. 183, 223. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited.
232 C. 537, 538. Cited. 233 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 106, 108. Cited. Id., 174, 189. Cited. Id., 517. Cited. Id., 813, 815. Cited.
235 C. 206, 209, 251. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 413, 414. Cited. 236 C. 189, 191, 202. Cited. Id., 342, 343, 345, 356.
Cited. Id., 388, 390. Cited. 237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 253. Cited. Id., 313. Cited. 239 C. 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id.,
395. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 322. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. Id., 665. Cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 485. Cited. 243 C. 205.
Term "death" as used in Penal Code includes irreversible cessation of functioning of brain. 244 C. 761. Section incorporates
the doctrine of transferred intent and holds both a principal and an accomplice liable for death of an unintended victim.
253 C. 354. Re jury charge on extreme emotional disturbance, it was proper for trial court to refuse to instruct jury to
consider defendant's unique mental and emotional characteristics and impact of those characteristics on defendant since
the statute incorporates a standard that is objective as to its overview, but subjective as to the defendant's belief. 261 C.
336. Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set forth in section 53a-55(a)(1). 262 C. 453.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 182. Cited. Id., 367, 370. Cited. Id., 457-459. Cited. 8 CA 496, 497, 504-506. Cited. Id., 147, 148;
judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278 et seq. Cited. Id., 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Cited. 10 CA 697,
699. Cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Cited. Id., 628, 630. Cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Cited. 21 CA 801. Cited. 22 CA 199, 201. Cited. Id.,
507, 508. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 23 CA 692, 693. Cited. 24 CA 624, 625, 627. Cited. Id., 692, 693. Cited. 25 CA 433,
434. Cited. 26 CA 242-245. Cited. Id., 259, 260. Cited. 27 CA 73, 74, 92. Cited. Id., 403, 404. Cited. Id., 643, 644. Cited.
28 CA 231, 238. Cited. Id., 416. Cited. Id., 469. Cited. 29 CA 499, 501. Cited. 29 CA 573, 574. Cited. 30 CA 406, 407;
judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 385, 386. Cited. 32 CA 438-440. Cited. Id., 687, 689. Cited. Id.,
759, 761. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. Id., 122, 123. Cited. Id., 782, 783. Cited. 34 CA 58, 59, 93; judgment reversed, see
232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 96, 97; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 317, 318, 321. Cited. Id., 368,
369; see also 233 C. 517 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 153. Cited. Id., 374, 375; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413 et
seq. Cited. Id., 541, 543. Cited. 36 CA 336, 337. Cited. Id., 364, 365. Cited. Id., 417, 418. Cited. Id., 516, 517. Cited. Id.,
805, 806. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Cited. 37 CA 252, 253; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 388 et seq. Cited. Id., 404, 405, 414.
Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. Id., 749, 753. Cited. 38 CA 371, 374. Cited. 39 CA 18, 19, 24; judgment reversed, see 237 C.
748 et seq. Cited. Id., 224, 238. Cited. 40 CA 47, 48. Cited. Id., 60, 61. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited.
Id., 470, 471. Cited. 41 CA 361, 362, 365-367. Cited. Id., 495. Cited. Id., 515, 517. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 555.
Cited. 43 CA 252. Cited. Id., 830. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 198. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 338. Cited. Id., 790. Cited.
45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 297. Cited. 46 CA 216. Cited. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 600. Cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id.,
684. Statute sets forth a standard that is objective in its overview, but subjective as to defendant's belief. 48 CA 784. Trial
court's instruction re extreme emotional disturbance defense was proper. 55 CA 469. Cited. 57 CA 734.
Subsection must be read without the word "affirmative". The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements of the offense charged without imposing any burden on the defendant. 33 CS 28, 81. Unborn not included in
definition of "person". 40 CS 498, 499. Cited re ineffective counsel claim. 46 CS 344.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 603, 606. Evidence of mental capacity admissible when defendant is charged with commission of crime
under which state must prove defendant acted recklessly. 195 C. 232, 240, 241. Cited. 218 C. 349, 351, 379.
Cited. 17 CA 602, 623. Cited. 44 CA 70.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 180 C. 171, 173. Cited. 181 C. 151, 153. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151, 153. Cited. Id., 350, 352. Cited. 194 C. 376,
380, 383. Cited. Id., 392, 393. Cited. Id., 416, 418. Cited. Id., 530, 559, 560. Cited. 196 C. 655, 661, 662. Cited. 200 C.
721, 722. Cited. 201 C. 244, 245. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 401. Cited. 205 C. 616, 619. Cited. Id., 638-640. Cited. 214 C. 378,
385. Cited. 216 C. 282, 285, 294, 295. Cited. 218 C. 486, 488.
Cited erroneously as Sec. 53a-54(c). 41 CA 530, 532.
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(P.A. 73-137, S. 3; P.A. 77-604, S. 39, 84; 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 80-335; P.A. 85-144; P.A. 92-260, S. 27; P.A.
95-16, S. 4; P.A. 98-126, S. 1; P.A. 00-99, S. 120, 154; P.A. 01-84, S. 10, 26; 01-151, S. 3, 5.)
History: P.A. 77-604 substituted "chief inspector or inspector in the division of criminal justice" for "county detective"
in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January
1, 1979; P.A. 80-335 added Subdivs. (7) and (8) making murder in course of committing sexual assault in first degree and
murder of two or more persons at same time a capital felony; P.A. 85-144 amended Subdiv. (6) by adding "economic"
and deleting the proviso that the seller was not, at the time of such sale, a drug-dependent person; P.A. 92-260 made
technical changes in Subdivs. (1) and (3); P.A. 95-16 added Subdiv. (9) re murder of a person under sixteen years of age;
P.A. 98-126 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace "an official of the Department of Correction authorized by the Commissioner
of Correction to make arrests in a correctional institution or facility" with "an employee of the Department of Correction
or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of
his employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility";
P.A. 00-99 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace reference to sheriff and deputy sheriff with provision re state marshal exercising
statutory authority and judicial marshal in performance of duties, effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-84 replaced "fireman" with "firefighter" and made other technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001; P.A.
01-151 amended Subdiv. (1) to include the murder of a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by
the Commissioner of Environmental Protection under the provisions of Sec. 26-5, deleted former Subdiv. (6) re the illegal
sale, for economic gain, of cocaine, heroin or methadone to a person who dies as a direct result of the use of such cocaine,
heroin or methadone, redesignating existing Subdivs. (7), (8) and (9) as Subdivs. (6), (7) and (8), and made technical
changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.
See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.
See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.
Cited. 194 C. 416, 418. Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. 199 C. 163, 174, 177, 178. Cited. 201 C. 276, 288. Cited. 211 C.
289, 296. Cited. 215 C. 570, 581. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 218 C. 486, 488. Cited. 230 C. 183, 188, 201, 236. Cited.
234 C. 324, 340, 341. Cited. Id., 735, 738. Cited. 235 C. 206. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id., 828.
Cited. 240 C. 727. Cited. 241 C. 702. Cited. 242 C. 409. Murder in the course of kidnapping does not require ransom;
murder in the course of sexual assault includes murder to prevent victim from becoming a witness; denial of a bill of
particulars on aggravating factors did not deny fair hearing; meaning of "heinous" and "depraved" discussed; "heinous,
cruel or depraved" as a unitary rather than three separate factors discussed; statute complies with the eighth and fourteenth
amendments; statutory construction and precedent support conclusion that the burden of persuasion applies to both elements
of mitigation; proportionality review still available in this case despite repeal of requirement. 251 C. 285.
Cited. 32 CA 38, 40. Cited. 36 CA 364-366, 370, 377, 378. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. 43 CA 549. Cited. 45 CA 207.
Cited 42 CS 426, 427.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Conviction for felony murder under Sec. 53a-54c cannot serve as the predicate murder
for the crime of capital felony under this section; term "murder" in capital felony statute may be applied only to intentional
murder. 241 C. 702. In order to satisfy the element that police officer had been "acting within the scope of his duties", the
state was only required to prove that police officer was acting in the good faith discharge of his official duties when he
stopped defendant and attempted to subdue him. 264 C. 1.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (2):
Capital felony murder discussed. 199 C. 163, 164, 173, 174, 176, 178. Cited. 203 C. 420-422, 424. Cited. 215 C. 570,
576-578, 581-583. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 19 CA 111, 144; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 234 C. 324-326, 329, 331, 334, 336, 338, 339, 341, 343, 347, 349, 350. Cited. 238 C. 828.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 616, 617. Cited. 45 CA 390.
Subdiv. (4):
Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342.
Subdiv. (5):
Cited. 197 C. 436, 439, 461. Cited. 213 C. 388, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 195, 200-202, 228. Cited. 234 C. 324,
341, 342. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 242 C. 409. Provision does not require that kidnapping be accompanied by a demand
for ransom. 249 C. 645. Trial court properly instructed jury that its verdict of guilty on charge of intentional murder would
provide the predicate for criminal liability under subsection. 263 C. 478.
Cited. 36 CA 364, 378. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 230 C. 183, 201. Cited. 233 C. 174, 189. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 238 C. 828. State need only prove
that the murder in a kidnap-murder or sexual-assault murder was aggravated in order to establish the aggravating factor.
269 C. 213.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 205 C. 298, 299. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 229. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Cited. 242 C. 409. Double jeopardy clause not violated where defendant convicted for two counts of capital felony. Evidence
indicated that the murders occurred in two sets, at distinctly separate times. 260 C. 339.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (8):
Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. 206 C. 213, 214. Cited. 207 C. 374, 377. Cited. 208 C. 125, 127, 145. Cited. 209 C. 225,
230, 239. Cited. 212 C. 258, 259. Cited. 213 C. 708, 711. Cited. 216 C. 699, 701. Cited. 218 C. 349-351. Cited. 221 C.
430, 431. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 195. Cited. 233 C. 813, 815. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited.
235 C. 206, 209. Only an intentional murder can be a predicate murder to capital felony charge under this section. 238 C.
828. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 93. Proper construction to be given to term "in the course of a single
transaction" is that there need only be some nexus between murders, that the murders be connected by a common purpose
or plan in order to be "in the course of a single transaction". Does not require murders to be at the same time in order to
constitute "in the course of a single transaction". Temporal relationship between murders is not an absolute prerequisite
to prosecution under subsection. 254 C. 578. Read together, Sec. 53a-54(a) and this subdiv. provide that conviction of
intentional murder under doctrine of transferred intent may be the predicate for conviction of capital felony under this
subdiv. when victim is under sixteen, regardless of defendant's subjective state of mind. 265 C. 35. Knowledge of the
victim's age is not an element of this subdiv. Id. To limit applicability of subdiv. to cases in which state can prove that
defendant knew or reasonably should have known the age of his victim would be both impracticable and inconsistent with
the legislative intent. Id.
Cited. 36 CA 364, 365, 377, 380. Cited. 38 CA 581, 582. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
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(P.A. 74-186, S. 11, 12; P.A. 76-336, S. 21; P.A. 79-570, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 28.)
History: P.A. 76-336 replaced rape in first degree, deviate sexual intercourse in first degree and sexual contact in first
degree with sexual assault in first degree, sexual assault in first degree with firearm, sexual assault in third degree and
sexual assault in third degree with firearm; P.A. 79-570 removed murder resulting from commission of or attempt to
commit arson from purview of section; P.A. 92-260 replaced obsolete reference to offense of "sexual assault in the first
degree with a firearm" with revised name of "aggravated sexual assault in the first degree"; (Revisor's note: In 1995 the
indicators (A), (B), (C) and (D) were changed editorially by the Revisors to (1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively for consistency
with statutory usage).
See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.
See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.
Cited. 171 C. 683, 687. Cited. 176 C. 257, 258. Cited. 177 C. 677, 679. Cited. 178 C. 116, 118. Cited. 179 C. 78-80.
Court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on lesser offenses of first degree burglary and first degree robbery since element
of causation, which differentiates felony murder from the lesser offenses, was not sufficiently in dispute. 180 C. 599, 601,
602, 604. Cited. 181 C. 151, 153; id., 187, 188. Cited. 182 C. 419, 420; id., 580. Cited (1975 revision). 183 C. 299, 300,
311. Cited. 186 C. 1, 2, 7. Cited. 188 C. 542, 543, 545, 550. Cited. 189 C. 346, 347. Cited. 191 C. 636, 638-641, 644; id.,
659-663. Cited. 193 C. 70, 72, 75. Cited. Id., 144, 145, 151. Cited. Id., 350, 352. Cited. 194 C. 223, 224. Cited. Id., 279,
285. Cited. Id., 416, 419. Cited. Id., 530, 559, 565. Cited. 195 C. 505, 506. Manslaughter is not a lesser included crime
otherwise of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 423, 429. Cited. 197 C. 396, 397, 401. Cited. Id., 436, 438, 460. Cited. Id., 588,
591. Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. Id., 255, 256, 269. Cited. Id., 386, 387. Cited. Id., 397, 399. Cited. Id., 435, 436. Cited.
Id., 506, 507, 515. Cited. Id., 517, 518, 537. Cited. Id., 638. Cited. Id., 644, 646. Cited. 199 C. 110, 111. Cited. 200 C. 323,
324, 336. Cited. Id., 721. Cited. 201 C. 34, 35, 37. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 399, 401, 416-418. Cited. Id., 462, 464, 465. Cited.
202 C. 18, 19, 21, 24, 26. Cited. Id., 39, 40. Cited. 203 C. 4-6. Cited. Id., 212, 213, 217, 239, 243. Cited. 204 C. 377-379,
385, 387. Cited. 205 C. 298, 300. Cited. Id., 485, 486. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 616, 619. Cited. Id., 638-640. Cited.
206 C. 157, 158. Cited. Id., 657, 667. Cited. 207 C. 1, 2, 12, 13. Cited. 208 C. 52, 54. Cited. 209 C. 34, 35. Cited. Id., 75,
76, 78. Cited. Id., 290-292. Cited. Id., 564, 565. Cited. Id., 636, 637. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81. Cited. Id., 652, 654, 696, 697.
Cited. Id., 751, 752. Cited. 211 C. 289, 296. Cited. 212 C. 387, 389. Cited. 213 C. 388, 389. Cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Cited.
Id., 454, 457. Cited. Id., 493-495, 501. Cited. 215 C. 695, 698. Cited. 216 C. 282-285, 293, 295-297. Cited. Id., 367, 368.
Cited. Id., 699, 700, 708, 710, 715, 717-719, 726. Cited. 218 C. 85, 87. Cited. Id., 151, 152. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited.
Id., 447, 448. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. 219 C. 743, 744. Cited. 220 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 385, 386, 388. Cited. Id., 417, 418,
420, 426, 428, 429, 431. Cited. 221 C. 315, 316. Cited. Id., 635-637. Cited. Id., 643, 644, 666, 668. Cited. Id., 685, 687.
Cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Cited. 223 C. 299, 301. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. Id., 635, 637. Cited. Id., 834-836. Cited. 225
C. 270, 271, 277. Cited. Id., 347, 348, 350-352. Cited. 227 C. 101, 102. Cited. 229 C. 691, 694. Cited. 230 C. 88, 90. Cited.
Id., 183, 201, 224. Cited. Id., 351, 352, 354, 362. Cited. 233 C. 44, 52. Cited. 234 C. 97, 98. Cited. 235 C. 595, 596. Cited.
Id., 748, 749. Cited. Id., 802-804. Cited. 237 C. 390, 392. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 694. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id.,
828. Cited. 240 C. 727. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 322. Conviction for felony murder under this section cannot serve as
predicate for the crime of capital felony under Sec. 53a-54b(1). Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 93. Cited. Id., 125. Cited. Id., 409.
Cited. Id., 666. Cited. 247 C. 662. It is inconsistent with purpose of this statute to allow defendant who causes a death in
the course of a felony to claim self-defense because victim attempted to thwart the felony. 254 C. 184. The defense of self-defense does not apply to charge of felony murder as a matter of law. Id., 202.
Cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Cited. 12 CA 385. Cited. 24 CA 723. Cited. 27 CA 794, 795. Cited. 29 CA 573, 574. Cited. Id.,
771, 772. Cited. 30 CA 381, 383. Cited 31 CA 771, 773; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 88-90, 92, 94. Cited. 32 CA 38,
40. Cited. Id., 431-433. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. 35 CA 762, 766. Cited. 36 CA 364, 365, 370, 375. Cited. Id., 506,
507. Cited. Id., 556, 558. Cited. 38 CA 581, 582. Cited. 41 CA 515-517. Self-defense not available as a defense to charge
of felony murder. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 472. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. 45 CA 32. Cited. Id., 187. Cited. Id., 390. Cited. Id.,
658. Reaffirmed prior holding that self-defense not a valid defense to charge of felony murder. 51 CA 798. Court rejects
defendant's argument that killing of victim who resisted a robbery attempt by walking away is not committed "in the course
of and in furtherance of" the attempted robbery because the attempted robbery had ceased. 64 CA 596.
Cited. 36 CS 141. Cited. 41 CS 385-387. Cited 42 CS 426, 427.
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(P.A. 79-570, S. 1.)
Cited. 191 C. 636, 644. Does not violate defendant's right to due process and equal protection. 196 C. 655-665. Cited.
Id., 667, 668, 670, 675. "... when two or more persons are the victims of a single episode there are as many offenses as
there are victims." 198 C. 92-94, 103, 110. Cited. 204 C. 377, 386. Cited. 210 C. 22. Cited. Id., 519, 526. Cited. 211 C.
258, 283, 284. Cited. Id., 289, 296. Cited. 213 C. 161, 162. Cited. 214 C. 378, 385. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 237 C.
694. Cited. 238 C. 828. Cited. 240 C. 727. Cited. 241 C. 702.
Cited. 41 CA 476, 478, 479.
Cited. 42 CS 426, 427.
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